The Parable of the Isms - a guest post by Matthew Rojansky



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The Parable of the Isms, as Applied to the Former Soviet Union
Guest post by Matthew Rojansky

My colleague Karim Sadjadpour recently published a satirical analysis of Middle East politics, "The Cynical Dairy Farmer's Guide to the New Middle East," riffing on a famous Cold War joke about communism and capitalism, known as "the parable of the isms."  As Karim noted,

 No one really knows how the two-cow joke known as "Parable of the Isms" came about, but most students of Political Science 101 have likely come across some variation of the following definitions:

Socialism: You have two cows. The government takes one of them and gives it to your neighbor.

Communism: You have two cows. The government takes them both and provides you with milk.

Nazism: You have two cows. The government shoots you and takes the cows.

Capitalism: You have two cows. You sell one and buy a bull.

Satire it may be, but the essential truth of the "cow jokes" is what makes them funny. Karim's thirteen terse metaphors for Middle Eastern regimes cut to the heart of a complex region in which increasing American interest has followed increasing investments of blood and treasure, with very little added understanding of what's really going on.

The Soviet Union suffered no dearth of American attention over nearly half a century after World War II. Yet even the keenest observers, like Kennan and Kissinger, were focused almost entirely on Moscow, and within it mostly on the Kremlin. During the Cold War, that made good sense - after all, no one in Kiev or Almaty, let alone in Chisinau or Ashgabat, was making particularly important decisions for US foreign policy and global security.

But twenty years after the collapse of Communism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, things work a bit differently in Eurasia. To understand why drugs flow so readily from Afghanistan through Central Asia and into Russia and Western Europe requires some sense of what's going on - and what's not - in places like Dushanbe and Astana. To see why a NATO-Russia impasse over missile defense is so serious requires an understanding of how the people, and the governments, in Kyiv and Tbilisi relate to their massive neighbor.

The former Soviet republics are no longer defined so much by being formerly Soviet, as by what they have become after twenty years of independence. Yet the old categories - socialist, communist, capitalist, fascist - don't easily work to describe a region where political cultures draw on everything from Rome and Byzantium to Baghdad and Beijing. Let's see how the "parable of the isms" might offer a convenient shorthand guide to the fifteen states that once made up the USSR.

Russia
You have six cows and four bulls. Two of the bulls die from alcoholism, and the remaining two form a "tandem" to take the cows' milk and sell it to Germany and China.

Ukraine
You have four of the most productive cows on the farm, two of which allow themselves to be milked by Russia, which upsets the other two so much their milk goes sour.

Georgia
You have two cows and one prize-winning bull. The bull is so distracted winning prizes that Russia runs away with both cows.

Belarus
You have one cow which you savagely beat until it produces milk. The milk dries up after your last savage beating, so now you must sell the cow to Russia.

Moldova
You have two cows and a calf, but the cows live in Italy and Russia and send milk home by Western Union. You ferment the milk into wine, and launch a frenzied campaign to join the EU. Meanwhile, the calf is stolen and sold by rustlers.

Armenia
You have four cows, but three of them live in Los Angeles and think they are horses. They send money for you to build stables.

Azerbaijan
You have one cow that produces lots of excellent milk. You sell the milk to Farmer Browne and buy cattle prods from Israel and Turkey.

Turkmenistan
You had one cow but you sold it to buy a golden statue of a cow that rotates with the sun.

Kazakhstan
You have two cows that produce vast quantities of milk. You sell the milk, buy each cow a gold-plated cow bell, and declare yourself bull for life.

Kyrgyzstan
You have two cows: one Kyrgyz and one Uzbek; they hate each other and refuse to be milked. Instead of hay, feed them tulips. Then sell one each to Russia and the United States. After six months sell them again.

Tajikistan
You have three cows: one Tajik, one Uzbek, and one Russian. You beat the Russian cow until it runs away, and use your misfortune to plead for international aid. Meanwhile Iran milks your remaining cows.

Uzbekistan
You have four cows. You let them drink all the water in the neighborhood swimming pool. Now no one can go swimming. You blame this on "corrupt and lawless elements," and volunteer to remain in power until the problem is solved.

The Baltic States

You have lost half your cows, for which you blame Russia and demand an apology. As consolation, the EU gives you a sleek Scandinavian-designed barn and NATO farmers teach you advanced milking techniques.

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Conflict Cables Series: Transdniester, October 1991

These three cables cover a fateful month in the development of the Transdniestrian conflict and Moldova's post-Soviet development in general.  This was the period when Igor Smirnov, who would go on to lead what became the secessionist Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic for 20 years (so far), was released from the custody of Moldovan authorities and allowed to return to Tiraspol.  The first cable below goes into interesting detail about the problems presented by "the Trans-Dniester" and Gagauzia, as well as potential border issues with Ukraine.

This was also a month when President Snegur was forced to cancel a visit to the U.S. due to unspecified domestic "political problems."  As the second cable below shows, the visit was intended to familiarize U.S. business and political leaders with Moldova, something the Moldovan government is still working on today.  The second cable also contains a number of statements from official Chisinau about how Moldova saw its future status at that moment in time. 

Tiraspol Blockade Ended; Moldova Avoiding Confrontation with Secessionist "Republics" (Oct. 4, 1991)

Moldovan President to Visit U.S. October 19-24 (Oct. 11, 1991)

Moldovan President Snegur Cancels U.S. Visit (Oct. 18, 1991)

For more about the "Conflict Cables" series, see this post.

Whither the "Near Abroad"?

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A couple of translations from today's Johnson's Russia List:

Rossiiskaya Gazeta
July 6, 2010
FAR AWAY AND CLOSE BY
CIS countries hold little interest for Russia
Author: Leonid Radzikhovsky
RUSSIA: CIS COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN OFF THE PRIORITY LIST FOR A LONG TIME NOW

When the recent Russian-Belarussian gas war broke out, pointless but no less ferocious for that, President Dmitry Medvedev was away in California prior to attending G8 and G20 meetings.

What is closer to Russia then - California or Belarus? And what is more important?  As a matter of fact, Russia removed CIS countries off its list of priorities long ago.

Trade with post-Soviet countries accounts for only 17% of the total volume of Russian trade with foreign countries. Major recipients of Russian export include (in the descending order) the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Turkey, and finally Ukraine. Major suppliers to Russia are China, Germany, Japan, and finally Ukraine.

Neither does the Commonwealth offer anything sufficiently interesting to Russian investors. Economies of most post-Soviet countries are so weak and legislations so bizarre that Russian businesses know better then invest in neighbors. Ukraine is probably the only exception. Roman Abramovich and Alisher Usmanov did procure some assets in Donbass there; Ukraine's Antonov Company recently joined the Russian United Aircraft Corporation.

As for human contacts, approximately 20 million Russians visited distant foreign countries and about 13 million chose CIS countries in 2008 (no hard data on 2009 travel yet).

Where political relations are concerned, the overall situation is no better. Everyone remembers conflicts with Georgia (and not just verbal conflicts, unfortunately), Baltic states, Poland, Ukraine (under its previous president), and the permanent "brotherly" quarrel with Belarus. Compared to that, Russia's relations with major European countries, China, India, Japan, Middle East countries, African and Latin American states are but exemplary.

So is the relationship with the United States. There are no trade, political, or even information wars between our countries any more. Attitude toward the United States in Russia is changing for the better. Forty-six percent Russians did not see the United States as an adversary a year ago. These days, they already number 59%.

Conclusions:
1. Russia has many more common economic interests with the European Union, China, and America than with its CIS neighbors;
2. conflicts with CIS countries vastly outnumber quarrels with distant foreign countries.

What about the Commonwealth being a zone of Russia's special interests or zone of influence then? The impression is that the Kremlin means to establish Russian domination of the post-Soviet zone. Forget it. No post-Soviet country will put up with it anymore. Political establishments throughout the Commonwealth are as sensitive to Russian political dictatorship as the Russian establishment is to American or Chinese. Meaning that no dictatorship at all will be tolerated.

And what do we have then? The Commonwealth has nothing to offer Russia in terms of modernization, particularly technological, that official Moscow is focused on, these days. The Ferghana Valley is not the Silicon Alley after all.

Security of Russia requires at least relative political stability in Central Asia. Unfortunately, the latest developments in Kyrgyzstan make it plain that Russian clout with this region, Russia's ability to exert influence with it, is quite restricted, not to say non-existent. God bless the Kremlin for having had the
sense not to send Russian paratroops to rioting Kyrgyzstan. And not to try to tame another regime that would have cost it dearly without giving anything worthwhile in return.

Russia lacks the resources (financial, moral, or physical) for the so called "strong" policy in the region. It follows that it had better abandon its penchant for shouldering all of the responsibility for Central Asia and start involving other
countries. After all, all of the international community ought to be interested in a stable Central Asia. Once again, the recent events in Kyrgyzstan are proof that nobody in the world is really eager to become involved.

Last but not the least, Moscow should finally do something about the endless saga of the so called Russian-Belarussian union.

The Russian-Belarussian union is not a harmless myth. This concept (for lack of a better term) is a source of endless conflicts. Were it not for this myth, it would never have occurred even to Minsk to demand all these colossal preferences and unprecedented discounts from Moscow. Time to dispel this myth and shut down this stillborn project. Invented by Boris Yeltsin's PR specialists in 1996, it has made no progress at all in all these years. What it keeps fomenting are scandals and quarrels. Were it not for the myth itself, there would have been no high hopes and expectations that are so frequently frustrated. This lie about a union harms both countries. Time to say that there is no Russian-Belarussian union and there has never been any.

Labor immigration is Russia's major link with CIS countries. The need for cheap labor will keep growing, and Central Asia remains the essentially inexhaustible source of menial workers. This is what Russia ought to focus on. It ought to perfect immigration legislation and so on - but this is Russia's domestic affair that has nothing at all to do with influence with Central Asian countries.

It all comes down to a choice, really. When the concept of "relations of priority" with CIS countries collides with reality, something ought to be done. Either concept amended, or reality changed. What's your pleasure?

___________________________________________________

Kommersant
July 6, 2010
RELOAD BYPASSING RUSSIA
Official Washington is rebuilding its clout with Ukraine and republics of the Caucasus
Author: Alexander Gabuyev, Georgy Dvali, Rafael Mustafayev, Ike Dzhanpoladjan
WASHINGTON DISAGREES WITH THE CONCEPT THAT REGARDS UKRAINE AND THE CAUCASUS AS A ZONE OF MOSCOW'S EXCLUSIVE INTERESTS

U.S. State Secretary Hillary Clinton completed her tour of Ukraine, Poland, and three countries of the Caucasus. The trip was intended to bolster America's clout with these countries and facilitate Nabucco, project of a gas pipeline to Europe bypassing Russia. Reload or no reload, Clinton's tour plainly shows that the United States denies Russia the right to regard Ukraine and republics of the Caucasus as a zone of its special, much less exclusive interests.

Clinton visited Ukraine, Poland, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia - just like Vice President Joe Biden did a year ago. Biden visited Ukraine and Georgia right in the wake of his patron Barack Obama's triumphant visit to the capital of Russia. It was Washington's way of telling Moscow that the United States stands by its allies regardless of what might be happening in and with the American-Russian relations.

It is fair to add that America's positions in the region did weaken in the last twelve months. New President of Ukraine Victor Yanukovich began his term of office with the permission to Russia to leave its Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea after 2017. Not a single senior functionary of the U.S. Administration visited Ukraine yet (before Clinton). As for Poland, it is still seething at Obama for abandonment of his predecessor's plans to develop the third position area in this country (and in the Czech Republic). Where countries of the Caucasus are concerned, it was Clinton's first visit there in the capacity of the state secretary. Moreover, the United States does not even have its ambassador in Azerbaijan. Its inability to choose an adequate candidate remains a source of quiet resentment for official Baku.

That Clinton could not hope to solve or even address all problems in the course of so brief a visit goes without saying. Assistant Secretary Philip Gordon explained that Clinton's tour was supposed to demonstrate that the United States has no intention to abandon its own interests in the region for the sake of betterment of the relations with Moscow. In fact, Clinton's brief stay in Kiev confirmed it. She discussed with Yanukovich advancement of the relations between Ukraine and the Western community and assured him that NATO was always there, waiting for him to change his mind perhaps and apply for membership after all.

The day Clinton deplaned in Kiev, the International Monetary Fund declared readiness to loan Ukraine $14.9 billion. Foreign Minister Konstantin Grischenko in the meantime announced that Clinton and he discussed "diversification of nuclear fuel suppliers". Contract with Russia's TVEL signed last month all but made the Russians monopolists in the Ukrainian market of nuclear fuel - or so the Russians thought. It seems now that Westinghouse might elbow its way in, too.

Clinton visited Azerbaijan and Armenia within a single day, Sunday. She met with presidents Ilham Aliyev and Serj Sargsjan as well as with her opposite numbers Elmar Mamedjarov and Edward Nalbandjan. The visitor spoke, choosing her words carefully, of the necessity to settle the matter of Karabakh on the basis of the
Madrid Principles formulated by the OSCE Minsk Group. Considering seriousness of the problem, it is unlikely that Clinton expected her brief speech to have any effect on Karabakh conflict resolution process.

In any event, she had other things to discuss with the hosts, things of more immediate interest to the United States. With Sargsjan, she discussed normalization of the relations with Turkey and called for the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border the sooner the better. In Azerbaijan, the discourse was centered around energy cooperation. Neither Clinton nor Azerbaijani functionaries offered comment afterwards, but observers assumed that they had been discussing Nabucco, the international project halted due to the discord between Baku and Ankara over gas transit. In fact, Aliyev put off his planned visit to Turkey on two occasions already.

Georgia was the last stop on Clinton's route. The visiting U.S. functionary called Abkhazia and South Ossetia "occupied by Russia" to President Mikhail Saakashvili's vast relief. Her meeting with Saakashvili over, Clinton met with leaders of the Christian Democrats and Free Democrats. The former are represented in the parliament of Georgia. Leader of the latter Irakly Alasania had polled almost 20% in the race for mayor of Tbilisi not long ago. Official Washington regards Alasania as a promising politician in the light of the presidential election scheduled to take place in Georgia in 2013. Also importantly, Alasania served as representative of Georgia to the UN in the past. He has extensive contacts within the American establishment.

Alasania's aide Aleksy Petriashvili said that his patron and Clinton discussed politics - presidential election, undesirability of amendment of the Constitution or transformation of Georgia into a parliamentary republic where Saakashvili will remain essentially the ruler in the premier's capacity.

Talking past each other

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Nezavisimaya Gazeta
July 5, 2010
Russian language loses its status [translation from JRL]
The Ukrainian leadership provoked a new wave of "linguistic sovereignty"
By Tatiana Ivzhenko (Kiev)

Ukraine is facing another language war: recently, Leninsky District Court of Sevastopol had overturned the decision made by the Sevastopol City Council on awarding Russian a regional language status. At the same time, the resolution, adopted by the Supreme Soviet of Crimea on May 26, on implementation of constitutional guarantees on the free use of the Russian language, which implies a de facto rise of status of the Russian language in the autonomy, remains in force. All the confusion could be settled by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, although deputies note that the language politics are once again being influenced by the election campaign.

Late last week, the Ukrainian parliament had scheduled local elections for October 31. These election results will determine if the ruling Party of Regions will be able to complete the formation of a rigid vertical of power or be forced to deal with the powerful opposition, represented by regional structures. Therefore, it looks as though all pressing issues, capable of splitting the society, are being set aside until after the elections ­ one of which is the language issue.

The position to grant the Russian language a status of the second official state language was a part of the election campaign program of the Party of Regions and Viktor Yanukovich. Soon after the elections, an ally of the newly-elected president, Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, Anna German, told Nezavisimaya Gazeta (NG) that an immediate implementation of the campaign promise should not be expected. She explained that it requires a complex and lengthy procedure of amending the Ukrainian Constitution. "When supporters of the idea to raise the Russian language to the official state level have a constitutional majority of 300 votes in the Verkhovna Rada, then this issue may be resolved," said German.

She added that Yanukovich will not wait until the number of allies in the parliament increases, and will, instead, resolve the problem by other means: "We could implement the European Charter for Regional of Minority Languages in the Ukrainian legislation, which will allow giving Russian a regional status in places with Russian-speaking population".

In mid-May, a corresponding bill was registered in the parliament by Party of Regions deputy Vadim Kolesnichenko. He explained that in case the document is adopted, local authorities will be able to independently make decisions on regional language or languages ­ "in places where more than 10% speak the regional language". The deputy does expect the bill to be approved before the summer legislative recess, although he did caution: "There is one sword of Damocles, which is also known as 'the approaching [local] elections'". However, Kolesnichenko was talking about the elections in the context of the Party of Regions' implementation of its election pledges. Meanwhile, Yanukovich's current allies in the parliamentary coalition view the problem differently.

Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, Vladimir Litvin, whose faction is part of the coalition, fears that the language issue will deepen the split of Ukraine. Many experts have criticized Litvin, suspecting him in an attempt to pass between two fires by neither supporting the idea of raising the Russian language's status nor the maintenance of the linguistic status-quo.

The situation, developing around the status of the Russian language, could divide the country.

This opinion is strongly shared by the Communist Party, which had registered its own language law much earlier than Kolesnikov had submitted his document. Its author, Deputy Leonid Grach, believes that many politicians are, once again, trying to exploit the language issue with the objective to benefit at the elections, but are not planning to change anything about the situation that has unfolded in Ukraine. He recalls that Yanukovich promised to raise the status of Russian to the level of an official state language in 2004 and in 2009, but in the end, distanced himself from the process.

Vadim Kolesnichenko agrees that "Russian is the native language for 30% of the population, all other national minority languages amount to 0.4%". That is precisely why he is convinced that adoption of his draft law, will, de facto, lead to upgrading the status of Russian on most territories.

Because resolution of the question is once again being delayed and is drowning in procedural complexities, in late May, the Supreme Soviet of Crimea had adopted a decision to raise the status of Russian on the territory of the autonomy. This prompted protests from Crimea's Tatars and national-democratic forces in Kiev. Deputies of Viktor Yushchenko's party insisted that the prosecutor general initiates legal action in connection to the violation of the Constitution of Ukraine. Even Party of Regions deputies agree that their Crimean colleagues had put the cart before the horse by refusing to wait until the issue is settled at the national level. "They will have Supreme Soviet elections in the fall; that is why they are in a hurry to score some points," a member of the ruling coalition ­ who agrees with the view that, in doing so, Crimea's deputies have compromised the ratings of the Party of Regions ­ told NG. Neither Ukraine's Prosecutor General's Office nor the Ministry of Justice had reacted to the situation. Meanwhile, the Odessa Oblast of Ukraine is preparing to declare "Russian language sovereignty".

In order to save face and keep the situation under control, central authorities are forced to act the same as Viktor Yushchenko's allies did in 2006 ­ through the courts. The former president's team managed to extinguish the "language fire" with harsh judicial verdicts, which accused the local authorities of exceeding their limits of authority and violation of the Constitution. The new decision of the Sevastopol District Court continues the old tradition. However, the problem cannot be resolved without it being regulated by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. It looks as though one document won't be enough. Even its author, Kolesnikov, admits that in the years since its independence, Ukraine has adopted "more than 100 laws, which directly prohibit the use of Russian language and other national minority languages". Meanwhile, the authorities, who are busy tackling economic problems and preparing for the local elections, do not have enough time to reconcile these documents, raising the status of Russian, if not to the official state level, then at least to the level of an official language for documentation.

Discouraging words

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This article from Nezavisimaya (original is here, the translation below is courtesy of JRL) is not encouraging, particularly on the issue of peacekeepers.  However, I suspect Gamova - especially given her habit of spinning stories about these regions in what are supposed to be straight news pieces - is not quite accurately reflecting Moldovan elite opinion with respect to the Kozak Plan:

Nezavisimaya Gazeta
May 13, 2010
MEDVEDEV AND YANUKOVICH TO OPEN TRANS-DNIESTER REGION
Runaway Moldovan province pins a good deal of hopes on the new Ukrainian authorities
Author: Svetlana Gamova
THE EVE OF DMITRY MEDVEDEV'S VISIT TO UKRAINE: THE TRANS-DNIESTER REGION EXPECTS SUPPORT FROM KIEV NOW ALONG WITH THAT FROM MOSCOW

Presidents of Russia Dmitry Medvedev and Ukraine Victor Yanukovich will make a joint statement regarding the Trans-Dniester region during Medvedev's visit to Ukraine on May 17-18.

A source within the Foreign Ministry said that the statement in question would declare coordination of efforts in Trans-Dniester conflict resolution. (Both Russia and Ukraine are guarantors and intermediaries in the process.) Quite importantly, there are almost 150,000 Russians and 100,000 Ukrainians living in the self-proclaimed Trans-Dniester Moldovan Republic. Medvedev once promised Trans-Dniester leader Igor Smirnov that the locals with Russian passports could count on Russian protection. Smirnov called it the most important guarantee the self-proclaimed and non-recognized republic had.

Insiders say that the joint statement to be made by Russian and Ukrainian presidents will reiterate their stand on the matter of peacekeepers: they should be left where they are. It is going to be an answer to the idea regularly brought up by Kishinev to replace the existing peacekeeping contingent in the Trans-Dniester region comprising Russian, Moldovan, and local units with foreign policemen or observers.

The Trans-Dniester parliament (Supreme Council) in the meantime hopes that installation of the new regime in Ukraine will mean an end to the blockade. Aided by then President of Ukraine Victor Yuschenko, the Moldovan authorities were able to close the border for goods and produce from the Trans-Dniester region in 2006. EU observers have manned the Trans-Dniester part of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border ever since. Without Russian aid, the region would have never survived.

"That Yanukovich wants no EU experts or whoever on the border is common knowledge. I suspect that he will do everything now to prevent prolongation of the Europeans' mandate. The Ukrainian border with the Trans-Dniester region will open then," said Arkady Barbarosh, Director of the Center for Social Policy (Kishinev).

"The EU has never wielded any clout or possessed any leverage with the region in question. Its Eastern Partnership initiative does not even promote any such objectives," said Alexander Rahr of the German Foreign Policy Council. "Russia would like to return to the region, of course, but with Yuschenko in Kiev it was impossible. It is different now. Moscow will probably reanimate Kozak's Plan, and Yanukovich will raise no objections."

"Moldova is not going to accept Kozak's Plan because it stands for continued presence of the Russian military on the Moldovan territory," Barbarosh said.

Considering the attitude of the powers-that-be currently in Kishinev, there is no chance to reanimate the Kremlin's plans first designed in 2003. The parliamentary election in Moldova this autumn may change everything. The Moldovan political establishment is already castigating ex-President Vladimir Voronin for the dismissal of Kozak's Plan. Marian Lupu, leader of the Democratic Party which is part of the ruling alliance nowadays, said that official Kishinev had failed then to consider all implications and made a mistake. Were it not for this mistake, there would have been no wine embargo that crippled Moldovan economy, he said.

The Gray Lady's Moldova coverage

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Although there have been very credible reports that some foreign journalists have had a difficult time getting into Moldova, the New York Times has a correspondent on the ground. This means that Americans will read about events in Moldova in the national paper of record and perhaps I'll no longer have to explain to people where the country is located (though perhaps I shouldn't get my hopes up).

The paper's main recent articles are here and here, and the comments page to the first one has a wealth of thoughtful Moldovan voices (+1 more) occupying various points of view but mostly seeming to agree that Tuesday's violence was unacceptable. There are not many other places I can think of where one could see a relatively articulate debate about events in Moldova conducted in English.

In addition, the NYT has updated its Moldova topic page, which is a quite fortunate since in the past I recall it being a bit sparse - perhaps in part because articles about Moldova in the NYT seemed to run no more frequently than once every two months.

[Bonus bit for followers of other protest-prone post-Soviet countries - on the eve of opposition rallies in Tbilisi, the NYT's The Lede blog has a hilarious but also illuminating piece about the latest (semi-manufactured) scandal surrounding Saak, titled "A President, His Masseuse and Her Blog"]

Finally, the NYT has an op-ed on the situation in Moldova by Andrew Wilson, the guy who literally wrote the book on the Orange Revolution. It's definitely worth reading in full:

Europe’s Next Revolution?
By ANDREW WILSON
New York Times, April 8, 2009

The demonstrations in the Moldovan capital of Chisinau after last Sunday’s elections are not like Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution” in 2004. Most obviously, they have been far from peaceful. Nor have they been provoked by incontrovertible evidence of massive voting fraud. The demonstrators just don’t like the governing party: Moldova is the only European country where a nominally “Communist” party has won largely free and fair elections, in 2001 and 2005.

So why the protests? The Communists fought dirty in the campaign, but not as dirty as others in the region. Regional TV was harassed, but the main national opposition channel stayed open. Businesses were pressured to sever ties with the opposition and the president reminded voters none too subtly who would pay for their new schools. Nothing was done to make voting easier for the hundreds of thousands of Moldovans abroad, who were less likely to vote for the Communists.

But Moldova is still a relatively open country. Its people have access to Romanian, Ukrainian and Russian mass media. There is no single economic player of which ownership would effectively grant control of the whole country — like Gazprom in Russia. In 2007, 51 percent of Moldovan exports went to the E.U. and only 17 percent to Russia. Even Transnistria, a major producer of steel and cement, trades mainly with Europe.

So the Communists may have padded the result. The official exit poll gave them 45 percent of the vote and they claimed exactly 50 percent — compared with 46 percent in 2005 and less than 40 percent in local elections in 2007. But the result was not a total steal. The main opposition parties, the pro-European Liberals and Liberal-Democrats, only won around 13 percent each, and the “Our Moldova” alliance just under 10 percent.

But the Communists need 61 out of the 101 seats to elect the next president and other officials. Their leader, President Vladimir Voronin, has served his maximum two terms: The most likely outcome is for him to become chairman of Parliament and for Moldova to “rediscover” that it is actually a parliamentary republic.

Funnily enough, the Communists are forecast to get exactly 61 seats. In 2005 they had to make an alliance with the Christian Democrats — who suffered in the long-term, losing their traditional pro-Romanian electorate and ending up with only 3 percent of the vote. This time, the Communists will not need to make alliances: They can easily pick off one or two businessmen from the other three parties’ lists.

A second reason for the protests has been the Communists’ flirtation with Russia. Moldova’s foreign policy has swung back and forth in recent years, but Mr. Voronin has conducted a largely pro-E.U. course since 2003. Yet in a close contest this time, he relied heavily on Moscow as an election resource.

This trend could well continue. Russia is seeking to settle the dispute with the separatist “Transnistrian Republic” on its own terms. It is also seeking to buy up assets such as power plants in Chisinau and Balti, which now look relatively cheap.

A third factor is that Moldova is yet another country facing economic crisis. It has artificially prolonged a boom in local consumption through the April elections, financed by external remittances from as many as 500,000 Moldovans working in the E.U. and 344,000 in Russia — sums that once comprised a third of GDP. Mr. Voronin’s circle takes a cut on imports and on construction fueled by remittances — and so has tried to keep the cycle going for more than the usual electoral reasons. But imports are now three times exports and customs duties make up 70 percent of budget revenues. A crunch is coming.

When it does, the E.U. has a number of cards to play. Visas are a huge issue for Moldovans working legally or illegally in the E.U. The E.U. Border Monitoring Mission has helped cut down on corruption and the trafficking of people and drugs through Transnistria. Moldova may soon have to go cap-in-hand to the I.M.F.

Moldova may be a small country, but it is one of the region’s few democracies. And it is symptomatic of a broader trend. In the global economic crisis there is a real risk of the E.U. stepping back from the “eastern neighborhood” as it plunges into ever deeper crises. Russia, on the other hand, does not fall back on utilitarian thinking in times of crisis. It is investing to win influence in the future.

Andrew Wilson is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Pondering the prospects for a post-Putin "perestroika"

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I found this article fascinating - hopeful and yet pessimistic at the same time, it perhaps relies too much on comparisons with the USSR and makes a conclusion that may be too bold. But its author, an emigre sociologist and a long-time and prolific commentator on life and public opinion in the USSR and Russia, makes a number of important points in arriving at that conclusion.

Johnson's Russia List
27 May 2008
How the new Russian President could start a new Perestroika with friendly trips to the capitals of neighboring countries
By Vladimir Shlapentokh
Michigan State University

[...]

[M]aintaining the image of the world as an enemy of Russia is a crucial way to legitimize current regime, along with the political stability in the country. The imperial ideology exploits the nostalgia of many Russians for the great empire and abets nationalism. It pits the population against foreign countries, treating them as hostile toward Russia and its integrity, and as working against the restoration of the country’s previous geopolitical role. In order to maintain a climate of patriotic agitation and divert the people from the country’s real problems, Russian politicians and journalists talk incessantly about “great Russia,” “Russia’s great past,” and “the great victory in 1945.” It is remarkable that, on the official site of the Russian president (2000-2007), the adjective “great” was mentioned more than 3000 times.

The practicality of the imperial ideology is seen in the fact that up to 85 percent of the population, according to a survey by the BBC at the beginning of 2008, responded positively, in one way or another, to the xenophobic propaganda of the Kremlin and its foreign policy. In fact, the ruling elite do not possess other ideological ways to influence the minds of most Russians. Alternative ideological fundamentals, such as private property and the market economy (in April 2008, Medvedev underscored their importance for Russia), are not attractive at all to the majority of the population, which hates the corrupt bureaucrats and their illegal fortunes. Only 10 percent of the population, according to a survey by Levada’s polling firm conducted in November 2007, declared that they “respect people who became rich in the last 10-15 years.”

Only the imperial ideology allowed the Kremlin to pursue its deeply antidemocratic domestic policy and disregard the growing social inequality in the country. This ideology justifies the supremacy of the “national leader” and the mistreatment of democratic institutions. It presents the members of the opposition as almost foreign agents and makes it impossible for Western organizations, such as the British Council, to function in Russia. It justifies the rude intervention of the state in the activities of foreign companies, such as British Petroleum, which cannot protect their interests against Russian competitors. It helps persecute the Protestant Church in Russia as an American agent. The imperial ideology also treats Stalin as its main hero and maintains his positive image by silencing the media’s coverage of the mass terror in Soviet times.

In fact, the imperial ideology is only meant for a domestic audience and its influence on the relations with foreign countries is rather limited. The case involving the USA is typical. During the parliamentary (December 2007) and presidential (March 2008) elections, the volume of anti-American propaganda was extremely high. However, this propaganda did relatively little to deteriorate the relations between the two countries and in no way prevented the cordial meeting between Bush and Putin in Sochi where they, like a loving couple, went to see the sunset on the Black Sea on March 27.

In order to restart Russia’s move toward democracy, it is vitally important to break the spine of the imperial ideology. Germany and Japan, after the war, would not have been able to take the road toward democracy without a resolute and consistent rejection of the ideology of supremacy, militarism and expansionism.

The most peculiar fact is that a radical change of foreign policy is much easier than doing the same in domestic affairs. This is exactly what should be on Medvedev’s mind, if he wishes to be a liberal and not one of Putin’s clones. Medvedev seemingly understands the danger of using “greatness” as the central postulate of the official ideology. In April 2008, Nikolai Svanidze, a known Russian journalist, asked Medvedev, “What does great Russia mean to you?” Putin’s heir answered, “Russia, without doubt, is a great country.” However, he then called upon the Russians “not to be intoxicated” with the idea of “greatness” and to look soberly at the real position of Russia in the world.

Many liberals are waiting for the release from prison of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, an oligarch jailed by Putin for his political ambitions. However, Medvedev would have a more difficult time releasing Khodorkovsky than attacking the imperial ideology. As a matter of fact, liberalizations in post-Stalin Russia began in this area. Even before Khrushchev’s famous speech about Stalin’s atrocities at the Twentieth Party Congress, he proclaimed a policy of peaceful coexistence and undertook a number of actions that radically changed Soviet foreign policy. He was instrumental in the achievement of the armistice in Korea in 1953 and the peace in Indochina in 1954. Then, in 1955, he made a trip to Yugoslavia and apologized for Stalin’s policy toward this country and its leader Josip Tito. Then (still in 1955 and before “the thaw”) he reduced the Soviet army.

Mikhail Gorbachev’s foreign deeds also preceded his domestic liberal policy. Before the Soviet people and the world understood Gorbachev’s democratic intentions, which did not become clear until 1987, the new Soviet leader met with Reagan in November 1985, only a few months after his ascension to power. This meeting marked the beginning of the warming of relations between the two superpowers. It was followed by a new meeting with the American president in the next year in Reykjavik. By 1987, the USSR and USA prepared a treaty on the elimination of short- and middle-range missiles.

The experiences of Khrushchev and Gorbachev might serve as a playbook for the new president, if he had the guts to turn toward the democratic road. In fact, the major obstacle to democratization is the Kremlin’s support for the imperial and nationalist ideology.

Ironically, the key element of the imperial ideology and Russian foreign policy that should be attacked by a new reformer is not the animosity against the West, the USA or Europe. The hatred of Russia’s neighboring countries (the former Soviet republics such as Ukraine, Georgia and Estonia, and former satellites such as Poland) plays a much more important role today. For instance, in April­May 2008, Russian media talked much more about the perfidious Georgia than England, which now, after the Litvinenko case, is also treated as a committed enemy of Russia. What is more, the media talked about Georgia almost as much as it did about NATO, which is seen as another one of the country’s fierce enemies. Indeed, between April 21 and May 22 , Georgia was mentioned almost 590 in 50 major Russian newspapers; England was mentioned 420 times and NATO 425 . The Kremlin’s aggressiveness toward the neighboring countries is a major source of friction between it and the West, which became apparent at the Bucharest meeting of NATO in April 2008.

Many experts in Russia and the West believe that the imperial ideology is deeply rooted in the Russian mind. Of course, the traditions of the country’s political culture, with its authoritarianism and xenophobia, are quite strong. However, the impact of the media on the Russians is much stronger. Khrushchev easily and almost instantly transformed public attitudes toward Tito’s Yugoslavia, a “fascist country,” from deep hostility to friendliness. President Reagan was vilified by the Soviet media in all possible ways from the moment of his inauguration in January 1981. However, when he came to Moscow as Gorbachev’s guest in May 1988 (I was there and watched it myself), he was greeted by ordinary people and intellectuals with great joy.

It would be easier for the Kremlin to redirect the media away from its hostility toward the Ukraine and Georgia than make the judicial system honest and independent. If president Medvedev decided to “reboot” the Russian political process, he would have to go on friendly visits to the capitals of all neighboring countries, starting with Kiev and Tbilisi. These visits would be as historically important as Khrushchev’s trip to Belgrade in 1955. He also must remove (which would be even easier) the main hawks on TV, including Maxim Shevchenko and Mikhail Leontiev, who sow the hatred of the external world on an everyday basis by inventing the most absurd theories about the subversive activities of the United States and the Ukraine against Russia.

Whether and when Medvedev will choose this scenario is highly uncertain. Many subjective and objective factors are in the game. So far, all signals coming from Moscow indicate that Medvedev, as Putin promised, will stick to the imperial ideology. He had no objection against the military parade on the Red Square on May 9, which was clearly addressed not to foreign governments in order to scare them, but only to the domestic audience in order to fuel the imperial spirit in the country. In his speech at the parade, Medvedev talked about some enemies who present threats to the motherland. In his capacity as president, Medvedev deemed it necessary to visit the base of strategic missiles in order to “enjoy,” as reported by a Moscow newspapers, “the might of Russian weapons.”

The new president also hailed Russian TV, an open bulwark of the imperial ideology, and the antidemocratic policy as “one of the best in the world.” Instead of Tbilisi and Kiev, Medvedev chose as the place of his first visits Astana (the capital of Kazakhstan) and Beijing (the capital of China). Both visits, as Moscow newspapers wrote, demonstrated the continuity of Putin’s foreign policy. However, these first steps did not doom the idea of a future perestroika. Mikhail Gorbachev, in the first year of his tenure, verbally attacked imperialism and considered the improvement of the Soviet military forces as his main task.

However, it is almost certain that a return to democracy in Russia lies in the capitals of Ukraine and Georgia. Friendly relations with its neighboring countries are important to Russia because any hatred of them damages the Russian people. Whoever becomes the next American president, he or she should pay special attention to the relations between Russia and its neighbors. Without an improvement of these relationships, Russia will not be a stable partner in solving the world’s major problems.

Another Good Read

[image source]

From the Kennan Institute's 2006-07 Annual Report:

DIRECTOR'S REVIEW: Bumper Cars and Demolition Derby
Blair Ruble, Oct. 1, 2007

[...] Ukraine and Russia have been on different trajectories for some time, presenting an ideal setting for comparative social science research. Ukraine is a country visibly divided by fractures and fissures which run through the entire social landscape. Politicians are like bumper cars, clumsily careening toward one another in an amusement park before bouncing off more or less unharmed only to come crashing together yet again. Society sorts out its own coping mechanisms every day on the streets so as not to allow divisions to overshadow an increasingly good life.

Russian politics, on the other hand, resemble the American automobile sport of demolition derby, in which drivers of old, beat-up cars viciously crash together with increasing violence until only one victor is left to ramble around the field. The good life in Russia seems reserved for the strong.

Russian reality is more complex than its ever-more controlled political life might suggest, with very real divisions and contrasts existing across the sprawling Russian Federation. The social science question posed by contemporary Russia is more difficult than that presented by contemporary Ukraine. Ukraine’s complexities are open for all to see. Russia’s contradictions are hidden behind layers of obfuscation. No observers mistake Ukraine for the Soviet Union; analysts talk and write about the return of Soviet political practices in Russia every day. This perspective—which, at times, appears to be shared by the Russian political class—is misplaced. [...]

Read the whole article.

Uninspired and overcommitted

For some reason, 2008 hasn't inspired me to write about anything in this space. Oh, I've been following events and collecting links for posts, they just never get written. Sometimes my would-be posts end up as addenda (also known as comments) elsewhere. So, in lieu of a post requiring any thought or research, and in order to avoid having January pass without anything new here, I'm posting a few photos from our summer '06 sojourn to Odessa and points thereabout. The full photoset from that day can be seen here.

Guy selling every imaginable type of light bulb at the 7th Kilometer Market
(officially the Avangard Market - read a great NYT article about the market here).

Кафе-Бар "Ё-Моё," Privoz Market.
The name is a phrase which means something like "Aw, Shucks," in the sense
that it's a euphemism for a commonly used vulgar expression. The window advertises
"assorted ice cream," "cold beer" and "hot dogs." We did not sample the fare.

I don't pretend to know Ukrainian, but I'm guessing the truck is labeled "Live Fish."
Also from the Privoz market. Read more about the market here.

In the beach/resort area of Zatoka, near the Karolino-Bugaz and Limanskaya train stations.
The yellow posters are promoting some sort of adult entertainment -
the sign says "Happy Titties Await You."

Beach in the area of Zatoka. The sign says (in Russian),
"Do not swim past the place indicated by the buoys."

The bulletin board of a "база отдыха" (recreation center, lit. "base of rest") named Micron -
the name is no doubt a relic from the Soviet era when some Research Institute's
employees and their families enjoyed one free trip per year to the Black Sea.
Now anyone can book a vacation there!

Mini-documentary on EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM)

The EU is "Working Together for Regional Security and Economic Development on the Moldovan-Ukrainian Border." One of the goals has been to monitor and cut down on the level of smuggling on that border.

From the EUBAM website:

EUBAM was established by the EU at the joint request of the Presidents of Moldova and Ukraine in their joint letter of 2 June 2005.

While the management of the border guard and customs services is firmly in the hands of the experienced personnel of the two states, the EU stands ready to assist and advise wherever this may be helpful. The Mission is seeking to make a sustainable contribution to enhancing the delivery of good quality border and customs services to the citizens of Moldova and Ukraine.

Our common aim is a system of border and customs controls and border surveillance which meets not only European standards, but also, and especially, the legitimate needs of the citizens of each country.

I found this documentary on YouTube:

Ukraine

Seems like lots of stuff still going on in Kyiv. Lots of chat earlier in the week at this Siberian Light post on matters Ukrainian and otherwise. I'll leave the pontificating to the pundits and the eyewitness accounts to the people who are actually there.

Krizis v Kieve?

Looks like it may be an interesting weekend in Ukraine. Andy has a post that looks like it could start a comment debate. Veronica has photos and will not doubt have more as the weekend wears on - as long as her internet service is squared away!

An interesting tidbit I've just culled from Google News - the Georgian foreign minister is on a two-day visit to Ukraine and has met with Yanukovich. Not that it has anything directly to do with the current domestic crisis, mind you. But Ukraine's role in the GUAM organization (often described as a "counterweight" to Russian influence in the area Russia sees as its "near abroad") seems like it must be relevant to the domestic political situation there, because - at least as it seems from afar - so much of the back-and-forth going on in Ukraine in recent years has been about the fundamental question of whether the country will integrate with Europe or gravitate back towards Russia, or whether some sort of balancing act will be possible.

An interesting thing about GUAM is that with Uzbekistan's withdrawal from the organization, it now contains four post-Soviet countries - Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova - which have all had issues with secessionist regions. In each of the four current GUAM members, Russia has played a role in supporting the region(s) attempting to break away. While in Crimea this has so far been limited mostly to words and to stunts like Dmitri Rogozin showing up at the Kerch Strait a few years ago, there are still a lot of Russians who think that Crimea should belong to them (that link is to a rather outdated survey, from 2001, but still...).

This is not always discussed in Western analysis of the organization but is clearly something that the members see themselves as having in common (see, for example, this joint declaration referring to "aggressive separatism" and "unresolved conflicts"). The GUAM charter emphasized that the organization's role is "promoting stability and strengthening security in Europe on the basis of principles of respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of the state borders, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights." Note the emphasis on European orientation and combating secessionism. But I digress. It will be interested to see what develops this weekend in Kiev/Kyiv.

Cold War redux

I am relatively new to this blogging thing, but I've found a few of the bloggers out there who focus on parts of the region that used to be ruled from Moscow. There is some very interesting commentary out there; I won't post the links here because the best ones I've found are located permanently in the right-hand column.

One parenthetical observation before getting to the point: there seems to be lots of quality English-language blogging about Ukraine (by Ukrainians and otherwise) in a way that suggests the bloggers are physically there, though of course that's never verifiable, and there are at least a couple of excellent English-language bloggers posting from Central Asia, but I have not found a wealth of English-language blogs originating in Russia. Is this yet another consequence of Russia's ejection of the Peace Corps - a source of thoughtful English-speakers with time on their hands - while volunteers remain in Ukraine and Central Asia?

That logic breaks down, though, when I realize that I haven't been able to find a single Moldova-related blog (English-language or otherwise), although there are still lots of PCV's in that country. Maybe the expats in Russia don't think this place is exotic or interesting enough anymore to merit a blog; maybe they are just too busy getting a piece of the petrodollar windfall.

Anyway, one of the aforementioned excellent bloggers from Ukraine, Discoshaman of Postmodern Clog, posts the following, in part:

Ukrainians are people, not geopolitical pawns. And they want to be free.

One of the tragic things I see developing is that the Western media narrative seems to be falling into a US vs. Russia play. And I'm seeing more and more commentary in that vein on the web. So few seem to grasp that this is about an entire system, not about an election. Yes, the people are rallying for Yushchenko, but it goes so, so much deeper than that. [...]

People are proud to be Ukrainian, proud that their country is now known for something other than mafia, dead journalists, and corruption. People who a week ago were convinced of their own powerlessness are now standing fearlessly, singing together, "We are many, we are one, we can't be stopped!"

Can anyone be so dead of heart not to find this beautiful?

Powerful words and powerful ideas. The cynic in me is almost overpowered (then wants to say, "wait a minute, aren't we ALL geopolitical pawns?"). The Argus agrees heartily with Discoshaman's post, then goes into detail which is interesting and relevant to the point to which I'm getting. Namely, that it wasn't the US or Western media that created the narrative of the Chestnut Revolution as a US-Russian proxy battle - this narrative was created in no small part by the many Russian leaders, pundits, and media outlets which have framed the story in these terms.

Every time Channel 1's Vremya covered the events in Kiev, there was lots of footage of the orange brigades' large stocks of food and clothing, and not-so-thinly veiled insinuations that "someone" - i.e., "the West," or Soros, or another such meddler - had to pay for all of this, right? As for Russian elder statesmen, who should know better, Primakov's recent statement that "the West stands behind the crisis in Ukraine" is just the latest - Foreign Minister Lavrov is also on the record talking about Western "interference," not to mention Putin's statements on this score. All of this in spite of Ambassador Vershbow's protestations that the US "does not see Ukraine as an arena for US-Russian rivalry."

Furthermore, the mere comparison of the current events in Ukraine to Georgia's Rose Revolution, during which the role of the US irritated many Russian political elites, implies that there is some level of US involvement with a goal of rolling back Russia's sphere of influence. So it's not just "our" journalists shoehorning the story into a simpler narrative that lets them file their articles on time, there really is something to the US-Russian conflict angle, if only because the wounded superpower pride of so many Russian leaders prevents them from seeing that activities in the post-Soviet space do not have to be a zero-sum endeavor.

There is room for humor in all of this, right? I got a laugh out of some of the anti-American posters which apparently turned up in the hands of Yanukovych supporters, which polit.ru has helpfully aggregated on a single page.