The lighter side of secessionism

There has been plenty of serious discussion from all quarters - not to mention overblown posturing from some - about Kosovo's declaration of independence. Heck, even here at Scraps of Moscow I have been unable to resist posting on the subject from time to time (though not because it should necessarily have any relevance or precedential value for the resolution of the other unresolved conflicts). But there is also a lighter side to the struggle of unrecognized states, de facto states, microstates and other secessionist entities for legitimacy.

For example, shortly after Kosovo's "UDI," snarky DC gossip site Wonkette - in a tongue-in-cheek style which was intended to ape American provincialism but really just confirms a sort of knowing indifference which may be worse than ignorance - posted a rundown of the other spots on the globe vying to be next:

The Foreigns Present: Your Guide To The Hellholes

Those crazy Kosovars! Their little declaration of independence has caused quite the shitstorm — not just among the great powers who are wrangling over whether to recognize them or not, but among the world’s other pissant quasi-countries, who are mad that they didn’t get to do it first....This week, The Foreigns will take you on a tour of the world’s saddest unrecognized not-countries.

The territories profiled were "TRANSNISTRIA: Come for the heroin, stay for the whores"; "NORTHERN CYPRUS: Maybe this 'independence' thing wasn’t such a hot idea"; "SOMALILAND: Proving that 'hellhole' is a relative term"; "ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA: Sometimes pawns are just happy to be in the game"; and "WESTERN SAHARA FREE ZONE: Sand, sand sand!"

The highlights of the comments section:

Bill Clinton: "Transnistria? I think I caught that from a New Orleans hooker once."

And:

"because nothing could possibly go wrong for you when your enormous neighbor is playing games with your sovereignty for its own larger geopolitical purposes!"

Huh. I have that EXACT phrase on my license plate holder.

But the real impetus for this rundown was not a month-and-a-half-old Wonkette post. No, it was my good fortune in happening upon a hilarious episode of Family Guy entitled E Peterbus Unum. Here is Wikipedia's plot synopsis:

Peter declares his house to be the new microstate of "Petoria." He spends a night in Quahog insulting Horace (at The Druken Clan) and bringing beer out into the streets, stepping on grass that can't be touched, and violating numerous laws such as littering, sexual harassment, and vandalism. He flaunts his diplomatic immunity by singing a parody of MC Hammer's song "U Can't Touch This" and mentions that he can’t be sued by Hammer.

Snubbed at the United Nations, Peter follows the advice of a diplomat from Iraq and annexes Joe's pool, calling it "Joe-hio." Days later, when Chris tries to go to school, he is turned away because the US Army surrounds and blockades the nation of Petoria with tanks and missiles as part of "Operation: Desert Clam." Further, all electricity and water has been cut and Lois home schools the kids.

Sadly, this is not one of the few Family Guy episodes that have been made available on the TV companies' new video site Hulu. But you can watch MC Hammer parody, "U Can't Touch Me," on YouTube, at least for now:

The idea of being "untouchable" - more commonly known as immunity - as well as a general bad-ass complex, seems like it could be common among the leaders of would-be states. The Family Guy parody calls to mind a story I heard from someone who'd had occasion to meet with Igor Smirnov, the de facto leader of Transnistria. Apparently Smirnov keeps a safe full of gold coins in his office, and when he wants to convince his interlocutor of the fact that he is both independent of Russia and not susceptible to Western inducements, he shows off his hoard.

The last bit of comic relief I wanted to share is about Kosovo, from a Wall Street Journal article last week:

Freedom's Ring: Kosovo Covets A Dialing Code

By CHRISTOPHER RHOADS
March 27, 2008; Page A1

Kosovo, which a month ago declared independence from Serbia, is working on a constitution. One problem: On the front page of the latest draft, the government phone number is Serbian.

....Kosovo has a problem, because it isn't a member of the U.N., and only countries that are can get their own dialing codes. So, land-line calls into Kosovo still must use the exchange, +381, of a group that many Kosovars detest: the Serbs.

"Every country's independence rests on certain pillars," says Anton Berisha, chief telecom regulator of Kosovo, a land of two million a little larger than Delaware. "One of them is a country dialing code."

Matters so mundane aren't usually considered the stuff of patriotic fervor. But in Kosovo during the past tumultuous decade, the battle for telephone autonomy has led to the ouster of the head of a telecom company, the dismantling of cell towers built by a Serbian company and two assassination attempts, one using a rocket launcher.

"I was not prepared for this kind of debate," says Mr. Berisha, the target of both attacks, which occurred last year. He now travels only with police escort.

In fact, dialing codes have figured in nationalist movements before, from the Palestinian territories and Taiwan to Catalonia and Sudan. "Even if it doesn't make sense, people are attaching more weight to having a dialing code," says Richard Hill, whose duties include distributing dialing codes as an official at a U.N. body in Geneva, the International Telecommunication Union, or ITU.

For those of a nationalistic bent, Mr. Hill says, a dialing code can be as meaningful as a flag, a national anthem or a team in the Olympics. He declines to comment on the Kosovo situation.

Without permission from the ITU, the Palestinian phone company has struck agreements with phone companies in sympathetic Arab countries to connect calls through the Palestinian company's unofficial code, +970. Previously, calls to the Palestinian territories connected only through the Israeli dialing code, +972, which is still used by callers from many Western countries.

As for Taiwan, as it emerged as an economic power in the 1980s, it began using an unassigned calling code, +886. Taiwan, too, persuaded some foreign phone companies to send along calls with the number it preferred. The move defied China, which has long claimed Taiwan and had assigned it a regional phone prefix as a Chinese province. After years of negotiations, the ITU in 2006 officially assigned the +886 exchange to Taiwan, while still listing the island as part of China.

Foreign Exchange

Dialing codes carried little of this political baggage in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when they first grew in use and became standardized, according to Mark Cuccia, a retired library worker in Lafayette, La., who tracks phone numbers as a hobby. Creating a single list of dialing codes made it easier for international operators to connect calls, since countries often had unique phone systems.

In the 1990s, political events turned dialing codes "into a big phenomenon," Mr. Cuccia says.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early '90s led to a scramble for dialing codes by new states eager to underscore their independence. Tiny European states like Andorra and Liechtenstein, which had long shared the dialing codes of their bigger neighbors, felt compelled to get their own codes, too. Just last year, Montenegro, a former Yugoslav republic that's now independent, was granted +382.

The struggle for a Kosovo dialing code dates to as early as 1999. Bombing led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had just expelled Serb forces from Kosovo -- then a Serbian province -- and placed Kosovo under U.N. supervision.

The U.N. mission ousted the head of the Kosovo telecom operator after he bitterly opposed awarding a mobile-phone license to Monaco Telecom. His problem: Although the Monaco company had essential international roaming agreements, using the company would mean using Monaco's dialing code.

The disgruntled chief of the local telecom operator, which is called PTK, had wanted a bidder with no dialing code, so he could agitate for Kosovo's own code. But, a U.N. official told reporters at the time, PTK needed a solution that "would actually allow people to make phone calls."

Monaco Telecom began to charge PTK tens of millions of dollars in annual fees to handle Kosovar wireless calls. The deal meant that people abroad who called a cellphone user in Kosovo had to use Monaco's +377 exchange.

But that was still better than using a Serbian carrier, in the eyes of many ethnic Albanians, who are about 90% of Kosovo's population. Ethnic Serbs in Kosovo, most of whom live near the border with Serbia, can pick up signals from a Serbian carrier.

In 2005, a Kosovar delegation visited the ITU in Geneva to argue that Kosovo should get its own code, says Etrur Rrustemaj, a PTK official in the delegation who later served as chief executive officer of PTK.

Unsuccessful, Mr. Rrustemaj turned his attention instead to dismantling antennas installed by a Serbian wireless carrier in the Kosovo capital of Pristina, including one atop a PTK building.

He was careful not to destroy the antennas, just unplug them. "If I took them down, I'd be in jail for attacking minorities," he says.

In February of last year, after a muddled bidding process for Kosovo's second mobile-phone license, Kosovo declared the winner to be Slovenia Telekom. Mr. Berisha, the telecom regulator who oversaw the auction, had to consider foreign bidders, since Kosovo doesn't have its own dialing code.

Bullets Fly

One morning later that month, Mr. Berisha was riding in a car to work with his aunt and her daughter when gunmen emerged from the side of the road and opened fire on their car. No one was injured.

Just six weeks later, Mr. Berisha, by then commuting in a police vehicle with two armed officers, was attacked again. This time, one of the gunmen launched a rocket at the car. It didn't explode properly, and injured only the driver, he says.

One of the alleged attackers, later arrested, turned out to be an official of PTK, the local telecom operator. Mr. Berisha believes his attackers were upset that he had awarded a mobile-phone license to a Slovenian operator and at the prospect of new competition.

The solution, for nationalists who yearn for a Kosovo dialing code, would be U.N. recognition of Kosovo as an independent nation. But while the U.S. and more than 30 other countries recognize Kosovo's newly declared independence, U.N. membership is far from assured. Russia, which has a veto as a permanent Security Council member, has vowed to block it.

"We are forced to work with these mixed country codes, which has made our lives more difficult," says Mr. Berisha.

"Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law"

Nikolai Zlobin is a Russian analyst who has been based in DC for some time - I'm not sure if it's that exposure that makes him generally sound more sensible than the average pundit, or something else. He also has a blog, the insights of which I wish I had been reading last fall when I was pontificating and speculating in this space about the fate of the Russian throne presidency. The article below is from the newspaper Vremia Novostei, and there's a slightly longer version on his blog.

Anyway, although I don't agree with everything in this article, I enjoyed the blend of an "outside-the-box" approach to international law with a pragmatic assessment of why things went down as they did in this case, so I decided to translate it for the edification of anyone who is fascinated or frustrated with the idea of a "Kosovo precedent" - and where it might lead - but doesn't read Russian.

Kosovo will not return to Serbia, just as Abkhazia will not return to Georgia

Nikolai Zlobin, Vremia Novostei, Feb, 29, 2008

In international law there are two principles – the right of nationalities to self-determination and territorial integrity of states – that at first glance appear to contradict each other. But if an ethnic group wants to break away and create its own state, it has the right to do so. The right of an ethnic group is superior to the right of a state. But if another state seeks to annex a part of the territory of a neighboring country, then the principle of territorial integrity applies, and the international community must ensure that it is observed.

In other words, if Russia wants to annex Abkhazia, that would be a violation of international law. But if Abkhazia wants to secede from Georgia and create an independent state, then its people have the full right to do so. There have been similar cases since 1945. This is the case in Kosovo as well, which is not becoming part of another state but is trying to create its own state. Moreover, a prohibition against becoming part of another state was a condition of Kosovo’s independence. Therefore, there is no basis for comparing the situation in Kosovo with the “Munich Agreement” which gave Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland to Germany in 1938.

International law inevitably changes. The foundations of the current system were formed in the first years following World War II. This was the international law of the Cold War period, and it does not adequately reflect contemporary realities and requires serious changes. Russia should become one of the leaders in the creation of a new system of international law, which would take into account the processes of globalization and technological developments. The way to do this is to avoid clinging to the norms and procedures of the past, whatever their benefits were in their day, and to shape the future based on the realities of the present.

The UN system, created in 1946, is in need of modification. It has long since ceased to be a politically effective international organization, has turned into a humanitarian organization and has not been in a position to solve a single significant international problem for years. In addition to Kosovo, one can point to the proliferation of nuclear weapons worldwide, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and many other things taking place which conflict with the letter of international law. We need new organizations which are capable of placing the world’s development within a manageable framework, so that events will not be left to their natural course as is the case today. Russia can and should play a large role in the creation of this new system, in cooperation with the EU, the USA, China, the Arab world, and other interested parties.

The principal complaint against supporters of Kosovo’s independence is that they have violated UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of June 10, 1999. But it’s not all that simple. That resolution concerned the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which ceased to exist a few years later. Serbia is not mentioned once in the resolution. The document does not require a UN Security Council resolution to approve further changes to Kosovo’s status, and supporters of the region’s independence took advantage of this.

I consider what happened in Serbia to have been a huge and primarily human tragedy. It happened, though, not on February 17, when Kosovo declared independence; it has been going on for quite some time already. In recent months, Russia’s representatives at meetings in Washington and Brussels made terrible threats, but then on the sidelines said, “Don’t worry, Moscow won’t do anything in response.” Serbian politicians constantly took a ambiguous position, sent unclear signals, and tried to sit not just on two, but on three or four chairs at once. As a result, it was they who lost Kosovo. The task became to make sure that this tragedy didn’t become a larger tragedy, that it didn’t lead to another war in the Balkans. Between a very bad option and a very, very bad one, the former was chosen.

Kosovo won’t return to Serbia, just as Abkhazia won’t return to Georgia – no matter what they are promised, no matter how high a level of autonomy is offered, no matter what position the UN Security Council takes. At some point in the negotiations, it became clear that Kosovo and Serbia would never come to an agreement. The EU and the US decided to be realistic and take responsibility for the situation. They decided that maintaining the status quo in Kosovo would be more dangerous than disrupting it.

Serbia wants to become an EU member and to join NATO as soon as possible. Kosovo and the other Balkan states want the same things. Adherence to European norms is a powerful motivation and sets the standard of behavior for the region’s politicians. Each country wants to enjoy a quality of life such that no one would want to secede from it. Serbia was unable to achieve this. It’s essential to create a country which attracts everyone to join it and not one which makes entire regions want to break away. President Putin had good reason to speak about the importance of making Russia an attractive country. This is a more effective method of combating separatism than appeals to other states whose own problems will always be more important to them.

Kosovo independence is one of very few foreign policy issues on which the Bush Administration has followed President Clinton's line. The genuine feeling in Washington is that stability in the Balkans depends in large part on whether Serbia can become a truly democratic country which fully shares Western values. But this can't possibly happen as long as Serbia has the colossal problem of Kosovo weighing it down.

In Washington, they say that the independence of Kosovo will help Serbia to become a successful state.

Serbia's reputation in American political circles has been ruined over the course of the past decade. Many American politicians see Serbia as the main threat to European security. This is why American policy on this issue was openly anti-Serbian from the beginning and continues to be so. Unfortunately, neither Russia nor Serbia itself will be able to quickly change this situation. This situation, though, makes Washington's stance even more intransigent and increases its impatience and willingness to take drastic measures without listening to its opponents. And not only on the issue of Kosovo.

I would take issue with a couple of the points here – first, the idea of self-determination under international law is not generally considered to be the unfettered right implied by Zlobin's description. The self-determination he suggests is so broad that it sounds almost like Lenin's idea of self-determination inevitably involving a separate state. In fact, I believe the current state of international law (for whatever it's worth) is that the general right of self-determination refers first of all to the right of nations to enjoy their national language, traditions, etc., within the confines of the state they happen to find themselves in through representation in that state's government; and secession, also known as "external self-determination," is considered a remedy of last resort.

Moreover, in the case of Abkhazia, there is a fairly compelling argument to be made that the conflict was not the sort of national self-determination which the international community should seek to promote or reward by recognizing. The Abkhaz, who constituted 17% of the population of the region in 1989, managed to drive out well over 200,000 ethnic Georgians – nearly a majority of the region’s population – during the fighting in 1992-93, and even then did not become a plurality in the region.

But perhaps I’m simply falling victim to the “old thinking” that Zlobin would like to move beyond. In all seriousness, I too have found the existing international law framework to be insufficient to deal with or even at times to describe some of the aspects of the unresolved conflicts in the post-Soviet space. In any event, international law is at least to some extent based on state practice, so perhaps another Oliver Wendell Holmes quote (in addition to the one used in the title) might be applied to the situation surrounding Kosovo: “It is the merit [sic] of the common law that it decides the case first and determines the principle afterwards.”

It's interesting that as Zlobin proposes an innovative, cooperative role for Russia in formulating new international law norms, at least one other commentator is observing that Russia's use of international law is stuck in the past.

Also interesting are some - though by no means all - of the articles that made up the avalanche of commentary which followed Kosovo's declaration of independence. Here is a random selection of ones I enjoyed reading:

Christopher Borgen, the lead author of the definitive legal analysis of Transdniester's attempt at secession from Moldova, runs through the legal analysis of Kosovo independence and concludes that it is "a quintessential 'tough case,' demonstrating the ways in which political interests of states affect how the international law is given effect." Borgen rightly points out the importance of the facts of a potentially precedential case (and how narrowly they are interpreted) in drawing broader legal lessons, but he concludes that

Despite the declarations and best intentions, just saying something is "unique" may not be enough. States and commentators may need to ask why one claim of independence is purportedly unique and then consider its downstream political and legal effects. In the end, we need to keep in mind that sometimes the most effective law in politically-charged situations may be the law of unintended consequences.

Moldovan analyst Dumitru Minzarari believes there is now a "Kosovo precedent," and that it represents "a triumph of the law of the fist over international law." He also points readers of his blog to Charles Kupchan's article on the Foreign Affairs website and discusses that article at length.

Slate's Christopher Hitchens, with his usual acerbic tone, lays the blame for the ultimate outcome at the feet of Serbia:

Of course, one ought to acknowledge that this is a calamity for the Serbs and indeed an injustice in the sense of an insult to their pride and history. But the injustice was self-inflicted. I remember seeing, in Kosovo, the "settlements" for Serbs that the Milosevic regime was building in a vain effort to alter the demography. And who were the bedraggled "settlers"? The luckless Serbian civilians who had been living in the Krajina area of Croatia until their fearless leader's war of conquest for "Greater Serbia" had brought general disaster and seen them finally evicted from farms and homesteads they had garrisoned for centuries. Promised new land on colonized Albanian territory, they had been uprooted and evicted once again. Where are they now, I wonder? Perhaps stupidly stoning the McDonald's in Belgrade, and vowing fervently never to forget the lost glories of 1389, and maybe occasionally wondering where they made their original mistake.

Oh, and in lieu of tracking down a pretty picture for this post, I'll simply point out that you can track which countries have recognized Kosovo's independence here.

Russian popular opinion on the "frozen conflicts"

[image source]

The Russian Analytical Digest (RAD) is a valuable resource; each issue focuses on a different topic (almost always something highly relevant to current events) and has essays as well as polling data. A recent issue focused on the "frozen conflicts" (even as that term comes to seem less and less apt) in Georgia. The lead essay provided a good overview of the ongoing tension between Georgia and Russia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia and incorporated some of the ideas that were discussed at a recent conference on the "frozen conflicts" that I was fortunate enough to attend.

One interesting thing that the RAD often does is put together relevant polls on whatever topic the issue is covering, often using Russia's major polling outfits. Even though one of them has been compromised after its director received an award from Putin for his work during the recent election campaign, their polls are still probably the best ways to follow the changes in Russian public opinion over a span of years. Here are a few of RAD's graphical summaries of their polling data on Abkhazia and South Ossetia (click on them to enlarge if you can't read the fine print):

[original source - Levada Center]

[original source - VTsIOM]

Russia's third major polling agency, FOM, also had a report in early April about the situation surrounding Abkhazia, with some interesting analysis about the changes in Russian public opinion about the secessionist region over the years:

And how have the events in Kosovo affected Russians' attitudes toward the Abkhazian problem? Reference to the example of Kosovo is encountered fairly rarely among the arguments advanced by those in favor of recognizing Abkhazia's independence - in just 2% of the responses: "how is it any worse than Kosovo?"; "America recognized Kosovo, and we need to recognize Abkhazia"; "in connection with Kosovo - likewise." [these are quotations from FOM's respondents]

There is, however, another number, which obviously demonstrates that the events in Kosovo have put Russians noticeably on guard. Since October 2006, the portion of our fellow citizens who believe that Russia should recognize Abkhazia's independence has declined by 12% - from 51% to 39%. Correspondingly, the percentage of respondents who found this question difficult to answer increased from 30 to 45%. The answers to the free-form questions prevent us from concluding that support in Russia for Georgian sovereignty over the region has increased. More likely, we should conclude that solidarity with Serbia and feelings of sympathy for the "brother Slavs" related to their loss of Kosovo forced some Russians to begin to doubt whether it is desirable or acceptable to promote separatist tendencies wherever they may arise - including in Georgia.

The FOM question discussed in the bit I translated above was worded as follows (the graphic is from the same report):

In 1999, Abkhazia declared its statehood and independence [from Georgia]. Other countries have not recognized Abkhazia's independence. Do you think that Russia should or should not recognize Abkhazia's independence?

(left column - should [recognize]; center - should not [recognize]; right column - difficult to say)

(blue - July 29-30, 2006; purple - Oct. 7-8, 2006; yellow - March 29-30, 2008)

The latest chapter (or perhaps the latest paragraph in the latest chapter) in this very long story would seem to be this report.

A bit dated but still interesting

[image source]

I decided to type up my notes from a talk I went to a month ago (on April 22) titled, “Recent Russian Policies in Georgia: How Should the West Respond?” and presented by the Johns Hopkins SAIS Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. You can listen to the audio from the event here and read a more timely write-up of the event here. The account below is as close to a transcript as I could come without listening to the recording. I have added some minimal editorializing in the footnotes at the very end.

The first speaker was David Bakradze, the Georgian Foreign Minister, former Conflict Resolution Minister, Saakashvili’s campaign manager, who at the time was about to leave his position as Foreign Minister to head up the United National Movement party list in the parliamentary elections. He was scheduled to go to the UN the following day for meetings about the “recent developments” under discussion.

Remarks by Georgian Foreign Minister David Bakradze

Bakradze outlined what Georgia saw as three factors behind the change in Russia’s policy toward Abkhazia. The first factor was the prospect of NATO membership and the fact that the compromise between supporters and skeptics about Georgia’s and Ukraine’s candidacies at the Bucharest summit put the two countries in a situation where they “became members but still need to become members.” Second was the reaction to Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), and third was the power transition in Russia from Putin to Medvedev.

Regarding NATO, Moscow saw the outcome of the Bucharest summit as a mixed signal – the fact that Georgia and Ukraine did not receive Membership Action Plans seemed like a Russian victory, but then they were confused by the apparent open door and want to prevent Georgian and Ukrainian membership. Between now and December, according to Bakradze, will be a “grey zone” of increased risk for Georgia. Russia is interested in delaying a decision on Georgian NATO membership, and increased Russian pressure on Georgia should be anticipated. This is Russia’s window of opportunity to prevent Georgian NATO membership.

Georgia sees two results of Kosovo’s UDI. First, people in Moscow now believe they have the moral high ground vis-à-vis the US and the EU with respect to the frozen conflicts and that new steps are now possible. Second, Kosovo can be understood as a new kind of case re-establishing the idea of spheres of influence – Russia can draw the conclusion that if the US and EU can do what they want in the Balkans, Russia can do what it wants in the “near abroad.”

The political transition in Russia is “painful” and change-generating. The time before the new president comes to power is a time to make decisions which might be difficult for the new president to make. The interregnum is thus a window of opportunity for “unfinished business.”

Bakradze then described the recent steps taken by Russia intensifying the process of de facto Russian control and integration of Abkhazia as a chain of small events. One component was the legal component outlined in President Putin’s decree of April 16. Under this decree, the Russian government is to start direct cooperation with Abkhazian organs of government. This is the first time Russia has formally “attacked Georgia’s jurisdiction” over Abkhazia and represents a new and “very dangerous component” of Russian policy. It constitutes a very big step toward practical absorption of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Russia.

Bakradze emphasized that the de facto government structures with which Russia is cooperating in Abkhazia were formed as a result of the ethnic cleansing of Georgians from the region. Accepting the legitimacy of these structures amounts to the legitimization of the results of ethnic cleansing and is a very dangerous development which removes the chances of the Georgian internally displaced persons (IDPs) to return home. This is a new reality which could change the situation on the ground, as Georgia may not be able to control the situation with the IDPs.[1] Bakradze estimated the population of Abkhazia today as consisting of 45,000 Abkhaz, 45,000 Russians and Armenians, and roughly 50,000 Georgians.[2]

The changes in Russian policy have had a military component as well, which was part of Russia’s decision in March to withdraw from the trade restrictions and sanctions imposed by the CIS in 1996.[3] Bakradze noted that Georgia had never stopped humanitarian intercourse with Abkhazia, rather the 1996 document prohibited a military buildup but allowed ties and communications with other countries through Georgia.

Russia has now freed its hands to establish an increased military presence in Abkhazia, as evidenced by the recent downing of the Georgian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Bakradze explained that the Georgian UAV had been deployed because de facto President Bagapsh had declared an intention to undertake military activity in the Kodori and Gali regions to UNOMIG, but UNOMIG has no UAVs of its own with which to monitor the situation.

Bakradze stated that it was a Russian MiG-29 which shot down the Georgian UAV and that the plane then flew back to Russia. Georgia has radar records and the video from the UAV to prove this. Russia therefore has an illegal military presence on Georgian territory. The MiG-29 stationed at Gudauta is a clear violation of the CFE and the Istanbul Commitments because the Gudauta facility is supposed to be closed. Russia committed an act of aggression by shooting down an unarmed UAV in Georgian airspace. Russia’s recent steps, then, have included military steps in addition to attempts to legalize its creeping annexation of Georgia.

Considering the potential resolution of the conflict, Georgia is faced with a difficult choice in deciding how to react to these recent developments. There is huge public pressure from groups such as the IDPs to react. Georgia has not responded with confrontation, to the contrary Saakashvili has advanced new peace proposals. Abkhazia was offered the chance to designate the vice-president in a reunified country and a veto over any government decision involving Abkhazia as well as a guarantee of Abkhazian autonomy. Georgia’s goal has been to show maximum restraint by avoiding harsh rhetoric or military responses and asking for the international community to act diplomatically.

Bakradze then listed Georgia’s main goals which he planned to articulate at the UN the following day. First, Russia should reverse its two recent decisions on withdrawing from the sanctions regime and on direct legal relations with Abkhazia’s de facto authorities. Second, Russia and the international community should support Georgia’s peace plan. Third, UNOMIG’s capability should be increased to include border and airspace monitoring. Fourth, Georgia plans to emphasize the issue of ethnic cleansing, since it should provide a “safeguard” preventing Russia from legally cooperating with the de facto authorities.

In addition, Europe should call on Russia to not only not implement the decision on legal cooperation but to reverse the decision, because the decision changes the reality on the ground. Since Putin will be the prime minister, the decision – taken in his decree made as president – will be implemented if not reversed. Overall, the recent developments present a test to the international community to see how decisive it will be in a crisis situation (because that is what the annexation of neighboring territory is).

Remarks by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza

Matthew Bryza stated that his goal was to provide the US perspective on these “recent and extremely serious events.” Many elements require attention, but overall the situation is very serious and has presented a test for Georgia – to rework its peace proposal – as well as a test for Russia and a test for the US Where Russian policy will go is unpredictable. US policy will continue to be to help Georgia to restore its territorial integrity peacefully.

Unfortunately it does not look like the Friends process [4] can move things forward. The group has looked at the conflict from the bottom up and undertaken “below grass roots” activities, but tends to get bogged down in small details and doesn’t deal with the big issues (e.g., of the security of returned IDPs in the Gali region) and political settlement. 200-300,000 IDPs remain displaced, and the question now is about sales of property which belongs to the IDPs. Such sales are not only unfair but destabilizing and create tension.

Bryza mentioned some aspects of the situation in South Ossetia, where Russian officials have been seconded to the local de facto authorities and Russia has hooked the region up to its telephone and natural gas networks, not to mention the billboard in Tskhinvali showing Putin and captioned “Nash Prezident” [“Our President”] – all while Russia officially recognizes Georgia’s territorial integrity.

Russia has come right up to the edge of recognition but has stopped short. Offices to serve the interests of the Russian citizens in Abkhazia will be opened on Russian territory, but just across the border. Russia will recognize the legitimacy of documents and decisions of the Abkhazian authorities. This blurs the border between recognition and non-recognition of independence and is not in keeping with the mediating sentiment of the Friends process and with Russia’s role as the facilitator in the conflict resolution process.

The US always encourages Georgia to stay peaceful, but meanwhile Russia is lifting restrictions on military transfers to Abkhazia and recognizing the decisions and documents of its de facto authorities. Georgia is urged not to try to change the format of the Friends process, but that process keeps moving backwards. Georgia needs to make its peace plan more appealing to Abkhazia but seems to be reacting with appropriate calm.

The negotiations have spent years batting around confidence-building measures, people-to-people approaches, economic cooperation, etc., but it’s past time to be talking about a political settlement at this point. The US encourages Georgia to take steps on South Ossetia which have been recommended by Russia – in the areas of security (to reduce tension) and economy (to increase prosperity) – these steps have been taken already – and politics.

Russia’s “deplorable” action in shooting down the Georgian UAV was clearly not in keeping with its role in the UN Friends process. Bryza observed that things seem to be moving in the wrong direction and that the resolution process needs to be rejuvenated, at the same time the US needs to “call things like we see them.” He referred to the missile incident last August and the “absurd” idea that “Georgia attacked itself.” Although there may never be “smoking-gun intel reports,” there is an accumulation of circumstantial evidence (including, e.g., the March 11, 2007 Kodori attack) [of Russian involvement].

Was the UAV’s flight illegal under the 1994 cease-fire agreement? Who knows, but Georgia needs to be able to observe what is going on in order to know that it doesn’t need to take military action. More intelligence would reinforce stability. Why not have more OSCE military monitors in South Ossetia? Why not give Georgia joint administration of the Roki Tunnel?

Georgia has its own work to do as well – it needs to make its settlement plan attractive to the separatists (Georgia is not a “darling” here). Bryza reminded the audience that the Abkhazian quest is for independence, to not be a part of either Georgia or Russia. Georgia needs to show them there is nothing to fear.

Remarks by Vladimir Socor

Jamestown Foundation senior fellow Vladimir Socor began by stating that he would have five observations about Russian policy and five policy recommendations. He observed that Russia’s affirmations of Georgia’s territorial integrity were only real in the sense that Russia does not formally claim any Georgian territory. Otherwise, those declarations are contradicted by Russia’s steps on the ground. Under Putin, there has been creeping annexation: Russian citizenship was given to residents of the region en masse, unlawfully under both Russian and international law; appointment by Russia of local leaders; and property takeovers, arms handovers, use of transit routes. Russia’s policy is now to pose a territorial claim to Georgian land in terms of Russian law – not in terms of international law – as Russian government bodies will conduct relations with Abkhazian bodies.

Socor’s first observation was that Putin’s decree of April 16 capped Russia’s policy of creeping annexation of Abkhazia. It turns an unofficial policy into a semi-official policy. The response should not focus on the decree, because it doesn’t have validity under international law. The international community should demand the reversal of Russia’s policy of creeping annexation, because otherwise the situation will not return to normal.

Second, Putin’s decree moves the process of de facto annexation onto pseudo-legal grounds in terms of Russian law. This should disqualify Russia from its role as a peacekeeper and mediator in the region – it does more than just put Russia’s role into question, it had already been in question as Russia has never been neutral in the conflict. It is impossible or perhaps counterproductive to exclude Russia from the peacekeeping and negotiation formats, but the formats need to be transformed with more international involvement. Russia’s recent move has made a mockery of the current formats.

Third, Russia has for the first time made an attempt to change post-Soviet borders in an overt way, which could be momentous. The tendency could spread unless checked. There is a need to have international oversight of the Russian-Georgian border, to put it under joint control between Russia, Georgia and maybe the EU or the OSCE. Such proposals have been around, but they need to be considered anew. It is necessary to check border revisionism. Socor raised the topic of Sochi and the upcoming 2014 Olympics – will the international community participate if Russia is changing international borders close by? The Sochi Olympics provide a good context in which to raise the issue.

Socor’s fourth observation was that Russia’s recent steps have been an overt exercise of “hard power.” Putin’s decree doesn’t mention military-to-military contacts, but these are the main instruments of Russian power. The response should be the soft power of the EU The EU likes soft power as a foreign policy tool – the international community needs to appeal to the EU to establish a soft-power presence in Abkhazia, through technical projects or similar initiatives. The EU could also offer visa facilitation to Georgian citizens. As it currently stands, Russian citizens residing in Abkhazia enjoy visa facilitation, but Georgian citizens do not – this erodes the appeal of Georgian citizenship.

Fifth, Russia’s recent steps are a signal to NATO that giving Georgia a MAP will involve
NATO in a clash that could jeopardize NATO-Russia relations. The move is not so much an anti-Georgian move as it is an anti-MAP move. Georgia is indeed in a “danger zone” and should be given a MAP as soon as possible. NATO should not repeat the Acheson mistake of 1950 by defining a perimeter – a MAP would signal Georgia’s presence inside NATO’s perimeter.

Regarding the effect of Kosovo’s UDI, Socor observed that it is ironic, because of Russia’s “lack of a legal culture,” that Russia took a legalistic approach to Kosovo recognition and has made claims that it would set a precedent. The real Kosovo precedent, according to Socor, is of a conflict resolved through the reversal of ethnic cleansing and intervention by international organizations (NATO, the EU, the OSCE). This is the real precedent, not in legal theory but in strategic reality. Reversal of ethnic cleansing should become the basis for resolving the conflict in Abkhazia as well.

Remarks by Svante Cornell, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Research Director

A major issue is how to interpret the Kremlin’s moves in the context of Kosovo. We were led to expect recognition based on the declared legalistic Kosovo precedent, but we may be seeing an intentionally misleading move. Russia’s policies have nothing to do with recognition, they have to do with annexation. Kosovo and Taiwan, for example, are territories open to the world and not being isolated or absorbed into other countries – they are fundamentally different from the situation in Abkhazia. Russia’s moves prevent the self-determination of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The US does not appoint the Interior Minister of Taiwan.[5]

So, it probably has nothing to do with recognition or opening up the territories, they are being cut off. Abkhazian leadership is being humiliated and alarmed by the Russian steps, they realize that Russia has no intention of recognizing them and will use them as anti-NATO pawns.

Cornell went on to describe the relationship of the Abkhazia crisis to US-Russian relations. The Russian moves were mere days after Putin’s summit with Bush in Sochi and after Bush’s heavy rhetorical investment in getting Georgia a MAP. Therefore, Russia’s steps directly confront a stated high-level interest of the US and are a “personal slap in the face” to Bush. The US cannot allow this to happen – forceful reaction is needed. Russia’s next steps may be directed against Ukraine,[6] which would further undermine US credibility.

In Abkhazia, the current peacekeeping and negotiating formats are not working – Russia is now explicitly a party to the conflict and therefore not an appropriate mediator. The recent developments should disqualify Russia from having a peacekeeping role in Abkhazia. The international community should no longer accept the Russian monopoly on the negotiating and peacekeeping processes – it is absurd that a party to the conflict could be a mediator. But what new mechanisms can be introduced? And can the old ones be reformed?

Question-and-answer

The first question was posed to Mr. Socor about what types of technical assistance he thought would be feasible and helpful. He mentioned agriculture, health and infrastructure projects aimed at benefiting the local population, as well as the need to set up a mechanism to oversee Georgian-language schooling in the Gali region. In South Ossetia, cross-border irrigation projects are an option, and the Sanakoyev government could be used to deliver some of the assistance.

Georgia’s European choice, according to Socor, opens up prospects of Europeanization for the populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These people now have a window into Europe and away from an exclusively Russocentric environment. The idea would be to use Georgia as a “locomotive”[7] to pull Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Europe – the EU needs to live up to its rhetoric about using soft power to spread European values.

The next question focused on the “Taiwanesque” nature of the scenario, while acknowledging that such terminology is a matter of semantics, and asked what Georgia and the US would do in the event of a military buildup in Abkhazia. Bakradze pointed out that Taiwan is very different from Abkhazia – US-Taiwanese cooperation is carried out with the agreement of the PRC government. He said that he was pleased to have Georgia compared to the PRC, but that the comparison is nevertheless a bad analogy. As for the question about the buildup, Bakradze stated that his response would depend on Bryza’s response.

Socor mentioned the break in the link between the Istanbul Commitments and the CFE Treaty and its relevance to the base at Gudauta. He opined that it was a mistake to ratify the CFE without resolving the issue of “unaccounted-for treaty-limited equipment.” International inspection of Gudauta is necessary to be sure that it has been mothballed, but NATO is pulling back from requests like this.

Bryza noted that Russia and others understand that there is no military solution to the problem and that even suggesting one opens a Pandora’s box. There is a great danger of reverberation after the use of force since the region is so interconnected.[8] Georgia also understands this, and no one wants to contemplate a military confrontation. There is a need to rejuvenate the political talks, and Georgia needs to show Abkhazia that they are serious about a settlement. Bakradze mentioned that a Russian military buildup would constitute an open military occupation of part of Georgia and noted that Georgia would do what any other country would do. “It is in Russia’s hands,” but if they undertake a military buildup in Abkhazia then they will back Georgia into a corner.

Andrei Piontkovsky asked about the reactions of other CIS countries to Russia’s withdrawal from the sanctions regime. Bakradze responded that several CIS countries stated they would not join Russia’s decision. Russia, however, has a special status because of its physical presence on the ground and its status in the negotiations, so it is different from any other CIS state.

A representative of the Turkish Embassy recalled Saakashvili’s statement that no MAP for Georgia would amount to appeasement of Russia and asked why, then, would a MAP for Georgia be a deterrent. He also asked whether there was any real chance for productive talks after Abkhazia had swiftly rejected Georgia’s most recent peace proposal, and whether Turkey might play a role in facilitating the process, given the presence of some 400,000 ethnic Abkhaz in Turkey. Socor confirmed that Saakashvili made the statement and remarked that appeasement indeed invites aggression, and that in that respect Russia’s recent actions “agreed” with Saakashvili’s statement, because Russia was emboldened. In past NATO enlargement rounds, Russia pulled back when membership became a reality.

Bakradze observed that the Baltic countries and Poland enjoyed better relations with Russia after their accession to NATO. There are illusions in Moscow about the new situation in the near abroad and about Russia’s sphere of influence. There is a need to reduce uncertainty, because doing so will improve the relationship. Russia is pragmatic – once it sees a reality on the ground, it accepts that reality.

As for Georgia’s peace proposals, Abkhazia’s de facto leaders did not even look at them; but Abkhazia’s leaders should feel uncomfortable, because they may be absorbed. If the region becomes part of Russia, ethnic Abkhaz will be a tiny portion of the population there. Georgia is ready to pay a lot for what the Abkhazians have, otherwise they may wind up giving it away for free. But before talking about negotiations, the conflict needs to be brought back to a frozen condition. Georgia is very open to a Turkish mediation role.

[1] This sounded like a veiled threat of action which might be undertaken by or in the name of the IDPs, who number roughly 200,000, according to generally accepted estimates, or up to 300-350,000 according to some Georgian government estimates.

[2] The population is more likely roughly 180-200,000 and varies significantly depending on whether it is resort season or not. The important point made by Bakradze’s figures and all other estimates I’ve seen is that ethnic Abkhaz do not constitute a majority of the population of the region even after the cleansing of at least 200,000 Georgians.

[3] The terminology used by Abkhazians and many others in referring to these measures is “blockade.” In any event, while Russia formally renounced the restrictions in March of this year, it had been failing to observe them since 2000-01. Presumably one group of individuals who will see a change from the recent change in Russian policy is Russian border guards, who will no longer be able to use the trade restrictions as an excuse to engage in rent-seeking.

[4] Bryza was referring to the long-running discussions under the framework of the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General, a body which has long been a format for discussing the conflict over Abkhazia, which involves representatives of Germany, France, Russia, the UK and the US.

[5] At this point, Bryza leaned over to Bakradze and said, in a smiling aside loud enough to hear in the first few rows, “That’s what he thinks.” It didn’t seem like the most appropriate venue to make such a joke.

[6] This observation looks pretty prescient in light of Luzhkov’s recent rhetoric about taking back Sevastopol and/or the Crimea.

[7] The exact same suggestion has been made by Romania to Moldova in recent years - it is difficult to imagine that Abkhazia and South Ossetia will find it any more appealing than Moldova did.

[8] This was a not-so-subtle reminder of Russia’s own potential difficulties in controlling ethnic tensions in the North Caucasus. Russia is not always fond of Bryza's comments and actually issued a communique in response to some remarks he made recently while visiting Georgia.

When enmity gets in the way of friendship

The free rein given to Kremlin-controlled mass media to whip up anti-Western sentiment briefly upset Russia's relationship with Serbia over the weekend. Somewhat ironically, this occurred just as the Russian government was accusing the U.S. of seeking to "humiliate" Serbia.

Serbia has forgiven Russia for the offensive comment made on "Vesti"
Lenta.ru, Feb. 25, 2005 [my translation]

Serbian President Boris Tadic accepted the explanation provided by a Russian delegation headed by Dmitrii Medvedev for a scandalous comment on the "Vesti +" TV show during a report on the massive protests in Belgrade against Kosovo's separation from Serbia, reports RIA Novosti.

According to a Russian diplomatic source, "an exhaustive explanation was given for this regrettable incident, and it was accepted." "Boris Tadic emphasized that he of course understands that these statements, which are unacceptable to Serbia, cannot possibly reflect Russia's position,"* said the source.

Reporting on the "Rossiia" channel on a mass protest in Belgrade, anchor Dmitrii [sic] Semin stated that today the Serbs had remembered "how a country stupefied by liberal promises mourned the loss of the Western puppet Zoran Djindjic, a man who destroyed the legendary Serbian army and special forces, selling out the heroes of Serbian resistance to the Hague for abstract economic assistance, and received for that a much-deserved bullet."

In response, Serbia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent the "Rossiia" channel a note of protest, which stated that "the comment of journalist Konstantin Semin, which insulted democratically elected Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic and excused his murder, is absolutely unacceptable for Serbia."

A video clip of the statement in question is up on RuTube and has collected some predictable comments there.

New Times journalist Ilya Barabanov diagnoses this on his blog as "smoldering schizophrenia" on the part of the Russian media, but one of his commenters takes a more reserved view:

Ilya, this isn't schizophrenia at all. It's ignoble, politically incorrect, short-sighted - call it what you want, but not schizophrenia. These people are not idiots, they understand perfectly well what they want and what they are doing. That doesn't justify their actions, but it shows that the diagnosis should really be a different one.

The reaction of another commenter:

When all kinds of scum started writing on the internet after Anna Politkovskaya's murder that she deserved to be killed, it was disgusting and bitter... When news broadcasts are conducted in this manner, I don't even know how to react.

And another interesting series of comments is here, suggesting how the rhetoric used by the Kremlin's court commentator with respect to Serbia's own passivity leading to their loss of Kosovo (in this case, the anchor's statement about having two options - "option A, to resist; option B, to give in, and this relates not only to Serbia") can with some creativity be applied to the Russian domestic political situation.

* Yes, I know this suggests that an alternative argument could be made that this incident actually demonstrates the Kremlin's inability to control the people who do its TV reporting.

[Update 2/27]

Two articles in today's Eurasia Daily Monitor mention this incident - here and here. The TV anchor's name is of course pronounced Syomin, not Semin.

And the Moscow Times has just put on its website a blistering editorial, which will run in tomorrow's print edition:

Rossia Should Bite the Bullet And Apologize

Thursday, February 28, 2008. Issue 3851. Page 08.

Rossia television has laid to rest any lingering doubts about whether the level of propaganda on state television has returned to record Cold War highs. Konstantin Syomin, an anchor with "Vesti Plus," opined on the nightly news program last Thursday that Yugoslav Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic had deserved to be assassinated for "selling out" to the West.

Syomin described Djindjic as "a Western puppet" who "destroyed the legendary Serbian army." He accused Djindjic of "selling the heroes of Serbian resistance" to the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague. Therefore, Djindjic "got a well-deserved bullet" in 2003, Syomin said.

One has to wonder whether even Soviet television anchors made such outrageous observations after the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy, Moscow's Cold War foe.

The Serbian Foreign Ministry has filed an official protest, and Serbian lawmakers have complained. But neither the Russian Foreign Ministry nor Rossia have deemed it necessary to apologize.

Lax reporting standards allowing television anchors to opine on their news programs have long been a tradition in Russia. Another tradition has been state control of television management and the editorial content of news programs. The anti-Western bias, if not borderline hysteria, fomented on the national channels these days is part of this carefully planned coverage.

But to call the assassination of a prime minister "well deserved" is beyond the realm of biased reporting. It is simply appalling and unacceptable. It is also unsatisfactory for a democratic country and for any media outlet, whether it is state-controlled or not, to refuse to apologize.

The anchor's remarks were so shocking that one might be tempted to speculate that they were an attempt to undermine presidential candidate Dmitry Medvedev ahead of his trip to Serbia on Monday.

Not only do Rossia and the Foreign Ministry owe an apology, but the channel would do well to fire the anchor and whoever allowed -- or instructed -- him to put such a "spin" on the bullet that killed Djindjic.

State media and its Kremlin supervisors should stop fomenting irrational anti-Western hysteria. True, there is a divergence of interests between Russia and Western countries on many key issues. But this does not mean that coverage of the West should be based on groundless or unacceptable invectives, such as the one voiced about Djindjic.

Sooner or later ordinary people will begin to wonder why the country's rulers want them to hate the "evil" West but send their own children to study there, keep their money in banks there, and buy real estate there.

Strangely enough, the Politburo, which guided the anti-Western propaganda on Soviet television, was more honest with the people because it did none of that.

 [image source]

Moskovskiy Komsomolets
August 25, 2010
Commentary by Marina Pervozkina: Thanks to Everyone, Everyone Is Free. South Ossetia and Abkhazia are gradually gaining independence from Russia. [Translation from JRL]

"Abkhazia is less dependent on Russia than Russia is on Abkhazia," one of the popular Abkhaz newspapers wrote recently. And the impression sometimes forms that the author was right on target. In any case, the elites of both the republics recognized by Russia often behave as if these words were inscribed on their family seal. Abkhazia and South Ossetia increasingly recall the willful beauty who condescendingly receives gifts from her long-standing, loyal suitor at the same time as her eyes are darting around looking for other interesting partners. And as always happens in such cases, the alternative is quickly found.

The Quiet American

"I think that he (Mikheil Saakashvili -- author) used the confrontation with Russia for personal goals: to muffle the voices of the discontented people in his own country. I hope that Saakashvili realized what harm he did to his own country, losing Abkhazia and South Ossetia in this way. After all, in this situation there will no longer be a road back."

"Kremlin propaganda again," some progressive reader will say involuntarily. And he will almost be right: such thoughts were heard on the official level in Russia so often that they became a kind of cliche that already seems almost improper somehow.

Nonetheless, these words, spoken just before the second anniversary of the August war, were a real sensation. After all, the person acting as the mouthpiece for Kremlin propaganda on this occasion is called the "shadow architect of American foreign policy" by well-informed people. And some consider him one of the most authoritative representatives of the American intelligence community. And not without grounds: Paul Goble (the quotation cited above belongs to him) in fact worked for a long time in the CIA, then served as an associate of the US State Department's Bureau of Research and Intelligence and as deputy director of broadcasting for Radio Liberty/Free Europe. He is considered one of the best experts on the Caucasus and inter-ethnic conflicts in post-Soviet space. In short, the classic "quiet American." Very quiet and very influential.

The significance of a person is best illustrated by the legends that surround him. There is a story that circulates about Goble, that supposedly the speaker and the prime minister of Armenia, who died at the hands of terrorists in October 1999, were paid back for rejecting the so-called Goble plan to settle the Karabakh conflict. We are sure that this is malicious slander.

And if such a complex person says publicly, "I think that on the threshold of the conflict Saakashvili misinterpreted statements by the US president and secretary of state... He did not hear at all what we had in mind. I hope that the American authorities are aware of the harm Saakashvili caused by his actions. We did not need that war," this certainly bodes no good for Saakashvili. It may already be time for him to look for a job in a quiet provincial American university. Just in case.

But here is the most interesting thing: "I believe in the right of nations to self-determination," Mr. Goble says. "And I am sure that Abkhazia has demonstrated its possibility of realizing this right in practice."

But what will happen with the territorial integrity of Georgia, for which official Washington is constantly affirming its support? The events of recent years have shown that for the Americans the integrity of other countries is always a relative value. When a probable enemy or its ally loses integrity it is welcomed. The examples of the USSR and Yugoslavia are known to all. But while the USSR collapsed relatively peacefully ("just" a few tens of thousands killed in Tajikistan, Abkhazia, the Dniester region, and South Ossetia), everything was much worse in Yugoslavia. At first glance US policy toward Slobodan Milosevic looked somewhat schizophrenic: after all, in its time Yugoslavia was the most pro-Western country in the socialist camp and had difficult relations with Moscow while Milosevic himself up to a certain time seemed to be a completely loyal client of Washington. He made concessions easily, in fact surrendered Serbian Krajna, and declared an economic blockade of the Bosnian Serbs (how can we help recalling here the multi-year blockade of Abkhazia by the Russian Federation?). But here is the paradox: the more Milosevic gave away, the less the West liked him. Ultimately the Serbs even gave up Milosevic himself, but they still took Kosovo away from them. The poor devils simply did not understand that it was not a matter of Milosevic, but of themselves -- the West does not need a strong, unified Serbia, which sooner or later will return to its traditional role as Russia's outpost in the Balkans.

But whereas everything is clear with Serbia, Turkey is, after all, a reliable ally and strategic partner of the Americans. And therefore the Americans' support of Kurdish separatism in Iraq is, from the Turkish point of view, completely beyond good and evil. I took a look at the Kurdish website yesterday, and saw there threats to secede from Iraq with highly promising commentary: "And if the Kurds slam the door, glass will fly across the whole region." In connection with which very alluring prospects could open up for Turkish Kurdistan. And how is Georgia better than Turkey?

Normal Heroes Always Take the Bypass

It is not only no better, but even in some respects worse: Georgia, an Orthodox country like Serbia, was a reliable supporter of the Russians during the Caucasus war and together they wiped out the mountain rebels, who are brothers in spirit and faith with the Kosovo terrorists, the United States' current strategic partners. So who will sort them out, the Georgians? Where will their sun rise tomorrow? Half of the North Caucasus is related by kin to the Abkhazes.

Of course, from the standpoint of America's strategic interests it would be best if a united Georgia including Abkhazia and South Ossetia joined NATO. But the West is starting to understand that it is probably impossible for Abkhazes and Georgians to live in one state. That means it is necessary to "enter" already independent Abkhazia maybe as a carcass, maybe as a scarecrow, maybe as an embassy if nothing else works.

"For Moscow the worst development of the situation in the Caucasus is if the West, and the United States in particular, decides to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia," Mr. Goble says. "Picture 27 embassies of the NATO members in Sukhum. No doubt the Russian authorities would be horrified at that. Then after all, there are others in Russia who would like self-determination -- Dagestan, for example. I do not rule out such a development of events. I hope that we greet the 10th anniversary of the conflict between Russia and Georgia in a significantly calmer state. There will be fewer comments on Russian aggression, and more embassies of foreign states in Sukhum. I do not know if there will be an American Embassy among them. That, of course, is a very bold dream."

Paul Goble is undoubtedly a brilliant analyst and a master strategist. He set forth a perfectly realistic plan to "nullify" Russia's August victory: reorient Abkhazia to the West and turn it into a Mecca for North Caucasian separatists. This is not fantasy. Suffice it to recall the Gorskaya (Mountain) Republic that was declared after the fall of the Russian Empire. It included Abkhazia, Ossetia, and five other republics of the North Caucasus. The ideas of the Gorskaya Republic were reborn after the fall of the Union. In November 1991 Sukhum was declared the capital of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus. During the war with Georgia representatives of all the national movements of the North Caucasus fought on the Abkhaz side. The minister of defense of war-time Abkhazia was Sultan Sosnaliyev, a Kabardin, and Shamil Basayev was his deputy. Kabardin and Chechen battalions played a decisive part in the war. Afterw ard those same Chechens, having become battle hardened on the fronts of Abkhazia, fought against Russian troops.

Highly-placed people I spoke with in Sukhum told me that even before the August events representatives of Western countries in private conversation hinted on occasion that Abkhazia's main problem was its pro-Russian orientation. "If the Abkhazes turn their faces to the West, anything is possible, including international recognition" -- according to my interlocutors that is how these emissaries talked.

"If the 'restoration' of Georgian rule is a fantasy, accordingly it is essential to prevent Abkhazia from finally falling under Russia's power," the journalist Neal Ascherson writes in his article entitled "Abkhazia and the Caucasus: the West's Choice," which was posted on the Open Democracy website. "The West is facing an urgent need to arrange direct contacts with Abkhazia -- economic, social, and cultural contacts -- and to get access to Abkhaz ports. That will help Abkhazia emerge from isolation."

News from the Field

As for South Ossetia, in the opinion of Western analysts it has fewer grounds for independence. Small territory, small population. And geographic position: South Ossetia is a "dagger aimed at Tbilisi," an ideal launching point for an invasion of Georgia. But the main thing is that North Ossetia is located in the Russian Federation. In this connection (I am again speaking on the basis of the words of participants in events who hold high positions in the Ossetian elite) on numerous occasions the Ossetians have been told unofficially that if North Ossetia unites with South Ossetia and withdraws from Russia, such a united Ossetia could well expect international recognition.

This idea is not at all as utopian as it seems.

In Tskhinval today we observe a paradoxical situation. While South Ossetia, its people, and the whole elite are entirely dependent on our maintenance -- in the war-ravaged republic nothing is working, there are no domestic sources of income at all, and even its security depends entirely on Russia -- Moscow cannot resolve a single significant problem there. Not even monitor the expenditure of its own money or protect its own people. Moscow (and according to my information the Russian premier personally) was even unable to get Mr. Kokoyty to dismiss South Ossetian officials who were caught stealing and whose names were known. The story of former health minister Nuzgar Gabarayev, who distributed Russian financial aid, is illustrative. His name has already become part of the language in the republic. After Moscow protege Vadim Brovtsev sent Gabarayev into retirement, President Kokoyty appointed him his own state counselor. Evidently an indispensable personage. Even more illustrative is the story of General Barankevich, who Moscow wanted very much to appoint to be head of the MVK (interdepartmental commission on the restoration of South Ossetia), but COULD NOT. In other words, in this case terribly dependent and very proud Tskhinval, living entirely on our money, was actually able to influence our internal personnel policy. At the same time we cannot influence Tskhinval's. I would say that this is the apotheosis of impudence.

There is an analogous situation in Abkhazia, where Moscow is unsuccessfully trying to get the property rights of Russian citizens who were illegally deprived of their housing restored. In order to avoid misunderstanding, I will emphasize that we are not talking here about the property of Georgian refugees. Their problems should be the subject of bilateral talks between Georgia and Abkhazia. It is those for whom the Russian government is fighting, principally Russians, Armenians, Greeks, and the like. Many of them never left Abkhazia at all.

In these very days another scandal has flared up. Sukhum rejected a document sent to it by the MID RF (Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs) entitled "Concept of the Work of the Joint Russian-Abkhaz Commission on Questions of Restorin g the Property Rights of Citizens of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Abkhazia." We will recall that the decision to form such a commission was reached in Moscow after an article published in MK (Moskovskiy Komsomolets) made the problem a matter of public record. Before this, according to our information, the MID RF and the Russian Embassy in Sukhum had sent several diplomatic notes to the Abkhaz side (dated 25 November 2008, 19 March 2009, 22 April 2009, and 31 July 2009). President Medvedev and foreign minister Lavrov discussed the problem with the president of Abkhazia. Sergey Baghapsh pointed out to the chiefs of local administrations the necessity of "taking a hard line with seizures of property." However, nothing happened. Not one of the protagonists of our article has gotten his apartment back at this point.

At the same time strange articles are appearing in the Abkhaz press in which the plans to form the commission are called "anti-state and anti-Abkhaz," while giving people back property that was fraudulently taken from them is considered a threat to the Abkhaz people. The Abkhazes never tire of repeating that their foreign policy must be multi-vectored, that they are not some pathetic outpost of Russia, but a sovereign state with its own interests. Thus if there is a change in the West's position on the issue of Abkhaz independence, Moscow stands a good chance of being left empty-handed.

And if we close our eyes to the problems that already exist in relations with our Abkhaz and Ossetian partners, it is not impossible that some day museums "of the Russian occupation" will open on the central squares of Sukhum and Tskhinval.

God forbid, of course.