Twittering while Russia burns

It was interesting to see the translated article below appear in JRL on the same day as Svetlana Babaeva's piece appeared dismissing the political impact of social networking and new media in Russia ("nothing more than banal social chatter"; "inconsequential prattle").  

My value add in the article below is to link to the Twitterings of these government luminaries (other than Medvedev, since I can't be fussed to figure out which is the real one, and Astakhov, since I couldn't locate his using any of the obvious search terms) - and to point out that there is an aggregator-type Twitter account called gosblogi for Russian official Twitterers.  I would also note that the only one of these guys I really try to follow is Rogozin - he is a master of the form and often manages to display his sense of humor in 140 characters or less.  Though somewhat confusingly, he appears to have two accounts - the one linked in the previous sentence and this one.

And my purpose is, in part, to plug my very own new Twitter feed (in which, of course, I will tweet a link to this post, while praying that the universe does not collapse upon itself or get stuck in some sort of infinite loop of narcissism).  You can see recent tweets in the sidebar and the whole thing here - http://twitter.com/scrapsofmoscow


Twitter Takes Off Among Russian Politicians
Izvestia [translation courtesy of JRL]
July 29, 2010
Report by Aleksandra Beluza: Authorities of Short Messages

The Twitter era has begun in Russian politics. In the wake of President Dmitriy Medvedev, who launched his micro blog in June, governors and other highly placed figures have arrived there. A round the clock personal broadcasting channel, which is what Twitter essentially is, can be used during elections to mobilize the population when actions are being conducted.

Thanks to Twitter (from the English "to twitter") politicians all over the world are "taking off their jackets" and giving us the chance to see a stream of their personal news. Here is Dmitriy Medvedev writing about his visit to Belgorod Oblast: "I flew in to Alekseyevka. I went to the graves of my great grandmothers and great grandfathers. I was going for the first time. For work, as always." Now Medvedev has over 50,000 regular readers on Twitter.

Medvedev himself reads the micro blogs of US President Barack Obama and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper. But presidential aide Arkadiy Dvorkovich believes that it is precisely the Russian leader who has the best Twitter. "None of the leaders is comparable," Dvorkovich wrote on his own Twitter. "Where else will you see a photo taken by him personally (Medvedev -- Izvestiya)?" A picture called "view from the window of my hotel" taken by Medvedev in San Francisco has already been viewed almost 233,000 times, for example. Dvorkovich himself also posts a lot of photographs on his micro blog. He also writes quite openly -- for example, that "it is very hard to sleep after a week's tour in North America, but it is harder for the president."

"What does Twitter give you? Why are you ready to spend time on postings?" Izvestiya asked Dvorkovich on Twitter.

"Not a great deal of time is spent, but the ability to set out thoughts and share them concisely is developed," the presidential aide responded before five minutes had passed.

There are already around 20 senior Russian politicians and hundreds of officials at the level of deputies and heads of departments, including in the regional administrations, and also mayors, on Twitter. However, it is not pleasant to read all the micro blogs. Out of 10 governors only three write really interestingly -- Nikita Belykh (Kirov Oblast), Dmitriy Zelenin (Tver Oblast), and Mikhail Men (Irkutsk Oblast). Zelenin in particular distinguished himself by simply writing the following after Medvedev's departure from the Seliger youth camp: "The boss has left. The Tver forum and Seliger went well. I feel like a horse at a wedding -- with my muzzle in the flowers, and myself in a lather."

" Twitter has become a little personal news agency for politicians," managing partner of the Sotsialniye Seti (Social Networks) agency Denis Terekhov believes. "And here it is a question of information openness -- is the person ready to write quickly and without coordinating, without thinking about whether he has said it right or wrong 10 times? I think politicians who join Twitter are a priori more open than others. In this sense Twitter can be an acid test."

Essentially Twitter today is a test of a politician's openness -- is he ready to show that he is a person like everyone else? Mikhail Men admits: "I listened to (singer Vladimir) Vysotskiy all day." Dmitriy Rogozin, Russia's permanent representative to NATO, writes: "I have arrived in Moscow for a week's vacation; 360 degrees Centigrade (as published) is not that hot. It has been hotter at our NATO sessions." Pavel Astakhov, the ombudsman for the rights of the child in Russia, characterizes his secretariat like this: "I have 12 women working for me. I call them the 'child's special purpose troops.'"

There are only two party leaders here, Sergey Mironov, speaker of the Federation Council and the head of Just Russia, and Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). They both write every day, but somewhat turgidly. Denis Terekhov believes that "the part ies are quite sluggish and it is hard for them to use Twitter as a real channel of communication." In the opinion of other experts, Twitter could attract them not so much as an information technology as a mobilization technology.

"Many politicians are seeking communication with their target audience here -- the middle class and young people," Dmitriy Badovskiy, the deputy director of Moscow State University's social systems scientific research institute, says. "Plus Twitter gives an instant link with quite a big audience. And this makes it possible to gather supporters, coordinate observers at elections, and publish current information quickly. So I think that as the elections approach, activity and testing of Twitter as a possible environment for political mobilization will increase."

The 10 most popular Russian politicians on Twitter (by number of micro blog followers):

Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev 52,896
Russian's permanent representative to NATO Dmitriy Rogozin 7,513
State Duma Deputy Konstantin Rykov 3,769
Federation Council Speaker Sergey Mironov 2,084 [strangely seems to have protected tweets]
Tver Oblast Governor Dmitriy Zelenin 1,988
LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy 1,716
Kirov Oblast Governor Nikita Belykh 1,489
Presidential aide Arkadiy Dvorkovich 1,309
Perm Kray Governor Oleg Chirkunov 812
Children's Ombudsman Pavel Astakhov 535

 Perhaps tweeting is, for Russian officials in the era of Medvedev, something akin to 

taking up tennis under Yeltsin or becoming a martial arts beast / skier under Putin.

Social Networking in Russia

A bit of a cut-and-paste post here - a couple of translated articles courtesy of Johnson's Russia List, and some awesome graphics from Yandex kartinki, all dealing with the always-interesting topic of social networking in Russia.

Young Russian professionals choose social networks - survey

MOSCOW, May 25 (RIA Novosti)-More than half of Russian Internet users (52%) have accounts in several social networks, a poll by the Russia Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) published on Tuesday revealed.

Sociologists portrayed the typical social network user as a resident of Russian northwest administrative district (71% of them have accounts in the social networks), aged from 18 to 24 (75%), highly-educated (57% have a higher education), and financially stable.

The poll shows that the most popular network among Russians is Vkontakte with more than 75 million registered accounts. Almost one-third of the respondents (31%) visit it daily and another 23% visit the site on a weekly basis.

The second most popular Internet spot for Russian networkers- is Odoklassniki.ru. Twenty-one percent of the users visit it daily, 28% - weekly.

Unlike Odoklassniki.ru, Vkontakte allows the posting of music and video, which the networker can share with the friends and manage his or her account by changing privacy settings.

According to the survey, other social networks are not so popular amid the Russian audience. The micro-blog network Twitter is used by only 13% of the respondents, blog-generating site Blog.ru - by 14%, Facebook and MySpace are familiar to only 15% of the respondents.

The poll was held on April 3-4, 2010, with 1,600 respondents in 140 localities of 42 regions. The margin of error is 3.4%.

_______________________________________


Social Networking Sites Becoming Political, Alarming Authorities

Yezhednevnyy Zhurnal
http://ej.ru/
May 18, 2010
Commentary by Marina Litvinovich, under the rubric "In the Opposition/The Wild Ones": "The Miners Are in Contact"

Social networks are the egg in which the needle is kept, and along with it -- the death of Koshchey (fairy tale monster). Koshchey is not so much Putin as he is the established social order (which, it is true, has nothing in common with order in the sense of harmony). The social order built in Putin's time presupposes the absence of self-willed and self-reliant citizen unification and action and proceeds from the idea that everything that is happening with the society should be approved and financed in the Kremlin, and then shown in approved form on television. Public action a la Putin is a youth army of many thousands which is brought in to stand on Academician Sakharov Prospekt, who is turning over in his grave for the umpteenth time at this spectacle. The young people usually are standing to confront some kind of color threat: the planners apparently proceed from the principle of "if not skills, then numbers," and each time bring in more and more people to do the "confronting," while who they are confronting remains unclear to this day. The personification of confrontation usually ends up with good-natured bouts of drinking in the neighboring courtyards, and this is despite that fact the all the local wine stores have been closed since morning.

However, as many people predicted -- and I was one of them -- the Internet is creating a completely new structure of public space. This has become especially noticeable in the last two years thanks to the growth and development of the social networks. Millions of new social cells -- groups, communities, circles, and associations -- have arisen on the Russian (more accurately Russian-language) Internet at the websites VKontakte (In Contact), Odnoklassniki (Classmates), Meyl.ru (Mail), and LiveJournal. These communities and groups structure Russian society in an absolutely new way: the ordinary urban Internet user today voluntarily belongs to at least 2-3 communities, but at the same time is not and has never been a participant in any public association or group in reality. It is considered natural for young city-dwellers to "belong to groups" on the Internet, but completely unnatural for them to join a party or become a member of some association. This is largely because membership in Internet groups does not obligate you to anything in particular except voluntarily receiving information, and entry to and departure from them is simple. However, here is an interesting fact: if there is a threat to some interest of the given group, it mobilizes instantly and is frequently ready to move from the virtual world to reality.

With the arrival and spread of social networks, we absolutely unexpectedly received in Russia an enormous civil society consisting of millions of virtual groups. The construction of a civil society, which Russia has been seeking for many years now, was not assisted by any state efforts or international grants: it was facilitated by a simple leap forward in Internet technologies -- the transition to web2.0. And it is not so bad at all that many of the groups that have arisen on the networks are comical like, for example, the large society of people who lick yoghurt lids. Suffice it to glance at the lists of public organizations in the United States or in Europe -- strange organizations are met there too, such as the Foundation To Rescue Cows in Great Britain or the Movement To Resist Aliens from Other Planets in the United States. I will go further -- if something begins to threaten yoghurt lids, we can receive a vigorous, ready-to-act community that rises to the defense of its interests, even such unusual ones.

There are many political, human rights, and social communities in the networks. But they are not so large. The large communities are those created on the territorial or fan principle. Experience shows that in critical situations it is these communities that become the main sources of information and help people unite their efforts and move to actions offline, that is, in reality. When it was decided to revoke the license of the television channel "2x2," hundreds of fans and viewers who adored the Simpsons and "South Park" went into the streets with posters in defense of the channel. People far from politics were organized for public actions thanks to the users of the VKontakte network who originally belonged to the "2x2" Channel fan group.

After the accident at the Sayano-Sushenskaya GES (Hydro Power Plant) operational information that was different from official reports could also be gotten from users of the VKontakte network, who organized a group to exchange information on survivors and victims.

A recent example is provided to us by the situation in Mezhdurechensk, where after the explosion at the Raspadskaya Mine, the rally, the clashes with OMON (special-purpose police), and censorship of the mass media, the primary debate and exchange of information and opinions developed in the community "Devoted to the Miners of the City of Mezhdurechensk" at the mail.ru website and in a group on this same subject at VKontakte. Both communities had existed for a long time and joined people on the territorial-vocational principle. The first has more than 6,000 participants, while the second has more than 5,000. It was in fact online in the community on mail.ru that the first report appeared that clashes with OMON had begun on the railroad tracks. These same communities went very quickly from discussing "what is happening" to "what is to be done" and, inevitably, to political topics and conclusions. Words that formerly had been heard only from the mouths of the non-system opposition began to be heard from the mouths of ordinary people. And this alarmed the fighters against extremism (E Center) and the FSB (Federal Security Service). The administrator of the VKontakte group was summoned to the organs and they took his password, which makes it possible to manage user profiles and groups. Power over the group was seized, its name was changed, the group was made closed (originally admission to the group had been free and open), and all information and exchanges of opinions were deleted. Several users who made pictures of screens were able to document the process of the disappearance of information and the irreversible metamorphoses with the group.

The group on mail.ru still exists, but no one is giving any guarantees that they will not treat it in the same way. This is actually the first time that the security structures worked out a procedure for a "raider takeover" of a group on the social networks. "All it took" for this was to put strong pressure on the administrator so he would give up the password. And "pressure" is something the "siloviki" (security officers) know how to do -- it is not brain work.

State and security structures have been concerned with the subject of controlling the Internet for years now. They usually talk a great deal about the fight against pornography, but during the commotion they deal with politically undesirable websites and bloggers. And the fight is not against "wheels," but rather against individuals: bloggers are being put in jail, and as we now see, they are pumping out their passwords with threats. It is like some kind of "war and the Germans," and every blogger or group owner is a potential female radio operator Ket (Cat). I think that in the near future the "siloviki" will try to incorporate this new and promising area of the fight against their own people.

[image source]

Where's the content?

Highly politicized map of Bessarabia, from the 1930 edition of the Malaya Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia.

[source: Wikipedia]

It's hard to believe I have neglected this space for three solid months now.  Things have been quite busy, and now we're about to enter another transitional period which might make it easier for me to devote more time to blogging but more likely will not.

Therefore, with the thought that this might be the "front-page" post for at least a few weeks, I thought I'd give a rundown of what I've been reading/watching/looking at online, with the assumption that of course if I've found it interesting, you will as well.

The interesting, insidery blog Diplopundit points out a recent blog post by U.S. Ambassador to Russia John Beyrle that made something of a splash, and Russian politicians (and their aides) are also capable of making news these days with nothing more than a click of the "post" button:

ADVISER TO RUSSIAN SPEAKER CALLS FOR RECOGNITION OF MOLDOVA'S BREAKAWAY REGION
Ren TV, privately-owned Russian television channel, Feb. 18, 2010

A statement that could cause a new large international scandal - in his blog today, an adviser to the chairman of the Federation Council of Russia, Aleksandr Chuyev, expressed the opinion that it is time for Russia to recognize the independence of the Dniester region, following Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Interestingly, this statement coincided with the statements by Igor Smirnov, leader of the Dniester republic, which broke away from Moldova, according to which they are prepared to accept Russian Iskander missiles and other armaments.

Other recent stories about Transnistria have ranged from disappointing to optimistic (and another), and from nutty to nuttier.

Some blogs to read while this one lies dormant:

- The Russia Monitor, which Jesse has turned into a must-read resource.
- Siberian Light - lots on there recently for you sports fans, or sport fans, as I guess they say here in the UK.
- Sean's Russia Blog - Sean's still got it, and now that he is in Russia the posts are even better.
- Robert Amsterdam - comprehensive as always.
- Window on Eurasia - just check it out (especially this post on fake NGOs).
- Poemless - opinionated, in a good, entertaining way.
- A Good Treaty - an interesting NKOTB, which came to my attention via Poemless.
- Morning in Moldova - for those interested in keeping current on developments there.

Other worthwhile reads - the long but engrossing Vanity Fair piece chronicling the rise and fall of the Exile, and (from the dead-tree realm) Keith Gessen's New Yorker piece on the Ukrainian elections and Yushchenko's failures (full text not available online w/o subscription), which captures Ukraine's dilemmas, from the profound to the ridiculous:

[Quoting Leonid Shvets:] 'But Ukraine was a historical actor, and how! I have a friend, one of his grandfathers was in the Galician S.S. and died fighting, and his other grandfather was in the Red Army and made it all the way to Berlin.  What do you do with that?  Politicians should stay away from it.  They should look to the future.' [...]

Yanukovych's people were taking no chances.  If there was an initiative to be seized by taking to the streets, they were going to be the ones to seize it.  The...square filled up with Yanukovych 'supporters.'  A television crew on the scene conducted interviews.  Many supporters were drunk, and men in Yanukovych jackets began cutting off interviews before they began.  But they didn't manage to reach one angry woman in time.  'We've been here since 5 a.m., and they still haven't paid us!' she said.  'It's outrageous!'  It was an interesting moment in post-Soviet life: a paid participant in a street action meant to fool the media was appealing to the media for justice, because she had not been paid.

Poking around online to check prices of antique maps, I happened upon Wikipedia's surprisingly content-rich "Atlas of Moldova" page (the source for the illustration above).

I also noticed a Moldovan connection while watching the Winter Olympics (well, not really, my sister clued me in) - apparently, one of the U.S. ice dancing pairs used a song for their routine that was identified as a "Moldavian Folk Dance."  NBC makes the video content from the Games somewhat challenging to access, but there are a couple of YouTube clips showing the duo using the routine in previous competitions.  Predictably, the comments on both YouTube clips are taken up in large part by arguments over whether this is a Romanian melody or a Moldovan one. 

On a more serious note, I've been spending some time remembering my father, who passed away ten years ago this weekend, thanks to some material that has appeared online recently about the work he was doing before I was in the picture (see also this recently posted four-part article - part 1, part 2, part 3, part 4). 

And what could be a better soundtrack for such reminiscences than this classic song (an even more old-school video is here)?

Roundup of blog coverage

[image source]

Picking through the online detritus, here are some of the reactions to the events in Chisinau from bloggers around the world:

Alina Stefanescu has a number of posts at her Totalitarianism Today and Romania Revealed blogs. One of them gets my award for headline of the day - "The Moldovan government is smoking crack and trying to convince others to smoke it as well."

Eternal Remont observed that - based on the violent behavior of the protesters - "This ain't no color revolution."

Kosmopolito posted some exclusive photos as well as the third part of a serial post by a guest blogger writing from Chisinau.

The unrest seems to be spawning new monikers daily (note that my use of "Grape Revolution" as a tag for these posts is pretty tongue-in-cheek - I needed a tag to keep all of the posts about the protests together, and that just happened to be the one I chose) - UN Dispatch tries out "#pman Revolution," and Dumitru Minzarari mentions (in a great post which has also attracted some worthwhile comments) another name that is apparently being used:

Now the communists and their Eastern “partners” are building a huge media myth to discredit the pure ideals of Moldovan youth willing nothing more than freedom and respect for their rights. Their protests were labeled the “Orphans’ Revolution” because under the Communist government close to a third of Moldovan citizens (their parents) went abroad to earn money for a living.

Minzarari has another post where he translates a Russian blog post that posits there may have been a deliberate decision by the authorities to allow the protesters to loot government buildings, presumably so that the protests would take on the character of a riot and their political demands would be discredited. If that was the plan, it may have worked. Somewhat relatedly, Minzarari also has an article at TOL dated April 7th about the Transnistria settlement process and headlined "Moscow Is Still the Master."

Sean has a post up focusing on the role of youth in the protests, noting that "unlike the innocuous colors of orange, tulip, and rose, the Moldovan youth appears to favor blood red."

I would be remiss if I didn't also point out GVO's main post so far on the situation in Moldova.

The "Updates" post at the Neighborhood blog by Nicu Popescu should be a good place to go for news.

Popescu has a couple of good posts at his Romanian-language blog, discussing the merits and effectiveness of non-violent protest and the degree to which Voronin has become a liability and a "factor of instability" for Moldova. I've taken a stab at translating portions of the latter post.

"The prospect that the Communist victory could lead to a situation where Voronin would remain the de facto head of state for another 4 years...is one of the key causes of the violent protests," writes Popescu. "During the 8 years of his presidency Voronin was seen as a symbol of stability, but today he has become the main factor in polarizing society." Popescu suggests that Voronin gracefully leave the political stage with a guarantee of immunity from prosecution - a la Yeltsin, I suppose - and continues:

The violent protests in Chisinau symbolize most of all that whatever stability there was in recent years has come to an end. Moldova is facing a turbulent period in which world economic instability, internal political cleavages and the personality of Vladimir Voronin could shatter the Republic of Moldova's fragile statehood.

Another outstanding Moldovan blogger (and, like the others, a proper specialist in real life), Alexandru Culiuc, has a post noting that he's seen a spike in traffic in recent days even though he hasn't had anything to say about the events in Chisinau. I translated a part of his post, in which he refuses to weigh in on the events of the week other than to pose a disturbing question:

Having access to a relatively limited set of sources of information, it is difficult for me to give a balanced assessment of the situation. Nevertheless, I daresay that the phrase "Revolution in Chisinau," which aboundes in the headlines of news items on Romanian websites, is inappropriate. It is quite possible that after some time has passed the recent events in downtown Chisinau will come to be characterized rightly as the greatest man-made calamity Moldova has endured since the war in Transnistria. And just like with the conflict in Transnistria, no one is to blame and no one takes responsibility - everyone points their fingers at each other. Will the outcome really be so disastrous? I don't know, but I don't think we'll have long to wait for an answer to that question.

In the Russian blogosphere, "'Color Revolution' in Moldova" is the number one blogged about topic according to Yandex, which counts over 3,700 posts on that theme in the past three days. Here is one which is at least somewhat humorous in places, although it displays an attitude of condescension toward Moldovans which is all too typical among Russian bloggers.

Natalia Morari, one of the organizers of the initial, peaceful proitests and a popular topic of discussion in the Russian blogosphere in her own right, resurfaced Wednesday with another post justifying the protest organizers' actions, which has already attracted over 900 comments. If they are anything like the comments to other recent posts, they probably contain numerous vicious personal attacks on her and surprisingly few messages of support.

Some commenters seem to be questioning Morari's political judgement - like this one, who wonders why Morari wore an "I love Obama" T-shirt to a rally in Chisinau, "knowing that color revolution activists are forever facing accusations of being pro-American puppets. And in that situation, to give your opponents such a tasty morsel..."

Morari's husband, fellow New Times journalist Ilya Barabanov, is apparently also now in Moldova and posted a wild-eyed and completely incredible (by which I mean, not credible) rumor of weapons being flown into the country from Russia and transported from the airport to downtown Chisinau in ambulances.

Putvedev's faith-based initiatives

A couple of the hired guns at one of last weekend's pro-gov't counterprotests.
My favorite part is the unrealistically hard-looking image of Dimmovochka.
[image source]

The Russian government has published, on PM Putin's website, a list of "measures undertaken to combat the consequences of the global financial crisis" (the word "crisis" never appears in official pronouncements without the modifier "world" or "global," because as any good United Russia functionary knows, the global financial crisis is called 'global' because it's happening outside of Russia).

But United Russia's supporters - both the ones hired as crowd filler and the ambitious, plum-job-seeking core - seem to be running on faith (to use a phrase immortalized by Eric Clapton).

Witness this by now infamous speech by a United Russia activist at one of last weekend's rallies. The speaker, a young lady named Maria Sergeeva, whose blog identifies her as "The Mashka" and who seems to like to post photos of herself, has helpfully posted a transcript of her remarks here. Here's my translation of the most testifyin' part of her performance (she even identifies her holy trinity!):

It's no secret: in Russia today there are forces which are trying to blame Putin, Medvedev and United Russia for our temporary difficuties. These forces are like a dangerous virus - as soon as they sense a weakening of our immune system, they'll attack.

But let's be honest with ourselves. Take me, for instance, a student who pays full tuition. In 1998 I wouldn't have known what to do. And now I don't just believe. I know for certain that Putin, Medvedev and the United Russia party will protect me. They'll give me the chance to take out a student loan at a rate of five percent, not 55 percent. They'll give me a job. They won't allow me to be fired illegally.

That post drew over 4,000 comments, many of them critical, compelling Ms. Sergeeva to write a rambling rebuttal castigating the "two-legged cockroaches on LiveJournal" and "parasites," and even deploying against her critics United Russia's rhetorical WMD - a quotation from the ideological architect of "sovereign democracy" himself, Vladislav Surkov - but (in case we forgot it was all about her) taking the first two paragraphs to marvel at her newfound fame. She sort of has elements of a Russian Sarah Palin - spunky and down-to-earth, but also self-contradictory and determinedly dim-witted, and not really ready for prime time.

It turns out that Ms. Sergeeva is not only a YouTube celebrity of sorts - an irony-free and more heavily managed version of Obama Girl, except without, you know, the singing - she is also a member of the political council of the Young Guards (United Russia's youth wing, usually abbreviated as MGER) and a videoblogger on United Russia's website, where the section devoted to blogs is wittily titled "Berloga" (which means "bear's den," but also happens to be spelled by inserting the initials of United Russia - ER, in Russian - after the "B" in "blog" - how punny!).

Based on her apparent inability to memorize even a few sentences of her monologues, and assuming the MGERovtsy are supposed to be a breeding ground for future Russian political elites, there really will be problems finding qualified leadership among the younger generation. Youth wings of political parties - especially parties with no opposition - are of course populated by careerist hacks to some degree in all countries, but this young lady takes self-absorbed hackdom to another level.

Anyway, here is a rather more articulate analysis of why Putin remains popular even in the face of an economic situation that seems to get more calamitous every week. The English translation is from the JRL, the original article in Russian is here.

Putin's Stable Popular Support Based on Cultural Closeness, Not Results

Gazeta.ru
January 29, 2009
Commentary by Boris Tumanov: "People Like Putin"

Despite all the crises,tragedies, disasters, and disorders, the citizens of Russia are not disillusioned with Putin because he is a symbol and the personification of themselves.

The global economic crisis with its still unknown outcome has already caused a marked intellectual revival in that segment of Russian society that can tentatively be called the thinking part of our elite. The general catalyst of this process is the expectation of sociopolitical cataclysms.

Russian thinkers who belong to the "vertical hierarchy of power" consider this perspective as a threat to their own well-being and seriously hope to avert it with the help the non-existent middle class and the traditionally obedient "tin soldiers,"' who are already being pushed into manifestations of loyalty. And their freedom-loving opponents believe just as sincerely that the coming upheavals will be a factor in the inevitable liberal transformations in the sociopolitical life of Russia.



However, in the former case it is nothing more than a helpless simulation of their own professional suitability, while in the latter it is an equally nonsensical, equally pretentious attempt at Cartesian analysis of the inscrutable instincts of Russian society.

As Solovyev's Khodzha Nasreddin would say in such circumstances, "Oh jinnis, you are searching where it is not hidden." For the main, if not the only, effective factor capable of determining the state of Russia in the foreseeable future is that almost symbiotic unity that exists between the largest part of Russian society and the person of the "national leader" known as Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin.

This unity could not be shaken by the tragedies of the Kursk, Nord-Ost, and Beslan, the administrative tyranny of "sovereign democracy," "Basmannyy justice," or the rumors of the "national leader's" fabulous personal wealth just as it cannot be shaken by the current growth in unemployment, inflation, devaluation of the ruble, the disintegration of mortgages, or even the coming deprivations.

Here are figures that thoroughly illustrate this assertion. According to the findings of the Levada Center, in September of last year an overwhelming majority of Russian citizens polled --61% -- thought that things were moving in the right direction in Russia and only 21% of the respondents thought that the country was taking a wrong path. The short war in Georgia played a part here, of course, but even today a majority of Russia's citizens believe that things are going well in the country. In December 2008 and January of this year their number remained constant at 43% while the number of pessimists dropped from 40% to 34%.

Last September also marked the peak of positive assessments of the activities of the government headed by Vladimir Putin, 66% against 31%. But in December 2008 and January of this yeart hese figures were 60% and 36%, and 58% and 38% respectively.

But then the activities ofVladimir Putin personally in the job of premier are evaluated by Russian citizens using some different system of coordinates and criteria, if we judge by the fact that in December 2008 and January 2009 he was consistently approved by 83% of those polled, while the number who were dissatisfied with his activities declined from 15% in December to 14% in January. We will add that the peak of approval of Putin's activities, 88%, came in that same victorious September.

Remarking this phenomenon, both the liberals and the state-minded thinkers -- the one in vexation, the other with chauvinistic satisfaction -- explain it by essentially the same factor, which is indeed the main, although not the only, factor in "Putinomania." For some this factor is formulated as the patriarchal inertia of Russian society, the result of many centuries of slavery, while the others see it as a manifestation of sovereign Russian uniqueness expressed in communality, spirituality, and patriotic unity with the government. At the same time the most inquisitive opponents of Putin become lost guessing about what kind of mistakes and blunders he would have to make or what "Egyptian plagues" would have to overtake Russia under his leadership to disillusion the majority of Russian citizens who love him.

It would be simplest to answer this question by saying that Vladimir Vladimirovich can do anything he wants, practically without risk to his popularity rating. But such an answer, even if it corresponds to reality, demands convincing explanation, or rather a detailed investigation of the genesis of the "national leader's" unprecedented popularity. Russia's leaders and Vladimir Putin personally are absolutely right when they say that the main reason for the current crisis was their responsible consumption of the West, above all the United States. But afterall, it was this very mindless consumption that caused the manna from heaven that poured down on Russia in recent years in the form of incredibly fast-rising oil prices.

And if we take an unbiased look at the results of these "seven fat years," those who sincerely care for the real interests of Russia and its citizens could register serious charges against the Russian leadership and Vladimir Putin himself regarding how they managed the wealth that Russia enjoyed.

Instead of fighting corruption, instead of effective army reform, instead of development and diversification of domestic production, instead of building up still restless provincial Russia, they worked on strengthening the vertical hierarchy of power, which guarantees them practically lifetime terms of office. And after setting their intention as restoring Russia's stature on a global scale, the Russian ruling elite managed to quarrel with almost all of their Western partners; indeed they have found themselves in virtual isolation. Beginning with Vladimir Putin's Munich speech and up to the recent gas war with Ukraine, Russia has stubbornly destroyed its own international reputation and pushed away not just Europe and the United States, but also our neighbors in the CIS.

If Russian society were consciously striving to assume responsibility for the fate of the country or, at a minimum, if it were capable of an independent evaluation of the government's actions, its reaction to such behavior by the government would be much less equable. But civic responsibility presupposes a search for alternatives, which requires intellectual and psychological exertion, and the citizens of Russia will not be ready for that for a long time. Not just because the few opponents of the government are incapable of formulating an intelligible alternative to the current course, but above all because of the traditional and almost panicky fear that Russian society will be deprived of its paternalistic oversight by the state. That is why Russian citizens do not try to look carefully at the mechanisms of control over the state, the economy, and society, preferring to rely on the omniscience of the tsar, great leader, or national leader who by definition cannot answer for the mistakes of the ordinary mortals under him.

But in Putin's case there is one substantive aspect that prevents us from viewing the universal trust of him exclusively in the framework of the fatalistic formula: "Good tsar but his boyars are indifferent." For unlike the tsars who are "ordained from above" and the general secretaries, the citizens of Russia are convinced that Putin took charge of Russia as the result of their own will, not Divine Providence or a decision of the Politburo. And the fact that they chose him the way they choose the best fellow in the village (athlete, does not smoke, likeable, went into intelligence work) only emphasizes that from the beginning this choice did not presuppose any political responsibility of Putin to the voters. That is why, from the standpoint of the citizens of Russia, Putin does not have to answer for the activities of his own government, for the results of his own term in office.

They do not judge Putin because for society he is not functional. He is a symbol. He is the personification of the Russian citizens themselves; they identify themselves with him. And this is perhaps the first case in Russian history when the purely reflexive worship by the Russian masses of the latest domestic divinity is tinged with a sincere feeling of solid affection for him.

Affection that is linked not with his political and economic decisions, but rather with the fact that his worldview, hopes, and complexes are indistinguishable from those of the average Russian citizen.

It is the diehard fastidious intelligentsia who may be horrified at the vulgar language that Vladimir Putin uses with emphatic pleasure in his public statements, and especially in contacts with Western politicians and journalists. It is the numerous snobs who are amused at the former president's almost childish liking for dressing up as a submariner, a fighter pilot, or showing off his torso, and his way, plainly seen at Kennebunkport, of imposing the company of his Labrador Koni on his foreign guests. It is the liberal analysts, who are becoming extinct, who see in his aggressive megalomania in relation to the West echoes of the old humiliation felt by the future national leader when he discovered that Germany, even though it was socialist, was able, unlike the USSR, not only to produce an adequate amount of beer, but also to bottle it in three-liter bottles with a convenient spigot. And they are malicious skeptics who blasphemously mock the apocryphal tale that during his entire KGB career Vladimir Putin, surrounded by militant and vigilant atheists, never parted with the cross around his neck and his belief in the Almighty, risking exposure at the first physical training exercise.

On the other hand, a majority of Russian society is in complete solidarity with these behavior traits of the national leader because they fully coincide with the social culture of the Russian citizens themselves, with their ideas about the outside world and their complaints about the rest of the human race.

Well then, if we add to these feelings the easy material well-being that coincided with Vladimir Vladimirovich's term of office for a significant part of the society, which continues to believe furiously in the return of the "rivers of gas and banks of oil," we can say with certainty that Putin is going to last a long time.

And, incidentally, so is today's Russia.

Polemics and paranoia about a love-hate relationship

Sometimes the back-and-forth between scholars and self-appointed pundits at JRL can be entertaining. The excerpt below is from Andreas Umland's response to this critique of his article (full version here) about anti-American sentiment in Russia - I'm eliding the details.

Whoever knows Russian and had the opportunity to watch, for a week or so, the foreign affairs reporting of the two main Russian TV stations ORT and RTR might also start to "like the word 'paranoia'." Because that is exactly what Russia's politicians, journalists, pseudo-scholars, and other public figures are cultivating, on a daily basis, in Russian mass media today. Thus, Vladimir Putin's recent assessment that the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict has been instigated by the Bush administration has raised only few eyebrows, in Russia. Who else than the amerikantsy could be behind the costly confrontation between the two Slavic brother-nations?

Many Russian opinion makers seem to think that the more unpleasant an international (and, sometimes, even national) event is for Russia, the more likely it is that the US is somehow behind it. Scores of Russian intellectuals and politicians appear to actually "need" America for the definition of their homeland: Russia is what the US not is, and the US is what Russia is not. The longer these intellectuals and politicians will have access to Russian mass media the deeper such views will sink into Russian discourse already heavily contaminated with xenophobia and conspirology. My prediction is, therefore, that ­ should Putin continue to shape Moscow's information policies ­ Russian popular anti-Americanism will grow further, in the future. Whereas Western and Central European views of the US will, after the end of the Bush Jr. Administration, significantly and lastingly improve, the "Obama effect" may be only brief, in Russia.

I tend to agree that the anti-Americanism one encounters in the Russian mainstream is sometimes breathtaking. However, it's strange that amidst all of the dislike of the amorphous concept of "America," one still often encounters acceptance of or even affection for things American. drugoi had a post about this a while ago, in which he asked whether Russians' attitude toward the US might be similar to the way you feel about "a woman you really like who won't let you get close to her." I'm not sure it's as simple as that, but the seven pages of comments to his post provide at least some insight as to the range of opinions existing among the more vocal segments of the Russian blogosphere.

Nostalgia

tema has an interesting post about the visual design of Soviet agitprop materials (which he calls monotonous, "communist shit") that includes the above photo of Moscow's Dom Knigi, which is still there on Novyi Arbat. Dom Knigi is not even my favorite Moscow bookstore, and today it doesn't look anything like it did in 1967, when the photo was taken, but it still made me want to pay the place a visit.

Synchronicity, intellectual goofiness and Google hits

The past couple of months' uprootings and putting down of roots will (perhaps) be explored in a later post. For now, Scraps returns to the virtual airwaves with a rather frivolous post in lieu of something more serious. After all, "a blog is...a broadcast, not a publication. If it stops moving, it dies. If it stops paddling, it sinks."

Others who saw the video clip embedded below summed it up as follows:

In this awesome video for the song “Gorbachov” by Russian metal band ANJ, former Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Gorbachev is an axe-wielding barbarian, destroying zombies who attack the hard working big breasted women of Mother Russia. It really is a thing of beauty. Actually it’s more than that. It’s the best damn music video ever created.

Or, more succinctly:

Wow. Hot Russian women, Zombie Stalins, Gorbachov the barbarian, and erotic food innuendo. What else could you possibly need in a music video?

Indeed. Judge for yourselves (click here to see the HD version):

GORBACHOV: THE MUSIC VIDEO - BIGGER AND RUSSIANER from Tom Stern on Vimeo.

The video's director describes his opus as follows:

Suffice to say it's half Russian History allegory as told through an old zombie movie made in the Soviet Union, and half animated Soviet Propaganda posters.

This apparently made the rounds of RuNet a few months ago, and the link was emailed to me at that time by a fellow GVO Summit attendee. As I sifted through my neglected inbox today, I came upon this link and decided to check whether any of my fellow Russia bloggers have posted anything about this curious production. Apparently, no one did. Perhaps people found parts of it too tasteless, or the music accompanying the video too awful, to subject others to it; on the other hand, I would imagine that Sean could have a field day with some of the symbolism.

Imagine my surprise when, among the Technorati sightings of the video, I found an announcement that the band whose song inspired this crazy clip is performing tonight in my home town. Since we landed here in London exactly a month ago, this discovery tickled my homesickness bone and cemented my decision to post a video that would otherwise be out of character - not that there's anything NSFW, mind you, it's just rather... well, check it out yourself.


PS notwithstanding the potpourri of Google-friendly search terms appearing above, I should state quite clearly that this post was not authored with the intention of driving traffic...

Voice of Tiraspol

CIMG6523, originally uploaded by lyndonk2.

As has happened more times in the past than I'd care to admit, a few weeks ago a discussion in the comments section of Sean's Russia Blog sent me searching for info on a fairly obscure topic. One result was that I revisited ocity, the LiveJournal community set up by residents of Tiraspol - for those of you who understandably might not follow these things, that's the capital of the unrecognized Transnistrian Moldovan Republic (a.k.a. PMR, Transnistria, Transdniester, Pridnestrovie, etc.), a little strip of land that's been trying to secede from Moldova since the breakup of the USSR.

It seems that some of Tiraspol's netizens are unhappy with some of the initiatives of the territory's de facto government. Here are my translations of a couple of recent posts to the ocity community (which also exists outside of LJ):

Demand and complaint addressed to Evgeny Shevchuk, Chairman of the "Renewal" (Obnovlenie) party (posted by 06_07_1970)

Dear Evgeny Vasil'evich!

We woke up this morning and left our apartments intending to head to the cemetery and honor our dearly departed.

In the entryway of the building where we live, we found a huge quantity of "Renewal" party newspapers - they are strewn on the landing on every floor, in the stairwells, in people's mailboxes (several copies of this spam in each mailbox), and in the elevator. Part of the area in front of the building is already besmirched with your party's newspapers - some of the building's residents have tossed them out of the stairwell.

It should be noted that this is not the first time when the entryway of our residential building has been littered with such trash.

Based on these facts, I request that you organize the cleanup of the stairwells of the building at Zapadnyi Per. 19/1 in Tiraspol as soon as possible.

Otherwise, we will have to go to court with a complaint against the Renewal party and against you personally as the director of that organization.

With respect,

Residents of the besmirched [засранного] building

This complaint was also posted on a more traditional online forum, where it has generated some 25 comments. On LiveJournal, it generated the following comment by verba77:

They say our government is impoverished, but think how much money was spent on this garbage. Our authorities don't do anything useful for the people, instead they rub in the people's faces what good rulers we have.

I should note, in fairness to Obnovlenie and Shevchuk, that it's not unheard of for political parties in the post-Soviet space (and probably elsewhere) to engage in the "dirty trick" of placing their opponents' materials in locations designed to annoy voters. I seem to recall that one example of such "black PR" involved party A sticking party B's stickers on cars parked on the street. In this case, though, if I had to guess, I'd say the offending newspapers were probably left by overzealous "Obnovlentsy."

Here's another assessment of the local government by a resident of Transnistria:

Defense of human rights, Transnistrian-style (posted by verba77 [whose journal is subtitled "life with a 'special' child in a 'special' country"])

Two years ago, on June 7, 2006, Pridnestrovie first appointed a representative on human rights issues. An 10-room office was set up and luxuriously renovated to European standards. Dozens of new computers and other office equipment was purchased, excellent furniture, air conditioners, etc. There are plans to open branch offices of the human rights representative in other cities in Transnistria.

Interruptions in - and later complete denial of - the government's supply of essential medication to disabled children began around the same time.

Is it possible that the funds which had previously been devoted to saving the lives of disabled children are now going toward the human rights representative's office?

From my conversation with Transnistria's human rights representative V. Kol'ko last week:

- Does the non-issue of medications which are legally provided for to disabled children constitute a violation of human rights?
- Yes, of course, but what can I do about it?
- What do you mean, what, you are the human rights representative. Can you defend the rights of a sick child?
- There isn't any money in the budget for those medications, our government is very poor.
- Then why does the government have money for such luxurious facilities for a human rights office which is unable to protect human rights?
- What, it's my fault that the Supreme Soviet decided to create this office?

I might also suggest that our rulers do away with pensions and use the money saved to create an office of the representative of pensioners' rights. Or they could close the hospitals and open an office of the representative for the rights of sick people.

In the comments, verba77 explains that his family pays for a couple of more expensive medications, but is trying to get the government to pay for one cheaper item prescribed for their child which is included in the official list of medications the government is supposed to provide:

This has become a matter of principle, because those animals are buying themselves expensive official cars, building lordly estates, and renovating their offices to European standards using the money of the Transnistrians who break their backs working for them, but they refuse to comply with the law guaranteeing medication to sick children. But they spit on my requests and on all of us put together. The animals have made it to the trough.

And on a more humorous note, here's a comment from the same forum titled "[Customer] Service" (posted by sasha_ethna):

Tiraspol'. The train station. We get on the number 3 minibus, hoping to get to Balka.

...I was already handing the driver my fare when a one-lady orchestra came up to the minibus. She had a guitar on her shoulder, fancy luggage and several musical instruments. She tossed her first bag into the minibus and was getting ready to toss in the second, when the driver spat out "I'M NOT GOING TO BALKA!"

All of the passengers were baffled, the one-lady orchestra quickly retrieved her bags, and many people prepared to get off the minibus.

"But we all want to go to Balka!" said a few people.

"Everything's OK - that's where we're going. I just wanted to avoid all of that baggage," said the driver, revealing the logic behind his trick.

[update July 15]

Incidentally, there used to be a LJ community called Foto_PMR (I reposted one cool photo from that forum here) devoted to photos from Transnistria, but within a couple of months after I discovered and linked to it that forum disappeared, replaced by a LJ error message which reads “This journal has been deleted and purged.”

"Contempt and Compassion"

Respected (and at one time, arrested) journalist Valerii Panyushkin published an article in Vedomosti two Fridays ago which became quite controversial in the Russian blogosphere. Panyushkin decided to use some of his free time during the May holidays to read some blogs on LiveJournal and write about what he saw. He made it clear that he wasn't focusing on, "how shall I put it, the 'leaders' of Internet public opinion, all those 'tysiachniki'[1], the pro-Kremlin or anti-Kremlin Internet screamers," which according to him was because such bloggers are professionals whose writings have nothing to do with their actual opinions ("if a person is a janitor, that doesn't necessarily mean he is a neatnik").

Instead, he focused on the blogs of people who leave comments on some of the more popular LiveJournals. His article, titled "Contempt and Compassion," was hardly a flattering look into the RuBlogosphere. The first sentence read, "People, I've read your diaries. You are non-entities." I'm pretty sure there have been similar snarky commentaries about bloggers in the American mainstream media, but I'll leave it up to you to find them.

As for Panyushkin's article, I decided to translate just one paragraph:

My little male bloggers from time to time also write in their blogs about patriotism. Their patriotic outpourings usually have something about the demeaned and insulted Motherland. But other than the Limonovtsy, I didn't see a single patriotic blogger who had sacrificed anything of substance for their demeaned and insulted Motherland.

Bloggers' reactions to Panyushkin's article at one point occupied 15 of the 30 top spots on Yandex's "popular posts" list. Presumably those reactions were mostly negative - if you're interested, you can follow some of the links below.

[1] тысячник - a "thousandeer," a LiveJournal blogger with 1,000 or more "friends."

Презрение и сострадание Валерий Панюшкин об интернет-дневниках У пользователя «ЖЖ» годами может не быть ни одного всплеска отчаяния, только вялое нытье Далее Эта статья в блогах [?] tema, radulova, tanyant, evil-ninja, dolboeb, m-yu-sokolov, doctor-liza, olegart, sermal, skuzn, prof-rabotnik, barabanch, oleg-kozyrev, ivand, _kutuzov, golishev, kovanova, turova, rostovsad, guruken, penguinny, antusha, anashulick, ms-lizzy-bennet, zurfreude, pe3yc, kamrad-kats, maxim-kononenko, neznaika-nalune, kozenko, scottishkot, lvoropaeva, 1755078, dobrokhotov, ladoga, cybervantuz, namarsh_ru, shurics, obezyana, kolezev, youzef, krasovkin, _kogan_, pigbig, ru_politics, epliss, sexfunk, fomenko, shurko, winnukem, roman-shurukhin, kookoondra, e228, bekara, mosmellowman, robyana, allan999, blue-olusha, t-link, yuozik, ulixes, doronin, d-eva-chka, rigello, 1447, davelee76, peresedov, thecheshirecat, aisatu, in-b, evi-19, berlinka, trigg, worvik, sling, der-wish, nataljusha, rajaka, rimona, uncle-thompson, _ko_alla, stuart1861, chiifa, nedolboeb, dmih, feeling-of-void, anykeen, richard-grm, dorothy91, stas-kulesh, guralyuk, hate-daily, the-jove, shirly-noclaf, missseeya, dobrotolubie, cesurka, paufnuty, yangel, hollandrat, sinnieonfire, kliuv, hiddenmit, 1684702, alderina, diksi, partr, kozhev, kaizer-84, theeinstein, q-marik, chemodanov, cka304huk, captain-memo, zubkoff, maliar, kinshik, tapirr, melnikoff, lunaire, glint-way, lilit-boo, talismanser, ermouth, tr00per, h-op-e, anutka-il, anglus, catpad, todofmm, moon-live, gella4ka, psychomodo, kototuj, lyamur, zzerzonat, freken-boo, contra-ventum, 944340, izbuh, yandex-top-ru, topbot_flashr, _elhana_, roman-n, tanast, soboleva-t, alex-celly, prime12, rozanof, lunar-mist, olamia, goodwin45, surjojo, kilya-ya, bezumnypiero, satanya-chan, snadworm-arr, _kv, superina, nikitina-mama, chmv_, spirit-of, ultroliberal, elena-hochnadel, nu-i-shto, freya1, _starley_, dzz, pani-janna, mortang, alexey-viper, myem, vs-beloff, mark1992, al-manama, oxxx, trauch, witard, as-ne4aev, sergius, fedor-shilov, interviwer, zlaya-koroleva, vitaliy-fadeyev, viking-nord, djdrive, die-tier, asya-kareva, mamacholy, marish-plohish, yandex-top5, v-l-a-d-i, zakharov-m, wegg, ksyuhin-i-ya, el-periodista, inosmi_ru, arcaim, perlovka-blog, 45878, yandex-top10, kinomonster, soamo, kotarko, gmz, zen-buddha, demset, gatazo, alextr98, svinka-majalis, mind-exploded, jarolep, hitin, bp21, marina74, otshelnica, roma-2, aledr, g-r-p, moorca, kerlangua, odozmorov, brain_marrow, alexandra-junne, bigshaft, kottega, vialla, tinskaya, dn-d, lazy_rabbit, nadeyka-sh, leonsija, ervix, violent_vertigo, ajde-jano, readership, silberwe, tribunus, innomini, lisusha, rodoss, reistlin, male-x, sjevn, dobroslav, kumaxx, smolyak, hermangen, sceptic-rus, domkin, 986667, ivan-laptev, mikrukova, mont-blanc, mcarrow83, niotkyda, da-het, la-asteria, fagot99, nicodim-from, anhela-l, lovely-witch, adora-m, beobaxter, tommy-art, alliruk, mikhail-golub, hermionita, erenko, onsamyi, valnaya, emia99, doobydoom, dolgova, kfadffal, nexxon, catbayan, faiman, webalkach, mangusta, bagbier, ljoshkina, khorkoff, 2308342, cold-n-sour, neumno, zverozyab, ailoyros, tverdyi-znak, 2289491, vewwww, andrey-fromfili, lafdanov, mechanician, rachelka, idillliya, docent-07, duhonavt, hozhai, lafdanov, visvit, belko-i-pr, ollia-lukoye, ray-binko, semtn, m-oduvanka, 5fjord, thecrazyelf, lera-posmitnaya, psy-afterdark, marzipanela, dad_s, rotwain, dsa-blogspot, rein-bl8d, vinokurov, caesar-magnus, dazor

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