Traffic

Graphic from the "Tu nu esti marfa" ("You are not chattel") ad campaign,
developed by IOM and sponsored by, among others, USAID

A friend emailed me this link to a rather moving slideshow with audio about women who have been trafficked into prostitution from Moldova. This made me think about doing a more comprehensive post on the subject, but what I've wound up with is more like just a collection of links.

Natalia Antonova had a post recently dealing with some of the issues surrounding trafficking and prostitution in the former Soviet space.

The movie Lilya 4-ever does not deal specifically with Moldova but is about the trafficking of women from post-Soviet countries and is so good that it's even been screened by NGOs in an effort to deter young women from naively going abroad with perfect strangers. I've seen it and can recommend it.

This page appears to summarize much of the information about trafficking and anti-trafficking activity in Moldova, though it doesn't appear to have been updated for a couple of years. In 2003, this BBC article described Moldova as "Europe's human trafficking hub," and in 2004 RFE/RL wrote about young rural women being "vulnerable to human trafficking." Organizations that work on this issue (among others) are the Polaris Project and La Strada.

The OSCE Mission to Moldova's website has a page which includes pdfs of major anti-trafficking legislation and other reports on the issue. Jonathan at The Head Heeb has also blogged about some of the legal efforts to combat trafficking. The OSCE's page on trafficking also links to the Moldovan anti-trafficking and gender network, which has a page with a number of reports on the subject and has a profile of the problem in Moldova:

Poverty, inadequate public services, high levels of unemployment, discrimination against women, and domestic violence are among the main factors making Moldova a major country of origin for trafficking in human beings. According to recent data, around 420,000 Moldovans are currently abroad, primarily prompted to leave the country due to economic decline. However, of the Moldovans living abroad, no reliable data on the total number of trafficked persons is available given the multi-faceted nature of the crime and the absence of a standard identification procedure. None the less, information from countries of destination confirms a prominent number of Moldovan citizens among the identified trafficked persons.

From January 2000 to 31 December 2004, the total number of Moldovan nationals assisted as victims of trafficking by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) was 1633. Most Moldovan victims are women and children trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation, although a number of men have also been trafficked for forced labour and begging. Children are trafficked for sexual exploitation and begging.

The IOM reports that Moldovan victims have been trafficked to some 32 destination countries in Western Europe, South Eastern Europe, the Middle East, the former Soviet Union, including primarily Russia, and the United States. In 2004, the destination countries included Turkey (45%), South Eastern Europe (18%), the Middle East (15%), Russia (11%), and Western Europe (8%). Thus, the number of trafficked persons returning to Moldova, especially from the Western Balkans, is slowly declining, whilst the number of trafficked women returning from Turkey and Russia is increasing. There is also more information about trafficking from Moldova to Israel and the Middle East, as well as more evidence of children being trafficked to Russia.

Here's another older article from a Moldovan newspaper (in Russian), which purports to be based on an interview with a woman who was trafficked to Israel - the story is interesting because it goes into some detail about the long and winding path that groups of women often take to get to their destination abroad.

Blogger Mihai Moscovici wrote about the "Tu Nu Esti Marfa" anti-trafficking ad campaign in section 4.1 of his university thesis (in Romanian); the campaign was also covered by Newsweek at its peak back in 2002.

Abkhazia goes for the gold?

A couple of weeks ago, I translated an article from Nezavisimaia Gazeta which is rather speculative but looked to be about some elements in the Russian government trying to use the award of the 2014 Winter Games to Sochi as an excuse to launder money in Abkhazia, raise the value of their investments there, or perhaps simply help out the separatists' cause. It ran in JRL, but I'm posting it here in lieu of more original content. The transition back to DC and impending parenthood are keeping me from spending my usual excessive amount of time online, which may be a good thing.

When word emerged that Sochi would be hosting the Games, I thought immediately about the repercussions for the conflict in Abkhazia, which is within spitting distance of Sochi. TOL's Steady State speculated that Sochi's hosting the 2014 Games might postpone resolution of the conflict until 2018, because there would be incentives to paper over differences and avoid potential flare-ups until the Games were over, and while I'd hope the opposite would be true and we could perhaps expect an accelerated, more focused approach to conflict resolution, their pessimistic guess is probably better than mine.

Anyway, here's the translation:

Svetlana Gamova
Abkhazia's Olympic Triumph
Nezavisimaia Gazeta, July 26, 2007

Russia to invest hundreds of millions of dollars in the unrecognized republic

Sochi's victory in the contest to host the 2014 Winter Olympics has opened previously unheard of prospects for neighboring Abkhazia. Russia is planning to place in the unrecognized republic key elements of the construction complex that will guarantee the erection of the Olympic infrastructure. The amounts of investment currently under discussion are in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Abkhazia's undeniable triumph could turn out to be quite costly for Russia itself – it complicates the already difficult relationship with Georgia and could lead to new problems with [Russia's] WTO accession.

As Abkhazia's Foreign Minister Sergei Shamba told NG yesterday, in order to supply the needs of the Olympic construction complex, new facilities will be built in Abkhazia to produce cement and bricks and to mine gravel. However, he had a hard time naming the total cost of Abkhazia's "Olympic" program, saying that this issue is currently being discussed within the governments of Moscow and the Russian Federation. At the same time, according to information on the Abkhazian government's website, the construction of a cement factory in Tkvarcheli, which is proposed under the program, will alone cost investors $170 million. And that's just one factory. According to Sergei Shamba, there are also plans to establish a gravel production facility in the Gudauta region and a brick factory in the Gul'ripshskii region of the republic.

The Abkhazian Minister [Shamba] summed up Sukhumi's plans as follows: "In short, Abhkazia has been included in the Olympic zone, and the Russian investments are linked to our hopes for the development of our economy."

According to Shamba, the investment proposals were prepared in Sukhumi and given to the Russian government some time ago, but "Moscow paid attention to them only once it became clear that Sochi would host the Olympics." He also stated that possible investments in Abkhazia's resort zone, adjacent to Sochi, are under discussion within the Russian government. "It's clear that the Olympics will attract a large number of visitors who can also be housed on our territory [u nas]." Overall, though, added Shamba, Abkhazia's participation in Russia's preparation for the Olympics is founded on simple calculations which show that it is cheaper to transport building materials to Sochi from various regions of Abkhazia than from, say, Novorossiisk.

The administration of the Federal Development Program for Sochi [Federal'naia tselevaia programma po razvitiiu Sochi] did not confirm to NG that Abkhazia had been officially included in the Russian Olympic zone. FDP press-secretary Dmitrii Nezdorovin noted that "the Federal Development Program does not provide for sites located on the territory of another country." However, the FDP is only one of the sources of funding for construction related to the Olympics. The placement of construction industry facilities in neighboring Abkhazia is being discussed at the highest levels in Russia. For example, last Thursday, Vice-Premier Aleksandr Zhukov openly stated that Abkhazia would become one of the suppliers for construction materials for Sochi. According to him, cement factories might be built in Abkhazia that would supply material for the construction of the Olympic Village.

Tbilisi has not yet responded officially to this happy news for Sukhumi. Nino Kadzhaia, Director of the Georgian Foreign Ministry's Department of Information and Press, told NG that "Georgia's foreign ministry has no comment for the time being on the Russian Vice-Premier's statement about investment in construction in Abkhazia." At the same time Georgian politicians are not concealing their disapproval. Konstantin Gabashvili, the Chairman of the Georgian Parliament's Committee on External Contacts, had the following to say to NG yesterday about the situation: "I would ask my Russian colleagues not to use the preparations for the Olympics in Sochi as an excuse to complicate Russo-Georgian relations. Investment is possible, but it shouldn't be done over Tbilisi's head. It is essential that everything be agreed with the government of Georgia, whose territorial integrity Russia officially acknowledges. Investment in Abkhazia which is not approved by the Georgian leadership is a direct basis for the deepening of the conflict and damages Russo-Georgian relations."

According to the leader of the political movement "By Ourselves" ["My sami"] Paata Davitaia, "The Russian government's decision to invest $170 million to build a cement factory in Tkvarcheli on the territory of Abkhazia is a blatant violation of several international agreements." The Georgian politician referred to, among others, the agreement of the heads of the CIS states of January 19, 1996, which refers to economic sanctions against Abkhazia. "Another question arises: what tax service will monitor the expenditure of these not insignificant sums? The Abkhazian tax service, which is for all intents and purposes illegal? The Russian tax service? But this is not in their jurisdiction. Perhaps the Georgian tax service, which doesn't monitor the situation on separatist Abkhazian territory? All of this looks like money laundering," concluded Davitaia.

Moscow Carnegie Center expert Aleksei Malashenko told NG that Aleksandr Zhukov's statement could have a negative impact on relations between Russia and Georgia. "We are giving yet another excuse for Georgia to raise a question about Russia's WTO accession," said the Malashenko. According to him, in the story about Abkhazia's participation in the construction of Olympic sites "there is an element of senselessness: if cement is needed, it can be bought from a legitimate company in a legitimate country."

Georgia's official protest was swift enough, published on the IHT website (in an AP story) on the same date as the article I translated:

"Any joint projects between Moscow and Abkhazia failing to take into account Georgian interests wouldn't only draw Georgia's negative reaction, but will call into doubt the rightfulness of the selection of the Olympics' site," Burdzhanadze said Thursday.

The story covering Georgia's outrage also suggested that Shamba was running out in front of the train with his statements about huge Russian investment in the region:

No Russian officials have put forward any plans to involve Abkhazia in preparations for the Sochi Olympics, but Sergei Shamba, the foreign minister in the separatist government of Abkhazia, told Georgian television Thursday that the region was eager to offer construction materials and labor.

Russia has since denied (through Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov) that involving Abkhazia in the preparations for the 2014 Games is "on the agenda." Furthermore, according to a post on this topic by cyxymu (heavily commented on, if you're interested in reading more about this and you read Russian), Gref (or at least his ministry) also denied that Russia has plans to invest in Abkhazia in connection with the Sochi Games. Cyxymu thinks this is a simple calculation - $170 million of investment in Abkhazia would lead to Russia losing a billion or more dollars a year by having its WTO membership blocked by Georgia.

Notwithstanding these denials and the above AP report, the statements coming from Russian officials have seemed as conflicted as Russia's long-term approach to settling the Abkhazian conflict:

There have been mixed signals coming from different levels of the Russian authorities on Abkhazia’s possible role in preparation for the Olympic Games in Sochi, which is less than 40 kilometers away from the breakaway region.

Moscow Mayor, Yuri Luzhkov, said on July 9 that it was difficult to imagine holding the Olympics in Sochi without the participation of “such a kind neighbor as Abkhazia.”

On July 19 Russian Vice-Premier Alexander Zhukov said that cement-producing factories could be built in Abkhazia to supply the construction of infrastructure in Sochi. [...]

On July 27, Russian ambassador to Georgia, Vyacheslav Kovalenko said although Moscow was interested in Abkhazia’s involvement “no one has ever said that Russia is going to do this without Georgia."

On the other hand, the same article that quoted those statements also quoted Abkhazian "president" Sergei Bagapsh as saying the potential investment from Russia was around $15 million, an order of magnitude less than the figure cited by Shamba in the Nezavisimaya Gazeta article.

It seems obvious that all of the conflicting statements flying around are a result of the divergent interests of elites, even within the same country or de facto country. Some Russian officials have huge investments in Abkhazia and feel strongly that it should be returned more firmly and officially into Russia's orbit. It's a different matter whether their views on this preceded their property holdings, but now anyone who holds property in Abkhazia which was acquired after the shooting war ended has a strong incentive to make sure that Georgian refugees (with their pesky claims to their homes) and rule from Tbilisi (which might contest some of the "privatization" or "leasing" of public property) do not return to Abkhazia.

The approach of the group of Russian elites who seek official economic engagement with Abkhazia, which includes Mayor Luzhkov and some Duma Deputies (some of whom also like to play on the populist potential of Abkhazia) seems to run counter to the views of others who might have other priorities and be willing to use Abkhazia as a bargaining chip to pursue them. There are cleavages in Abkhazia as well, between more Russia-oriented elites (indeed, some officials in the de facto Abkhazian government are current or former officers in the Russian security services) and those who value the small measure of independence Abkhazia has attained, remember Russia's willingness to blockade Abkhazia in the 1990s, and/or realize that some in Russia may be willing to sell Abkhazia down the river if the right incentives come along.

Courtesy of two recent posts by cyxymu (which is easily my favorite blog about Abkhazia) on "How Abkhazia is Being Sold Off" - here and here - here are a couple of articles on the hot topic (especially during resort season) of Abkhazian real estate from Izvestiia and Kommersant-Vlast' (the latter is titled "Подмосковный абхазский округ," or - roughly - "Moscow Suburban District of Abkhazia"). OK, that parentheses-laden sentence tells me I've lost the thread, and it's time to go back to reconnecting with DC - by which I mean baking in the near-record heat on my way to taking refuge from said heat in a movie theater.

[Update Aug 10] I've found a few links I'd saved back when I first translated this piece. They may not be so relevant, but here goes: Russian official (interestingly, the presidential property manager) denying that Abkhazia would pose a "threat" to the Sochi Games; a piece by Molly Corso citing "experts" suggesting that Sochi's getting the Games could "create yet another obstacle to the resolution" of the "frozen conflicts" in Georgia; and a Guardian Unlimited commentator opining about the significance of the decision to give the 2014 Games to Sochi in general.

[Update Aug 11] Vilhelm Konnander also had an interesting post about his first thoughts on learning of Sochi's getting the 2014 Winter Games.

Tangerines, Moldovans far from home, and a river named Psou

This nearly five-year-old story definitely fits into the "truth is stranger - and sometimes more tragic - than fiction" category:

Tangerine Fever Grips Abkhazia By Inal Khashig on the Psou River
(IWPR Caucasus Reporting Service No.156, 21-Nov-2002)

The "yellow fever" season has begun in Abkhazia.

That is what Abkhaz call the time of year when the tangerine harvest is ripe and thousands of residents of the unrecognised republic flock to its northern border with Russia to trade them.

Since the end of the war with Georgia in 1993, the tangerine trade has become the main source of income for Abkhaz families. With the region's chronic lack of employment, the money they earn in the three months of the season must be enough to sustain them over the rest of the year.

With the border closed to the south, the tangerine traders all head north to the river Psou that divides Abkhazia from Russia. Here on either side of a narrow bridge, the respective customs services have set up posts. [...]

"I could trade my tangerines on the Abkhaz side too, but the price here is much lower than on the Russian side and my family badly needs the extra roubles," said Nadezhda, a woman in her fifties, standing in the long queue.

She said the salary she earned after 30 years teaching as a maths teacher was not enough to live on. Which is why she has to spend her weekends ferrying up to 50 kilogrammes of tangerines in a small cart, made out of an old child's pram. When she has sold her cargo, she generally uses the money to buy food, which is cheaper in Russia.

"My daughter-in-law used to come here," Nadezhda said. "But she developed health problems and the doctors told her that if she did not stop dragging heavy loads, she could not have children. So I took over the tangerines. Otherwise we would have nothing to feed the family." [...]

The most industrious of these traders earn up to 300 roubles (a little less than ten dollars) a day, which in Abkhazia is regarded as a good wage. Over the last two years, they have been joined by people from the North Caucasus and places as far a field as Moldova and Ukraine.

"When I was a child, tangerines were a fantastic treat, but now I can't bear the sight of them," said Svetlana Koditsa, from the town of Beltsy [Bălţi] in Moldova.

Svetlana makes three trips across the border a day before she has something left over from what she pays to cover her accommodation, food and bribes to the police, who, she complains, demand money even from those standing patiently in line.

"You try not to give it to them and they might not let you through," she said angrily. [...]

The whole story is worth a read, as it talks a bit about who profits from the trade and why the problem is intractable - an object study in corruption. I would imagine things have changed for the better since 2002, but perhaps not by much.

I found this story last fall while doing research on Russia's passportization campaign in Abkhazia. The article at one point mentions all of the Abkhazians* who had recently begun to receive Russian passports - and perhaps citizenship, depending on what you think constitutes citizenship. I decided to try to find the story once again and post the part about poor Svetlana from Balti, and it was easy to find - I just googled "Psou tangerine Moldova," and the article was, of course, the first result.

Incidentally, IWPR is a treasure trove of searchable, first-hand reporting by local correspondents. They even publish (online it's in pdf format) a locally oriented newspaper, Panorama, in Georgian and Russian, which turned out to be a good source of citations about Russian economic interests in Abkhazia (e.g., the Moscow Military District renting a Sukhumi resort for use by its personnel) and the local controversy they create; and about some of the ongoing debates in local politics. Of all of the post-Soviet secessionist statlets, Abkhazia seems to have the most developed political culture - elections which even Moscow can't fully control, for example.

For some stunning photos from Abkhazia, check out LJ user kunstkamera's recent set (HT Levan); this railway-themed set from cyxymu (who has many other photos from the region), recently featured at Registan; and of course the set I linked to earlier here.


*I prefer to use a non-ethnic term referring to people of all nationalities who live in Abkhazia, since the ethnic Abkhaz are still not a majority there - even after ethnically cleansing hundreds of thousands of Georgians, they are but a plurality in their own land, which they share with Russians, Armenians, and some returned Georgians. And of course, statistics from the region are unreliable and disputed.