The Parable of the Isms - a guest post by Matthew Rojansky



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The Parable of the Isms, as Applied to the Former Soviet Union
Guest post by Matthew Rojansky

My colleague Karim Sadjadpour recently published a satirical analysis of Middle East politics, "The Cynical Dairy Farmer's Guide to the New Middle East," riffing on a famous Cold War joke about communism and capitalism, known as "the parable of the isms."  As Karim noted,

 No one really knows how the two-cow joke known as "Parable of the Isms" came about, but most students of Political Science 101 have likely come across some variation of the following definitions:

Socialism: You have two cows. The government takes one of them and gives it to your neighbor.

Communism: You have two cows. The government takes them both and provides you with milk.

Nazism: You have two cows. The government shoots you and takes the cows.

Capitalism: You have two cows. You sell one and buy a bull.

Satire it may be, but the essential truth of the "cow jokes" is what makes them funny. Karim's thirteen terse metaphors for Middle Eastern regimes cut to the heart of a complex region in which increasing American interest has followed increasing investments of blood and treasure, with very little added understanding of what's really going on.

The Soviet Union suffered no dearth of American attention over nearly half a century after World War II. Yet even the keenest observers, like Kennan and Kissinger, were focused almost entirely on Moscow, and within it mostly on the Kremlin. During the Cold War, that made good sense - after all, no one in Kiev or Almaty, let alone in Chisinau or Ashgabat, was making particularly important decisions for US foreign policy and global security.

But twenty years after the collapse of Communism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, things work a bit differently in Eurasia. To understand why drugs flow so readily from Afghanistan through Central Asia and into Russia and Western Europe requires some sense of what's going on - and what's not - in places like Dushanbe and Astana. To see why a NATO-Russia impasse over missile defense is so serious requires an understanding of how the people, and the governments, in Kyiv and Tbilisi relate to their massive neighbor.

The former Soviet republics are no longer defined so much by being formerly Soviet, as by what they have become after twenty years of independence. Yet the old categories - socialist, communist, capitalist, fascist - don't easily work to describe a region where political cultures draw on everything from Rome and Byzantium to Baghdad and Beijing. Let's see how the "parable of the isms" might offer a convenient shorthand guide to the fifteen states that once made up the USSR.

Russia
You have six cows and four bulls. Two of the bulls die from alcoholism, and the remaining two form a "tandem" to take the cows' milk and sell it to Germany and China.

Ukraine
You have four of the most productive cows on the farm, two of which allow themselves to be milked by Russia, which upsets the other two so much their milk goes sour.

Georgia
You have two cows and one prize-winning bull. The bull is so distracted winning prizes that Russia runs away with both cows.

Belarus
You have one cow which you savagely beat until it produces milk. The milk dries up after your last savage beating, so now you must sell the cow to Russia.

Moldova
You have two cows and a calf, but the cows live in Italy and Russia and send milk home by Western Union. You ferment the milk into wine, and launch a frenzied campaign to join the EU. Meanwhile, the calf is stolen and sold by rustlers.

Armenia
You have four cows, but three of them live in Los Angeles and think they are horses. They send money for you to build stables.

Azerbaijan
You have one cow that produces lots of excellent milk. You sell the milk to Farmer Browne and buy cattle prods from Israel and Turkey.

Turkmenistan
You had one cow but you sold it to buy a golden statue of a cow that rotates with the sun.

Kazakhstan
You have two cows that produce vast quantities of milk. You sell the milk, buy each cow a gold-plated cow bell, and declare yourself bull for life.

Kyrgyzstan
You have two cows: one Kyrgyz and one Uzbek; they hate each other and refuse to be milked. Instead of hay, feed them tulips. Then sell one each to Russia and the United States. After six months sell them again.

Tajikistan
You have three cows: one Tajik, one Uzbek, and one Russian. You beat the Russian cow until it runs away, and use your misfortune to plead for international aid. Meanwhile Iran milks your remaining cows.

Uzbekistan
You have four cows. You let them drink all the water in the neighborhood swimming pool. Now no one can go swimming. You blame this on "corrupt and lawless elements," and volunteer to remain in power until the problem is solved.

The Baltic States

You have lost half your cows, for which you blame Russia and demand an apology. As consolation, the EU gives you a sleek Scandinavian-designed barn and NATO farmers teach you advanced milking techniques.

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Orientalizing post-Soviet politics?

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Andrew Wilson has an article out on openDemocracy that provides a taxonomy of post-Soviet political systems and where they stand in terms of their employment of "political technology."  The piece is interesting for its anecdotes, and I've always been a big fan of Andrew Wilson's work introducing Westerners to the concept of "political technology."  Some of the main ideas from his seminal 2005 book, Virtual Politics, are outlined in a shorter format in these remarks of his from a few years ago.

The questions that Wilson really seems to be asking with this new article - why do governments of states like Russia and Kazakhstan bother orchestrating falsely competitive elections? what is it about the political culture of certain post-Soviet states that has allowed them to more or less leave the pervasive use of "political technology" behind? are some of these countries destined to remain in some sort of political purgatory, having left behind the "hell" of an authoritarian one-party state but never reaching the "heaven" of the (ultimately unattainable) idealized, squeaky-clean, competitive political system extolled by classic democracy promoters? - are very good ones and have concrete policy applications in addressing Western approaches to other political systems now in transition in the Arab world and elsewhere, not to mention American budgets for the variety of activities that fall under the umbrella of "democracy promotion."

The clarity of the current article's thesis, though, suffers a bit from the author's implication that political dark arts and even practices as benign as the manufacturing of artificial campaign narratives are somehow unique to the post-Soviet space and are something that should be "gotten rid of" as these countries move toward some democratic ideal. 

Is it possible that Wilson believes what he calls the "highly developed industry of political manipulation" that exists in Russia and elsewhere in the region is not in many respects an imitation of our own political system with many more rough edges (and a much smaller price tag, at least when compared to American electoral politics)?  The ghost of Lee Atwater, along with generations of dirty tricksters (from both of America's august major political parties) - not to mention a fella named Breitbart - would beg to differ.

[image source - "history reveals that smear campaigns are as American as apple pie"]

I'm not proposing throwing in the towel and allowing moral relativist "whataboutism" to triumph by making us all shrug and say our systems are no better - because that's not the case.  However, I'm not sure how much we do for the cause of "democracy," however one defines it, by lumping in things like politicized judges, politicians advancing the causes of favored business interests, and advanced political campaigning - which has become a career track and educational specialty in its own right in the U.S. in recent years and includes what Americans call "dirty tricks" and Russians call "black PR" - with factors more uniquely present (one hopes) in the transitional, soft- or hard-authoritarian political systems that Wilson writes about - actual ballot-rigging, the use of law enforcement to muzzle political opponents and domination of the media space by the government.

I also take issue with Wilson's assessment that Moldova became one of the post-Soviet world's "serious potential democracies" only in 2009, but that's another story...

Conflict Cables Series - Inaugural post

In the spring of 2008, I filed a number of requests under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) with the State Department, asking for cables related to the initial "hot" stages of the conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdniester which have, over the years, come to be known first as "frozen conflicts" and nowadays as "protracted conflicts."  The FOIA process took a couple of years, but in 2010 I finally received two large packages with documents responsive to my requests.  I am uploading them to Scribd and highlighting some of the more interesting ones on this blog.

Unlike the Wikileaks cables, these documents were all obtained legally through the FOIA process, but that doesn't make them any less interesting.  Although I can't promise a juicy revelation in every one, I am pretty sure that most of them were previously classified and unreleased and therefore potentially have new information of interest to researchers interested in these conflicts.  In addition, a number of them mention one of the conflicts in the context of broader issues of the US approach to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

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Protest rally in Tiraspol, Sept. 1991; the sign reads, "Ukraine and Russia, defend your citizens!"

The batch of cables I am going to upload first was received in response to my request for documents related to the Transdniestria conflict.  Below are the first two cables in this batch.  In the first one, paragraph 11 describes a visit by U.S. officials to Tiraspol, where they met with Igor Smirnov, then Gorispolkom (city council) Chairman, as well as the "recently named chairman of the 'Supreme Soviet of the Trans-Dniester Republic'...and a number of other people whose functions were not entirely clear."  "Smirnov treated pol[itical] off[icer]s with a degree of suspicion reminiscent of the Cold War days, asking why American diplomats were interested in coming to Tiraspol, and refusing to accept the standard replies."

The second cable provides a brief assessment of the political situation in Moldova in the fall of 1991: "The Moldovan government is steering a careful course between the Scylla of the breakaway Trans-Dnister and Gagauz 'republics' and the Charybdis of militant pan-Romanian nationalists."

Increasing Political Polarization in Moldova (April 12, 1991)

Moldova: A Fragile Stability Endures, but for How Long? (Sep 28, 1991)

The Return

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It's hard to believe it's been almost four months since I posted anything here.  The fourth quarter of last year was filled with work, work and work, but that's no excuse. Scraps of Moscow is back for 2011 and hoping to provide better content than ever with a new series of posts to be launched over the weekend.  My focus, as before, will be on the "protracted conflict" areas in the post-Soviet space, with other topics to be covered including the domestic politics in Moldova and Russia - both of which promise to be interesting this year.

In the meantime, I was remiss last year in not sharing any of my non-blog writing about the region, which included some thoughts on Karabakh as well as co-authored opinion pieces on "Why Moldova Matters" (Russian version) and on Transdniester (Russian version).  If you're interested in a longer read, an article I co-authored with a mouthful of a title - "Acquiring Assets, Debts and Citizens: Russia and the Micro-Foundations of Transnistria's Stalemated Conflict" - was published in the Fall 2010 issue of Demokratizatsiya but is unfortunately not available online.

I'm still trying to figure out how to usefully integrate some of the content from my Facebook wall into this space - an friend recently referred to it as my "Facebook blog," which is accurate given the amount of links posted and comment discussions that erupt there.  I guess the simplest way is just to be less lazy and do a three-sentence blog post when I see an interesting article instead of a one-sentence comment with a shared link on FB.  Stay tuned...

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Moskovskiy Komsomolets
August 25, 2010
Commentary by Marina Pervozkina: Thanks to Everyone, Everyone Is Free. South Ossetia and Abkhazia are gradually gaining independence from Russia. [Translation from JRL]

"Abkhazia is less dependent on Russia than Russia is on Abkhazia," one of the popular Abkhaz newspapers wrote recently. And the impression sometimes forms that the author was right on target. In any case, the elites of both the republics recognized by Russia often behave as if these words were inscribed on their family seal. Abkhazia and South Ossetia increasingly recall the willful beauty who condescendingly receives gifts from her long-standing, loyal suitor at the same time as her eyes are darting around looking for other interesting partners. And as always happens in such cases, the alternative is quickly found.

The Quiet American

"I think that he (Mikheil Saakashvili -- author) used the confrontation with Russia for personal goals: to muffle the voices of the discontented people in his own country. I hope that Saakashvili realized what harm he did to his own country, losing Abkhazia and South Ossetia in this way. After all, in this situation there will no longer be a road back."

"Kremlin propaganda again," some progressive reader will say involuntarily. And he will almost be right: such thoughts were heard on the official level in Russia so often that they became a kind of cliche that already seems almost improper somehow.

Nonetheless, these words, spoken just before the second anniversary of the August war, were a real sensation. After all, the person acting as the mouthpiece for Kremlin propaganda on this occasion is called the "shadow architect of American foreign policy" by well-informed people. And some consider him one of the most authoritative representatives of the American intelligence community. And not without grounds: Paul Goble (the quotation cited above belongs to him) in fact worked for a long time in the CIA, then served as an associate of the US State Department's Bureau of Research and Intelligence and as deputy director of broadcasting for Radio Liberty/Free Europe. He is considered one of the best experts on the Caucasus and inter-ethnic conflicts in post-Soviet space. In short, the classic "quiet American." Very quiet and very influential.

The significance of a person is best illustrated by the legends that surround him. There is a story that circulates about Goble, that supposedly the speaker and the prime minister of Armenia, who died at the hands of terrorists in October 1999, were paid back for rejecting the so-called Goble plan to settle the Karabakh conflict. We are sure that this is malicious slander.

And if such a complex person says publicly, "I think that on the threshold of the conflict Saakashvili misinterpreted statements by the US president and secretary of state... He did not hear at all what we had in mind. I hope that the American authorities are aware of the harm Saakashvili caused by his actions. We did not need that war," this certainly bodes no good for Saakashvili. It may already be time for him to look for a job in a quiet provincial American university. Just in case.

But here is the most interesting thing: "I believe in the right of nations to self-determination," Mr. Goble says. "And I am sure that Abkhazia has demonstrated its possibility of realizing this right in practice."

But what will happen with the territorial integrity of Georgia, for which official Washington is constantly affirming its support? The events of recent years have shown that for the Americans the integrity of other countries is always a relative value. When a probable enemy or its ally loses integrity it is welcomed. The examples of the USSR and Yugoslavia are known to all. But while the USSR collapsed relatively peacefully ("just" a few tens of thousands killed in Tajikistan, Abkhazia, the Dniester region, and South Ossetia), everything was much worse in Yugoslavia. At first glance US policy toward Slobodan Milosevic looked somewhat schizophrenic: after all, in its time Yugoslavia was the most pro-Western country in the socialist camp and had difficult relations with Moscow while Milosevic himself up to a certain time seemed to be a completely loyal client of Washington. He made concessions easily, in fact surrendered Serbian Krajna, and declared an economic blockade of the Bosnian Serbs (how can we help recalling here the multi-year blockade of Abkhazia by the Russian Federation?). But here is the paradox: the more Milosevic gave away, the less the West liked him. Ultimately the Serbs even gave up Milosevic himself, but they still took Kosovo away from them. The poor devils simply did not understand that it was not a matter of Milosevic, but of themselves -- the West does not need a strong, unified Serbia, which sooner or later will return to its traditional role as Russia's outpost in the Balkans.

But whereas everything is clear with Serbia, Turkey is, after all, a reliable ally and strategic partner of the Americans. And therefore the Americans' support of Kurdish separatism in Iraq is, from the Turkish point of view, completely beyond good and evil. I took a look at the Kurdish website yesterday, and saw there threats to secede from Iraq with highly promising commentary: "And if the Kurds slam the door, glass will fly across the whole region." In connection with which very alluring prospects could open up for Turkish Kurdistan. And how is Georgia better than Turkey?

Normal Heroes Always Take the Bypass

It is not only no better, but even in some respects worse: Georgia, an Orthodox country like Serbia, was a reliable supporter of the Russians during the Caucasus war and together they wiped out the mountain rebels, who are brothers in spirit and faith with the Kosovo terrorists, the United States' current strategic partners. So who will sort them out, the Georgians? Where will their sun rise tomorrow? Half of the North Caucasus is related by kin to the Abkhazes.

Of course, from the standpoint of America's strategic interests it would be best if a united Georgia including Abkhazia and South Ossetia joined NATO. But the West is starting to understand that it is probably impossible for Abkhazes and Georgians to live in one state. That means it is necessary to "enter" already independent Abkhazia maybe as a carcass, maybe as a scarecrow, maybe as an embassy if nothing else works.

"For Moscow the worst development of the situation in the Caucasus is if the West, and the United States in particular, decides to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia," Mr. Goble says. "Picture 27 embassies of the NATO members in Sukhum. No doubt the Russian authorities would be horrified at that. Then after all, there are others in Russia who would like self-determination -- Dagestan, for example. I do not rule out such a development of events. I hope that we greet the 10th anniversary of the conflict between Russia and Georgia in a significantly calmer state. There will be fewer comments on Russian aggression, and more embassies of foreign states in Sukhum. I do not know if there will be an American Embassy among them. That, of course, is a very bold dream."

Paul Goble is undoubtedly a brilliant analyst and a master strategist. He set forth a perfectly realistic plan to "nullify" Russia's August victory: reorient Abkhazia to the West and turn it into a Mecca for North Caucasian separatists. This is not fantasy. Suffice it to recall the Gorskaya (Mountain) Republic that was declared after the fall of the Russian Empire. It included Abkhazia, Ossetia, and five other republics of the North Caucasus. The ideas of the Gorskaya Republic were reborn after the fall of the Union. In November 1991 Sukhum was declared the capital of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus. During the war with Georgia representatives of all the national movements of the North Caucasus fought on the Abkhaz side. The minister of defense of war-time Abkhazia was Sultan Sosnaliyev, a Kabardin, and Shamil Basayev was his deputy. Kabardin and Chechen battalions played a decisive part in the war. Afterw ard those same Chechens, having become battle hardened on the fronts of Abkhazia, fought against Russian troops.

Highly-placed people I spoke with in Sukhum told me that even before the August events representatives of Western countries in private conversation hinted on occasion that Abkhazia's main problem was its pro-Russian orientation. "If the Abkhazes turn their faces to the West, anything is possible, including international recognition" -- according to my interlocutors that is how these emissaries talked.

"If the 'restoration' of Georgian rule is a fantasy, accordingly it is essential to prevent Abkhazia from finally falling under Russia's power," the journalist Neal Ascherson writes in his article entitled "Abkhazia and the Caucasus: the West's Choice," which was posted on the Open Democracy website. "The West is facing an urgent need to arrange direct contacts with Abkhazia -- economic, social, and cultural contacts -- and to get access to Abkhaz ports. That will help Abkhazia emerge from isolation."

News from the Field

As for South Ossetia, in the opinion of Western analysts it has fewer grounds for independence. Small territory, small population. And geographic position: South Ossetia is a "dagger aimed at Tbilisi," an ideal launching point for an invasion of Georgia. But the main thing is that North Ossetia is located in the Russian Federation. In this connection (I am again speaking on the basis of the words of participants in events who hold high positions in the Ossetian elite) on numerous occasions the Ossetians have been told unofficially that if North Ossetia unites with South Ossetia and withdraws from Russia, such a united Ossetia could well expect international recognition.

This idea is not at all as utopian as it seems.

In Tskhinval today we observe a paradoxical situation. While South Ossetia, its people, and the whole elite are entirely dependent on our maintenance -- in the war-ravaged republic nothing is working, there are no domestic sources of income at all, and even its security depends entirely on Russia -- Moscow cannot resolve a single significant problem there. Not even monitor the expenditure of its own money or protect its own people. Moscow (and according to my information the Russian premier personally) was even unable to get Mr. Kokoyty to dismiss South Ossetian officials who were caught stealing and whose names were known. The story of former health minister Nuzgar Gabarayev, who distributed Russian financial aid, is illustrative. His name has already become part of the language in the republic. After Moscow protege Vadim Brovtsev sent Gabarayev into retirement, President Kokoyty appointed him his own state counselor. Evidently an indispensable personage. Even more illustrative is the story of General Barankevich, who Moscow wanted very much to appoint to be head of the MVK (interdepartmental commission on the restoration of South Ossetia), but COULD NOT. In other words, in this case terribly dependent and very proud Tskhinval, living entirely on our money, was actually able to influence our internal personnel policy. At the same time we cannot influence Tskhinval's. I would say that this is the apotheosis of impudence.

There is an analogous situation in Abkhazia, where Moscow is unsuccessfully trying to get the property rights of Russian citizens who were illegally deprived of their housing restored. In order to avoid misunderstanding, I will emphasize that we are not talking here about the property of Georgian refugees. Their problems should be the subject of bilateral talks between Georgia and Abkhazia. It is those for whom the Russian government is fighting, principally Russians, Armenians, Greeks, and the like. Many of them never left Abkhazia at all.

In these very days another scandal has flared up. Sukhum rejected a document sent to it by the MID RF (Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs) entitled "Concept of the Work of the Joint Russian-Abkhaz Commission on Questions of Restorin g the Property Rights of Citizens of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Abkhazia." We will recall that the decision to form such a commission was reached in Moscow after an article published in MK (Moskovskiy Komsomolets) made the problem a matter of public record. Before this, according to our information, the MID RF and the Russian Embassy in Sukhum had sent several diplomatic notes to the Abkhaz side (dated 25 November 2008, 19 March 2009, 22 April 2009, and 31 July 2009). President Medvedev and foreign minister Lavrov discussed the problem with the president of Abkhazia. Sergey Baghapsh pointed out to the chiefs of local administrations the necessity of "taking a hard line with seizures of property." However, nothing happened. Not one of the protagonists of our article has gotten his apartment back at this point.

At the same time strange articles are appearing in the Abkhaz press in which the plans to form the commission are called "anti-state and anti-Abkhaz," while giving people back property that was fraudulently taken from them is considered a threat to the Abkhaz people. The Abkhazes never tire of repeating that their foreign policy must be multi-vectored, that they are not some pathetic outpost of Russia, but a sovereign state with its own interests. Thus if there is a change in the West's position on the issue of Abkhaz independence, Moscow stands a good chance of being left empty-handed.

And if we close our eyes to the problems that already exist in relations with our Abkhaz and Ossetian partners, it is not impossible that some day museums "of the Russian occupation" will open on the central squares of Sukhum and Tskhinval.

God forbid, of course.

Reacting to Medvedev's visit to Abkhazia - and to the S-300 deployment

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 The article below is a good read, and this RT press review of coverage of Medvedev's visit to Abkhazia is also worth checking out if you are interested in how this story played.  Neither takes into account today's news about Russia deploying an S-300 air defense system in Abkhazia, which has the Georgians up in arms and has received more coverage than I think it merits - after all, the State Dept claims they've known the Russians have had this system up and running there for the past two years...


Kommersant, August 9, 2010 [translation from JRL]
Report by Zaur Farniyev in Tskhinvali et al.: "Two Years Later: Trans-Caucasus Mark Second Anniversary of 2008 Events"

South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Georgia marked the second anniversary of the August 2008 war differently. South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoyty made his fellow countrymen happy with the news that the deputies of the Latvian Seim had raised the question of recognition for South Ossetia. For the first time since its recognition by Moscow, Abkhazia had a visit from Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev. And Georgian head Mikheil Saakashvili went to distant Colombia in order to avert further recognition of Tskhinvali and Sokhumi in Latin America.

Video Conference on Recognition

Unlike last year, South Ossetia's leadership decided to scale things down. This time, there was almost nothing in Tskhinvali to remind anyone that two years had passed since the war that brought the republic its independence.

Within the framework of memorial events, the authorities organized an excursion to the places where the greatest number of civilians, citizen soldiers, and Russian soldiers died in 2008. The departure was delayed by nearly an hour. On the square in front of the train station, located several meters from the Alan Hotel, where most of the reporters were housed, they were searching for a bomb. Apparently, at seven in the morning, an unknown woman called a Moscow police station to tell them of an imminent terrorist act in Tskhinvali.

Meanwhile sources close to the government reported that President Eduard Kokoyty would not be at the site of the first flower laying because he was "holding a video conference with Latvia." The republic chief was indeed in touch with representatives of the Ossetian diaspora and deputies from the Latvian Seim by video conference. "Both my fellow countrymen and the Latvian deputies expressed their condolences to the people of South Ossetia," Mr. Kokoyty later related, after which he reported the main sensation: several Seim deputies had brought up for consideration by their colleagues the issue of recognition for South Ossetia. "This is a necessary step," the president commented, adding that only with the help of a few Western countries "will the Saakashvili regime feel its own impunity."

President Kokoyty and members of his government and administration laid flowers at the entrance to School No. 6, where North Ossetian native Aslan Aguzarov died. He had attempted to shield the women and children hiding in the school basement on the night of 7-8 August 2008. Aslan Aguzarov was posthumously awarded South Ossetia's highest honor, the Order of Uatsamong. Flowers were laid in several other places in Tskhinvali as well.

Later, on a bypass near the village of Khetagurovo, which suffered more than any other during the war, Eduard Kokoyty unveiled the Tree of Grief memorial, which looks like a tree a little taller than a person and instead of leaves has little bells that tinkle when the wind blows. Ten meters away from it are the frames of 20 warped automobiles. "These are those who tried to leave Tskhinvali at the very beginning of the invasion," local residents explain. "But they failed. Nearly all the vehicles were destroyed by Georgian tanks."

In the evening, on Tskhinvali's main square, the last memorial event was held; an academic orchestra from Moscow played a requiem.

August Theses

The main guest at the events in Abkhazia was Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev. He flew in yesterday to Sokhumi unexpectedly. The president's visit, his first to Abkhazia since Moscow recognized this republic's independence, was kept secret until the moment Russian flight number one landed at the Sokhumi airport. "Sergey Baghapsh (Abkhazia's head -- Kommersant) has long been inviting Dmitriy Medvedev to visit the republic, and now he ha s taken him up on the invitation," Natalya Timakova, the Russian president's press secretary, explained to Kommersant.

At the very beginning of his talks with Mr. Baghapsh, Dmitriy Medvedev emphasized the two main theses he wanted to bring out with his visit. First, the decision to bring Russian troops into South Ossetia in August 2008 and the subsequent recognition of Sokhumi and Tskhinvali "was difficult and complicated but, as time has shown, correct." Second, Russia intends to continue to develop "good relations with Abkhazia" in the areas of economics, politics, and security. Over the course of the several hours of his stay in Abkhazia, the Russian president returned more than once to these two theses.

At the end of the talks, Dmitriy Medvedev and Sergey Baghapsh, now without ties and jackets, headed for the U Akopa coffeehouse on the Sokhumi embankment, where there were many Russian tourists at that time. "May we join you?" Mr. Medvedev asked, and he immediately sat down with the vacationers. The Russian president asked how their vacation was going in Abkhazia. They started vying with each other to say how marvelous it was here, what wonderful air there was, and in general how well they were living at the Moscow Military District's Sukhum sanatorium. Sergey Baghapsh even laughed: "Of course, we aren't going to hear anything bad from them now." But the tourists tried to convince the presidents that they were speaking sincerely, and at the same time they asked Mr. Medvedev about the fate of the Sukhum sanatorium.

"Let's ask the defense minister about this right now!" The Russian president turned to Anatoliy Serdyukov, who had accompanied him on the trip. The head of the military department assured them that the Russian Defense Ministry sanatorium in Abkhazia would be restored and would operate as before.

Mr. Medvedev promised the coffeehouse's customers that Russia would be rendering assistance to Abkhazia in restoring the airport and air traffic, since "that would be more convenient." In general, he said, Abkhazia had every opportunity to become a tourist center on the Black Sea coast and occupy "its own niche" here. "Simply restoring Soviet service is the wrong way to go," the Russian president explained. "It has to be comparable to Turkey."

Before leaving U Akopa, Dmitriy Medvedev once again repeated that Russia was not going to abandon Abkhazia, and turning to Sergey Baghapsh sitting next to him, he commented, "But they themselves must try, too. Will you?" The Abkhazian president seemed stung. "We are."

After the coffeehouse Dmitriy Medvedev and Sergey Baghapsh spent some time at the Abkhazian State Philharmonic and the second Russian school, which were restored with Russian investments. At the Memorial to the Glory of Those Who Died in 1992-1993 for Abkhazia's Freedom, Mr. Medvedev once again recalled his two-year-old decision. "We acted correctly. We saved people and prevented a bloodbath here," he said. He repeated this same thought during his visit to the Russian military base in Gudaut. Were it not for the help of Russian military personnel, "many of them (civilians -- Kommersant) would simply not be among the living," the Russian president said. "Russian soldiers in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are not letting extremist forces foist their own approaches, sow enmity and hatred, and shed blood," he added.

"The Russian president's visit to Abkhazia is more a political visit than a trip filled with specific content," a source in the Kremlin explained to Kommersant. "The goal of the visit is to emphasize the Russian Federation's political and military presence in the region."

Battle for America

Tbilisi reacted harshly to the Russian president's visit to Abkhazia. "They are continuing to play a lost game," Temur Ya kobashvili, Georgia's deputy prime minister and minister of reintegration, stated. "These territories have been recognized as occupied, and trips like this do not change anything or add anything positive for the region."

The anniversary of the five-day war was marked in Georgia on 7 August, since it is this date that Tbilisi considers to be the beginning of military actions. "On the night of 6-7 August 2008, fire from Ossetian artillery coming from Dzhava (a village not far from the Russian Federation border -- Kommersant) and from Tskhinvali almost totally destroyed the Georgian village of Avnevi," Mikhail Machavariani, deputy chair of the Georgian parliament, told Kommersant. "At the same time we have received incontrovertible reports that a column of Russian troops crossed the border at the Roki tunnel on the night of 6-7 August."

It is worth noting that on 7 August of this year President Mikheil Saakashvili was in distant Colombia, where he participated in the inauguration of that country's new president, Juan Manuel Santos. "The problem is that two states in Latin America, Venezuela and Nicaragua, have recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia," political analyst David Avalishvili explained to Kommersant. "Therefore the president could not let slip a chance to meet with other leaders of Latin America and convince them not to follow the example of Hugo Chavez and Daniel Ortega." Nevertheless, on the evening of 7 August, Georgian television showed Mikheil Saakashvili's speech, recorded on the backdrop of the Colombian capital, in which he promised that "the battle for Georgia's deoccupation would continue to the end."

Georgian authorities organized their main memorial events in the village of Ganmukhuri, on the border with Abkhazia, and in Gori, 25 km from South Ossetia. Not far from Ganmukhuri the authorities have built the Anaklia resort, and Parliamentary Speaker David Bakradze has opened a new hotel there. Right now hundreds of teenagers are vacationing at the resort, including from Belarus, and the arrival there of young Belarussians, naturally, is at the center of attention for the Georgian media. A memorial concert was held at the new hotel, and Bolshoy Theater tenor Zurab Sotkilava sang. The honored guests included former Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus, who actively supported Georgia in August 2008 and whose name now is on the riverside boulevard in Anaklia. This boulevard ends right at the Georgian-Abkhazian border, which since August 2008 has been guarded by Russian border guards, who have watched what was going on in Ganmukhuri through binoculars.

While in Gori several thousand young people holding candles formed the outline of Georgia's borders. Including Abkhazia and South Ossetia, naturally.

The hardy and pernicious myth of Western designs on Russia

Pundit Sees Attempts to Incite Anti-Western Sentiment as Threat to Russia Itself

Nezavisimaya Gazeta [translation from JRL]
August 4, 2010
Article by Georgiy Mirskiy: "Patriots' Fears -- West Not At All Interested in Weakening Russia"
[Institute of World Economy and International Relations]

"People want to weaken Russia ... what do you mean weaken it - they want to crush, dismember, subordinate it..." Who among us has not heard such cries? Journalists, TV and radio commentators, parliamentarians, generals, and professors compete with one another in their attempts to convince the Russian people that the West - and especially America - dreams only of causing catastrophic damage to our country, destroying it, taking things away from it. What is particularly interesting is the more our relationship with Western countries improves, the more vigorous and vociferous the counterattack becomes of those who implore: "Do not believe this! It is all lies! They are undermining our vigilance, they want to trap us!" And this mass brainwashing that has lasted for many years must inevitably produce results. In one opinion poll, almost a third of those who answered thought it possible that AIDS had been deliberately brought into Russia by the Americans.

In part, this has been happening since ancient times. In the century before last, when Queen Victoria ruled Britain, if Russia suffered any foreign policy failure, people usually said: "The Englishwoman is playing dirty tricks on us". In the Soviet era, it was customary to use one word to explain any accident - "saboteurs". Generally speaking, the attitude of Russian people to the West has always been ambivalent. Even two hundred or three hundred years ago, they knew that life in Europe was better, even much better. It was an axiom, just as people have always been convinced that customs in Russia will continue to remain as foul as they have ever been. You may recall Saltykov-Shchedrin: "Everybody steals, and at the same time everyone laughs loudly and says: well, where else do you see such an outrage?" But in order to compensate for this inferiority complex, it was necessary to develop the opposite complex - a superiority complex. A few years ago, viewers on one of the central TV channels were asked why it was that we had beaten Germany but the Germans lived better than us. Most of the votes, almost 40 %, went to the answer: "On the other hand, we are more heartfelt".

The conviction that everyone hates Russia and wants to play all kinds of dirty tricks on it is not based on any facts. The author has worked in America for nine years, has talked to the most varied of people, from former high-ranking individuals to black drivers on the Princeton University minibus. I have never heard anything bad about our country, on the contrary - there has always been only one leitmotif to their statements: "How can it be that Russia, such a great country, with such a great culture, with such talented people, with such natural riches, has finally got rid of totalitarianism, obtained its freedom, but we still get bad news from there?"

Of course, there are Russophobes in the West, just as there are anti-Semites and Islamophobes. But anti-American sentiment is also widespread throughout the world, it is enough to talk to French people, Turks, or Latinos; for example, I only actually know of two nations that really have a warm attitude towards America - the Poles and the Iraqi Kurds. But the Americans do not suffer from any complex because this. And we have no reason to complain about a bad attitude by foreigners; if our people do not themselves misbehave, they have a right to expect friendliness and benevolence everywhere.

I can foresee at least two objections: firstly, Americans and Europeans may not have anything against the Russians as a people, but they hate our regime, our state, and, secondly, even if the ordinary people there have some sympathy for us this is not of any significance - the position of politicians, capitalists, and the military is what is important. Well, what can be said in response to this.

It is true that people in America and Britain, for example, do not much like our regime. But do you think that they actually adore their own regimes? They curse them and change them every few years. And in any case, the words "regime" and "love" should not be combined at all, at least in democratic societies. It is usually only dictators and despots who are loved. Liking a ruler of one kind or another is another matter. It seems to me that of all the Russian rulers, only two were liked in the West - Catherine the Great and Mikhail Gorbachev. And the attitude there to the Russian state has since ancient times naturally been ambiguous. Russia seemed all too vast, incomprehensible, and mysterious, some latent threat seemed to emanate from it. The image of the powerful, sinister strength of this huge country has become a stereotype in the West, and when the Soviet Union became the "vanguard of world revolution", and subsequently, having shown its strength in the war with Germany also turned into a nuclear superpower, this image turned into a deadly threat.

But all this is in the past. After the collapse of the Soviet regime, the Western world sighed in relief. No one in the West now believes in Moscow's global imperial threats, or in a suicidal world nuclear war. Admittedly, people have understood there that the current Russian regime is not quite what would be desirable from the point of view of the "civilized democratic world", this is unpleasant and at times extremely disturbing, but in general, it is tolerated. The most important thing is that the insurmountable ideological chasm, the threat of the expansion of "world Communism", has disappeared. Many of the problems in Russia's relations with the West will not be resolved any time soon, but who says that it is impossible to live with unresolved problems?

Things are more difficult, at first glance, with the second argument: people say that American politicians, generals, and the military are fundamentally unable to reconcile themselves to the existence of a strong independent Russia, they want a weak Russia, or even better - one that has completely collapsed. Is that the case?

Let us imagine this scenario for a moment: everything works out for our foes, they have brought about a catastrophic weakening of Russia. But what is a weakened Russia? It is an economically degraded, impoverished, decaying country with a desperate, angry, embittered population. The question is: in which direction will the population turn, who will it heed, who will it follow? The pro-Western liberals, the democrats? There is no question of even talking about this, it is they who will be blamed for all the misfortunes, the potential support-base of Western ideological influence will be smashed to pieces. The Communists? Only partially, the baggage they carry from the Soviet era is just too unattractive. No, the people will follow the extreme nationalists, they will heed their xenophobic Nazi-tainted appeals. Hatred of the West, which "destroyed the Soviet Union and is now destroying Russia", will increase one-hundred-fold. The Nazis will not be able to break through into the real leadership of the country, but their influence on the ruling elite will increase to an enormous extent. But at the same time, no matter how weakened Russia might be and whatever pieces of it might fall off, Moscow will still retain the atomic and the hydrogen bomb. So you have a pretty picture: a poor, decaying country, seething with hatred for the West and all the "crappy democratic" countries there - but one with nuclear weapons. What could be worse for the West than such a scenario? And surely the West understands this, does it not?

They understand it very well, this very idea has been touched upon in many conversations. Tom Friedman of the New York Times wrote: "We do not fear a strong Russia, what is dangerous for us is a weak Russia, in which a missile could fall off the back of a truck and turn up somewhere in Iran". That is why Western diplomacy will, reluctantly and occasionally wincing, continue to do business with today's Russia, as the lesser of the possible evils. After all, is easy to imagine what horrific, truly apocalyptic consequences the disintegration of Russia could have, the emergence of new state e ntities that devour one another, the explosion of Islamist extremism in some of them, etc. The modern world, which is extremely agitated anyway, would turn into a nightmare.

"That would be good for the West," some people will say, "the Americans will be fishing in troubled waters, they will get rid of Russia as a competitor, and they will lay their hands on our natural resources." Here, it has to be said that there is little that can be compared in its absurdity to the argument that is often used about Russia being a competitor that must be finished off. What kind of a competitor are we, for goodness sake, and to whom? We export oil, gas and weapons - and there is enough room on the world market for everyone here. And in the most important sphere in the modern world, high-tech and knowledge-based production - where are we, in what place? When we have created Skolkovo, we will compete on an equal footing with America - so that will be when hell freezes over. And even if Russia were a serious competitor - so what? Look at China - it really is a competitor to everyone, the entire world is piled high with Chinese goods, but no-one intends to undermine, weaken or break up China.

The trouble for our apologists of fighting the West is that they are living with yesterday's realities, if not those of the day before yesterday, they do not understand how the world has changed. They still think there is nothing more important for the imperialists than, for example, seizing our Siberian oil. But any manager of a transnational oil company would have a heart attack as soon as he really imagined that he would have to deal with producing and transporting oil in the remote expanses of Russia. And seizing territories, establishing military bridgeheads - all of this is obsolete, like airships or gramophones.

The question then arises: why are all our hate-mongers, all the political scientists, journalists, and deputies "attached to the Kremlin" creating such an uproar? One of the explanations is understandable: the Soviet mentality is operating with its built-in mechanism that ensures the constant maintenance of the required level of anti-Americanism. What is amusing is that this anti-Americanism is for the most part affected and hypocritical. These people are now actually travelling to the West, they are prepared to fly off to America at the first invitation, their children study at British and American colleges, many of them have a lot of money in Western banks, and even real estate somewhere there. But when they return from their latest trip, they consider it their duty to "sling mud at" America, those are the rules of the game. Yes, and they get signals from above - saying there is nothing more useful for mobilizing the people around the party and the government than pedalling the external threat. And nobody thinks that this kind of game might be harmful within the country, for a population which is already clearly morally degraded. Xenophobia, inciting hatred towards "strangers", whether they are Caucasians or Americans, will inevitably lead to an increase in aggression and intolerance in society, which sociologists have long been sounding the alarm about. The "hardening of the hearts" of the younger generation is a threat not so much to the "Western enemy" as to Russian society itself.

"Black PR" lives...

The article below reminded me of how widespread the concept of "black propaganda" or "black PR" is in Russian political life (and in the competitive world of business as well).  The term is sort of a catch-all for any kind of "dirty" campaign tactics, from American-style opposition research, "dirty tricks" and negative campaigning to mud-slinging, sabotage and the dispensing of kompromat.  Anyway, I found more illustrations for a post on this topic than I expected - all of the images here are book covers, which suggest that fictional accounts of and instructions related to "black PR" - and how to defend yourself from it - are in demand in Russia.  As a bonus, here are a couple of fliers which serve as examples of "black PR" in Moldova; and the second image at this post is one from the 2004 campaign in Ukraine.

BBC Monitoring [courtesy of JRL]
Woman appeals to Putin, says One Russia owes her for 'black propaganda' - RenTV
August 2, 2010

A scandal has erupted in Suzdal, Vladimir Region over last year's mayoral elections, Russian privately-owned REN TV reported on 2 August. A young woman, Vera Nesvyashchenko, has written to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, complaining that she has not been paid for work she carried out for the One Russia party during the election campaign, which involved destroying opponents' campaign materials, and that the work she was asked to do was not entirely legal.

"The letterboxes were checked, there were some campaign materials there, we removed them; there were posters hanging on the poles, we tore them down and (it became) waste paper. All of the waste paper we brought to the headquarters, to the town library," she said.

Nesvyashchenko admits that she was engaged in "black propaganda", the correspondent notes. She was recruited by One Russia to work on the mayoral elections in August 2009 and was promised R7,000 (235 dollars) to destroy opponents' campaign materials, plus a bonus of R7,200 to compile a list of people who were intending to vote for One Russia's candidate Olga Guseva.

Nesvyashchenko also says that she and her colleagues questioned the legality of their actions but were assured that everything was above board.

"Tatyana Aleksandrovna said that it's no problem. The period of validity for campaign posters is three hours so you can safely clean up the streets," she said. "Only in court did I find out that it was illegal and hooliganism," she added.

The correspondent noted that 5,000 people (52 per cent of the overall number of voters) cast their ballots in the mayoral election in Suzdal - a record turnout.

"At the finish, the gap (between the candidates) was minimal. Olga Guseva received just 111 votes more than her opponent Oleg Grigorenko. It is not known what the state of affairs would have been, if there had not been the so-called guards (referring to Young Guard, the youth wing of the ruling One Russia party) and their mass clean-up operation."

Grigorenko unsuccessfully appealed against the election result, the correspondent noted.

The head of the regional branch of One Russia, Sergey Borodin, called Nesvyashchenko's actions "provocation". However, the former mayor of Suzdal, Sergey Gadunin, who held the post from 2005-2009, defended her.

"I have read some commentaries which said that this is an attempted smear on the part of the opposition. You know, the opposition can have a rest. There is no need to do anything more. The party is discrediting itself in such a way that there are simply no further words," Gadunin said.

Nesvyashchenko is also preparing a lawsuit, demanding the payment of the R14,200 and a further R5,000 for moral damage.

Twittering while Russia burns

It was interesting to see the translated article below appear in JRL on the same day as Svetlana Babaeva's piece appeared dismissing the political impact of social networking and new media in Russia ("nothing more than banal social chatter"; "inconsequential prattle").  

My value add in the article below is to link to the Twitterings of these government luminaries (other than Medvedev, since I can't be fussed to figure out which is the real one, and Astakhov, since I couldn't locate his using any of the obvious search terms) - and to point out that there is an aggregator-type Twitter account called gosblogi for Russian official Twitterers.  I would also note that the only one of these guys I really try to follow is Rogozin - he is a master of the form and often manages to display his sense of humor in 140 characters or less.  Though somewhat confusingly, he appears to have two accounts - the one linked in the previous sentence and this one.

And my purpose is, in part, to plug my very own new Twitter feed (in which, of course, I will tweet a link to this post, while praying that the universe does not collapse upon itself or get stuck in some sort of infinite loop of narcissism).  You can see recent tweets in the sidebar and the whole thing here - http://twitter.com/scrapsofmoscow


Twitter Takes Off Among Russian Politicians
Izvestia [translation courtesy of JRL]
July 29, 2010
Report by Aleksandra Beluza: Authorities of Short Messages

The Twitter era has begun in Russian politics. In the wake of President Dmitriy Medvedev, who launched his micro blog in June, governors and other highly placed figures have arrived there. A round the clock personal broadcasting channel, which is what Twitter essentially is, can be used during elections to mobilize the population when actions are being conducted.

Thanks to Twitter (from the English "to twitter") politicians all over the world are "taking off their jackets" and giving us the chance to see a stream of their personal news. Here is Dmitriy Medvedev writing about his visit to Belgorod Oblast: "I flew in to Alekseyevka. I went to the graves of my great grandmothers and great grandfathers. I was going for the first time. For work, as always." Now Medvedev has over 50,000 regular readers on Twitter.

Medvedev himself reads the micro blogs of US President Barack Obama and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper. But presidential aide Arkadiy Dvorkovich believes that it is precisely the Russian leader who has the best Twitter. "None of the leaders is comparable," Dvorkovich wrote on his own Twitter. "Where else will you see a photo taken by him personally (Medvedev -- Izvestiya)?" A picture called "view from the window of my hotel" taken by Medvedev in San Francisco has already been viewed almost 233,000 times, for example. Dvorkovich himself also posts a lot of photographs on his micro blog. He also writes quite openly -- for example, that "it is very hard to sleep after a week's tour in North America, but it is harder for the president."

"What does Twitter give you? Why are you ready to spend time on postings?" Izvestiya asked Dvorkovich on Twitter.

"Not a great deal of time is spent, but the ability to set out thoughts and share them concisely is developed," the presidential aide responded before five minutes had passed.

There are already around 20 senior Russian politicians and hundreds of officials at the level of deputies and heads of departments, including in the regional administrations, and also mayors, on Twitter. However, it is not pleasant to read all the micro blogs. Out of 10 governors only three write really interestingly -- Nikita Belykh (Kirov Oblast), Dmitriy Zelenin (Tver Oblast), and Mikhail Men (Irkutsk Oblast). Zelenin in particular distinguished himself by simply writing the following after Medvedev's departure from the Seliger youth camp: "The boss has left. The Tver forum and Seliger went well. I feel like a horse at a wedding -- with my muzzle in the flowers, and myself in a lather."

" Twitter has become a little personal news agency for politicians," managing partner of the Sotsialniye Seti (Social Networks) agency Denis Terekhov believes. "And here it is a question of information openness -- is the person ready to write quickly and without coordinating, without thinking about whether he has said it right or wrong 10 times? I think politicians who join Twitter are a priori more open than others. In this sense Twitter can be an acid test."

Essentially Twitter today is a test of a politician's openness -- is he ready to show that he is a person like everyone else? Mikhail Men admits: "I listened to (singer Vladimir) Vysotskiy all day." Dmitriy Rogozin, Russia's permanent representative to NATO, writes: "I have arrived in Moscow for a week's vacation; 360 degrees Centigrade (as published) is not that hot. It has been hotter at our NATO sessions." Pavel Astakhov, the ombudsman for the rights of the child in Russia, characterizes his secretariat like this: "I have 12 women working for me. I call them the 'child's special purpose troops.'"

There are only two party leaders here, Sergey Mironov, speaker of the Federation Council and the head of Just Russia, and Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). They both write every day, but somewhat turgidly. Denis Terekhov believes that "the part ies are quite sluggish and it is hard for them to use Twitter as a real channel of communication." In the opinion of other experts, Twitter could attract them not so much as an information technology as a mobilization technology.

"Many politicians are seeking communication with their target audience here -- the middle class and young people," Dmitriy Badovskiy, the deputy director of Moscow State University's social systems scientific research institute, says. "Plus Twitter gives an instant link with quite a big audience. And this makes it possible to gather supporters, coordinate observers at elections, and publish current information quickly. So I think that as the elections approach, activity and testing of Twitter as a possible environment for political mobilization will increase."

The 10 most popular Russian politicians on Twitter (by number of micro blog followers):

Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev 52,896
Russian's permanent representative to NATO Dmitriy Rogozin 7,513
State Duma Deputy Konstantin Rykov 3,769
Federation Council Speaker Sergey Mironov 2,084 [strangely seems to have protected tweets]
Tver Oblast Governor Dmitriy Zelenin 1,988
LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy 1,716
Kirov Oblast Governor Nikita Belykh 1,489
Presidential aide Arkadiy Dvorkovich 1,309
Perm Kray Governor Oleg Chirkunov 812
Children's Ombudsman Pavel Astakhov 535

 Perhaps tweeting is, for Russian officials in the era of Medvedev, something akin to 

taking up tennis under Yeltsin or becoming a martial arts beast / skier under Putin.

More on "peacekeepers" vs. "occupiers"

[image source] 
GUAM appears to be DOA, of course, but the article below suggests some degree of 
coordination between MD and GE's Russia policies.  I'm not sure I buy it, particularly as
I think the article overstates Acting President Ghimpu's influence on MD foreign policy.
And is wanting Russian troops to leave territory one claims as its own sufficiently strange
of a policy preference as to suggest that it must be the result of a coordinated campaign?

Nezavisimaya Gazeta [translation courtesy of JRL]
August 2, 2010
KISHINEV AND TBILISI NEVER NOTICED MOSCOW'S PROTESTS
Moldova and Georgia demand withdrawal of the Russian military from what they call their territories
Author: Svetlana Gamova
MOLDOVA AND GEORGIA COORDINATE THEIR RUSSIAN POLICIES

Their relations with Russia already soured, Moldova and Georgia got international support. The matter concerns the report on arms control agreements the U.S. Department of State published last Wednesday. The document mentioned presence of the Russian troops on the territories of Moldova and Georgia without their consent. By and large, the thesis in question repeated what State Secretary Hillary Clinton had said about occupation of Moldovan (Trans-Dniester region) and Georgian (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) territories by the Russian military. This statement was made when acting president of Moldova Mihai Ghimpu signed a special decree calling the Russian contingent in the Trans-Dniester region "occupiers" and demanding its withdrawal. The Russian Foreign Ministry then reiterated Moscow's official stand on the matter and gave the floor to Gennadi Onischenko of the Rospotrebnadzor.

Onischenko's words made it plain that Kishinev's objections to the presence of the Russian military in the Trans-Dniester region might cost it dearly. Russia suspended import of Moldovan wines - just to make the point. The Moldovans arranged negotiations to discuss the matter but the effort was wasted. That was when Clinton made her statement and urged Russia to start honoring its obligations. Her words killed the last chance the Moldovans might have had then to reactivate wine export to Russia.

Russian Foreign Ministry called "incorrect" U.S. Department of State's speculations on the presence of the Russian military in Moldova and Georgia. "There are no Russian soldiers in Georgia. As for Abkhazia and South Ossetia on whose territories Russian military bases operate with their consent, these countries are
neither parts or Georgia nor signatories of the Treaty on Conventional Armed forces in Europe." The Foreign Ministry reiterated that Russian peacekeepers were on the Dniester in accordance with the agreement between Russia and Moldova (July 21, 1992). The Moldovan authorities demand withdrawal of the Russian
military contingent and peacekeepers from the self-proclaimed Trans-Dniester Moldovan Republic in the hope to replace them with an international police force.

In any event, official Kishinev studiously ignored all objections and protests from Russia. Moreover, it chose to comment on the conclusions drawn in the U.S. Department of State's report in application to the conflict with Tiraspol. Kishinev no longer accepts the terms formulated by Moscow (conflict resolution first, evacuation of the military afterwards). Moldovan Ambassador to Romania Yuri Renice told the Romanian newspaper Adevarul, "Synchronization of the Russians' withdrawal with Trans-Dniester conflict resolution is a thoroughly counterproductive approach...Presence of the Russian military collides with the principle of neutrality promoted by the Constitution. Most Trans-Dniester residents stand for reintegration of the territory."
Trans-Dniester Foreign Ministry in the meantime appealed to the UN to recognize sovereignty of the Trans-Dniester Moldovan Republic in the light of the recent ruling of the International Court of Justice regarding Kosovo. "Our position is clear: the Trans-Dniester region is part of Moldova," said Renice.

Georgia took Washington's position as a clear confirmation: there are no sovereign Abkhazia and South Ossetia, there are but regions of Georgia occupied by Russia. Ghimpu said that he would pay an official visit to Tbilisi before long. It is clear that Kishinev and Tbilisi intend to coordinate their Russian policies.

Another "Sexy Russian Spy"? Exclusive photos here!

Regular readers of this blog know that I try to keep things classy here.  However, I've seen my esteemed Russia-blogger peers make hay on the Anna Chapman story and will not get scooped again! 

It seems that another young Russian lady has been detained on suspicion of espionage, and this one also seems to have enjoyed posting revealing photos of herself on the internet.  Never mind that she was apparently born in Latvia and is a U.S. citizen, Gawker already has the Facebook photos of our "New Sexy Russian Spy," Anna Fermanova.  But Gawker must not know about Odnoklassniki, which has this photo of the latest innocent-until-proven-guilty victim of spymania - and more!

After the jump are some more photos of Ms. Fermanova that Gawker couldn't show you.  As of now, they appear to be available online only here.  Ah, I knew I would be proud of this blog someday...

It's a well-known fact that alleged spies prefer bottle service.

Camo skirt = military background?

A Bond-worthy getaway vehicle.

License to kill.

They use benches like this for dead-drops, right?

Red Sea?

Military training...

Preparing to visit handlers in the Kremlin?

Showing some secret agent attitude.

Post-gaming Hillary's visit to the Caucasus

[image source]

Nezavisimaya Gazeta
July 7, 2010
RELOAD FOR SOUTH CAUCASUS [Translation courtesy of JRL]
Washington had better bear in mind differences in psychological makeup and mentality of the local countries
An update on U.S. State Secretary Hillary Clinton's tour of the Caucasus
Author: Alexander Karavayev
EVERY COUNTRY OF THE SOUTH CAUCASUS COUNTS ON WASHINGTON'S ATTENTION TO ITS PROBLEMS

U.S. State Secretary Hillary Clinton's visit to the Caucasus was supposed to have a sedative effect on the anxious local regimes. Pointed attention from a world power is always flattering. Discounting George W. Bush's visit to Tbilisi, there have been no visits from high functionaries of American administrations to the region in a decade. Every country of the South Caucasus pins high hopes on the United States and expects from it sympathy with regard to local problems and particularly in connection with territorial issues.

On a stay in Baku, Clinton spoke of Washington's willingness and firm resolve to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. When in Yerevan, she guaranteed the hosts America's support in the same process. In Tbilisi at last, Clinton assured Georgia of America's solidarity with it. Her statement there became recognition of the status quo. The United States is Georgia's ally but not even the United States can change anything in the situation at this point or help Tbilisi reintegrate Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Putin's elite and Saakashvili's regime are diametrically polar in everything but the desire to set foreign policy for years to come. The only difference is that political life in Georgia is less rigid because the Georgian regime does permit existence of the opposition. It stands to reason to assume that Clinton brought a message to Saakashvili that Washington will welcome his efforts to normalize relations with Moscow. All things considered, however, making general statements is Tbilisi's only option. Moscow in its turn is convinced that it is better off without all and any contacts with Saakashvili.

The Karabakh conflict situation is certainly different. Where this problem is concerned, Russia and the United States are more or less neutral intermediaries. A broad assortment of options is available here - positive (encouragement of the Azerbaijani-Armenian peace) and negative alike.

In fact, two momentous events preceded Clinton's visit to the region. Presidents Dmitry Medvedev, Barack Obama, and Nicolas Sarkozy made a joint statement regarding Karabakh during the G8 summit. Fighting had occurred along the line-of-contact a week before that, right when president Serj Sargsjan and Ilham Aliyev were meeting in St.Petersburg. This clash might be interpreted as a hint at probability of military escalation in case peace efforts failed.

Granted that Azerbaijan and Armenia remain obstinately deaf to most arguments, there nevertheless exist principles of conflict resolution that are quite promising. The declaration made the three presidents plainly stated the necessity of the return of occupied Azerbaijani districts around Karabakh and interim status of the enclave with adequate guarantees of security and self-government. Establishment of a corridor connecting Armenia and Karabakh and return of all refugees to their homes are other priorities. That might necessitate a humanitarian-peacekeeping mission headed by OSCE Minsk Group countries. Last but not the least, foreign intermediaries believe that the future legal status of Karabakh ought to be decided at a referendum. Official Baku took the document with barely concealed enthusiasm even though its Russian translation somehow managed to miss the term "occupied".

Ethnic peace is difficult to establish - but possible all the same. Karabakh peace project will become an expensive political investment for Moscow and Washington and, also importantly, a serious financial strain on Baku. Infrastructure of the districts in question will have to be rebuilt from scratch. Foreign specialists will have to be found and brought in to consult in refugee-return matters and peaceful co-existence of two ethnic communities. Problems are a legion, but they must be addressed without delay...

Armenia fears that the suggested return of occupied territories adjacent to Karabakh will put Azerbaijan in a position to launch an outright offensive and try to reconquer Karabakh. It seems unlikely that Baku will want to disrupt peace process just when it has begun to bear results. Aliyev is not Saakashvili.