"Putin goes to Pikalyovo"

This is kind of funny. One thing missing from the Reuters report (below) is that the video was apparently put together by LJ blogger Oleg Kozyrev. Oh, and for those of you who missed Putin's Pikalyovo "I'm-a-badass (-especially-when-dealing-with-my-pocket-oligarchs)" show the first time around, of course there is video.

Putin's hard man image targeted by spoof Web song
July 27, 2009

MOSCOW (Reuters) - A spoof song which makes fun of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's hard man image as the savior of Russia's battered economy has been winning fans on the Internet.

Public satire of Putin, who stepped down as president in 2008 to become prime minister, is rare and state media present the former KGB spy as the main figure handling the crisis.

Putin last month publicly humiliated factory owners in the town of Pikalyovo and forced them to reopen their plants after workers protested against unpaid wages.

"Putin, Putin goes to Pikalyovo. Putin, Putin will make it cool for us," the Russian lyrics say as a bearded man in a suit gyrates. "Putin, Putin is quick to do justice. Putin, Putin is our Prime Minister."

The Russian song, set to a popular 1970s Czech tune Jozin z Bazin, has had tens of thousands of clicks on the www.youtube.com website in recent days.

Putin is Russia's most popular politician and his influence has fueled speculation that he could seek to return to the Kremlin in the future.

The spoof song says an election is just around the corner and that the result will be clear to everyone. But the song ends by saying the next Russian president will be the monster who gives his name to the original Czech song.

That very popular song tells the story of a village monster which ate tourists.

"Jozin z Bazin is the people's choice ... oligarchs, miners and even cops know that Jozin z Bazin will be our new president."

The song can be found at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v_Ho1H3HmzM

The Coming Storm?

Woman selling daffodils on the local equivalent of Palm Sunday,
April 12, about a block away from the opposition's peaceful protest.

The dire financial situation into which Moldova appears to be headed is an important part of the background to last week's events. It may explain why Moldova's Western partners initially appeared willing to take a hands-off posture and let Voronin make his own way out of last week's political crisis if he could - in these tough times, even the US is less disposed to get involved, and perhaps everyone would prefer to deal with a known quantity than with a fractious opposition.

The article below describes just how unfortunate the coincidence of political and financial crises could be for Moldova, although the last line sort of buries what could turn out to be the lede:

Moldova burdened with $1bn budget shortfall (Financial Times)
By Thomas Escritt in Chisinau

Published: April 15 2009 01:33 | Last updated: April 15 2009 01:33

Moldova could face a severe financial crisis later this year, if it fails to cover a $1bn budget shortfall, creating the prospect of unpaid salaries and heightening the political tensions in the country following contested election results 10 days ago.

The country, already Europe’s poorest, with a gross domestic product per capita of just $1,800, is dependent on some $2bn a year in remittances from residents abroad, which amount to a third of the country’s GDP.

Bleak conditions in Romania, Russia, Ukraine and southern Europe, where most of the Moldovan diaspora is to be found, mean remittances fell 28 per cent year on year in January.

Three quarters of Moldova’s tax revenues come from import-related indirect taxes, including value added tax, and imports have fallen 50 per cent year on year as Moldovans feel the pinch. Government revenues would fall to $2bn on current trends, leaving Moldova dependent on external financing.


“You have small, shallow domestic securities markets ... so to finance the deficit you only have external financing or you have to revise the budget,” said Johan Mathisen, the International Monetary Fund’s representative in the country.

A transition country with a low credit rating, Moldova has very limited access to commercial credit markets abroad, while there is no government in place to revise a $3bn budget drawn up before the impact on the crisis became clear.

An IMF delegation is due to arrive in the capital Chisinau next week to begin talks over the shape of a support package to replace a long-running agreement signed in 1995.

But Moldova has nobody to negotiate a deal. The results of elections 10 days ago, in which the ruling Communist party won 49 per cent of the vote, are contested by opposition parties who say the Communist victory was bought fraudulently. With the political process bogged down in recounts and ballot checks, it could be autumn before a new government is formed.

But with the political process at a stalemate that may drag on into the autumn following contested elections 10 days ago, there is no government to trim government spending or negotiate the terms of an international support deal.

Moldova’s economy has performed strongly under eight years of Communist stewardship, doubling in size to $6bn last year from $3bn in 2005, with public debt at only 18 per cent of GDP. But salaries are still low, with a policeman earning just $120 a month. And with the atmosphere already tense following the elections and the violence that followed them, a caretaker government could be forced to turn elsewhere for help.

Privately, western officials in the capital Chisinau suggest Russia may be waiting in the wings to offer financial support.

Putvedev's faith-based initiatives

A couple of the hired guns at one of last weekend's pro-gov't counterprotests.
My favorite part is the unrealistically hard-looking image of Dimmovochka.
[image source]

The Russian government has published, on PM Putin's website, a list of "measures undertaken to combat the consequences of the global financial crisis" (the word "crisis" never appears in official pronouncements without the modifier "world" or "global," because as any good United Russia functionary knows, the global financial crisis is called 'global' because it's happening outside of Russia).

But United Russia's supporters - both the ones hired as crowd filler and the ambitious, plum-job-seeking core - seem to be running on faith (to use a phrase immortalized by Eric Clapton).

Witness this by now infamous speech by a United Russia activist at one of last weekend's rallies. The speaker, a young lady named Maria Sergeeva, whose blog identifies her as "The Mashka" and who seems to like to post photos of herself, has helpfully posted a transcript of her remarks here. Here's my translation of the most testifyin' part of her performance (she even identifies her holy trinity!):

It's no secret: in Russia today there are forces which are trying to blame Putin, Medvedev and United Russia for our temporary difficuties. These forces are like a dangerous virus - as soon as they sense a weakening of our immune system, they'll attack.

But let's be honest with ourselves. Take me, for instance, a student who pays full tuition. In 1998 I wouldn't have known what to do. And now I don't just believe. I know for certain that Putin, Medvedev and the United Russia party will protect me. They'll give me the chance to take out a student loan at a rate of five percent, not 55 percent. They'll give me a job. They won't allow me to be fired illegally.

That post drew over 4,000 comments, many of them critical, compelling Ms. Sergeeva to write a rambling rebuttal castigating the "two-legged cockroaches on LiveJournal" and "parasites," and even deploying against her critics United Russia's rhetorical WMD - a quotation from the ideological architect of "sovereign democracy" himself, Vladislav Surkov - but (in case we forgot it was all about her) taking the first two paragraphs to marvel at her newfound fame. She sort of has elements of a Russian Sarah Palin - spunky and down-to-earth, but also self-contradictory and determinedly dim-witted, and not really ready for prime time.

It turns out that Ms. Sergeeva is not only a YouTube celebrity of sorts - an irony-free and more heavily managed version of Obama Girl, except without, you know, the singing - she is also a member of the political council of the Young Guards (United Russia's youth wing, usually abbreviated as MGER) and a videoblogger on United Russia's website, where the section devoted to blogs is wittily titled "Berloga" (which means "bear's den," but also happens to be spelled by inserting the initials of United Russia - ER, in Russian - after the "B" in "blog" - how punny!).

Based on her apparent inability to memorize even a few sentences of her monologues, and assuming the MGERovtsy are supposed to be a breeding ground for future Russian political elites, there really will be problems finding qualified leadership among the younger generation. Youth wings of political parties - especially parties with no opposition - are of course populated by careerist hacks to some degree in all countries, but this young lady takes self-absorbed hackdom to another level.

Anyway, here is a rather more articulate analysis of why Putin remains popular even in the face of an economic situation that seems to get more calamitous every week. The English translation is from the JRL, the original article in Russian is here.

Putin's Stable Popular Support Based on Cultural Closeness, Not Results

Gazeta.ru
January 29, 2009
Commentary by Boris Tumanov: "People Like Putin"

Despite all the crises,tragedies, disasters, and disorders, the citizens of Russia are not disillusioned with Putin because he is a symbol and the personification of themselves.

The global economic crisis with its still unknown outcome has already caused a marked intellectual revival in that segment of Russian society that can tentatively be called the thinking part of our elite. The general catalyst of this process is the expectation of sociopolitical cataclysms.

Russian thinkers who belong to the "vertical hierarchy of power" consider this perspective as a threat to their own well-being and seriously hope to avert it with the help the non-existent middle class and the traditionally obedient "tin soldiers,"' who are already being pushed into manifestations of loyalty. And their freedom-loving opponents believe just as sincerely that the coming upheavals will be a factor in the inevitable liberal transformations in the sociopolitical life of Russia.



However, in the former case it is nothing more than a helpless simulation of their own professional suitability, while in the latter it is an equally nonsensical, equally pretentious attempt at Cartesian analysis of the inscrutable instincts of Russian society.

As Solovyev's Khodzha Nasreddin would say in such circumstances, "Oh jinnis, you are searching where it is not hidden." For the main, if not the only, effective factor capable of determining the state of Russia in the foreseeable future is that almost symbiotic unity that exists between the largest part of Russian society and the person of the "national leader" known as Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin.

This unity could not be shaken by the tragedies of the Kursk, Nord-Ost, and Beslan, the administrative tyranny of "sovereign democracy," "Basmannyy justice," or the rumors of the "national leader's" fabulous personal wealth just as it cannot be shaken by the current growth in unemployment, inflation, devaluation of the ruble, the disintegration of mortgages, or even the coming deprivations.

Here are figures that thoroughly illustrate this assertion. According to the findings of the Levada Center, in September of last year an overwhelming majority of Russian citizens polled --61% -- thought that things were moving in the right direction in Russia and only 21% of the respondents thought that the country was taking a wrong path. The short war in Georgia played a part here, of course, but even today a majority of Russia's citizens believe that things are going well in the country. In December 2008 and January of this year their number remained constant at 43% while the number of pessimists dropped from 40% to 34%.

Last September also marked the peak of positive assessments of the activities of the government headed by Vladimir Putin, 66% against 31%. But in December 2008 and January of this yeart hese figures were 60% and 36%, and 58% and 38% respectively.

But then the activities ofVladimir Putin personally in the job of premier are evaluated by Russian citizens using some different system of coordinates and criteria, if we judge by the fact that in December 2008 and January 2009 he was consistently approved by 83% of those polled, while the number who were dissatisfied with his activities declined from 15% in December to 14% in January. We will add that the peak of approval of Putin's activities, 88%, came in that same victorious September.

Remarking this phenomenon, both the liberals and the state-minded thinkers -- the one in vexation, the other with chauvinistic satisfaction -- explain it by essentially the same factor, which is indeed the main, although not the only, factor in "Putinomania." For some this factor is formulated as the patriarchal inertia of Russian society, the result of many centuries of slavery, while the others see it as a manifestation of sovereign Russian uniqueness expressed in communality, spirituality, and patriotic unity with the government. At the same time the most inquisitive opponents of Putin become lost guessing about what kind of mistakes and blunders he would have to make or what "Egyptian plagues" would have to overtake Russia under his leadership to disillusion the majority of Russian citizens who love him.

It would be simplest to answer this question by saying that Vladimir Vladimirovich can do anything he wants, practically without risk to his popularity rating. But such an answer, even if it corresponds to reality, demands convincing explanation, or rather a detailed investigation of the genesis of the "national leader's" unprecedented popularity. Russia's leaders and Vladimir Putin personally are absolutely right when they say that the main reason for the current crisis was their responsible consumption of the West, above all the United States. But afterall, it was this very mindless consumption that caused the manna from heaven that poured down on Russia in recent years in the form of incredibly fast-rising oil prices.

And if we take an unbiased look at the results of these "seven fat years," those who sincerely care for the real interests of Russia and its citizens could register serious charges against the Russian leadership and Vladimir Putin himself regarding how they managed the wealth that Russia enjoyed.

Instead of fighting corruption, instead of effective army reform, instead of development and diversification of domestic production, instead of building up still restless provincial Russia, they worked on strengthening the vertical hierarchy of power, which guarantees them practically lifetime terms of office. And after setting their intention as restoring Russia's stature on a global scale, the Russian ruling elite managed to quarrel with almost all of their Western partners; indeed they have found themselves in virtual isolation. Beginning with Vladimir Putin's Munich speech and up to the recent gas war with Ukraine, Russia has stubbornly destroyed its own international reputation and pushed away not just Europe and the United States, but also our neighbors in the CIS.

If Russian society were consciously striving to assume responsibility for the fate of the country or, at a minimum, if it were capable of an independent evaluation of the government's actions, its reaction to such behavior by the government would be much less equable. But civic responsibility presupposes a search for alternatives, which requires intellectual and psychological exertion, and the citizens of Russia will not be ready for that for a long time. Not just because the few opponents of the government are incapable of formulating an intelligible alternative to the current course, but above all because of the traditional and almost panicky fear that Russian society will be deprived of its paternalistic oversight by the state. That is why Russian citizens do not try to look carefully at the mechanisms of control over the state, the economy, and society, preferring to rely on the omniscience of the tsar, great leader, or national leader who by definition cannot answer for the mistakes of the ordinary mortals under him.

But in Putin's case there is one substantive aspect that prevents us from viewing the universal trust of him exclusively in the framework of the fatalistic formula: "Good tsar but his boyars are indifferent." For unlike the tsars who are "ordained from above" and the general secretaries, the citizens of Russia are convinced that Putin took charge of Russia as the result of their own will, not Divine Providence or a decision of the Politburo. And the fact that they chose him the way they choose the best fellow in the village (athlete, does not smoke, likeable, went into intelligence work) only emphasizes that from the beginning this choice did not presuppose any political responsibility of Putin to the voters. That is why, from the standpoint of the citizens of Russia, Putin does not have to answer for the activities of his own government, for the results of his own term in office.

They do not judge Putin because for society he is not functional. He is a symbol. He is the personification of the Russian citizens themselves; they identify themselves with him. And this is perhaps the first case in Russian history when the purely reflexive worship by the Russian masses of the latest domestic divinity is tinged with a sincere feeling of solid affection for him.

Affection that is linked not with his political and economic decisions, but rather with the fact that his worldview, hopes, and complexes are indistinguishable from those of the average Russian citizen.

It is the diehard fastidious intelligentsia who may be horrified at the vulgar language that Vladimir Putin uses with emphatic pleasure in his public statements, and especially in contacts with Western politicians and journalists. It is the numerous snobs who are amused at the former president's almost childish liking for dressing up as a submariner, a fighter pilot, or showing off his torso, and his way, plainly seen at Kennebunkport, of imposing the company of his Labrador Koni on his foreign guests. It is the liberal analysts, who are becoming extinct, who see in his aggressive megalomania in relation to the West echoes of the old humiliation felt by the future national leader when he discovered that Germany, even though it was socialist, was able, unlike the USSR, not only to produce an adequate amount of beer, but also to bottle it in three-liter bottles with a convenient spigot. And they are malicious skeptics who blasphemously mock the apocryphal tale that during his entire KGB career Vladimir Putin, surrounded by militant and vigilant atheists, never parted with the cross around his neck and his belief in the Almighty, risking exposure at the first physical training exercise.

On the other hand, a majority of Russian society is in complete solidarity with these behavior traits of the national leader because they fully coincide with the social culture of the Russian citizens themselves, with their ideas about the outside world and their complaints about the rest of the human race.

Well then, if we add to these feelings the easy material well-being that coincided with Vladimir Vladimirovich's term of office for a significant part of the society, which continues to believe furiously in the return of the "rivers of gas and banks of oil," we can say with certainty that Putin is going to last a long time.

And, incidentally, so is today's Russia.

USDRUB

The ruble made a dramatic, if predicted, move lower today. Below is an article from Vedomosti on the subject as well as a link to their slideshow documenting the evolution of the dollar-ruble rate over the years. You can track the rate using Google Finance here.

35 руб. за доллар Сегодня на российском валютном рынке вновь драматические события — рубль дешевеет с самого начала торгов. Курсы доллара и евро в ходе торговой сессии (расчеты «сегодня») достигали 35 руб. и 45,88 руб. — оба значения исторические максимумы. Далее

Как менялся курс доллара Сентябрь 1999. Фото: Е. Стецко

And a post on businessneweurope's Moscow Blog asks, "Is it really that bad?"

"Moscow is the place to be, especially now"

After living in the heart of Moscow for nearly four years, some part of me always thinks it would be cool to go back for another stint. This recent MT article, however, while displaying much putting on of brave faces, didn't exactly make it seem as though this would be the easiest time to be there. An interesting time to be there, no doubt, but when in the past 20 years hasn't been?

Expats Digging In for Long Haul
Moscow Times, 21 January 2009
By Nadia Popova / Staff Writer

Although Russia has found itself among the countries worst-hit by the global financial mayhem, expatriates living here seem to be casting their lots with their adopted country, hunkering down through the economic malaise in hopes of brighter times ahead.

Hurt by salary cuts, the weakening ruble and looming dismissals but equipped with the experience of the 1998 default, expats say they are here to stay.

Many foreigners are paid in rubles, a currency that has lost almost 26 percent of its value against the dollar since July. And with debts and other obligations back home calculated in dollars and euros, some are feeling the pinch.

"I am paid in rubles, so I have to permanently watch the currency rates to hedge my risks," said the UralSib chief strategist Chris Weafer. "We are now facing triple risk of salary cuts, dismissals and currency-rate related losses."

Russian law requires Russian companies to pay salaries only in rubles. And although foreign-owned businesses are exempt, many working in Russia have switched to a ruble payroll over the last two years, said Yevgeny Reizman, a partner at Baker & McKenzie, which advises foreign companies in Russia.

"Now, when the ruble is getting weaker, with every passing day it --becomes harder for foreigners to pay their taxes, mortgages and kids' school fees in their domestic currency," said Neil Cooper, head of the Russian-British Chamber of Commerce.

Adding to the sob story, foreign professionals are witnessing the loss of the sometimes extravagant perks they had grown accustomed to before the financial turmoil.

Gone are the days of $200 restaurant bills charged to the company tab and limitless calls on the corporate cell phone.

Now employees of both domestic and foreign companies are finding their receipts scrutinized and their airline tickets decidedly economy class.

But the most painful problem, foreign employees say, is the reduction of their salaries and bonuses.

"My salary was cut by 15 percent in December," said a foreign specialist working at a Russian investment bank, who asked not to be identified, citing the privacy of the matter. "And I think there will be further cuts in spring as business conditions deteriorate."

Florian Hoser, Lufthansa's director for finance and administration in Russia, has seen similar cuts. "In some foreign companies, bonuses are not being paid, as the budgets of 2008 have not been met," he said.

"The attraction of an overseas posting is either job experience or the possibility of getting paid more than at home," the specialist said. "Under these conditions the only experience many are getting is a crash course in how to make ends meet."

While many firms are forced to reduce wages just to balance the budget, experts say some companies are overreacting, cutting wages first and asking questions later.

"Sometimes the impression is that some of the foreign employers overreact on the crisis because of the market's psychological pressure," Reizman said.

"For example, in December many foreign employers were planning around a 10 percent salary cut. But now they are cutting 20 percent or even more despite the decrease in the economic standing of the company was generally not worse than expected," he said.

But if the economy has been maligned in many respects, foreigners can at least take advantage of the now-affordable housing market. The economic downturn has caused rental prices in Moscow to drop, and tenants and prospective renters are now able to get a better deal than before.

"On the positive side rents are more easily negotiable," Hoser said.

Rental prices have fallen off, with apartments plummeting in cost from 20 percent to 30 percent since July, depending on the class of apartment, according to Penny Lane Realty. Business premium apartments that the firm used to sell for $12,000 a month now go for $8,000.

Yet every silver lining has a dark cloud. Some expats invested in the real estate market while it was booming, hoping to cash in on what seemed like Moscow's most lucrative sector.

Real estate prices have plunged in recent months, sending the average Moscow apartment price down to $5,186 per square meter from $6,122 per square meter since November, according to the real-estate analytical center IRN.ru.

"I bought an apartment in the center of Moscow late in 2007 and considered it a very good investment at the time," said Luca Gandino, who was recently laid off by Jones Lang La Salle.

Sberbank analysts expect apartment prices to drop by 50 percent in dollar terms by the end of this year.

"I know a lot of foreigners who came to work here and bought an apartment when the Russian real estate market was a never-ending upward spiral," Cooper said. "It is not that rosy now."

Other foreign professionals, while safe in their own jobs, look upon the current situation with a twinge of guilt.

"All of us here live with a thought saying 'I'm a very expensive guy,'" said the head of the Moscow office of a U.S. machinery-building company, who requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the issue.

"They rent an apartment and a car for us, pay for our kids' kindergarten," he said. "I recognize that it all costs my company a lot of money."

Despite the challenges, many expats say they aren't going anywhere.

Although Gandino was laid off by Jones Lang La Salle in December, he never doubted that he would stay in Russia.

"Moscow is the place to be, especially now," Gandino, a former associated partner at the development consultant said.

Hundreds of expats who have been given pink slips over the last few months think the same way.

The Russian-British Chamber of Commerce has been inundated by the resumes of laid-off professionals, mainly from the real estate, construction and banking sectors.

"The prospects here are way better than at home," Cooper said. "Russia is way more developed than 10 years ago when the default struck, so we believe in a quick recovery."

Until then, expats will stick around and think about brighter days — or try to.

"When the crisis broke out in 1998, you could hide from it, just leaving your office," Weafer of UralSib said. "Now, with your BlackBerry on, the crisis is always with you, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week."

VLKSM > Nashi

The 90th anniversary of the Komsomol is being celebrated more than one might expect, but it seems that the contemporary VLKSM-wannabes are not feeling as much love as they were a year ago. Read the full article for the punch line at the end...

Pro-Kremlin Youths Take Backseat to Crisis
Moscow Times, 28 October 2008
By Francesca Mereu / Staff Writer

Last year, pro-Kremlin youth groups were all over television, promising then-President Vladimir Putin love and loyalty, picketing foreign embassies and harassing a hodgepodge of opposition activists.

As recently as July, state-run television showed First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov lecturing Nashi activists in economics at their summer camp.

But with the election season over and the government grappling with the financial crisis, youth activists have drifted from the political spotlight, busying themselves instead with fashion shows and city cleanups.

There are no plans for a crisis-themed protest.

"We might organize something soon," Nashi spokeswoman Kristina Potupchik said of possible events concerning the crisis. "We have a meeting Friday. We will decide then."

Nashi is now working on "long-term projects," Potupchik said, adding that there are "fewer political reasons" for the mass demonstrations that the group organized during the December State Duma elections and the March presidential vote.

Nashi activist Antonina Shapovalova, who designed pro-Putin bikinis for the group, showed off her collection during the recent Moscow Fashion Week, Potupchik noted.

Nashi's top projects include promoting the patriotic children's movement Mishki, or Bear Cubs, tolerance programs and blood drives, she said.

"These are long-term and real projects, not one-day events," she said.

The plans are, however, unquestionably less confrontational than Nashi programs a year ago, when the group organized patrols -- accompanied by police and known as druzhinniki -- to head off any anti-Kremlin protests.

Now druzhinniki, members of a volunteer corps that dates back to Soviet times, are making different kinds of rounds. Recently, the volunteers removed political ads from the streets of Yaroslavl following local elections on Oct. 13, said Alexandra Valtinina, a spokeswoman for the volunteers.

"People were tired of seeing all those billboards, and we decided not to wait for communal workers to do the job," Valtinina said. "We cleaned everything up."

Nashi burst onto the political scene in 2005, staging a 50,000-member rally in Moscow to commemorate the 60th anniversary of Victory Day. The group was broadly seen as a response to the youth-led protests that helped bring pro-Western President Viktor Yushchenko to power in Ukraine.

Last year, the group noisily picketed the Estonian Embassy following a feud over the relocation of a Soviet-era war memorial in Tallinn. It has also been accused of harassing former British Ambassador Anthony Brenton after he attended an opposition conference.

Nashi founder Vasily Yakemenko left the group last year to head up the Youth Affairs Committee, which is in charge of the country's youth organizations.

A woman who answered the phone at the committee Monday said Yakemenko was unavailable for comment and referred all inquiries to Potupchik.

Nashi's fellow pro-Kremlin youth groups have been comparably tranquil since the end of the election cycle.

Vladimir Nasonov, spokesman for the United Russia youth group Young Russia, said "mass action" is not a wise tactic during times of crisis. He echoed President Dmitry Medvedev's accusation that the Unites States "set up" other countries in the current global financial crisis.

"Our duty is to defend the powers that be in case of large protests against the government," Nasonov said. "We need to back them, because the policy of those people living on the other side of the ocean should be blamed and not our government."

Andrei Groznetsky, a spokesman for Mestniye, another pro-Kremlin youth group, said youth movements were politically active only during the election season.

Both Young Russia and Mestniye appear to be focusing on more nationalistic issues.

Young Russia will hold a demonstration to "protect the Russian language" on Nov. 4, People's Unity Day, Nasonov said.

Mestniye, meanwhile, is devoting its energy to "fighting against illegal immigrants who work as unofficial cab drivers," Groznetsky said.

Both Nashi and Mestniye plan to hold demonstrations on People's Unity Day. The Nashi event, called "Blanket of Peace," will be held on Vasilyevsky Spusk, near the Kremlin.

After United Russia recaptured a constitutional majority in last year's Duma elections and Medvedev won a landslide victory in the March 2 presidential election, Nashi and other pro-Kremlin groups have denied suggestions that they might fade into political oblivion.

In March, several young people took to the streets to distribute rolls of toilet paper embossed with the logo of Kommersant after the newspaper quoted an unidentified Kremlin official as calling Nashi activists "jubilant street punks" and saying their services were no longer needed.

Also printed on the toilet paper was the cell phone number of the author of the article. Nashi denied any involvement in the stunt.

Yury Korgunyuk, a political analyst with Indem, a think tank, said the Kremlin needs all the resources it can get to deal with the current economic crisis, meaning that there will be few funds left over to finance youth groups.

"The markets are in chaos, and there are no bankers or businessmen the Kremlin can ask for money like before," Korgunyuk said. "What can the Kremlin ask of [the youth groups] now? To hold a sit-in in front of the American Embassy and scream, 'Down with the crisis?'"

In fact, Nashi is planning a Nov. 2 protest outside the U.S. Embassy in conjunction with Halloween, Potupchik said.

Nashi activists will bring pumpkins to protest "what the Americans did in South Ossetia, in Afghanistan and in other conflicts," Potupchik said.

The name of someone who died in one of these conflicts will be written on each pumpkin, she added.