Conflict Cables: Georgia, and the acceleration of the breakup, 1989-1990

Thanks to the August 2008 war, the conflicts over South Ossetia and Abkhazia have come to be perhaps the best known of the post-Soviet conflicts in the West.  The roots of these conflicts, according to some accounts, go back centuries, but the immediate triggers as the Soviet Union collapsed included missteps by Moscow, rhetorical overreach by a Georgian leader on the verge of independence, and unease over how inter-ethnic deals which had been enforced by Moscow would fare in the post-Soviet reality.

This batch of cables tracks the beginning of the downward spiral into armed ethnic conflict.  The first of them are post-mortems on the violent dispersal of a public protest in Tbilisi in 1989 that came to be known as the "April 9 events."  Six cables describing those events and their immediate aftermath were summarized in an earlier post in this series (read more about the "Conflict Cables" series here).

A May 5, 1989, cable titled "Georgian Activist on Events in Tbilisi" recounts a US Embassy official's conversation with "a prominent Georgian activist...in the 'moderate' Chavchavadze society," in which the anonymous Georgian source suggested a tangled web of motivations which allegedly led to the authorization for the use of force against non-violent protesters.

The Embassy officials' response to their Georgian source's conspiracy theory shows a charming naivete about the capability of Eduard "Silver Fox" Shevardnadze to engage in such machinations for his personal benefit - or perhaps faith in Shevy, who was at the time involved in negotiations with the U.S. on a much bigger stage: "We doubt that Shevardnadze would have put Perestroyka at risk by allowing or even quietly encouraging an ally to destabilize the situation in Georgia in order to bring down a political foe."

A May 6 cable - "More on Tbilisi Demonstrations" - gives a blow-by-blow account of the protesters' tactics and of their demands, which originally focused on Abkhazia but which progressed, in part due to friction between different dissident groups, to demands for independence.

On June 5, a cable went out describing a May 27 "Conversation with [a] Georgian Dissident" - Zviad Gamsakhurdia - declassified here for the first time, as far as I know, which shows Gamsakhurdia's penchant for wild accusations and inflammatory rhetoric. Gamsakhurdia remains controversial to this day in Georgia. In mid-1989, he began by "ACCUS[ING] THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT OF WAGING "GENOCIDE" AGAINST THE GEORGIAN PEOPLE, THROUGH THE USE OF CHEMICAL POISONS AND "ECOLOGICAL WARFARE".

Later in the conversation, he discussed Abkhazia and South Ossetia:

IN DISCUSSING INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS WITHIN GEORGIA, GAMSAKHURDIA SHOWED LITTLE TOLERANCE FOR THE REPUBLIC'S INDIGENOUS MINORITIES AND WARNED OF KARABAKH-LIKE SITUATIONS DEVELOPING IN THE ABKHAZIA AUTONOMOUS SSR AS WELL AS THE SOUTHERN OSETIAN AUTONOMOUS OBLAST'. HE DESCRIBED THE ABKHAZIANS AS "THE TRAITORS OF THE CAUCASUS" AND AS "CORRUPTED PEOPLE" WHO "WANT TO RUSSIFY THEMSELVES", CLAIMING THAT THE ABKHAZIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT IS ACTUALLY PROVOKED BY MOSCOW AND LED BY "TURKISH MOSLEMS" AS A TYPE OF GEORGIAN "INTERFRONT". HE INITIALLY CHARACTERIZED THE POLITICAL POSITION OF ABKHAZIAN AUTHOR FAZIL ISKANDER AS "NEUTRAL" BUT NEVERTHELESS FELT IT NECESSARY TO POINT OUT THAT ISKANDER IS AN ETHNIC PERSIAN AND A "GREAT LIAR".

ACCORDING TO THE GEORGIAN NATIONALIST, A SECOND GEORGIAN "INTERFRONT" -- A REFERENCE TO THE PRO-RUSSIAN GROUPS WHICH HAVE EMERGED IN THE BALTICS -- WAS BEING EXPLOITED BY MOSCOW AMONG THE 60,000 OSETIANS IN SOUTHERN OSETIA. GAMSAKHURDIA CLAIMED THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED REPORTS OF GEORGIANS BEING BEATEN IN SEVERAL OSETIAN VILLAGES, CLAIMING THAT THE OSETIAN POPULATION IS "VERY AGGRESSIVE". GEORGIANS ARE BEING OPPRESSED ON THEIR OWN LAND IN ABKHAZIA AND OSETIA, ACCORDING TO GAMSAKHURDIA, WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR MORE VIOLENT CONFLICTS.

Interestingly, this cable was apparently written by (or at least signed by) Richard Miles, later U.S. Ambassador to Georgia during the Rose Revolution.

During an August 1989 visit to Tbilisi, US Embassy officials spoke with a number of "Georgian intellectuals" (at a time when intellectuals still mattered politically), all of whom had "Abkhazia on their minds."  Their comments were summed up in an August 23 cable titled "Georgian Political Affairs." The Georgians were troubled by their portrayal in the Western press as "oppressors" of their national minorities.  One source saw the interethnic strife as "the work of a local Abkhazian mafia struggling to maintain its privileges in the face of a growing democratic movement throughout Georgia," which would leave the Abkhazians stripped of privileges as a result of being outnumbered  in their own autonomy.

Other interlocutors pointed suspicious fingers at Moscow, Turkey and Central Asia in explaining the unrest in Abkhazia.  None of the Americans' contacts was willing to entertain the possibility of satisfying the Abkhaz demands to elevate the Abkhazian ASSR to union republic status - "there were simply too few Abkhazians for that."  Georgians were already speaking about increased sovereignty and independence, though not necessarily of full-fledged secession from the USSR. 

The next few cables are roundups of "USSR domestic developments" and focus on other issues in addition to Georgia and other hot spots around the Soviet Union, which was by this point coming apart, though no one realized it at the time.  The first of these cables, dated November 9, 1989, includes a summary of a conversation with "noted Soviet pollster" Yuri Levada (paragraphs 15-16) as well as a synopsis of a familiar-sounding interaction with an opinionated taxi driver (para. 22), and quotes the "KGB press service" (para. 18) as stating that the "'present generation' of security officers dissociates itself from the Stalinist NKVD and condemns the arbitrariness of that period" (there appears to have been some regression in that regard since 1989).  Updates on South Ossetia (para. 27) and disruptions of Revolution Day celebrations in "Kishinev, Moldavia" (para. 31) and Tbilisi (para. 32), and the formal establishment of the "Soviet Interfront of Georgia," which swiftly demanded official status for the Russian language (para. 33).  There is also an interesting discussion of Soviet lawmaking (para. 34).

The November 17, 1989 "USSR Domestic Developments" cable melds old-school Sovietology (an extensive discussion of who stood on "the mausoleum" during the November 7 parade) with earnest discussions of the Soviet legislative calendar and priorities and comments from people like Anatoly Sobchak, and speculation like "Yel'tsin on the decline?" (para. 17).  Also interesting in light of current events are discussions of various popular front initiatives (paras. 20-21) and comments from Andranik Migranyan (para. 22) about domestic politics.  There is also a discussion of the "deteriorating" situation in Karabakh (para. 28) and of demands by Gamsakhurdia, whose organization is now referred to as "radical," that "Ossetians either support Georgian calls for independence from the Soviet Union or leave Georgia," and his forays into South Ossetia with busloads of armed men (para. 30).

The final roundup cable in this batch is "USSR Domestic Developments: December 1."  This one contains extensive discussion of Soviet domestic political developments, including some portions that apparently still merit classification and were redacted before the cable was released to me.  Not redacted, though, are some interesting points about the Karabakh conflict as it stood toward the end of 1989 (paras. 25-28), including some interesting comments by Yevgeny Primakov:

DURING A SPASO HOUSE DINNER NOVEMBER 29, YEVGENIY PRIMAKOV (PROTECT), A CANDIDATE POLITBURO MEMBER AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET'S COUNCIL OF THE UNION, SAID, "THE ARMENIANS WILL SIMPLY HAVE TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE PRESENT SITUATION." HE IMPLIED THERE WAS NO HOPE NAGORNO-KARABAKH WOULD EVER BE UNITED WITH ARMENIA. ACCORDING TO PRIMAKOV, THERE IS NO SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM AND EMOTIONS ARE RUNNING TOO HIGH FOR ARMENIANS AND AZERBAYDZHANIS TO REACH A COMPROMISE.

GEORGIY TARAZEVICH (PROTECT), CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET COMMISSION ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH, WHO VISITED THE AREA EARLY IN NOVEMBER, TOLD EMBOFF NOVEMBER 16 THAT HE BELIEVED THE SITUATION HAS DEADLOCKED.

This cable also has a brief update on continuing tension in South Ossetia (para. 29) and some thoughts from an unnamed Moldovan economist about new First Secretary Petr Luchinsky, and about leadership in the republic in general:

THE ECONOMIST SAID MOLDAVIA'S LEADERS WERE GENERALLY INCOMPETENT BECAUSE, UNLIKE IN THE BALTIC REPUBLICS, THE BEST LEADERS IN MOLDAVIA ALWAYS MOVED ON TO MOSCOW.

The next cable in this batch is titled "Tension Mounts in Georgia as Nationalism Grows," and is dated February 13, 1990. Embassy officials visiting Tbilisi "found the sense of fear palpable," and one source told them that the situation was "like a volcano ready to erupt any time."

In the midst of an extensive discussion of Georgian domestic issues, upcoming elections and emerging political groups is this instructive summary of Georgian Popular Front (PFG) Deputy Chairman Avtandil Imnadze's view of minority rights in a Georgia that was lurching toward independence:

THE PFG'S NATIONALIST VIEWS LEAVE FEW RIGHTS TO OTHER REPUBLIC ETHNIC GROUPS. WHILE IMNADZE TOLD EMBOFF THAT "WE WILL NOT VIOLATE THE RIGHTS OF OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS," HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THOSE RIGHTS IS VERY LIMITED AND GIVES NON-GEORGIANS VIRTUALLY NO POLITICAL POWER. "AFTER ALL," IMNADZE SAID, "THEY DO NOT BELONG HERE. THEY ARE ONLY OUR GUESTS." SEVERAL OTHER GEORGIANS WHO WERE NOT PFG MEMBERS ALSO EXPRESSED THIS SENTIMENT.

There is also discussion toward the end of the cable of the Georgian response to the deployment of Soviet troops in Baku in January 1990.

A cable from November 2, 1990 titled "Georgian Elections - Opposition Round Table Defeats Communists" summarized the implications of the elections won by Zviad Gamsakhurdia's Round Table - Free Georgia group.

GAMSAKHURDIA'S BLOC ADVOCATED INDEPENDENCE FROM MOSCOW, MAINTAINING GEORGIAN TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IN THE FACE OF MINORITY GROUP DEMANDS FOR AUTONOMY OR UNION WITH THE RSFSR.

There is also discussion of the way the election observation was conducted and the presence of foreign observers, noting some procedural flaws which did not in the estimation of the Embassy officials detract from the fairness of the elections. However:

MORE SERIOUS, PERHAPS, THAN THESE PROCEDURAL INCONSISTENCIES BEFORE AND DURING THE ELECTION WAS THE DECISION BY ABKHAZIA AND OSSETIAN NATIONAL GROUPS TO BOYCOTT THE ELECTIONS. INDEED, IN DISTRICTS WITHIN THE OSSETIAN CAPITAL OF TKHSINVALI LESS THAN TEN PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS CAST BALLOTS. IN TWO DISTRICTS IN ABKHAZIA ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS DISINTEGRATED AND ELECTIONS WERE NOT HELD AT ALL.

The position of the election's victor on the Abkhazians and Ossetians also did not bode well for inter-ethnic harmony in Georgia:

GAMSAKHURDIA ALSO SAID HE BELIEVES IN RESPECT FOR THE POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND RELIGIOUS RIGHTS OF THE MINORITIES LIVING IN THE REPUBLIC, BUT NOT THEIR INDEPENDENCE OR SEPARATION FROM THE GEORGIAN REPUBLIC. ANY SOLUTION TO THE MINORITY PROBLEM, HE STRESSED, MUST PRESERVE THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF GEORGIA AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE RIGHTS OF THE MAJORITY. [...]

GAMSAKHURDIA'S VICTORY COULD FURTHER FUEL ETHNIC TENSIONS AND CONFLICTS IN THE REGION. HE IS VIEWED BY SOME OF THE MINORITY GROUPS, PARTICULARLY THE ABKHAZIANS AND OSSETIANS, AS A GEORGIAN NATIONALIST AT BEST AND A CHAUVINIST AT WORST. HIS UNCOMPROMISING POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE SOUTHERN OSSETIANS, WHOM HE HAS CALLED A MINORITY WITHOUT RIGHTS TO THE LANDS THEY OCCUPY, HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY TROUBLING EVEN TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GEORGIAN DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION.

The cable's author(s) reached this unfortunately prescient conclusion:

THE RESISTANCE OF COMMUNIST PARTY APPARATCHIKI, AND THE RESENTMENT AND FEAR EXPRESSED BY MINORITY GROUPS IN ABKHAZIA AND SOUTHERN OSSETIA MAKE FOR A VOLATILE MIX: WITHOUT RESOLUTION OF THE PERSONAL ANIMOSITIES AMONG THE FORMER OPPOSITION LEADERS AND THE CONSENT OF THE ENTRENCHED COMMUNIST BUREAUCRATS, GEORGIA WILL, AT BEST, REMAIN CRITICALLY DIVIDED AT A TIME OF GREAT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTABILITY, AND, AT WORST, MAY SLIDE INTO FACTIONAL FIGHTING AND CIVIL WAR.

The final cable in this batch, from December 18, 1990, is titled "Union Treaty Negotiations: The Caucasus, Moldova, and the Baltics." This one is worth embedding in full, as it is laden with interesting observations about the internal situations in the republics of the Caucasus and Moldova, e.g. "INTERESTINGLY, FORMER COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER GElDER ALIYEV, FAMOUS FOR HIS CORRUPT POLITICAL PRACTICES, HAS MADE A POLITICAL COMEBACK AS A REBORN NATIONALIST."

Union Treaty Negotiations: The Caucasus, Moldova, and the Baltics (Dec. 18, 1990)

 

Conflict Cables Series: Abkhazia and the April 1989 Events in Tbilisi

 

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Unfortunately, I do not have too many cables on Abkhazia to share (read more about the "conflict cables" series here).  I'm still awaiting a response on my FOIA request covering the years of the actual conflict; therefore the Abkhazia-related material I'll be uploading for now is from 1989-90, when people were still trying to figure out what was going to happen to the USSR.

One of the clarifying events - at least viewed from a distance of a couple of decades - was the violence of April 9, 1989 in Tbilisi, Georgia.  The demonstration that Soviet troops broke up by hacking their way through a crowd of protesters with sappers' shovels was at least in part a response to a gathering the previous month in the Abkhazian village of Lykhny calling for the Abkhazian ASSR no longer be a part of the Georgian SSR. This tragedy still serves as a rallying point for Georgians who see the country's future free of Russian influence.

In the aftermath of April 9, the Soviet government attempted to demonstrate its openness by conducting a public investigation - above is a clip from Vremya in 1989 in which a the country's deputy general prosecutor is interviewed about the progress of the investigation, and here is the final report of the "Sobchak Commission" - constituted by the Congress of People's Deputies and headed by Anatoly Sobchak, who later became better known as the mayor of St. Petersburg and as a supporter of his former subordinate and protege, Vladimir Putin (Sobchak's name has lived on after his untimely death in 2000 as his daughter, TV personality and Paris-Hilton-like waste of space Ksenia Sobchak, has grown ever more infamous).

But I digress.  The six cables I've uploaded today are dated between April 6 and 13, 1989, and contain descriptions of the events in Abkhazia that motivated the Tbilisi demonstration and of the aftermath of the April 9 violence.

They also show the difficulties U.S. diplomats based in Moscow faced in monitoring rapidly developing situations in far-flung republics and the degree to which they were forced to rely on potentially unreliable sources in informing Washington, as well as the surprising fact that aspirations on the part of some Georgians to join "NATO" were causing problems in Tbilisi's relationship with Moscow as far back as 1989.  Click on the titles below to view scans of the full cables (I decided to experiment with not embedding them from Scribd, as I think doing so may make the page load slower).

Political Turmoil in Georgia over Abkhazia (April 6, 1989)
ACADEMICIAN SAKHAROV (PROTECT) TOLD A NATO AMBASSADOR APRIL 3 THAT GEORGIAN SOURCES HE CONSIDERED RELIABLE REPORTED THAT TROOPS FROM TBILISI WERE DEPLOYED TO ABKHAZIA OVER THE APRIL 1 WEEKEND TO FORESTALL POSSIBLE ETHNIC DISTURBANCES AS A RESULT OF RISING ETHNIC TENSION THERE. GEORGIAN DISSIDENT SOURCES REPORTED THE SAME. SAKHAROV ALSO REPORTED HE HAD HEARD THERE WERE ANTI-GEORGIAN DEONSTRATIONS IN SUKHUMI MARCH 31, AND HE DREW A PARELLEL WITH THE SITUATION IN ABKHAZIA AND THAT IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH IN LATE 1987, I.E., BEFORE THE KARABAKH CRISIS BLEW UP.

Abkhazia First Secretary Removed; Tbilisi Demonstrations Continue (April 10, 1989)
DEMONSTRATION ORGANIZERS HAVE SPLIT OVER THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF GEORGIAN INDEPENDENCE AND THE ABKHAZIA ISSUE. MODERATES IN THE IL'YA CHAVCHAVADZE SOCIETY AND RUSTAVELLI [SIC] SOCIETY, AS WELL AS RADICALS IN THE SAINT IL'YA SOCIETY, HAVE SOUGHT TO FOCUS PUBLIC ATTENTION ON ABKHAZIA. WHEREAS RADICALS IN THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NDP) AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE PARTY (NIM) INVOLVED IN ORGANIZING THE DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE REJECTED CALLS FOR A MASS INFLUX OF GEORGIANS TO ABKHAZIA AND HAVE EMPHASIZED THE GOAL OF GEORGIAN INDEPENDENCE FROM THE USSR. MODERATE GEORGIAN NATIONALIST ZURAB CHAVCHAVADZE, ADDRESSING DEMONSTRATORS APRIL 5, REPORTEDLY CALLED FOR ADLEYBA'S REMOVAL. HUNGER STRIKERS IN FRONT OF THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE NUMBERED 170 ON THE EVENING OF APRIL 7, ACCORDING TO GEORGIAN DISSIDENT SOURCES.

Soviet Troops Break up Tbilisi Demonstration; at Least 16 Dead (April 11, 1989)
ACCORDING TO GEORGIAN DISSIDENT SOURCES, SPECIAL RIOT TROOPS DISPERSED WITH FORCE ABOUT 8000 DEMONSTRATORS IN FRONT OF THE TBILISI GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT 3 A.M. APRIL 9. THE TROOPS REPORTEDLY USED TEAR GAS, CLUBS AND SPADES (LOPATKY).

ACCORDING TO AN AM[ERICAN] CIT[IZEN] (PROTECT) IN TBILISI, THE CROWD WAS DEMONSTRATING PEACEFULLY WHEN THE TROOPS MOVED IN. ONE GEORGIAN WOMAN REPORTEDLY THREW HERSELF IN FRONT OF AN APPROACHING TANK AND WAS CRUSHED. AN APRIL 9 TASS STATEMENT PUT THE DEATH TOLL AT 16 AND CLAIMED THEIR DEATHS RESULTED FROM BEING TRAMPLED BY THE CROWD WHEN SECURITY FORCES CLASHED WITH THE DEMONSTRATORS. [...]

WE HOPE TO GET SEVERAL EMB[ASSY] OFF[ICIAL]S TO GEORGIA BY THE END OF THE WEEK TO TRY TO GET A CLEARER PICTURE OF WHAT APPEARS TO BE QUITE A TENSE SITUATION

Georgian Update: Situation April 11 (April 11, 1989)
SEVERAL GEORGIAN DISSIDENT SOURCES AND AM[ERICAN] CIT[IZEN] OBSERVERS HAVE SHARED WITH US THEIR VIEW THAT THE DECISION TO SEND IN TROOPS STEMMED FROM CONCERN THAT THE DEMONSTRATION, WHICH HAD BEGUN IN PROTEST AGAINST CALLS FOR ABKHAZIA'S SECESSION FROM GEORGIA, HAD TAKEN AN ANTI-SOVIET AND ANTI-RUSSIAN TURN.

DEMONSTRATION LEADERS DEMANDING GEORGIAN INDEPENDENCE AND BANNERS CALLING FOR REMOVAL OF RUSSIANS FROM GEORGIA HAD TOUCHED A RAW NERVE IN MOSCOW. IN THESE SOURCES' VIEW, CALLS BY DEMONSTRATION SPEAKERS FOR AN INDEPENDENT GEORGIAN REPUBLIC'S ADMISSION INTO THE "UN" AND "NATO" MUST HAVE PROVOKED THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO AGREE TO USE TROOPS TO DISPERSE THE DEMONSTRATORS.

Georgia Update: April 13 (April 13, 1989)
GEORGIAN INTELLECTUALS WERE CONCERNED OVER THE GROWING DISPARITY BETWEEN THE COVERAGE OF THE SOVIET CENTRAL MEDIA AND THE GEORGIAN MEDIA. FOR EXAMPLE, AN APRIL 12 ARTICLE IN "KOMMUNIST", AN ORGAN OF THE GEORGIAN CC, DESCRIBED THE APRIL 9 DEMONSTRATION AS "PEACEFUL AND NO THREAT TO PUBLIC SECURITY," WHILE THE CENTRAL PRESS (SEE TASS APRIL 12) ACCUSED DEMONSTRATION LEADERS OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TRAGIC DEATHS, STATED OUR SOURCE. [...]

THE QUESTION OF INDEPENDENCE FOR NON-RUSSIAN REPUBLICS IS A SENSITIVE ONE FOR SOVIET LEADERS. GORBACHEV MADE CLEAR IN HIS APRIL 12 APPEAL TO THE GEORGIAN PEOPLE THAT HE REJECTS CALLS FOR GEORGIA INDEPENDENCE. SO FAR, HOWEVER, THE SOVIET MEDIA HAS REFRAINED FROM PUBLICLY ACCUSING WESTERN STATES OF FOMENTING NATIONALIST UNREST IN GEORGIA.

Abkhazian Accusations Against Georgians (April 13, 1989)
EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED FROM A DISSIDENT SOURCE A COPY OF WHAT PURPORTS TO BE THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT NOW CIRCULATING IN ABKHAZIA ACCUSING GEORGIANS OF VIOLATING THE RIGHTS OF THE ABKHAZIAN PEOPLE. THE STATEMENT HAS REPORTEDLY BEEN SIGNED BY OVER 30,000 PERSONS, INCLUDING B.V. ADLEYBA, A DEPUTY TO THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES WHO WAS OUSTED AS ABKHAZIA OBKOM FIRST SECRETARY APRIL 6. [Text of statement follows].

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Moskovskiy Komsomolets
August 25, 2010
Commentary by Marina Pervozkina: Thanks to Everyone, Everyone Is Free. South Ossetia and Abkhazia are gradually gaining independence from Russia. [Translation from JRL]

"Abkhazia is less dependent on Russia than Russia is on Abkhazia," one of the popular Abkhaz newspapers wrote recently. And the impression sometimes forms that the author was right on target. In any case, the elites of both the republics recognized by Russia often behave as if these words were inscribed on their family seal. Abkhazia and South Ossetia increasingly recall the willful beauty who condescendingly receives gifts from her long-standing, loyal suitor at the same time as her eyes are darting around looking for other interesting partners. And as always happens in such cases, the alternative is quickly found.

The Quiet American

"I think that he (Mikheil Saakashvili -- author) used the confrontation with Russia for personal goals: to muffle the voices of the discontented people in his own country. I hope that Saakashvili realized what harm he did to his own country, losing Abkhazia and South Ossetia in this way. After all, in this situation there will no longer be a road back."

"Kremlin propaganda again," some progressive reader will say involuntarily. And he will almost be right: such thoughts were heard on the official level in Russia so often that they became a kind of cliche that already seems almost improper somehow.

Nonetheless, these words, spoken just before the second anniversary of the August war, were a real sensation. After all, the person acting as the mouthpiece for Kremlin propaganda on this occasion is called the "shadow architect of American foreign policy" by well-informed people. And some consider him one of the most authoritative representatives of the American intelligence community. And not without grounds: Paul Goble (the quotation cited above belongs to him) in fact worked for a long time in the CIA, then served as an associate of the US State Department's Bureau of Research and Intelligence and as deputy director of broadcasting for Radio Liberty/Free Europe. He is considered one of the best experts on the Caucasus and inter-ethnic conflicts in post-Soviet space. In short, the classic "quiet American." Very quiet and very influential.

The significance of a person is best illustrated by the legends that surround him. There is a story that circulates about Goble, that supposedly the speaker and the prime minister of Armenia, who died at the hands of terrorists in October 1999, were paid back for rejecting the so-called Goble plan to settle the Karabakh conflict. We are sure that this is malicious slander.

And if such a complex person says publicly, "I think that on the threshold of the conflict Saakashvili misinterpreted statements by the US president and secretary of state... He did not hear at all what we had in mind. I hope that the American authorities are aware of the harm Saakashvili caused by his actions. We did not need that war," this certainly bodes no good for Saakashvili. It may already be time for him to look for a job in a quiet provincial American university. Just in case.

But here is the most interesting thing: "I believe in the right of nations to self-determination," Mr. Goble says. "And I am sure that Abkhazia has demonstrated its possibility of realizing this right in practice."

But what will happen with the territorial integrity of Georgia, for which official Washington is constantly affirming its support? The events of recent years have shown that for the Americans the integrity of other countries is always a relative value. When a probable enemy or its ally loses integrity it is welcomed. The examples of the USSR and Yugoslavia are known to all. But while the USSR collapsed relatively peacefully ("just" a few tens of thousands killed in Tajikistan, Abkhazia, the Dniester region, and South Ossetia), everything was much worse in Yugoslavia. At first glance US policy toward Slobodan Milosevic looked somewhat schizophrenic: after all, in its time Yugoslavia was the most pro-Western country in the socialist camp and had difficult relations with Moscow while Milosevic himself up to a certain time seemed to be a completely loyal client of Washington. He made concessions easily, in fact surrendered Serbian Krajna, and declared an economic blockade of the Bosnian Serbs (how can we help recalling here the multi-year blockade of Abkhazia by the Russian Federation?). But here is the paradox: the more Milosevic gave away, the less the West liked him. Ultimately the Serbs even gave up Milosevic himself, but they still took Kosovo away from them. The poor devils simply did not understand that it was not a matter of Milosevic, but of themselves -- the West does not need a strong, unified Serbia, which sooner or later will return to its traditional role as Russia's outpost in the Balkans.

But whereas everything is clear with Serbia, Turkey is, after all, a reliable ally and strategic partner of the Americans. And therefore the Americans' support of Kurdish separatism in Iraq is, from the Turkish point of view, completely beyond good and evil. I took a look at the Kurdish website yesterday, and saw there threats to secede from Iraq with highly promising commentary: "And if the Kurds slam the door, glass will fly across the whole region." In connection with which very alluring prospects could open up for Turkish Kurdistan. And how is Georgia better than Turkey?

Normal Heroes Always Take the Bypass

It is not only no better, but even in some respects worse: Georgia, an Orthodox country like Serbia, was a reliable supporter of the Russians during the Caucasus war and together they wiped out the mountain rebels, who are brothers in spirit and faith with the Kosovo terrorists, the United States' current strategic partners. So who will sort them out, the Georgians? Where will their sun rise tomorrow? Half of the North Caucasus is related by kin to the Abkhazes.

Of course, from the standpoint of America's strategic interests it would be best if a united Georgia including Abkhazia and South Ossetia joined NATO. But the West is starting to understand that it is probably impossible for Abkhazes and Georgians to live in one state. That means it is necessary to "enter" already independent Abkhazia maybe as a carcass, maybe as a scarecrow, maybe as an embassy if nothing else works.

"For Moscow the worst development of the situation in the Caucasus is if the West, and the United States in particular, decides to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia," Mr. Goble says. "Picture 27 embassies of the NATO members in Sukhum. No doubt the Russian authorities would be horrified at that. Then after all, there are others in Russia who would like self-determination -- Dagestan, for example. I do not rule out such a development of events. I hope that we greet the 10th anniversary of the conflict between Russia and Georgia in a significantly calmer state. There will be fewer comments on Russian aggression, and more embassies of foreign states in Sukhum. I do not know if there will be an American Embassy among them. That, of course, is a very bold dream."

Paul Goble is undoubtedly a brilliant analyst and a master strategist. He set forth a perfectly realistic plan to "nullify" Russia's August victory: reorient Abkhazia to the West and turn it into a Mecca for North Caucasian separatists. This is not fantasy. Suffice it to recall the Gorskaya (Mountain) Republic that was declared after the fall of the Russian Empire. It included Abkhazia, Ossetia, and five other republics of the North Caucasus. The ideas of the Gorskaya Republic were reborn after the fall of the Union. In November 1991 Sukhum was declared the capital of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus. During the war with Georgia representatives of all the national movements of the North Caucasus fought on the Abkhaz side. The minister of defense of war-time Abkhazia was Sultan Sosnaliyev, a Kabardin, and Shamil Basayev was his deputy. Kabardin and Chechen battalions played a decisive part in the war. Afterw ard those same Chechens, having become battle hardened on the fronts of Abkhazia, fought against Russian troops.

Highly-placed people I spoke with in Sukhum told me that even before the August events representatives of Western countries in private conversation hinted on occasion that Abkhazia's main problem was its pro-Russian orientation. "If the Abkhazes turn their faces to the West, anything is possible, including international recognition" -- according to my interlocutors that is how these emissaries talked.

"If the 'restoration' of Georgian rule is a fantasy, accordingly it is essential to prevent Abkhazia from finally falling under Russia's power," the journalist Neal Ascherson writes in his article entitled "Abkhazia and the Caucasus: the West's Choice," which was posted on the Open Democracy website. "The West is facing an urgent need to arrange direct contacts with Abkhazia -- economic, social, and cultural contacts -- and to get access to Abkhaz ports. That will help Abkhazia emerge from isolation."

News from the Field

As for South Ossetia, in the opinion of Western analysts it has fewer grounds for independence. Small territory, small population. And geographic position: South Ossetia is a "dagger aimed at Tbilisi," an ideal launching point for an invasion of Georgia. But the main thing is that North Ossetia is located in the Russian Federation. In this connection (I am again speaking on the basis of the words of participants in events who hold high positions in the Ossetian elite) on numerous occasions the Ossetians have been told unofficially that if North Ossetia unites with South Ossetia and withdraws from Russia, such a united Ossetia could well expect international recognition.

This idea is not at all as utopian as it seems.

In Tskhinval today we observe a paradoxical situation. While South Ossetia, its people, and the whole elite are entirely dependent on our maintenance -- in the war-ravaged republic nothing is working, there are no domestic sources of income at all, and even its security depends entirely on Russia -- Moscow cannot resolve a single significant problem there. Not even monitor the expenditure of its own money or protect its own people. Moscow (and according to my information the Russian premier personally) was even unable to get Mr. Kokoyty to dismiss South Ossetian officials who were caught stealing and whose names were known. The story of former health minister Nuzgar Gabarayev, who distributed Russian financial aid, is illustrative. His name has already become part of the language in the republic. After Moscow protege Vadim Brovtsev sent Gabarayev into retirement, President Kokoyty appointed him his own state counselor. Evidently an indispensable personage. Even more illustrative is the story of General Barankevich, who Moscow wanted very much to appoint to be head of the MVK (interdepartmental commission on the restoration of South Ossetia), but COULD NOT. In other words, in this case terribly dependent and very proud Tskhinval, living entirely on our money, was actually able to influence our internal personnel policy. At the same time we cannot influence Tskhinval's. I would say that this is the apotheosis of impudence.

There is an analogous situation in Abkhazia, where Moscow is unsuccessfully trying to get the property rights of Russian citizens who were illegally deprived of their housing restored. In order to avoid misunderstanding, I will emphasize that we are not talking here about the property of Georgian refugees. Their problems should be the subject of bilateral talks between Georgia and Abkhazia. It is those for whom the Russian government is fighting, principally Russians, Armenians, Greeks, and the like. Many of them never left Abkhazia at all.

In these very days another scandal has flared up. Sukhum rejected a document sent to it by the MID RF (Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs) entitled "Concept of the Work of the Joint Russian-Abkhaz Commission on Questions of Restorin g the Property Rights of Citizens of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Abkhazia." We will recall that the decision to form such a commission was reached in Moscow after an article published in MK (Moskovskiy Komsomolets) made the problem a matter of public record. Before this, according to our information, the MID RF and the Russian Embassy in Sukhum had sent several diplomatic notes to the Abkhaz side (dated 25 November 2008, 19 March 2009, 22 April 2009, and 31 July 2009). President Medvedev and foreign minister Lavrov discussed the problem with the president of Abkhazia. Sergey Baghapsh pointed out to the chiefs of local administrations the necessity of "taking a hard line with seizures of property." However, nothing happened. Not one of the protagonists of our article has gotten his apartment back at this point.

At the same time strange articles are appearing in the Abkhaz press in which the plans to form the commission are called "anti-state and anti-Abkhaz," while giving people back property that was fraudulently taken from them is considered a threat to the Abkhaz people. The Abkhazes never tire of repeating that their foreign policy must be multi-vectored, that they are not some pathetic outpost of Russia, but a sovereign state with its own interests. Thus if there is a change in the West's position on the issue of Abkhaz independence, Moscow stands a good chance of being left empty-handed.

And if we close our eyes to the problems that already exist in relations with our Abkhaz and Ossetian partners, it is not impossible that some day museums "of the Russian occupation" will open on the central squares of Sukhum and Tskhinval.

God forbid, of course.

Reacting to Medvedev's visit to Abkhazia - and to the S-300 deployment

 [image source]

 The article below is a good read, and this RT press review of coverage of Medvedev's visit to Abkhazia is also worth checking out if you are interested in how this story played.  Neither takes into account today's news about Russia deploying an S-300 air defense system in Abkhazia, which has the Georgians up in arms and has received more coverage than I think it merits - after all, the State Dept claims they've known the Russians have had this system up and running there for the past two years...


Kommersant, August 9, 2010 [translation from JRL]
Report by Zaur Farniyev in Tskhinvali et al.: "Two Years Later: Trans-Caucasus Mark Second Anniversary of 2008 Events"

South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Georgia marked the second anniversary of the August 2008 war differently. South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoyty made his fellow countrymen happy with the news that the deputies of the Latvian Seim had raised the question of recognition for South Ossetia. For the first time since its recognition by Moscow, Abkhazia had a visit from Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev. And Georgian head Mikheil Saakashvili went to distant Colombia in order to avert further recognition of Tskhinvali and Sokhumi in Latin America.

Video Conference on Recognition

Unlike last year, South Ossetia's leadership decided to scale things down. This time, there was almost nothing in Tskhinvali to remind anyone that two years had passed since the war that brought the republic its independence.

Within the framework of memorial events, the authorities organized an excursion to the places where the greatest number of civilians, citizen soldiers, and Russian soldiers died in 2008. The departure was delayed by nearly an hour. On the square in front of the train station, located several meters from the Alan Hotel, where most of the reporters were housed, they were searching for a bomb. Apparently, at seven in the morning, an unknown woman called a Moscow police station to tell them of an imminent terrorist act in Tskhinvali.

Meanwhile sources close to the government reported that President Eduard Kokoyty would not be at the site of the first flower laying because he was "holding a video conference with Latvia." The republic chief was indeed in touch with representatives of the Ossetian diaspora and deputies from the Latvian Seim by video conference. "Both my fellow countrymen and the Latvian deputies expressed their condolences to the people of South Ossetia," Mr. Kokoyty later related, after which he reported the main sensation: several Seim deputies had brought up for consideration by their colleagues the issue of recognition for South Ossetia. "This is a necessary step," the president commented, adding that only with the help of a few Western countries "will the Saakashvili regime feel its own impunity."

President Kokoyty and members of his government and administration laid flowers at the entrance to School No. 6, where North Ossetian native Aslan Aguzarov died. He had attempted to shield the women and children hiding in the school basement on the night of 7-8 August 2008. Aslan Aguzarov was posthumously awarded South Ossetia's highest honor, the Order of Uatsamong. Flowers were laid in several other places in Tskhinvali as well.

Later, on a bypass near the village of Khetagurovo, which suffered more than any other during the war, Eduard Kokoyty unveiled the Tree of Grief memorial, which looks like a tree a little taller than a person and instead of leaves has little bells that tinkle when the wind blows. Ten meters away from it are the frames of 20 warped automobiles. "These are those who tried to leave Tskhinvali at the very beginning of the invasion," local residents explain. "But they failed. Nearly all the vehicles were destroyed by Georgian tanks."

In the evening, on Tskhinvali's main square, the last memorial event was held; an academic orchestra from Moscow played a requiem.

August Theses

The main guest at the events in Abkhazia was Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev. He flew in yesterday to Sokhumi unexpectedly. The president's visit, his first to Abkhazia since Moscow recognized this republic's independence, was kept secret until the moment Russian flight number one landed at the Sokhumi airport. "Sergey Baghapsh (Abkhazia's head -- Kommersant) has long been inviting Dmitriy Medvedev to visit the republic, and now he ha s taken him up on the invitation," Natalya Timakova, the Russian president's press secretary, explained to Kommersant.

At the very beginning of his talks with Mr. Baghapsh, Dmitriy Medvedev emphasized the two main theses he wanted to bring out with his visit. First, the decision to bring Russian troops into South Ossetia in August 2008 and the subsequent recognition of Sokhumi and Tskhinvali "was difficult and complicated but, as time has shown, correct." Second, Russia intends to continue to develop "good relations with Abkhazia" in the areas of economics, politics, and security. Over the course of the several hours of his stay in Abkhazia, the Russian president returned more than once to these two theses.

At the end of the talks, Dmitriy Medvedev and Sergey Baghapsh, now without ties and jackets, headed for the U Akopa coffeehouse on the Sokhumi embankment, where there were many Russian tourists at that time. "May we join you?" Mr. Medvedev asked, and he immediately sat down with the vacationers. The Russian president asked how their vacation was going in Abkhazia. They started vying with each other to say how marvelous it was here, what wonderful air there was, and in general how well they were living at the Moscow Military District's Sukhum sanatorium. Sergey Baghapsh even laughed: "Of course, we aren't going to hear anything bad from them now." But the tourists tried to convince the presidents that they were speaking sincerely, and at the same time they asked Mr. Medvedev about the fate of the Sukhum sanatorium.

"Let's ask the defense minister about this right now!" The Russian president turned to Anatoliy Serdyukov, who had accompanied him on the trip. The head of the military department assured them that the Russian Defense Ministry sanatorium in Abkhazia would be restored and would operate as before.

Mr. Medvedev promised the coffeehouse's customers that Russia would be rendering assistance to Abkhazia in restoring the airport and air traffic, since "that would be more convenient." In general, he said, Abkhazia had every opportunity to become a tourist center on the Black Sea coast and occupy "its own niche" here. "Simply restoring Soviet service is the wrong way to go," the Russian president explained. "It has to be comparable to Turkey."

Before leaving U Akopa, Dmitriy Medvedev once again repeated that Russia was not going to abandon Abkhazia, and turning to Sergey Baghapsh sitting next to him, he commented, "But they themselves must try, too. Will you?" The Abkhazian president seemed stung. "We are."

After the coffeehouse Dmitriy Medvedev and Sergey Baghapsh spent some time at the Abkhazian State Philharmonic and the second Russian school, which were restored with Russian investments. At the Memorial to the Glory of Those Who Died in 1992-1993 for Abkhazia's Freedom, Mr. Medvedev once again recalled his two-year-old decision. "We acted correctly. We saved people and prevented a bloodbath here," he said. He repeated this same thought during his visit to the Russian military base in Gudaut. Were it not for the help of Russian military personnel, "many of them (civilians -- Kommersant) would simply not be among the living," the Russian president said. "Russian soldiers in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are not letting extremist forces foist their own approaches, sow enmity and hatred, and shed blood," he added.

"The Russian president's visit to Abkhazia is more a political visit than a trip filled with specific content," a source in the Kremlin explained to Kommersant. "The goal of the visit is to emphasize the Russian Federation's political and military presence in the region."

Battle for America

Tbilisi reacted harshly to the Russian president's visit to Abkhazia. "They are continuing to play a lost game," Temur Ya kobashvili, Georgia's deputy prime minister and minister of reintegration, stated. "These territories have been recognized as occupied, and trips like this do not change anything or add anything positive for the region."

The anniversary of the five-day war was marked in Georgia on 7 August, since it is this date that Tbilisi considers to be the beginning of military actions. "On the night of 6-7 August 2008, fire from Ossetian artillery coming from Dzhava (a village not far from the Russian Federation border -- Kommersant) and from Tskhinvali almost totally destroyed the Georgian village of Avnevi," Mikhail Machavariani, deputy chair of the Georgian parliament, told Kommersant. "At the same time we have received incontrovertible reports that a column of Russian troops crossed the border at the Roki tunnel on the night of 6-7 August."

It is worth noting that on 7 August of this year President Mikheil Saakashvili was in distant Colombia, where he participated in the inauguration of that country's new president, Juan Manuel Santos. "The problem is that two states in Latin America, Venezuela and Nicaragua, have recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia," political analyst David Avalishvili explained to Kommersant. "Therefore the president could not let slip a chance to meet with other leaders of Latin America and convince them not to follow the example of Hugo Chavez and Daniel Ortega." Nevertheless, on the evening of 7 August, Georgian television showed Mikheil Saakashvili's speech, recorded on the backdrop of the Colombian capital, in which he promised that "the battle for Georgia's deoccupation would continue to the end."

Georgian authorities organized their main memorial events in the village of Ganmukhuri, on the border with Abkhazia, and in Gori, 25 km from South Ossetia. Not far from Ganmukhuri the authorities have built the Anaklia resort, and Parliamentary Speaker David Bakradze has opened a new hotel there. Right now hundreds of teenagers are vacationing at the resort, including from Belarus, and the arrival there of young Belarussians, naturally, is at the center of attention for the Georgian media. A memorial concert was held at the new hotel, and Bolshoy Theater tenor Zurab Sotkilava sang. The honored guests included former Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus, who actively supported Georgia in August 2008 and whose name now is on the riverside boulevard in Anaklia. This boulevard ends right at the Georgian-Abkhazian border, which since August 2008 has been guarded by Russian border guards, who have watched what was going on in Ganmukhuri through binoculars.

While in Gori several thousand young people holding candles formed the outline of Georgia's borders. Including Abkhazia and South Ossetia, naturally.

American Interests in the Caucasus by Sergey Markedonov

Kavkazskii Krai - Transit Routes, originally uploaded by lyndonk2.

Below is an original translation of a recent article which I thought was important enough to spend time rendering in English. I have added hyperlinks to some of the items cited by the author. The original article is here.


American Interests in the Caucasus
Sergey Markedonov, Polit.ru, May 13, 2010

The immediate reason for writing this article was my telephone conversation with a correspondent of the Voice of Russia radio station. The journalist for the state-owned station was interested in an article by Alexander Cooley and Lincoln Mitchell, two American specialists from Columbia University. The political scientists’ article, subtitled “Action Memorandum” and addressed to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, concludes that a serious reformatting of America’s foreign policy toward Georgia and Abkhazia is necessary. You read correctly, Cooley and Mitchell consider Abkhazia as a separate policy actor (and not just an object of policy), with which a constructive relationship should be developed, without, however, formally recognizing Abkhazia’s independence. “Engagement without recognition” is the formula used by the Columbia University specialists. It is also worth noting that their piece was published under the heading “Off the Beaten Path” in the influential publication The American Interest. [1]

Certainly it is pleasant to see a state-run radio station that broadcasts overseas taking interest in foreign intellectual discourse. One can only welcome the familiarization of Russian journalists with the opinions of their foreign colleagues, without which an adequate understanding of the expert and policy community in the U.S. and Europe would be impossible. But I was puzzled by the tone of the question: “Does this signal a change in American policy priorities in the Caucasus?” What can we conclude from this question? That Russian journalists and experts (and this isn’t the first time I’ve heard such a question) genuinely believe that any article by an American professor or consultant represents an expression of the American government’s will. In the post-Soviet republics people take a similar approach toward the statements of Russian experts. In both cases such assessments are far from the truth. But the situation with Russia merits a separate article, and here we will focus on the American situation in greater detail. Especially since the understanding of it in our country is of practical significance. Failing to fully understand (or to understand at all) how the American government, decision-making systems, and academic community function, we make quite substantial mistakes in our foreign policy.

For example, in 2007, there was a lively discussion in the U.S. about American participation in the Baku-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Kars railway project. The Bush Administration was interested in this project, and no less a luminary than Matthew Bryza of the State Department (who was responsible for the South Caucasus) spoke about it as though it were a done deal. Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress was against the plan because it was opposed to increasing the international isolation of Armenia, an American ally. This topic was the subject of a representative roundtable discussion in Russia, where highly placed political analysts close to the government with utter seriousness asserted that Washington would support the project because the Administration was in favor of it. Attempts to explain to my colleagues that Congress is not the “voting department” of the White House were unsuccessful. To the contrary, they met with responses along the lines of, “But in Russia the Duma would never go against the Kremlin.” The whole point is that the American Congress is not the Russian Duma, which is why the ambitious railway plan was ultimately not supported by Washington. But a lack of understanding of the decisionmaking process in the U.S. created an inaccurate “picture” of the prospects of this particular project.

Unfortunately, those [Russians] who attempt to elucidate American foreign policy actions in the Greater Caucasus also fail to fully understand the debates among American specialists about this unsettled region. Aside from the association of political scientists with American passports en masse with the positions of the U.S. State Department, Russian experts and journalists suffer from an additional affliction – one that is, alas, quite widespread. They try to simplify the positions of American political scientists regarding the “Five-Day War” and its aftermath by presenting them as patently pro-Georgian. This leads to not entirely sensible actions. For instance, in the summer and fall of 2008 our politicians and journalists talked of practically an “informational conspiracy” against Russia during the hot August days in South Ossetia. Then in the fall of 2009 the same people expressed their surprise at the “balanced report” of the E.U. expert commission headed by Heidi Tagliavini. In the first case the incorrect assessment led to an extremely and unjustifiably inflated anti-Western hysteria, in which our mass media played into the hands of hawks in Washington and Brussels by portraying the events of 2008 as a confrontation not with the Georgian leader but with a “combination attack” of the Western world arrayed against “a Russia rising from its knees.” In the second case our surprise was again misplaced, because Tagliavini’s “balance” was suggested long before the official publication of her commission’s report. Quite simply, there was nothing to be surprised at.

To be clear, of course there are some American writers who are genuinely sympathetic to President Mikhail Saakashvili and view him and Georgia under his leadership as a “beacon of democracy.” Ronald Asmus, a well known and influential student of transatlantic security issues, devoted his entire book to this idea. In A Little War that Shook the World (published and widely presented in January 2010), the author states that “the origins of this war do not lie in the details of local ethnic rivalries between Georgians on the one hand and Abkhaz and South Ossetians on the other, or even the future status of these provinces.” In Asmus’s view, at the root of the events of 2008 lay “Tbilisi’s desire to break free of what had been a quasi-colonial relationship with Moscow and to become part of a democratic West.” (pp. 8, 216). As a matter of fact, this is the methodology used to construct [Asmus’s] assessments of the situation in the Southern Caucasus during the period leading up to the tragic events of that hot August of 2008. Abkhazia and South Ossetia are viewed not as independent figures but solely as instruments of Russia’s “offensive policy” and barriers to Georgia’s movement towards the West (pp. 54, 63-64). Russian policy toward the two formerly rebellious autonomies is regarded as a “creeping annexation” of Georgian territory, and “passportization” is seen as a politico-ideological justification for Georgia to cause “damage” (p. 42 [sic]). The introduction to Asmus’s study was written by Strobe Talbott, also a well known personality in contemporary American policy and analytical circles, the president of the Washington-based Brookings Institution who served as Deputy Secretary of State in 1994-2001: “I can even imagine [this book] will have resonance in Moscow, where thoughtful but well-connected and in some cases well-placed Russians are – quietly and cautiously – pondering the lessons, consequences and implications for the future of their government’s constant troublemaking in the Caucasus and, in particular, its mauling of Georgia in August 2008.” (p. xi). Thus, the introduction immediately indicates the book’s frame of reference for the reader: Russia is the “bad guy” and Georgia is the “good guy.”

However, judging all of American political science based on a single book (although quotations from it were eagerly posted by Russian websites) is a thankless task! Admittedly, it’s a thankless task in general to talk about a “unified Western approach” to the Five-Day War. On August 11, 2008 (while the fighting was still taking place), in an interview with Salon’s Glenn Greenwald, prominent Caucasus expert Charles King of Georgetown University said, “I think it's very simplistic to see this as the Russian autocratic bear trying to snuff out this small beacon of democracy. There are bigger issues…that are at stake here as well.” That same day Prof. King, in an article in the Christian Science Monitor (the publication with the second-largest circulation in the U.S. [sic]) appropriately headlined “Russo-Georgian conflict is not all Russia's fault,” wrote, “Russia must be condemned for its unsanctioned intervention. But the war began as an ill-considered move by Georgia to retake South Ossetia by force. Saakashvili's larger goal was to lead his country into war as a form of calculated self-sacrifice, hoping that Russia's predictable overreaction would convince the West of exactly the narrative that many commentators have now taken up.” Several lines later King concludes, “For Georgia, this war has been a disastrous miscalculation. South Ossetia and Abkhazia are now completely lost. It is almost impossible to imagine a scenario under which these places – home to perhaps 200,000 people – would ever consent to coming back into a Georgian state they perceive as an aggressor.”

Subsequently King examined these points in greater detail in his academic publications. Steven Pifer, former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine (who by the way works with Talbott at Brookings), told the Los Angeles Times on August 13, 2008, that “Saakashvili gave the Kremlin an opportunity when he sent troops into the separatist region of South Ossetia last week in an effort to reassert Georgia's sovereignty.” Nikolai Petro, a professor at the University of Rhode Island and an assistant on Soviet issues in the State Department under George H.W. Bush, published an article in May 2009 entitled “The Legal Case for Russian Intervention in Georgia,” in which he asserts that practically all aspects of Russia’s operation in the Caucasus in August 2008 were consistent with international law and with Russia’s mandate as a peacekeeper. And in 2008 Lincoln Mitchell, who we mentioned at the beginning of this article, published a book with the telling title “Uncertain Democracy [the word “uncertain” can be translated [into Russian] as “dubious,” “unstable,” “unreliable” – S.M.]: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia’s ‘Rose Revolution’.”

Therefore, we should not oversimplify the American expert community’s understanding of Russian motives and actions in the Caucasus, especially if we are mindful of the anti-Russian phobias and fears that are present in American society (which we should ourselves be working much more actively to break down). Only then will we avoid unexpected surprises and discoveries and minimize inappropriate actions.

In any event, Cooley and Mitchell’s article is valuable not only in the overall context of American political science. It proposes some interesting arguments which deserve serious attention. The authors start by pointing out that since August 2008 the U.S. and the E.U. have consistently refused to accept Russia’s decision to recognize Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence. And this policy, in their view, has failed, while there has been no success in developing an acceptable relationship with the two disputed regions. Cooley and Mitchell assert that “these territories are almost certainly lost to Georgia, possibly for decades,” and that Russian influence there “has increased rapidly and substantially.” Thus, “[u]nless the United States changes its approach, the Russian Federation will soon completely absorb Abkhazia and South Ossetia.” In order to prevent such a scenario, the Americans together with the E.U. must “urgently…end the current policy of isolation with respect to these territories and replace it with one of ‘engagement without recognition.’”

What methods do Cooley and Mitchell propose for this? In the section of their article subtitled “Abkhazia First” they discuss the serious differences between the two de facto states on Georgian territory. In their opinion, Abkhazia already has certain “attributes of statehood” while sparsely populated South Ossetia, “landlocked between Georgia and Russia,” is difficult to imagine as a full-fledged state. Consequently, the American specialists suggest that Abkhazia should be the first priority in terms of building bilateral (multilateral, if we take into account the U.S., E.U. and other Western integrative structures) relations. But what about Georgian territorial integrity? In Cooley’s and Mitchell’s opinion, Georgia’s territorial integrity has a “specific meaning”: this concept is correctly applied to describe the Georgian SSR, but not contemporary Georgia, since in reality such “integrity” “simply does not exist.” The authors do not seek to toss the project of “restoring Georgian territorial integrity” overboard, but they note in a politically correct way that this is a long-term project. And although such a resolution of the conflict would be “ideal,” it would not be constructive and doesn’t make sense to discuss it in terms of specific time frames.

The alternative proposed by Cooley and Mitchell consists of several elements. First, “engagement” without a guarantee of formal legal recognition. By this the American political scientists mean introducing a practice of issuing entry visas to Abkhazian officials (even those traveling on Abkhazian internal passports!) for them to participate in conferences, seminars and forums. The treatment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) could serve as a precedent for such a policy. “Even though Washington does not recognize the TRNC as a sovereign state, it recognizes TRNC passports for the purpose of travel and visa applications.” The second element is a diversification of Abkhazia’s economic ties. Here Cooley and Mitchell propose activating the Abkhaz diaspora in Turkey and other Western countries. Third, the American authors propose using a familiar mechanism: non-governmental structures and civil society. “Engagement without recognition is the only policy realistically able to prevent Abkhazia’s full absorption into the Russian Federation, thus preserving a chance for the territory to be restored to Georgian sovereignty. The more coordinated that policy is between the United States and the European Union, the more efficacious it will be,” conclude Cooley and Mitchell.

One cannot help but see several of sensible and realistic assessments in their framework. Among these is an understanding of the relative nature of Georgian “territorial integrity” and the impossibility of its restoration in the short term (and of its complete restoration in general). The authors also rightly point out the difference between Abkhazia and South Ossetia (and in fact at the outset these two projects were developed to pursue different policy goals). Cooley and Mitchell do not forget to mention the ethnic excesses in Abkhazia (the expulsion of the Georgian population) but also add that stronger demands for refugee return from Georgia only serve to turn the current population of Abkhazia more resolutely against Tbilisi. Their arguments might force not only theoreticians but also policymakers in Russia to stop and think about how it might be possible to accommodate both Russian interests in Abkhazia and Abkhazia’s own foreign trade interests. Otherwise even without the interference of any “third parties” friction and conflicts are inevitable.

But Cooley and Mitchell’s main point (one might even call it their matrix of reasoning) raises a number of questions. The authors present their concept (a more detailed version is to be published separately later) as a mechanism for combating Russian ambitions in Abkhazia and in South Ossetia, even though they understand that Georgian sovereignty in these areas is problematic and mention it more as a nod to tradition than anything else. But does a naval base in Ochamchire or an air base in Gudauta (both of which still haven’t been properly outfitted) threaten any U.S. interests? Today there are many experts in the United States and in Europe who smugly accuse Moscow and Beijing of seeking to play a “zero-sum” game. Cooley and Mitchell’s position, however, is in essence precisely a call to play that old, familiar game. It turns out that a strengthening of Russia in Abkhazia automatically strikes a blow against America’s standing. But where, in what part of the world? In Georgia, where the U.S. today has total support, or perhaps in Ukraine or other corners of Eurasia? Or in the Middle East? And if not, then is it really worthwhile for Washington to focus so much on Tbilisi’s support? Especially when it has so many shared strategic interests with Russia (e.g., Afghanistan and Iran).

Meanwhile, the Cooley-Mitchell approach loses the thread of the Georgian-Abkhazian game itself. After all, Russia’s relationship with the West in this area of international politics is a function, and not the foundation, of Abkhaz-Georgian relations. And today’s Abkhazian elite is much more radically disposed toward Georgia than Russian embassy officials in Sukhumi or the people responsible for Abkhazia in the presidential administration or in the [Russian] White House. And even if we can imagine a break between the Kremlin and the Abkhazian elite, and a growth of the latter’s interest in the West (which is happening even in an atmosphere of good relations with Moscow), this would not mean an increase in their affinity for Georgia. At the same time, American experts (even those who genuinely seek to figure out the tangled web of politics in the Caucasus and don’t believe in Saakashvili’s inherent democracy) for now admit the following fact only through gritted teeth: Abkhazian Georgia-phobia and Abkhazian nationalism have their own roots, bases and traditions, including ones not connected with Moscow and with Russian “imperial” policy. Even if Abkhazia were to befriend the West instead of the Kremlin, friendship with Georgia still wouldn’t be in the cards, at least not in the context of a relationship within the formal legal boundaries of a single state. As a neighbor, Abkhazia will inevitably sooner or later reach a stage of constructive and perhaps even friendly relations with Georgia.

And of course Abkhazia can simultaneously be “with us and with them.” This alternative didn’t occur to the American specialists (or perhaps they forgot about it?). There could be a mutually beneficial partnership with Abkhazia along the lines of “engagement without recognition, but also without contraposition” (to Russia, of course).

Attempts to unilaterally isolate Russia (or “contain” it) are inconsistent with American interests. Unless, of course, one understands those interests in the traditions of the Cold War.


[1] The American Interest (AI) is a bimonthly magazine published since 2005. It was founded by several members of the editorial board of another well-known American publication, “The National Interest,” who disagreed with that publication’s editorial policy. AI is devoted to issues of international policy, world economy and security. The chairman of the magazine’s executive committee is philosopher Francis Fukuyama; the chief editor is Orientalist professor Adam Garfinkel, who was a speechwriter for Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice in the George W. Bush administration.

A TRNC Precedent?

An interesting (certainly by the standards of an int'l law journal's website - cf. the concept of "law school hot" - and perhaps even really interesting) discussion of last year's war in Georgia and its possible repercussions:

I have read in the blogosphere and received emails myself claiming that the events in Georgia require a rethinking and rewriting of the laws governing the use of force and the acquisition of territory. I am rather sceptical but would welcome articles arguing the opposite. To me, it is a case of ‘plus ça change, plus ça reste la même chose‘.

But let us first address the depressing politics - this time demoralizing world politics perfectly personified by some celestial Central Casting.

First, the breathtakingly cerebrally challenged Saakashvili, whose every move, including throwing the match into the dry tinder, has militated against his desired entry of Georgia into NATO. The conspiracy minded may well claim that he was a Russian agent. His one redeeming feature were his blustering sophomoric news conferences which supplied relief to a very serious situation - comic relief, that is, provided by the squirming dignitaries forced to stand, ex officio, by his side and suffer each of his ‘I told you so…!’

Then we were treated to a rather new scary spectacle - US officials palpably and transparently aware of their real and perceived weakness, also of their lack of credibility, speaking loudly whilst carrying a broken reed. It is a photo-finish as to which America gives us more of a shiver - blustering, over-confident, but strong, or blustering, under-confident, and weak.

And then there was the redoubtable Sarkozy and Merkel (but hardly Solana…!) making all the right noises of ‘engagement diplomacy’, but unable to paper over the deep internal divisions within the Union, and therefore manifesting again Europe’s long inability to translate its economic might into political and military capital - so what’s new? Only Putin comes out entirely in control - hopefully, in the long run, a Pyrrhic victory.

The Russians will not withdraw from the two rump entities any time soon and no one will push them either. Have the Superpowers not been somewhat more equal than everyone else for some time now? That does not make the invasion any more legal than that of, say, Turkey into Cyprus and the status of the rump ’statelets’ is indeed likely to remain more like that of Northern Cyprus than that of Bangladesh. This may not be the time for talking of ’shifting paradigms’ (a less elegant phrase might be ‘koshering the pig’) but perhaps it is rather even more important to hold fast to the old ones oft consecrated in their breech. But I am sure there are other views out there and EJIL or EJIL:Talk! would welcome hearing them.

When I first read this earlier in the year, it made think of an article I saw back in December which made me think of the idea of a "TRNC precedent" (the phrase that popped into my mind, as a natural counterpoint to the idea of a "Kosovo precedent" which has been widely touted by secessionists the world over, but especially in the post-Soviet space) which is alluded to by the author above.

And now there's been an interesting follow-up to that article I saw in December: it seems that Greeks forced out of Northern Cyprus can lay claim to their land in the European Court of Justice. I wonder if this will have an impact on real estate prices in Abkhazia (especially since the registration of property claims by people displaced in the conflict there has been going on for years)?

Greek Cypriots 'can reclaim land'

The EU's top court has backed the right of a Greek Cypriot to reclaim land in Turkish-controlled northern Cyprus that has since been sold to a UK couple.

BBC News, 28 April 2009

Meletis Apostolides was one of thousands of Greek Cypriots who fled his home when Turkish forces invaded in 1974, following a Greek-inspired coup.

The land was later sold to Linda and David Orams, who built a villa on it.

The European Court of Justice says a ruling in a Cypriot court that the villa must be demolished is applicable.

Even if the ECJ ruling cannot be enacted because the land is under Turkish Cypriot control, it means Mr Apostolides will be able to pursue a claim for compensation in a UK court.

It could also open the way for hundreds more Greek Cypriots to demand restitution for properties they were forced to flee.

Many Britons and other foreigners have invested in property in northern Cyprus, despite the legal ownership still being in some doubt.

Mr Apostolides said he was "very much" pleased with the EU court's ruling, and that it was "what we expected".

He added: "This is a difficult issue that has to be decided by the courts."

Property boom

The European Court of Justice ruling on Tuesday said that the decision of a Cypriot court in Nicosia was applicable in the north, even though Cyprus does not exercise control there.

It also said that one EU country - in this case the UK - must recognise judgments made in the courts of another.

The Republic of Cyprus joined the EU in 2004.

EU law was suspended in northern Cyprus for the purposes of Cyprus's accession, but lawyers argued successfully that the Orams' civil case still falls within the scope of the EU regulation.

Northern Cyprus is self-governing and still occupied by the Turkish army, but is not recognised internationally.

Nevertheless, it has become a thriving tourist destination in recent years, and house-building has boomed.

Some of those houses have been sold by Turkish Cypriots to foreigners, even though the land they were built on was once owned by Greek Cypriots and its legal status remained uncertain.

Property disputes dating back to 1974 have been one of the main obstacles to efforts to reunify Cyprus.

Correspondents say dispossessed Greek Cypriots are now likely to launch more legal battles, which in turn may harden opposition to reunification among Turkish Cypriots.

Moldova and Information Wars

An interesting translation from today's JRL:

Nezavisimaya Gazeta
April 15, 2009
Editorial: "Campaigns and Wars: A Thing or Two About Information Policy"

Right now it's too soon to judge how much events in Moldova might exacerbate the information conflict between Russia and the West. There are substantial grounds for thinking there won't be any exacerbation. First, the attack upon and fire set at the parliament building is an obvious delict that does not offer a multitude of interpretations; second, both sides know full well that Voronin is not a pro-Russian figure; and finally, third, the prospect of Moldova joining Romania with the inevitable secession of the Dniester region is hardly inspiring to any sane person.

It would seem that in war as in war all means are good and you can quibble over anything. In fact, spontaneity and omnivory are signs more characteristic of a propaganda campaign, a more obviously local and short-term phenomenon.

That's not how it is in areal information war. Dilettantes sometimes think that its goal is to convince the opponent. However, that is the second goal both in time and importance; in fact, the top goal of an information war is to convince your own side. And only afterward to present this indestructible ideological unity to your opponent as an irrefutable argument in your debate.

The two phenomena we're talking about are utterly unalike in their very organization. A propaganda campaign is carried out by a limited circle of professionals and aimed outward from the beginning. There is no 'our side' here by definition. If you're convinced of what you're doing, fine; if you're not but you look convincing, that's not bad either. War is a deeply structured affair. Here each side has its headquarters and command points, a decent-sized army of mercenaries, abroad array of transmission belts to bring orders to subordinates and dependents. But the main thing is this: in no 'hot' war have so many volunteers participated as are now battling on the information fronts. Formally, these are the millions of participants in forums and blogs, but in essence it is everyone who has ever gotten into a conversation about the theme under discussion rather than about sports or the weather.

If we understand the goal of an information war as changing our opponent's mind, then it is hard to understand who is supposed to debate whom and in what language. Debates go on between countries, too, of course, but all these are faint streams on the backdrop of runaway domestic tsunamis going to and fro.

The information noise of politicians, the media, debating political experts, public figures, writers, artists, and even high school and university students is what creates the specific principles in accordance with which reality is understood and demonstrated. It is from this stock that the soft power of the state is extracted -- as an element of competitive advantage. Which ceases to be competitive if it is subordinated to the goals and means of the information war.

In very recent history we can distinguish three information wars between the West and Russia: the second Chechen war, the events surrounding the orange revolution, and 8 August 2008 in South Ossetia. All the rest -- Yukos, Litvinenko, and so forth -- are examples of classic propaganda campaigns.

It is wrong to think that there is one big war and the above mentioned are merely episodes in it. There is no total permanent war. Most of the time over the course of the last two decades, a pluralism of opinions in both camps has predominated over their uniformity, which is characteristic for war.

But what is most interesting is that all three instances developed according to completely analogous scenarios. A visible unity of the 'developed world' was achieved with respect to the subject of disagreement, and it was presented to Russia without visible effect, inasmuch as Russia had the opposite consensus. As we know, a whale and an elephant cannot fight each other. Due to a total mismatch of discourse.

Moreover, those who brought Russia human, material, and moral losses -- the Chechen fighters, the oranges, or Saakashvili -- subsequently made the West blush many times for the fact that it had ever supported them.

Could it be time to stop consolidating public opinion against one another? That is, might it be time for the elephant and whale to stop their attempts to butt heads?

Traitor, deserter, adolescent bumbler - or just a regular guy?

[image source]

Strange things are afoot in Georgia. According to today's Moscow Times:

A Russian soldier said Tuesday that he deserted from his unit in separatist South Ossetia and sought asylum in Georgia because of unbearable living conditions, including poor treatment and scarce food.

"I wasn't captured by Georgian police," Alexander Glukhov said in an interview at a McDonald's restaurant in the Georgian capital, Tbilisi.

"I ran away because I couldn't stand the conditions I was living in," he said. "I want to stay here."

Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Alexander Drobyshevsky said earlier that Glukhov had been "seized by Georgian agents in the Akhalgori district of South Ossetia and taken to Tbilisi." Russia demands Glukhov's immediate release, Drobyshevsky said by telephone in Moscow.

Georgian Interior Ministry official Shota Utiashvili said Glukhov had handed himself over to Georgian police on Monday, complaining that the major of his unit had been beating him. "We did not detain him. He is free and can do whatever he wants," Utiashvili said. [...]

Glukhov, 21, said he was deployed in South Ossetia on Aug. 9, the second day of the war. "But I didn't take part in military operations myself. I was assigned to dig ditches and that sort of thing," he said.

He said that if he were to return to Russia, he would not want to resume his military service. "I'd just like to go home," he said, adding that he had not considered the consequences of his actions when he fled his unit more than a week ago.

When a reporter asked to see Glukhov's military identification card during the interview, Georgian Interior Ministry spokesman Shota Khizanishvili, who was present, said the card was at the ministry. He confirmed Glukhov's identity. Glukhov had earlier explained his reasons for deserting on Georgian television and displayed his ID.

Drobyshevsky suggested that Georgian agents had coerced Glukhov into making the televised comments.

"If a soldier is threatened or subjected to physical or emotional and psychological pressure, he could say absolutely anything," Drobyshevsky said.

Not surprisingly, this story is today's most blogged-about topic, according to Yandex. drugoi posted the above picture and opined, "He's no traitor, of course. He's just a fool, an adolescent, a little boy. He shouldn't be in the army, he should still be making mud pies in the sandbox."

Georgian blogger cyxymu posts video from Georgian TV and links to Glukhov's interview with Ekho Moskvy and this interesting post by Russian blogger shurigin, who appears to be a veteran and blames the whole incident on mismanagement of the military in general, and the higher command's neglect of the Russian troops in South Ossetia in particular: "The problem is that the troops in SO have been practically abandoned. It's a complete mess there [Бардак дикий]. Units are wintering in old, raggedy tents. The supply situation is horrible."

[UPDATE 1/29 - the Russian MoD is now executing a climb-down from its earlier allegations that Glukhov was kidnapped from his unit by the Georgian special services.]

Meanwhile, closer to home, a Georgian politician in exile in Northern Virginia has a column slamming Saakashvili in today's Moscow Times. Is it too cynical to entertain the possibility that Saak may have flipped from "our SOB" to Saddam-ville in less than a year, and that Georgian Chalabis are already being groomed Stateside? Actually, I think it is too cynical, but I couldn't resist raising the possibility. And just as, over the years, no one ever went broke underestimating the intelligence of the American people, in recent years few people have gone broke overestimating the cynicism of American foreign policy.

South Ossetian Shakeup?

«Не место этому президенту в Южной Осетии» // Бывший секретарь совбеза республики о конфликте с Эдуардом Кокойты Герой войны в Южной Осетии, бывший секретарь совбеза республики АНАТОЛИЙ БАРАНКЕВИЧ рассказал спецкору “Ъ” ОЛЬГЕ АЛЛЕНОВОЙ о причинах своего увольнения, конфликте с президентом Кокойты, а также о кадровой и экономической политике Цхинвала. открыть материал ...

Kommersant has run a lengthy interview with former Russian army general and former South Ossetian de facto Minister of Defense which puts the region's president, former wrestling champion and phys. ed. teacher Eduard Kokoity, in a rather unflattering light.

General Anatoly Barankevich is one of the examples cited in recent years by Western observers in order to highlight the fact that South Ossetian secessionism at some point shifted from "self-determination" to a situation where the determination of key personnel appointments took place in Moscow. There were other former (or seconded) Russian officers serving in the territory's de facto government, but he was among the most prominent. And now he has come out with an interview mocking Kokoity's flight from Tskhinvali during the five-day war and relating tales of a reconstruction effort paralyzed by corruption.

One of the more damning excerpts reads as follows (my translation, hopefully Kommersant will put this on their English-language website but they haven't done so yet) - Barankevich is relating a scene he observed at a police station in Dzhava on August 10th:

And then I saw the following picture: a Georgian prisoner with his hands tied and shirt off, his hands had already gone blue, you couldn't see his eyes, he couldn't even cry, and the [South Ossetian] militants [бойцы, apparently police officers - trans.] were beating him. I went over to them and said, "What are you doing? You are mountain men [горцы - implying, apparently, that they should hew to some code of honor - trans.]. You can't beat a prisoner, his hands are tied." They looked embarrassed and said, "Sorry, comrade General."

I told them to go get someone from the KGB. To take the Georgian away. Right away they untied his hands. And then the president showed up. He saw me, saw the prisoner and understood what was going on. And the first thing he did was run up to the prisoner and start kicking him. It turned my stomach. The guys from the police looked at the ground, they were ashamed.

Without wanting to engage in too much Kremlinological tea-leaf-reading, one wonders what the publication of this interview means, given that it was published in a newspaper owned by Alisher Usmanov, the Kremlin-friendly oligarch and debt collector for Gazprom who - no doubt out of the goodness of his heart, and certainly not to win a natural resource tender - ponied up a billion rubles in aid for the post-war rebuilding effort in South Ossetia in September.

I somehow doubt that Eduard Kokoity is feeling comfortable in his presidential chair.

More Maps of Georgia

A couple more maps that I had the chance to scan in before leaving DC last week. Complaints about the white line through the larger images can be directed to the folks at A.U.'s library, although since they make an otherwise nice scanner fairly freely accessible I didn't have the heart to complain. The first is a map of tourist routes through Georgia which dates from 1966:

Georgia - Tourism Map 1966 - Cover, full-size image available here.

Georgia - Tourism Map 1966, full-size image available here.

The second is a city map of Tbilisi with a nifty folding layout, printed (according to the guy who sold it to me in Tbilisi) for the city's 1500th anniversary celebration in 1958; I am not sure about the "800" imprinted on the cover:

Tbilisi - 1958 Street Map Cover, full-size image available here.

Tbilisi - 1958 Street Map, full-size image available here.

This and all previous map-related posts can be seen on a single page here, or all of the map images I've uploaded can be viewed on Flickr here.