The Parable of the Isms - a guest post by Matthew Rojansky



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The Parable of the Isms, as Applied to the Former Soviet Union
Guest post by Matthew Rojansky

My colleague Karim Sadjadpour recently published a satirical analysis of Middle East politics, "The Cynical Dairy Farmer's Guide to the New Middle East," riffing on a famous Cold War joke about communism and capitalism, known as "the parable of the isms."  As Karim noted,

 No one really knows how the two-cow joke known as "Parable of the Isms" came about, but most students of Political Science 101 have likely come across some variation of the following definitions:

Socialism: You have two cows. The government takes one of them and gives it to your neighbor.

Communism: You have two cows. The government takes them both and provides you with milk.

Nazism: You have two cows. The government shoots you and takes the cows.

Capitalism: You have two cows. You sell one and buy a bull.

Satire it may be, but the essential truth of the "cow jokes" is what makes them funny. Karim's thirteen terse metaphors for Middle Eastern regimes cut to the heart of a complex region in which increasing American interest has followed increasing investments of blood and treasure, with very little added understanding of what's really going on.

The Soviet Union suffered no dearth of American attention over nearly half a century after World War II. Yet even the keenest observers, like Kennan and Kissinger, were focused almost entirely on Moscow, and within it mostly on the Kremlin. During the Cold War, that made good sense - after all, no one in Kiev or Almaty, let alone in Chisinau or Ashgabat, was making particularly important decisions for US foreign policy and global security.

But twenty years after the collapse of Communism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, things work a bit differently in Eurasia. To understand why drugs flow so readily from Afghanistan through Central Asia and into Russia and Western Europe requires some sense of what's going on - and what's not - in places like Dushanbe and Astana. To see why a NATO-Russia impasse over missile defense is so serious requires an understanding of how the people, and the governments, in Kyiv and Tbilisi relate to their massive neighbor.

The former Soviet republics are no longer defined so much by being formerly Soviet, as by what they have become after twenty years of independence. Yet the old categories - socialist, communist, capitalist, fascist - don't easily work to describe a region where political cultures draw on everything from Rome and Byzantium to Baghdad and Beijing. Let's see how the "parable of the isms" might offer a convenient shorthand guide to the fifteen states that once made up the USSR.

Russia
You have six cows and four bulls. Two of the bulls die from alcoholism, and the remaining two form a "tandem" to take the cows' milk and sell it to Germany and China.

Ukraine
You have four of the most productive cows on the farm, two of which allow themselves to be milked by Russia, which upsets the other two so much their milk goes sour.

Georgia
You have two cows and one prize-winning bull. The bull is so distracted winning prizes that Russia runs away with both cows.

Belarus
You have one cow which you savagely beat until it produces milk. The milk dries up after your last savage beating, so now you must sell the cow to Russia.

Moldova
You have two cows and a calf, but the cows live in Italy and Russia and send milk home by Western Union. You ferment the milk into wine, and launch a frenzied campaign to join the EU. Meanwhile, the calf is stolen and sold by rustlers.

Armenia
You have four cows, but three of them live in Los Angeles and think they are horses. They send money for you to build stables.

Azerbaijan
You have one cow that produces lots of excellent milk. You sell the milk to Farmer Browne and buy cattle prods from Israel and Turkey.

Turkmenistan
You had one cow but you sold it to buy a golden statue of a cow that rotates with the sun.

Kazakhstan
You have two cows that produce vast quantities of milk. You sell the milk, buy each cow a gold-plated cow bell, and declare yourself bull for life.

Kyrgyzstan
You have two cows: one Kyrgyz and one Uzbek; they hate each other and refuse to be milked. Instead of hay, feed them tulips. Then sell one each to Russia and the United States. After six months sell them again.

Tajikistan
You have three cows: one Tajik, one Uzbek, and one Russian. You beat the Russian cow until it runs away, and use your misfortune to plead for international aid. Meanwhile Iran milks your remaining cows.

Uzbekistan
You have four cows. You let them drink all the water in the neighborhood swimming pool. Now no one can go swimming. You blame this on "corrupt and lawless elements," and volunteer to remain in power until the problem is solved.

The Baltic States

You have lost half your cows, for which you blame Russia and demand an apology. As consolation, the EU gives you a sleek Scandinavian-designed barn and NATO farmers teach you advanced milking techniques.

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Orientalizing post-Soviet politics?

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Andrew Wilson has an article out on openDemocracy that provides a taxonomy of post-Soviet political systems and where they stand in terms of their employment of "political technology."  The piece is interesting for its anecdotes, and I've always been a big fan of Andrew Wilson's work introducing Westerners to the concept of "political technology."  Some of the main ideas from his seminal 2005 book, Virtual Politics, are outlined in a shorter format in these remarks of his from a few years ago.

The questions that Wilson really seems to be asking with this new article - why do governments of states like Russia and Kazakhstan bother orchestrating falsely competitive elections? what is it about the political culture of certain post-Soviet states that has allowed them to more or less leave the pervasive use of "political technology" behind? are some of these countries destined to remain in some sort of political purgatory, having left behind the "hell" of an authoritarian one-party state but never reaching the "heaven" of the (ultimately unattainable) idealized, squeaky-clean, competitive political system extolled by classic democracy promoters? - are very good ones and have concrete policy applications in addressing Western approaches to other political systems now in transition in the Arab world and elsewhere, not to mention American budgets for the variety of activities that fall under the umbrella of "democracy promotion."

The clarity of the current article's thesis, though, suffers a bit from the author's implication that political dark arts and even practices as benign as the manufacturing of artificial campaign narratives are somehow unique to the post-Soviet space and are something that should be "gotten rid of" as these countries move toward some democratic ideal. 

Is it possible that Wilson believes what he calls the "highly developed industry of political manipulation" that exists in Russia and elsewhere in the region is not in many respects an imitation of our own political system with many more rough edges (and a much smaller price tag, at least when compared to American electoral politics)?  The ghost of Lee Atwater, along with generations of dirty tricksters (from both of America's august major political parties) - not to mention a fella named Breitbart - would beg to differ.

[image source - "history reveals that smear campaigns are as American as apple pie"]

I'm not proposing throwing in the towel and allowing moral relativist "whataboutism" to triumph by making us all shrug and say our systems are no better - because that's not the case.  However, I'm not sure how much we do for the cause of "democracy," however one defines it, by lumping in things like politicized judges, politicians advancing the causes of favored business interests, and advanced political campaigning - which has become a career track and educational specialty in its own right in the U.S. in recent years and includes what Americans call "dirty tricks" and Russians call "black PR" - with factors more uniquely present (one hopes) in the transitional, soft- or hard-authoritarian political systems that Wilson writes about - actual ballot-rigging, the use of law enforcement to muzzle political opponents and domination of the media space by the government.

I also take issue with Wilson's assessment that Moldova became one of the post-Soviet world's "serious potential democracies" only in 2009, but that's another story...

Opening the U.S. Embassy in Chisinau, April 1992

The U.S. Embassy in Moldova, located in a historic building at 103 Mateevici St. in Chisinau

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Some of the cables that I received in response to my FOIA request for cables dealing with the post-Soviet conflicts highlight other interesting events from the time of the Soviet breakup.  This was a time when the U.S. had to open a whole bunch of new embassies, including one in the newly independent Republic of Moldova.  The report on the opening of the Embassy in Chisinau included a discussion of the situation in Transdniester and its impact on the Moldovan government:

The deterioration of the situation in the Trans-Dniester is occupying almost all the time of this very small, neophyte government.  While Moldovan officials have the understandable tendency to inflate the importance of their own republic, Embassy Chisinau finds many of their concerns well-founded.

Embassy Chisinau Opens: Moldovan Officials Discuss Trans-Dniester Crisis (March 26, 1992)


And what sort of environment would U.S. diplomats posted to Chisinau find in the capital of newly independent Moldova? This "Preliminary Post Report" from April 13 details a bygone era of wine for 80 rubles a bottle (at an exchange rate of 125 rubles to the dollar) and when travelers using Air Moldova had to be reassured that the airline "to date has a worse reputation than it actually deserves. The stories of standing passengers, four-legged passengers and other non-FAA approved behavior have so far not been witnessed on Air Moldova."

Preliminary Post Report for Chisinau (April 13, 1992)

Conflict Cables: Moldova-Transdniester Nov-Dec 1991

Mircea Snegur votes for himself - Dec. 8, 1991

As the Soviet Union formally fell apart, Moldovan President Mircea Snegur had his leadership validated an uncontested election in December 1991.  It was an eventful month, with the election preceded by independence referendums in Transdniester and Gagauzia on December 1 and followed by renewed violence in Transdniester and then Moldova's signing of the Alma-Ata Protocols under which it joined the Commonwealth of Independent States.  This post summarizes seven newly State Department cables newly declassified and released through the FOIA process, which I have made available on Scribd - read more about the Conflict Cables series here.

The stage is set by a November 5 cable from U.S. Embassy Moscow assessing the "Moldovan Political Scene as Foreign Minister Tiu Visits U.S.," in which the "principal political issue in Moldova" was described as "whether to unify with Romania or set out on the path of full independence." 

On December 8th, as three men signed away the USSR in a forest outside of Minsk, Moldova held elections.  Embassy Moscow had sent officials to observe, and they sent a brief cable on the 9th reporting Snegur's unsurprising victory which concluded with the following comment:

The vote appeared to be more a mandate for Moldovan independence and national unity than a reflection of support for Snegur as an individual.  While many Moldovan officials encountered had high expectations that Snegur would somehow be able to solve the separatist problem once he had a popular mandate, the task looks to be a hard one.  Trans-Dniester and Gagauz officials appear remarkably rigid, and, according to Moldovan government officials, the Trans-Dniester "government" is backed by Soviet military arms provided by forces based in Tiraspol.

A more detailed report on the elections, including difficulties faced by voters in Transdniester, followed several days later:
Moldovan Elections: Snegur Wins While Separatist Regions Obstruct Voting Process (Dec. 12, 1991)

This cable reported on the Embassy observers' visits to Comrat and to Tiraspol, where they learned about "the difficulties and discrimination faced by [ethnic] Moldovans in everyday life in the Trans-Dniester," and noted the following:

In both the Gagauz and Trans-Dniester regions, poloffs heard repeated claims of fraud during the previous week's [December 1] independence referendums and presidential elections.  There were numerous reports of attempts to force people to vote, including the use of armed militia who attempted to force villagers into mobile "bus polls" which went from village to village.  Some said they were threatened with loss of jobs if they did not vote.

Shortly after the elections, a December 13 cable summarized increasing Moldovan concern with alleged Soviet military support for the secessionists in Transdniester, including charges that Soviet troops were participating directly in the conflict, that military equipment being withdrawn from Eastern Europe was being diverted to the region, and in general that the secessionists were "receiving material and political support from mainline Soviet military forces...with the knowledge and perhaps approval of military and political leaders in Moscow."

The December 13 cable also described Moldovan allegations that Moscow was also already beginning to deploy its potent media weapon:

Moldovan officials also claim to see a pattern of bias in official statements and media reporting from Moscow which focuses excessively on Moldovan ethnic and economic problems.  They contend this is an attempt to portray Moldova as a hotbed of ethnic strife with massive economic problems; such an image could later be used to justify interference in Moldova under the guise of protecting ethnic Russians or preventing economic chaos.  On December 2, the presidium of the Moldovan Parliament issued an official statement charging Moscow-based news organizations with a prejudiced attitude toward Moldova.  One Moldovan official cited a November 30 TASS report of electrical shortages in Moldova as an example of inaccurate reporting.  The report claimed Moldova was short of fuel for electrical generation and was therefore alloting only four hours per day of electricity to residences.  The official said this was completely false; during their December 6-9 visit poloffs observed no unusual electricity problems and heard no one mention any such problems.

A "late development" - renewed violence on Dec. 13 in the city of Dubossary - was described in the last paragraph of the cable, including details about Transdniestrian authorities' accusations that the fighting was provoked by the Moldovan Popular Front and involved "Romanian weapons."

A subsequent cable on December 17th went into more detail about the flare-up in Dubossary and related Chisinau's side of the story - that "the fighting was an intentional provocation by the Trans-Dniester leadership designed to sabotage impending Russian recognition of Moldovan independence." The diplomats in Moscow, however, concluded that the violence so soon after elections in both Transdniester and right-bank Moldova "may also have been the result of a new assertiveness on the part of the leaderships of both areas, anxious to exercise their new mandate." Shying away from assigning blame, the cable concludes with the possibility that this was "simply a case of two increasingly assertive forces finally colliding, with both sides equally at fault."
Violence in Trans-Dniester: Complications for Moldovan-Russian Relationship (Dec. 17, 1991)

Also on December 17th, Moscow relayed to Washington that the Moldovan Foreign Minister had urgently requested a meeting to discuss the Transdniester issue with Secretary of State James Baker during the latter's scheduled visit to Kiev, and again summarized Moldovan concerns that the situation could turn into an "inter-republic" confrontation with Russia.

A third December 17 cable from Moscow describes a conversation with a Moldovan official in Moscow "as the Moldovan delegate to the Bilateral Relations Committee" (name redacted in the version released by the State Department, but they didn't redact his position which should make him easy to identify). This one is perhaps the most interesting of this batch as it summarizes a the candid views (in a conversation at an embassy reception) of a high-level Moldovan at the time about the country's aspirations for reunification with Romania, discussing things like potential territory swaps with Ukraine and the fact one of the factors slowing down reunification is that Snegur "enjoys being 'President' of a separate country and is not eager to give up that role." The source also trash-talks Moldovan Foreign Minister Tiu toward the end of the cable - see for yourself:

Aide to Moldovan Foreign Minister Describes Moldovan Political Picture (Dec. 17, 1991)

As this challenging month of a challenging year came to a close, Moldova after all signed up to join the new Commonwealth of Independent States. The cable below is interesting because it describes Russian and Central Asian reactions to the Alma Ata agreement as well as Moldovan reactions and is worth reading in full for any student of the Soviet collapse:

Reactions to Alma Ata Accords: Russia, Central Asia, Moldova (Dec. 26, 1991)

As a postscript, I can't resist sharing this photo from a later moment in President Snegur's career (presumably some time in 1992), mainly because I can't resist sharing something that shows our current Secretary of State in her previous life as an Arkansas political wife.

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Conflict Cables Series: Transdniester, October 1991

These three cables cover a fateful month in the development of the Transdniestrian conflict and Moldova's post-Soviet development in general.  This was the period when Igor Smirnov, who would go on to lead what became the secessionist Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic for 20 years (so far), was released from the custody of Moldovan authorities and allowed to return to Tiraspol.  The first cable below goes into interesting detail about the problems presented by "the Trans-Dniester" and Gagauzia, as well as potential border issues with Ukraine.

This was also a month when President Snegur was forced to cancel a visit to the U.S. due to unspecified domestic "political problems."  As the second cable below shows, the visit was intended to familiarize U.S. business and political leaders with Moldova, something the Moldovan government is still working on today.  The second cable also contains a number of statements from official Chisinau about how Moldova saw its future status at that moment in time. 

Tiraspol Blockade Ended; Moldova Avoiding Confrontation with Secessionist "Republics" (Oct. 4, 1991)

Moldovan President to Visit U.S. October 19-24 (Oct. 11, 1991)

Moldovan President Snegur Cancels U.S. Visit (Oct. 18, 1991)

For more about the "Conflict Cables" series, see this post.

Conflict Cables Series - Inaugural post

In the spring of 2008, I filed a number of requests under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) with the State Department, asking for cables related to the initial "hot" stages of the conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdniester which have, over the years, come to be known first as "frozen conflicts" and nowadays as "protracted conflicts."  The FOIA process took a couple of years, but in 2010 I finally received two large packages with documents responsive to my requests.  I am uploading them to Scribd and highlighting some of the more interesting ones on this blog.

Unlike the Wikileaks cables, these documents were all obtained legally through the FOIA process, but that doesn't make them any less interesting.  Although I can't promise a juicy revelation in every one, I am pretty sure that most of them were previously classified and unreleased and therefore potentially have new information of interest to researchers interested in these conflicts.  In addition, a number of them mention one of the conflicts in the context of broader issues of the US approach to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

 [image source - RIA Novosti]

Protest rally in Tiraspol, Sept. 1991; the sign reads, "Ukraine and Russia, defend your citizens!"

The batch of cables I am going to upload first was received in response to my request for documents related to the Transdniestria conflict.  Below are the first two cables in this batch.  In the first one, paragraph 11 describes a visit by U.S. officials to Tiraspol, where they met with Igor Smirnov, then Gorispolkom (city council) Chairman, as well as the "recently named chairman of the 'Supreme Soviet of the Trans-Dniester Republic'...and a number of other people whose functions were not entirely clear."  "Smirnov treated pol[itical] off[icer]s with a degree of suspicion reminiscent of the Cold War days, asking why American diplomats were interested in coming to Tiraspol, and refusing to accept the standard replies."

The second cable provides a brief assessment of the political situation in Moldova in the fall of 1991: "The Moldovan government is steering a careful course between the Scylla of the breakaway Trans-Dnister and Gagauz 'republics' and the Charybdis of militant pan-Romanian nationalists."

Increasing Political Polarization in Moldova (April 12, 1991)

Moldova: A Fragile Stability Endures, but for How Long? (Sep 28, 1991)

The Return

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It's hard to believe it's been almost four months since I posted anything here.  The fourth quarter of last year was filled with work, work and work, but that's no excuse. Scraps of Moscow is back for 2011 and hoping to provide better content than ever with a new series of posts to be launched over the weekend.  My focus, as before, will be on the "protracted conflict" areas in the post-Soviet space, with other topics to be covered including the domestic politics in Moldova and Russia - both of which promise to be interesting this year.

In the meantime, I was remiss last year in not sharing any of my non-blog writing about the region, which included some thoughts on Karabakh as well as co-authored opinion pieces on "Why Moldova Matters" (Russian version) and on Transdniester (Russian version).  If you're interested in a longer read, an article I co-authored with a mouthful of a title - "Acquiring Assets, Debts and Citizens: Russia and the Micro-Foundations of Transnistria's Stalemated Conflict" - was published in the Fall 2010 issue of Demokratizatsiya but is unfortunately not available online.

I'm still trying to figure out how to usefully integrate some of the content from my Facebook wall into this space - an friend recently referred to it as my "Facebook blog," which is accurate given the amount of links posted and comment discussions that erupt there.  I guess the simplest way is just to be less lazy and do a three-sentence blog post when I see an interesting article instead of a one-sentence comment with a shared link on FB.  Stay tuned...

More on "peacekeepers" vs. "occupiers"

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GUAM appears to be DOA, of course, but the article below suggests some degree of 
coordination between MD and GE's Russia policies.  I'm not sure I buy it, particularly as
I think the article overstates Acting President Ghimpu's influence on MD foreign policy.
And is wanting Russian troops to leave territory one claims as its own sufficiently strange
of a policy preference as to suggest that it must be the result of a coordinated campaign?

Nezavisimaya Gazeta [translation courtesy of JRL]
August 2, 2010
KISHINEV AND TBILISI NEVER NOTICED MOSCOW'S PROTESTS
Moldova and Georgia demand withdrawal of the Russian military from what they call their territories
Author: Svetlana Gamova
MOLDOVA AND GEORGIA COORDINATE THEIR RUSSIAN POLICIES

Their relations with Russia already soured, Moldova and Georgia got international support. The matter concerns the report on arms control agreements the U.S. Department of State published last Wednesday. The document mentioned presence of the Russian troops on the territories of Moldova and Georgia without their consent. By and large, the thesis in question repeated what State Secretary Hillary Clinton had said about occupation of Moldovan (Trans-Dniester region) and Georgian (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) territories by the Russian military. This statement was made when acting president of Moldova Mihai Ghimpu signed a special decree calling the Russian contingent in the Trans-Dniester region "occupiers" and demanding its withdrawal. The Russian Foreign Ministry then reiterated Moscow's official stand on the matter and gave the floor to Gennadi Onischenko of the Rospotrebnadzor.

Onischenko's words made it plain that Kishinev's objections to the presence of the Russian military in the Trans-Dniester region might cost it dearly. Russia suspended import of Moldovan wines - just to make the point. The Moldovans arranged negotiations to discuss the matter but the effort was wasted. That was when Clinton made her statement and urged Russia to start honoring its obligations. Her words killed the last chance the Moldovans might have had then to reactivate wine export to Russia.

Russian Foreign Ministry called "incorrect" U.S. Department of State's speculations on the presence of the Russian military in Moldova and Georgia. "There are no Russian soldiers in Georgia. As for Abkhazia and South Ossetia on whose territories Russian military bases operate with their consent, these countries are
neither parts or Georgia nor signatories of the Treaty on Conventional Armed forces in Europe." The Foreign Ministry reiterated that Russian peacekeepers were on the Dniester in accordance with the agreement between Russia and Moldova (July 21, 1992). The Moldovan authorities demand withdrawal of the Russian
military contingent and peacekeepers from the self-proclaimed Trans-Dniester Moldovan Republic in the hope to replace them with an international police force.

In any event, official Kishinev studiously ignored all objections and protests from Russia. Moreover, it chose to comment on the conclusions drawn in the U.S. Department of State's report in application to the conflict with Tiraspol. Kishinev no longer accepts the terms formulated by Moscow (conflict resolution first, evacuation of the military afterwards). Moldovan Ambassador to Romania Yuri Renice told the Romanian newspaper Adevarul, "Synchronization of the Russians' withdrawal with Trans-Dniester conflict resolution is a thoroughly counterproductive approach...Presence of the Russian military collides with the principle of neutrality promoted by the Constitution. Most Trans-Dniester residents stand for reintegration of the territory."
Trans-Dniester Foreign Ministry in the meantime appealed to the UN to recognize sovereignty of the Trans-Dniester Moldovan Republic in the light of the recent ruling of the International Court of Justice regarding Kosovo. "Our position is clear: the Trans-Dniester region is part of Moldova," said Renice.

Georgia took Washington's position as a clear confirmation: there are no sovereign Abkhazia and South Ossetia, there are but regions of Georgia occupied by Russia. Ghimpu said that he would pay an official visit to Tbilisi before long. It is clear that Kishinev and Tbilisi intend to coordinate their Russian policies.

Moldova's neighborhood as seen from Moscow

Selections from the June 25 and June 28 editions of RIA Novosti's "What the Russian Papers Say" section:

Nezavisimaya Gazeta - Bucharest blacklists Moscow

Romanian President Traian Basescu has submitted to the parliament a draft national defense strategy listing Russia as an external threat. The document says the deployment of Russian forces in the Republic of Moldova threatens Romania's national security.

The defense strategy mentions the deployment of foreign troops, rather than Russia's peacekeeping force, near Romanian borders. Moldovan media has promptly reported Bucharest's intention to take an active part in the region's demilitarization and the withdrawal of illegally deployed weapons systems.

The response in Transnistria, a breakaway territory located between the Dniester River, the eastern Moldovan border, and Ukraine, where the Russian task force is deployed, has been more emphatic: Bucharest must not intervene, or it will do more harm than good.

Transnistria's Foreign Minister Vladimir Yastrebchak stressed that the self-proclaimed republic's stance regarding the presence of the Russian peacekeeping force and limited troop contingent on its territory had remained unchanged since the end of the 1992 armed conflict between Chisinau and Tiraspol.

Commenting on Romania's proposal to mediate a bilateral peace settlement, Yastrebchak said Bucharest had already acted as mediator in the run-up to the 1992 war. At the time Romania supplied weapons to the Moldovan army, which had unleashed the conflict.

It may be a paradox, but Serafim Urekyan, leader of the Alliance Our Moldova, part of the Alliance for European Integration ruling coalition, supported Yastrebchak. Although Moldova and Romania are more than just neighbors, Bucharest had better mind its own business and not intervene in our affairs, Urekyan said.

The Moldovan politician said the conflict between Chisinau and Tiraspol should be settled in line with the Five Plus Two negotiating format involving Russia, Ukraine and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as guarantors and mediators, the European Union and the United States as observers, as well as Moldova and Transnistria as the parties to the conflict.

Urekyan also said the peace settlement should duly heed the relevant agreements on this issue between Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and German Chancellor Angela Merkel.

Bucharest's new draft national security strategy notes that the last barriers dividing a single nation could be eliminated by involving Romania in a common European space, Urekyan said. This implies Moldova being openly called a second Romanian state by Bucharest, which does not recognize the existence of the Moldovan nation.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Moscow and Brussels would do everything possible to resume negotiations, and that the main task was to search for a mutually acceptable resolution of this conflict through the preservation and strengthening of Moldovan sovereignty. Lavrov added that the EU may become involved in the Transnistria peacekeeping mission.



Vzglyad [often-tendentious online pro-Kremlin rag] - Top Moldovan official signs controversial document

(Acting Moldovan president tries to add Soviet Occupation Day to national calendar)

Moldovan Parliament Speaker Mihai Gimpu, who is now acting president of Moldova, has signed a decree on marking Soviet Occupation Day every June 28. Gimpu admitted that he had issued the decree without consulting his colleagues in the Alliance for European Integration ruling coalition.

On June 28, 1940, Soviet forces entered Bessarabia, and this became a black day in the history of Moldova, Gimpu said.

Political analyst Pavel Svyatenkov at the Moscow-based Institute of National Strategy said Moldova was following in the wake of other East European states, former Warsaw Pact members.

"But Moldova was part of the Soviet Union. It has an absolutely special status because Moldovan nationalists believe that there is only one Romanian, rather than Moldovan, nation. Moldova's conversion to anti-Communism is another step in severing ties with Russia," Svyatenko told the paper.

Gennady Konenko, head of the Moldova and Transdnestr section at the Institute of CIS Studies, said the decision to institute Soviet Occupation Day was not historically or legally motivated. He said Romania had taken advantage of Soviet Russia's weaknesses in 1918 and seized the Bessarabia Gubernia (Region) which had been part of the Russian Empire since 1812.

The opposition Communist Party of Moldova thinks that Gimpu has soured relations with Russia and was whipping up an anti-Communist hysteria in order to boost his popularity ratings before presidential elections. The latest opinion polls show Gimpu is supported by only 2% of respondents. Consequently, he is in no position to assume top state positions in the future.

In his decree, Gimpu demanded that Russia, the Soviet Union's legal successor, unconditionally and promptly withdraw its forces and weapons from Moldova. A Russian troop contingent has been fulfilling a peacekeeping mission in the self-proclaimed Transdnestr Republic since 1992.

Yuri Muntyan, Executive Secretary of the Moldovan Communist Party's Central Committee, said Gimpu and other ruling coalition leaders were ready to deprive Russian of its interethnic language status, and were preparing to amend the current polyethnic national policy concept.

Muntyan said his party was preparing to oppose official repressions strictly by legal means. The Communist Party is confident that Gimpu's decisions will be abolished after it stages a political comeback. Consequently, there will probably not be enough time for June 28 to become part of Moldova's political calendar.



Nezavisimaya Gazeta - Moldova to mark Soviet Occupation Day

New tensions in Russian-Moldovan relations were provoked by Moldovan authorities, who declared June 28 Soviet Occupation Day. Russia is the legal successor of the Soviet Union, which collapsed in 1991, and must now withdraw its "occupation troops" from Transdnestr, a breakaway republic of Moldova, the Moldovan leader said in a decree.

Acting President Mihai Ghimpu has recreated the situation of 1991, when his predecessor, Mircea Snegur declared war on Russia during his speech in parliament, but took his words back almost immediately. However, Ghimpu will not rethink or reword his demand.

He is preparing for the parliamentary and possibly presidential elections and needs to increase his extremely low rating of 2%. The popularity of his Liberal Party has fallen in the past six months, and its members are fleeing to another pro-Romanian rightwing party, the Liberal Democratic Party, whose rating has been growing.

Ghimpu has nowhere else to win votes because Moldova's rightwing electorate comprising intellectuals and students who identify themselves as Romanians is very stable, 20%, and has not been growing. That electorate is divided between the two parties, which reflect certain moods of society but not of its majority. This explains why Moldovans are divided over Ghimpu's decree.

The Moldovan parliament will today hear a report on the consequences of the Communist regime in the country. The agenda includes a proposal to prohibit the use of all Soviet and Communist Party symbols in the republic.

Ghimpu is expected to submit to parliament a draft law canceling the concept of the republic's nationalities policy adopted in 2003, in which Moldova was described as a polyethnic state and Russian as the dominant spoken language. That concept provoked major protests in the republic.

Valery Klimenko, leader of the socio-political movement Equality, described the developments as a rollback to the 1990s, when the Moldovan People's (Popular) Front held the power in the republic. Ghimpu was one of its leaders.

The extreme rightwing government pursued a policy that provoked an armed conflict on the Dniester, which has not been settled to this day, Klimenko said.

Bulgars and Gagauz, small ethnic groups living in compact communities in the south of Moldova, have expressed protest against the authorities' actions that are complicating relations with Russia.

The Civil Society movement said it would call people to the streets today, but the Liberals have the support of young people, who are society's most energetic part. This means that Ghimpu's decree may provoke clashes in Chisinau, the capital of Moldova.

Discouraging words

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This article from Nezavisimaya (original is here, the translation below is courtesy of JRL) is not encouraging, particularly on the issue of peacekeepers.  However, I suspect Gamova - especially given her habit of spinning stories about these regions in what are supposed to be straight news pieces - is not quite accurately reflecting Moldovan elite opinion with respect to the Kozak Plan:

Nezavisimaya Gazeta
May 13, 2010
MEDVEDEV AND YANUKOVICH TO OPEN TRANS-DNIESTER REGION
Runaway Moldovan province pins a good deal of hopes on the new Ukrainian authorities
Author: Svetlana Gamova
THE EVE OF DMITRY MEDVEDEV'S VISIT TO UKRAINE: THE TRANS-DNIESTER REGION EXPECTS SUPPORT FROM KIEV NOW ALONG WITH THAT FROM MOSCOW

Presidents of Russia Dmitry Medvedev and Ukraine Victor Yanukovich will make a joint statement regarding the Trans-Dniester region during Medvedev's visit to Ukraine on May 17-18.

A source within the Foreign Ministry said that the statement in question would declare coordination of efforts in Trans-Dniester conflict resolution. (Both Russia and Ukraine are guarantors and intermediaries in the process.) Quite importantly, there are almost 150,000 Russians and 100,000 Ukrainians living in the self-proclaimed Trans-Dniester Moldovan Republic. Medvedev once promised Trans-Dniester leader Igor Smirnov that the locals with Russian passports could count on Russian protection. Smirnov called it the most important guarantee the self-proclaimed and non-recognized republic had.

Insiders say that the joint statement to be made by Russian and Ukrainian presidents will reiterate their stand on the matter of peacekeepers: they should be left where they are. It is going to be an answer to the idea regularly brought up by Kishinev to replace the existing peacekeeping contingent in the Trans-Dniester region comprising Russian, Moldovan, and local units with foreign policemen or observers.

The Trans-Dniester parliament (Supreme Council) in the meantime hopes that installation of the new regime in Ukraine will mean an end to the blockade. Aided by then President of Ukraine Victor Yuschenko, the Moldovan authorities were able to close the border for goods and produce from the Trans-Dniester region in 2006. EU observers have manned the Trans-Dniester part of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border ever since. Without Russian aid, the region would have never survived.

"That Yanukovich wants no EU experts or whoever on the border is common knowledge. I suspect that he will do everything now to prevent prolongation of the Europeans' mandate. The Ukrainian border with the Trans-Dniester region will open then," said Arkady Barbarosh, Director of the Center for Social Policy (Kishinev).

"The EU has never wielded any clout or possessed any leverage with the region in question. Its Eastern Partnership initiative does not even promote any such objectives," said Alexander Rahr of the German Foreign Policy Council. "Russia would like to return to the region, of course, but with Yuschenko in Kiev it was impossible. It is different now. Moscow will probably reanimate Kozak's Plan, and Yanukovich will raise no objections."

"Moldova is not going to accept Kozak's Plan because it stands for continued presence of the Russian military on the Moldovan territory," Barbarosh said.

Considering the attitude of the powers-that-be currently in Kishinev, there is no chance to reanimate the Kremlin's plans first designed in 2003. The parliamentary election in Moldova this autumn may change everything. The Moldovan political establishment is already castigating ex-President Vladimir Voronin for the dismissal of Kozak's Plan. Marian Lupu, leader of the Democratic Party which is part of the ruling alliance nowadays, said that official Kishinev had failed then to consider all implications and made a mistake. Were it not for this mistake, there would have been no wine embargo that crippled Moldovan economy, he said.

Where's the content?

Highly politicized map of Bessarabia, from the 1930 edition of the Malaya Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia.

[source: Wikipedia]

It's hard to believe I have neglected this space for three solid months now.  Things have been quite busy, and now we're about to enter another transitional period which might make it easier for me to devote more time to blogging but more likely will not.

Therefore, with the thought that this might be the "front-page" post for at least a few weeks, I thought I'd give a rundown of what I've been reading/watching/looking at online, with the assumption that of course if I've found it interesting, you will as well.

The interesting, insidery blog Diplopundit points out a recent blog post by U.S. Ambassador to Russia John Beyrle that made something of a splash, and Russian politicians (and their aides) are also capable of making news these days with nothing more than a click of the "post" button:

ADVISER TO RUSSIAN SPEAKER CALLS FOR RECOGNITION OF MOLDOVA'S BREAKAWAY REGION
Ren TV, privately-owned Russian television channel, Feb. 18, 2010

A statement that could cause a new large international scandal - in his blog today, an adviser to the chairman of the Federation Council of Russia, Aleksandr Chuyev, expressed the opinion that it is time for Russia to recognize the independence of the Dniester region, following Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Interestingly, this statement coincided with the statements by Igor Smirnov, leader of the Dniester republic, which broke away from Moldova, according to which they are prepared to accept Russian Iskander missiles and other armaments.

Other recent stories about Transnistria have ranged from disappointing to optimistic (and another), and from nutty to nuttier.

Some blogs to read while this one lies dormant:

- The Russia Monitor, which Jesse has turned into a must-read resource.
- Siberian Light - lots on there recently for you sports fans, or sport fans, as I guess they say here in the UK.
- Sean's Russia Blog - Sean's still got it, and now that he is in Russia the posts are even better.
- Robert Amsterdam - comprehensive as always.
- Window on Eurasia - just check it out (especially this post on fake NGOs).
- Poemless - opinionated, in a good, entertaining way.
- A Good Treaty - an interesting NKOTB, which came to my attention via Poemless.
- Morning in Moldova - for those interested in keeping current on developments there.

Other worthwhile reads - the long but engrossing Vanity Fair piece chronicling the rise and fall of the Exile, and (from the dead-tree realm) Keith Gessen's New Yorker piece on the Ukrainian elections and Yushchenko's failures (full text not available online w/o subscription), which captures Ukraine's dilemmas, from the profound to the ridiculous:

[Quoting Leonid Shvets:] 'But Ukraine was a historical actor, and how! I have a friend, one of his grandfathers was in the Galician S.S. and died fighting, and his other grandfather was in the Red Army and made it all the way to Berlin.  What do you do with that?  Politicians should stay away from it.  They should look to the future.' [...]

Yanukovych's people were taking no chances.  If there was an initiative to be seized by taking to the streets, they were going to be the ones to seize it.  The...square filled up with Yanukovych 'supporters.'  A television crew on the scene conducted interviews.  Many supporters were drunk, and men in Yanukovych jackets began cutting off interviews before they began.  But they didn't manage to reach one angry woman in time.  'We've been here since 5 a.m., and they still haven't paid us!' she said.  'It's outrageous!'  It was an interesting moment in post-Soviet life: a paid participant in a street action meant to fool the media was appealing to the media for justice, because she had not been paid.

Poking around online to check prices of antique maps, I happened upon Wikipedia's surprisingly content-rich "Atlas of Moldova" page (the source for the illustration above).

I also noticed a Moldovan connection while watching the Winter Olympics (well, not really, my sister clued me in) - apparently, one of the U.S. ice dancing pairs used a song for their routine that was identified as a "Moldavian Folk Dance."  NBC makes the video content from the Games somewhat challenging to access, but there are a couple of YouTube clips showing the duo using the routine in previous competitions.  Predictably, the comments on both YouTube clips are taken up in large part by arguments over whether this is a Romanian melody or a Moldovan one. 

On a more serious note, I've been spending some time remembering my father, who passed away ten years ago this weekend, thanks to some material that has appeared online recently about the work he was doing before I was in the picture (see also this recently posted four-part article - part 1, part 2, part 3, part 4). 

And what could be a better soundtrack for such reminiscences than this classic song (an even more old-school video is here)?

"Information Direct from the Manufacturer": An interview with the guys behind Privesc.Eu

First off, apologies for the long absence from this space - things have been genuinely busy at work, and I just haven't had the time.  Fortunately, something I initiated back in early October, before I got busy, has finally born fruit.

I think I first wrote about Privesc.Eu back in July, on Moldova's second election day of 2009.  At the time, I described it as

a streaming video site called privesc.eu ("I watch," in Romanian), launched during the campaign, which has increased transparency by showing complete video of press conferences and public meetings of, for example, the Electoral Commission... rather than the carefully edited versions which appear on state-run TV.

And that evening, I watched on a laptop in my kitchen as the results came in and Privesc.Eu's live feed and open mic from the Central Electoral Commission picked up random conversations of journalists and election officials, including one where two people were discussing, in Russian, whether the country that had just voted should be called "Moldova" or "Moldavia." 

Anyway, I was familiar with Privesc.Eu founder Mihai Moscovici as one of the first Moldovan bloggers I saw on the interwebs, and more recently from his prolific Facebook updates, and decided to ask if he and his collaborators on this interesting project would mind answering a few questions about what it has been like to launch an online public-access channel in the midst of what has to have been one of the most politically tumultuous years in Moldova's history.

To put this in an American context, these guys have created something that is a cross between CNN, C-SPAN, NPR, and hip-hop (rap music being, in the immortal words of Public Enemy's Chuck D, "CNN for Black people"), all with a level of interactivity that makes full use of all the capabilities Web 2.0 (or is it 3.0 now?).  I don't think they were the first to do it in Moldova (Public TV and JurnalTV were first, I think, by a matter of months), but the team behind Privesc.Eu has done a great job working with hardly any resources other than what they have contributed from their own time and pockets.

Before (or after) you read the interview, please consider contributing some amount, however small (or large!) to support the work of these young Moldovans who are working to improve transparency and people's access to government in their country and for the many labor migrants who might otherwise be out of touch with political developments at home.  You can donate via PayPal (which takes all major credit cards) right here.

What motivated you to start this project?

On the way to democracy, Moldovan media find themselves forced to play the games of diverse political and economic interest groups, thus losing neutrality in presenting information to citizens. As a result, the Moldovan public is confused and is not discerning with respect to media coverage. Lately, international monitoring organizations have often criticized the Moldovan media for lack of objectivity, misleading reporting and one-sided presentations of information.

Since the Internet penetration rate in Moldova grows about 50% every year, online media coverage has long been a challenging journey for existing mainstream media, amateurs and new media projects. Still, there is a need for innovation and intense exploration to create new initiatives and progressively successful projects to satisfy the need of the Moldovan public for access to information online.

Information consumers, particularly youth, are looking to avoid media that only offer one-way information sharing and prefer to become participants in events and play their own role in the decision-making process.

We have started Privesc.Eu because there was a need for an innovative online platform which will give young people opportunities to share their opinions on real-time ongoing events, to instantly react and interact with each other, to ask questions, to be active and get involved in the country's daily life, to share and discuss their know-how, to organize and promote their own events, and, more than that, to share their activism by maintaining that platform.

Privesc.Eu is now an innovative online project, integrated with the latest social media elements and modern real-time data transmission technologies, that focuses on exposure of current events and on providing opportunities for social engagement for the Moldovan online youth community.

Did you start with a detailed business plan and specific goals, or just with a camera and a dream?

We started this project on July 5^th, 2009 in the central park in Chisinau. We had no business plan, but we had a dream, inspiration, and enthusiasm. In a few weeks, we realized that a business plan is necessary for the future of project, and eventually drafted one.

It occurred to me that Privesc.eu's content and goals are sort of like those of the C-SPAN channel in the U.S.  Are you familiar with this channel, and if so, what do you think of the comparison?

One of our team members watched this TV channel while living in the US, but we didn’t know about it until we launched the project. We started Privesc.Eu following the needs of the Moldovan society. As for comparison, we look forward to establishing such a TV channel in Moldova :)

When did you begin broadcasting online, and how did you promote the site when you launched it?  How quickly did you develop an audience, and how large is that audience now?

We started our broadcast on July 5^th, 2009, in the central park in Chisinau. On that day we set up the domain name for the project: www.Privesc.Eu (translated from Romanian as www.Watch.I).

We established two main directions of activity: provide live video streaming from the major events in the country (politics, economy, social, civil society, etc.); and establish user interaction to enable them communicate with each other and with the event organizers.

Since launching www.Privesc.Eu in July 2009, the site has continuously grown in traffic and user participation. In the first four months, the project has already become well-known among Moldovan young people in the country and abroad. Now we have more than 30,000 viewers per month. Every live stream on www.Privesc.Eu is watched and commented in real-time by 200 to 2000 visitors, depending on the event.

In addition, Privesc.Eu has more than 1000 fans on Facebook.

If you could start the project over again, is there anything that you would do differently?

If we would start over again, perhaps we would think more about better promotional methods than we have used so far.

Do the people involved have journalism backgrounds or more IT backgrounds?  (Please feel free to discuss what the various members of the Privesc.eu team do professionally or not, and/or their educational backgrounds, as you prefer)

Privesc.Eu was developed and is maintained by an innovative and creative team of volunteer young professionals: two high-skilled web developers, a professional journalist, a marketing/PR specialist, and an inspired and dedicated project manager.

You and your partners have obviously spent a lot of your own time on this project - how have you found time for this in addition to doing whatever your "day jobs" are?  And how much of your own money have you had to spend on equipment and other expenses (hosting, etc.)?

Five people are involved in this project: Eugeniu Luchianiuc, Vitalie Eşanu, Mihai Moscovici, Radu Chivriga, Oleg Ciubotaru. Each of them is responsible for a specific department: Tehnical Department - Vitalie Eşanu and Oleg Ciubotaru; Promotion and Marketing Department - Mihai Moscovici; Journalism and LIVE Video Streaming Department - Radu Chivriga and Eugeniu Luchianiuc. Every one of us has a primary job, but Privesc.Eu is more than just a hobby, it is a way for changing our society for better. We use our own equipment: laptops, microphones, webcams and 3G mobile internet services. Privesc.Eu is grown on enthusiasm and we don't seek any financial benefits from this project.

Have your expenses been covered by advertising revenue?  Do you have any other sources of funding for the project (private donors, grants)?

On our web-site, we have a page where people can donate money through PayPal or to donate money to cover our mobile internet expenses through top-up terminals. Until now, we have 13 private donors who have donated a total of 400 USD.  Also, we applied for a Soros Foundation grant and are currently waiting for their decision.

Why do you think online broadcasting is important in Moldova?

Privesc.Eu helps Moldovan internet users to have open access to unbiased, democratic, interactive, objective, as-is coverage of important events in Moldova.  It helps citizens to form their own opinions based on pure and as-is information, avoiding journalistic comments and opinions.

Privesc.Eu fills the void of information about the situation and events in Moldova currently experienced by citizens working abroad, as well as by those living in the breakaway Transnistria region.

What do you think Privesc.eu provides viewers that they cannot get from TV or other mainstream media, or from already existing online sources such as YouTube?

Primarily, Privesc.Eu is a source of pure and as-is information about Moldova’s major events for citizens, as well as for international internet users, tourists, business people, potential investors, researchers and other people interested in Moldova.

Do you view your primary audience as being located in Chisinau?  Moldovans overseas?  Rural areas of the country?  Romanians sympathetic to Moldova?

According to Google Analytics, last month we had viewers from 58 countries . Most of them are from Moldova – 27,000, Romania – 1,500, United States - 540, France - 500, Italy - 455. Moldovan viewers came mainly from 5 cities: Chişinău, Rîbniţa, Bender, Tiraspol and Balti.

Many Moldovan websites have Romanian-language and Russian-language versions (and often English-language as well) - is there a reason that Privesc.eu has only a Romanian-language interface?

We don't think this is a problem for Russian-speakers. Any visitor can easily click on the video and watch it as it is. Sometimes we cover events where people speak Russian. Also, there are many comments in Russian language during our live broadcast.

What has been the most memorable or most significant event you were able to broadcast this year (in the opinion of you and/or your partners)?

The day when we had the most traffic and the highest number of viewers so far, was July 29^th, when we presented the results of the elections in Moldova.  On that day we had more than 6,000 live viewers. Also, some Romanian TV channels and national web-sites used our live video stream.

Have you had any difficulties with hackers attacking your site or with people spamming or acting as provocateurs in the comments section?

Yes, we have lots of provocateurs in the comments section, but didn’t have any hacker attacks.

 Do you have any advice for people who might want to start similar projects in countries with semi-closed media systems?  Why do you think it was possible for you to make a project like this happen in Moldova, and do you think it would be possible for people in places with more authoritarian governments, for example in Central Asia (or Transnistria)?

The main problem is with the quality of internet coverage in the country, and it depends also on the country's government. Live video streaming requires a good Internet connection, without it you can only do live blogging from the events. 

 What are your future plans for Privesc.eu?  Do you have any plans to generate original content (roundtable discussions or interviews which would be exclusive to Privesc.eu), or will you continue to focus on providing direct coverage of government-related events without commentary?

We have lots of ideas, but it takes time and resources to develop them all, so we take one idea at a time. We already have a talk show called "Fara cenzura" ("No Censorship") it's a show that seeks to present the facts without editing the video. Follow Privesc.Eu and you’ll see many great things in the coming months.

Russian world

CIMG6491, originally uploaded by lyndonk2.

On the occasion of Russian-language advocacy organization Russkiy Mir (not this one) opening an office in Tiraspol, I decided to translate this commentary from an Ekho Moskvy blog about the role of Russian in the post-Soviet space:

Every day, there's some new story about the misfortunes of the Russian language in the former Soviet republics. Here are just three recent examples.

Kazakhstan: starting in 2012, all movies will be required to be shown in the state language [Kazakh].

Tajikistan: now all official paperwork, correspondence and education must be conducted in Tajik. All citizens are required to know the state language - Tajik.

And finally, Ukraine: Yulia Tymoshenko has signed government order #1033, which requires all public-school teachers to speak only Ukrainian during work hours - including during breaks. Even in the school cafeteria.

How can all of this be assessed by someone who lives in Russia, speaks Russian and loves their language? Of course, such a person should feel pain, bitterness and disappointment - basically, a whole range of negative feelings. After all, we're talking about the language of Pushkin and Dostoevsky! After all, this is the language which we all used to speak together and in which we all seemed to understand each other wonderfully! The language of peace and friendship!... And so on and so forth.

I love my language. That's what I could say. But I won't. Because I perfectly understand that there's no way to separate a language from politics.  Whether we like it or not, in the newly proclaimed states the Russian language is the most immediate (and daily!) reminder of the former empire.  And attempts to preserve or promote it are judged as attempts to return the former state of relations - between the imperial center and the colonies.

The arguments of the now-independent states say the following:  We have our own language, and this language should have an indisputable priority; anyone who wants to be a citizen of our country should first learn the national language, and all other languages are secondary.  Do you have anything to say against this?  I don't.  Because this is exactly how Russia acts in relation to its own state language.  And Russia is absolutely right!

But why does it deny others the same right?  Just because "we used to be together"?  That's why I won't say "how horrible" about the linguistic innovations of the former republics.

The real question is, what should Russia do about this - fight the situation or make peace with it?  I have an answer, but I doubt you'll like it.  We should make peace with it, I'd say.  Fighting it is not only useless, it's dangerous, because all it does is generate increased aggression and firm opposition to the phrase "Russian language."

So, we need to accept the situation.  And work out a new language policy.  A NEW policy!  One that will be, excuse the pun, free from politics.  People shouldn't be afraid of Russian.  They should love it.  And love and fear do not go together.