Conflict Cables: Georgia, and the acceleration of the breakup, 1989-1990

Thanks to the August 2008 war, the conflicts over South Ossetia and Abkhazia have come to be perhaps the best known of the post-Soviet conflicts in the West.  The roots of these conflicts, according to some accounts, go back centuries, but the immediate triggers as the Soviet Union collapsed included missteps by Moscow, rhetorical overreach by a Georgian leader on the verge of independence, and unease over how inter-ethnic deals which had been enforced by Moscow would fare in the post-Soviet reality.

This batch of cables tracks the beginning of the downward spiral into armed ethnic conflict.  The first of them are post-mortems on the violent dispersal of a public protest in Tbilisi in 1989 that came to be known as the "April 9 events."  Six cables describing those events and their immediate aftermath were summarized in an earlier post in this series (read more about the "Conflict Cables" series here).

A May 5, 1989, cable titled "Georgian Activist on Events in Tbilisi" recounts a US Embassy official's conversation with "a prominent Georgian activist...in the 'moderate' Chavchavadze society," in which the anonymous Georgian source suggested a tangled web of motivations which allegedly led to the authorization for the use of force against non-violent protesters.

The Embassy officials' response to their Georgian source's conspiracy theory shows a charming naivete about the capability of Eduard "Silver Fox" Shevardnadze to engage in such machinations for his personal benefit - or perhaps faith in Shevy, who was at the time involved in negotiations with the U.S. on a much bigger stage: "We doubt that Shevardnadze would have put Perestroyka at risk by allowing or even quietly encouraging an ally to destabilize the situation in Georgia in order to bring down a political foe."

A May 6 cable - "More on Tbilisi Demonstrations" - gives a blow-by-blow account of the protesters' tactics and of their demands, which originally focused on Abkhazia but which progressed, in part due to friction between different dissident groups, to demands for independence.

On June 5, a cable went out describing a May 27 "Conversation with [a] Georgian Dissident" - Zviad Gamsakhurdia - declassified here for the first time, as far as I know, which shows Gamsakhurdia's penchant for wild accusations and inflammatory rhetoric. Gamsakhurdia remains controversial to this day in Georgia. In mid-1989, he began by "ACCUS[ING] THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT OF WAGING "GENOCIDE" AGAINST THE GEORGIAN PEOPLE, THROUGH THE USE OF CHEMICAL POISONS AND "ECOLOGICAL WARFARE".

Later in the conversation, he discussed Abkhazia and South Ossetia:

IN DISCUSSING INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS WITHIN GEORGIA, GAMSAKHURDIA SHOWED LITTLE TOLERANCE FOR THE REPUBLIC'S INDIGENOUS MINORITIES AND WARNED OF KARABAKH-LIKE SITUATIONS DEVELOPING IN THE ABKHAZIA AUTONOMOUS SSR AS WELL AS THE SOUTHERN OSETIAN AUTONOMOUS OBLAST'. HE DESCRIBED THE ABKHAZIANS AS "THE TRAITORS OF THE CAUCASUS" AND AS "CORRUPTED PEOPLE" WHO "WANT TO RUSSIFY THEMSELVES", CLAIMING THAT THE ABKHAZIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT IS ACTUALLY PROVOKED BY MOSCOW AND LED BY "TURKISH MOSLEMS" AS A TYPE OF GEORGIAN "INTERFRONT". HE INITIALLY CHARACTERIZED THE POLITICAL POSITION OF ABKHAZIAN AUTHOR FAZIL ISKANDER AS "NEUTRAL" BUT NEVERTHELESS FELT IT NECESSARY TO POINT OUT THAT ISKANDER IS AN ETHNIC PERSIAN AND A "GREAT LIAR".

ACCORDING TO THE GEORGIAN NATIONALIST, A SECOND GEORGIAN "INTERFRONT" -- A REFERENCE TO THE PRO-RUSSIAN GROUPS WHICH HAVE EMERGED IN THE BALTICS -- WAS BEING EXPLOITED BY MOSCOW AMONG THE 60,000 OSETIANS IN SOUTHERN OSETIA. GAMSAKHURDIA CLAIMED THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED REPORTS OF GEORGIANS BEING BEATEN IN SEVERAL OSETIAN VILLAGES, CLAIMING THAT THE OSETIAN POPULATION IS "VERY AGGRESSIVE". GEORGIANS ARE BEING OPPRESSED ON THEIR OWN LAND IN ABKHAZIA AND OSETIA, ACCORDING TO GAMSAKHURDIA, WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR MORE VIOLENT CONFLICTS.

Interestingly, this cable was apparently written by (or at least signed by) Richard Miles, later U.S. Ambassador to Georgia during the Rose Revolution.

During an August 1989 visit to Tbilisi, US Embassy officials spoke with a number of "Georgian intellectuals" (at a time when intellectuals still mattered politically), all of whom had "Abkhazia on their minds."  Their comments were summed up in an August 23 cable titled "Georgian Political Affairs." The Georgians were troubled by their portrayal in the Western press as "oppressors" of their national minorities.  One source saw the interethnic strife as "the work of a local Abkhazian mafia struggling to maintain its privileges in the face of a growing democratic movement throughout Georgia," which would leave the Abkhazians stripped of privileges as a result of being outnumbered  in their own autonomy.

Other interlocutors pointed suspicious fingers at Moscow, Turkey and Central Asia in explaining the unrest in Abkhazia.  None of the Americans' contacts was willing to entertain the possibility of satisfying the Abkhaz demands to elevate the Abkhazian ASSR to union republic status - "there were simply too few Abkhazians for that."  Georgians were already speaking about increased sovereignty and independence, though not necessarily of full-fledged secession from the USSR. 

The next few cables are roundups of "USSR domestic developments" and focus on other issues in addition to Georgia and other hot spots around the Soviet Union, which was by this point coming apart, though no one realized it at the time.  The first of these cables, dated November 9, 1989, includes a summary of a conversation with "noted Soviet pollster" Yuri Levada (paragraphs 15-16) as well as a synopsis of a familiar-sounding interaction with an opinionated taxi driver (para. 22), and quotes the "KGB press service" (para. 18) as stating that the "'present generation' of security officers dissociates itself from the Stalinist NKVD and condemns the arbitrariness of that period" (there appears to have been some regression in that regard since 1989).  Updates on South Ossetia (para. 27) and disruptions of Revolution Day celebrations in "Kishinev, Moldavia" (para. 31) and Tbilisi (para. 32), and the formal establishment of the "Soviet Interfront of Georgia," which swiftly demanded official status for the Russian language (para. 33).  There is also an interesting discussion of Soviet lawmaking (para. 34).

The November 17, 1989 "USSR Domestic Developments" cable melds old-school Sovietology (an extensive discussion of who stood on "the mausoleum" during the November 7 parade) with earnest discussions of the Soviet legislative calendar and priorities and comments from people like Anatoly Sobchak, and speculation like "Yel'tsin on the decline?" (para. 17).  Also interesting in light of current events are discussions of various popular front initiatives (paras. 20-21) and comments from Andranik Migranyan (para. 22) about domestic politics.  There is also a discussion of the "deteriorating" situation in Karabakh (para. 28) and of demands by Gamsakhurdia, whose organization is now referred to as "radical," that "Ossetians either support Georgian calls for independence from the Soviet Union or leave Georgia," and his forays into South Ossetia with busloads of armed men (para. 30).

The final roundup cable in this batch is "USSR Domestic Developments: December 1."  This one contains extensive discussion of Soviet domestic political developments, including some portions that apparently still merit classification and were redacted before the cable was released to me.  Not redacted, though, are some interesting points about the Karabakh conflict as it stood toward the end of 1989 (paras. 25-28), including some interesting comments by Yevgeny Primakov:

DURING A SPASO HOUSE DINNER NOVEMBER 29, YEVGENIY PRIMAKOV (PROTECT), A CANDIDATE POLITBURO MEMBER AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET'S COUNCIL OF THE UNION, SAID, "THE ARMENIANS WILL SIMPLY HAVE TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE PRESENT SITUATION." HE IMPLIED THERE WAS NO HOPE NAGORNO-KARABAKH WOULD EVER BE UNITED WITH ARMENIA. ACCORDING TO PRIMAKOV, THERE IS NO SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM AND EMOTIONS ARE RUNNING TOO HIGH FOR ARMENIANS AND AZERBAYDZHANIS TO REACH A COMPROMISE.

GEORGIY TARAZEVICH (PROTECT), CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET COMMISSION ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH, WHO VISITED THE AREA EARLY IN NOVEMBER, TOLD EMBOFF NOVEMBER 16 THAT HE BELIEVED THE SITUATION HAS DEADLOCKED.

This cable also has a brief update on continuing tension in South Ossetia (para. 29) and some thoughts from an unnamed Moldovan economist about new First Secretary Petr Luchinsky, and about leadership in the republic in general:

THE ECONOMIST SAID MOLDAVIA'S LEADERS WERE GENERALLY INCOMPETENT BECAUSE, UNLIKE IN THE BALTIC REPUBLICS, THE BEST LEADERS IN MOLDAVIA ALWAYS MOVED ON TO MOSCOW.

The next cable in this batch is titled "Tension Mounts in Georgia as Nationalism Grows," and is dated February 13, 1990. Embassy officials visiting Tbilisi "found the sense of fear palpable," and one source told them that the situation was "like a volcano ready to erupt any time."

In the midst of an extensive discussion of Georgian domestic issues, upcoming elections and emerging political groups is this instructive summary of Georgian Popular Front (PFG) Deputy Chairman Avtandil Imnadze's view of minority rights in a Georgia that was lurching toward independence:

THE PFG'S NATIONALIST VIEWS LEAVE FEW RIGHTS TO OTHER REPUBLIC ETHNIC GROUPS. WHILE IMNADZE TOLD EMBOFF THAT "WE WILL NOT VIOLATE THE RIGHTS OF OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS," HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THOSE RIGHTS IS VERY LIMITED AND GIVES NON-GEORGIANS VIRTUALLY NO POLITICAL POWER. "AFTER ALL," IMNADZE SAID, "THEY DO NOT BELONG HERE. THEY ARE ONLY OUR GUESTS." SEVERAL OTHER GEORGIANS WHO WERE NOT PFG MEMBERS ALSO EXPRESSED THIS SENTIMENT.

There is also discussion toward the end of the cable of the Georgian response to the deployment of Soviet troops in Baku in January 1990.

A cable from November 2, 1990 titled "Georgian Elections - Opposition Round Table Defeats Communists" summarized the implications of the elections won by Zviad Gamsakhurdia's Round Table - Free Georgia group.

GAMSAKHURDIA'S BLOC ADVOCATED INDEPENDENCE FROM MOSCOW, MAINTAINING GEORGIAN TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IN THE FACE OF MINORITY GROUP DEMANDS FOR AUTONOMY OR UNION WITH THE RSFSR.

There is also discussion of the way the election observation was conducted and the presence of foreign observers, noting some procedural flaws which did not in the estimation of the Embassy officials detract from the fairness of the elections. However:

MORE SERIOUS, PERHAPS, THAN THESE PROCEDURAL INCONSISTENCIES BEFORE AND DURING THE ELECTION WAS THE DECISION BY ABKHAZIA AND OSSETIAN NATIONAL GROUPS TO BOYCOTT THE ELECTIONS. INDEED, IN DISTRICTS WITHIN THE OSSETIAN CAPITAL OF TKHSINVALI LESS THAN TEN PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS CAST BALLOTS. IN TWO DISTRICTS IN ABKHAZIA ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS DISINTEGRATED AND ELECTIONS WERE NOT HELD AT ALL.

The position of the election's victor on the Abkhazians and Ossetians also did not bode well for inter-ethnic harmony in Georgia:

GAMSAKHURDIA ALSO SAID HE BELIEVES IN RESPECT FOR THE POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND RELIGIOUS RIGHTS OF THE MINORITIES LIVING IN THE REPUBLIC, BUT NOT THEIR INDEPENDENCE OR SEPARATION FROM THE GEORGIAN REPUBLIC. ANY SOLUTION TO THE MINORITY PROBLEM, HE STRESSED, MUST PRESERVE THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF GEORGIA AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE RIGHTS OF THE MAJORITY. [...]

GAMSAKHURDIA'S VICTORY COULD FURTHER FUEL ETHNIC TENSIONS AND CONFLICTS IN THE REGION. HE IS VIEWED BY SOME OF THE MINORITY GROUPS, PARTICULARLY THE ABKHAZIANS AND OSSETIANS, AS A GEORGIAN NATIONALIST AT BEST AND A CHAUVINIST AT WORST. HIS UNCOMPROMISING POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE SOUTHERN OSSETIANS, WHOM HE HAS CALLED A MINORITY WITHOUT RIGHTS TO THE LANDS THEY OCCUPY, HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY TROUBLING EVEN TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GEORGIAN DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION.

The cable's author(s) reached this unfortunately prescient conclusion:

THE RESISTANCE OF COMMUNIST PARTY APPARATCHIKI, AND THE RESENTMENT AND FEAR EXPRESSED BY MINORITY GROUPS IN ABKHAZIA AND SOUTHERN OSSETIA MAKE FOR A VOLATILE MIX: WITHOUT RESOLUTION OF THE PERSONAL ANIMOSITIES AMONG THE FORMER OPPOSITION LEADERS AND THE CONSENT OF THE ENTRENCHED COMMUNIST BUREAUCRATS, GEORGIA WILL, AT BEST, REMAIN CRITICALLY DIVIDED AT A TIME OF GREAT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTABILITY, AND, AT WORST, MAY SLIDE INTO FACTIONAL FIGHTING AND CIVIL WAR.

The final cable in this batch, from December 18, 1990, is titled "Union Treaty Negotiations: The Caucasus, Moldova, and the Baltics." This one is worth embedding in full, as it is laden with interesting observations about the internal situations in the republics of the Caucasus and Moldova, e.g. "INTERESTINGLY, FORMER COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER GElDER ALIYEV, FAMOUS FOR HIS CORRUPT POLITICAL PRACTICES, HAS MADE A POLITICAL COMEBACK AS A REBORN NATIONALIST."

Union Treaty Negotiations: The Caucasus, Moldova, and the Baltics (Dec. 18, 1990)

 

 [image source]

Moskovskiy Komsomolets
August 25, 2010
Commentary by Marina Pervozkina: Thanks to Everyone, Everyone Is Free. South Ossetia and Abkhazia are gradually gaining independence from Russia. [Translation from JRL]

"Abkhazia is less dependent on Russia than Russia is on Abkhazia," one of the popular Abkhaz newspapers wrote recently. And the impression sometimes forms that the author was right on target. In any case, the elites of both the republics recognized by Russia often behave as if these words were inscribed on their family seal. Abkhazia and South Ossetia increasingly recall the willful beauty who condescendingly receives gifts from her long-standing, loyal suitor at the same time as her eyes are darting around looking for other interesting partners. And as always happens in such cases, the alternative is quickly found.

The Quiet American

"I think that he (Mikheil Saakashvili -- author) used the confrontation with Russia for personal goals: to muffle the voices of the discontented people in his own country. I hope that Saakashvili realized what harm he did to his own country, losing Abkhazia and South Ossetia in this way. After all, in this situation there will no longer be a road back."

"Kremlin propaganda again," some progressive reader will say involuntarily. And he will almost be right: such thoughts were heard on the official level in Russia so often that they became a kind of cliche that already seems almost improper somehow.

Nonetheless, these words, spoken just before the second anniversary of the August war, were a real sensation. After all, the person acting as the mouthpiece for Kremlin propaganda on this occasion is called the "shadow architect of American foreign policy" by well-informed people. And some consider him one of the most authoritative representatives of the American intelligence community. And not without grounds: Paul Goble (the quotation cited above belongs to him) in fact worked for a long time in the CIA, then served as an associate of the US State Department's Bureau of Research and Intelligence and as deputy director of broadcasting for Radio Liberty/Free Europe. He is considered one of the best experts on the Caucasus and inter-ethnic conflicts in post-Soviet space. In short, the classic "quiet American." Very quiet and very influential.

The significance of a person is best illustrated by the legends that surround him. There is a story that circulates about Goble, that supposedly the speaker and the prime minister of Armenia, who died at the hands of terrorists in October 1999, were paid back for rejecting the so-called Goble plan to settle the Karabakh conflict. We are sure that this is malicious slander.

And if such a complex person says publicly, "I think that on the threshold of the conflict Saakashvili misinterpreted statements by the US president and secretary of state... He did not hear at all what we had in mind. I hope that the American authorities are aware of the harm Saakashvili caused by his actions. We did not need that war," this certainly bodes no good for Saakashvili. It may already be time for him to look for a job in a quiet provincial American university. Just in case.

But here is the most interesting thing: "I believe in the right of nations to self-determination," Mr. Goble says. "And I am sure that Abkhazia has demonstrated its possibility of realizing this right in practice."

But what will happen with the territorial integrity of Georgia, for which official Washington is constantly affirming its support? The events of recent years have shown that for the Americans the integrity of other countries is always a relative value. When a probable enemy or its ally loses integrity it is welcomed. The examples of the USSR and Yugoslavia are known to all. But while the USSR collapsed relatively peacefully ("just" a few tens of thousands killed in Tajikistan, Abkhazia, the Dniester region, and South Ossetia), everything was much worse in Yugoslavia. At first glance US policy toward Slobodan Milosevic looked somewhat schizophrenic: after all, in its time Yugoslavia was the most pro-Western country in the socialist camp and had difficult relations with Moscow while Milosevic himself up to a certain time seemed to be a completely loyal client of Washington. He made concessions easily, in fact surrendered Serbian Krajna, and declared an economic blockade of the Bosnian Serbs (how can we help recalling here the multi-year blockade of Abkhazia by the Russian Federation?). But here is the paradox: the more Milosevic gave away, the less the West liked him. Ultimately the Serbs even gave up Milosevic himself, but they still took Kosovo away from them. The poor devils simply did not understand that it was not a matter of Milosevic, but of themselves -- the West does not need a strong, unified Serbia, which sooner or later will return to its traditional role as Russia's outpost in the Balkans.

But whereas everything is clear with Serbia, Turkey is, after all, a reliable ally and strategic partner of the Americans. And therefore the Americans' support of Kurdish separatism in Iraq is, from the Turkish point of view, completely beyond good and evil. I took a look at the Kurdish website yesterday, and saw there threats to secede from Iraq with highly promising commentary: "And if the Kurds slam the door, glass will fly across the whole region." In connection with which very alluring prospects could open up for Turkish Kurdistan. And how is Georgia better than Turkey?

Normal Heroes Always Take the Bypass

It is not only no better, but even in some respects worse: Georgia, an Orthodox country like Serbia, was a reliable supporter of the Russians during the Caucasus war and together they wiped out the mountain rebels, who are brothers in spirit and faith with the Kosovo terrorists, the United States' current strategic partners. So who will sort them out, the Georgians? Where will their sun rise tomorrow? Half of the North Caucasus is related by kin to the Abkhazes.

Of course, from the standpoint of America's strategic interests it would be best if a united Georgia including Abkhazia and South Ossetia joined NATO. But the West is starting to understand that it is probably impossible for Abkhazes and Georgians to live in one state. That means it is necessary to "enter" already independent Abkhazia maybe as a carcass, maybe as a scarecrow, maybe as an embassy if nothing else works.

"For Moscow the worst development of the situation in the Caucasus is if the West, and the United States in particular, decides to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia," Mr. Goble says. "Picture 27 embassies of the NATO members in Sukhum. No doubt the Russian authorities would be horrified at that. Then after all, there are others in Russia who would like self-determination -- Dagestan, for example. I do not rule out such a development of events. I hope that we greet the 10th anniversary of the conflict between Russia and Georgia in a significantly calmer state. There will be fewer comments on Russian aggression, and more embassies of foreign states in Sukhum. I do not know if there will be an American Embassy among them. That, of course, is a very bold dream."

Paul Goble is undoubtedly a brilliant analyst and a master strategist. He set forth a perfectly realistic plan to "nullify" Russia's August victory: reorient Abkhazia to the West and turn it into a Mecca for North Caucasian separatists. This is not fantasy. Suffice it to recall the Gorskaya (Mountain) Republic that was declared after the fall of the Russian Empire. It included Abkhazia, Ossetia, and five other republics of the North Caucasus. The ideas of the Gorskaya Republic were reborn after the fall of the Union. In November 1991 Sukhum was declared the capital of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus. During the war with Georgia representatives of all the national movements of the North Caucasus fought on the Abkhaz side. The minister of defense of war-time Abkhazia was Sultan Sosnaliyev, a Kabardin, and Shamil Basayev was his deputy. Kabardin and Chechen battalions played a decisive part in the war. Afterw ard those same Chechens, having become battle hardened on the fronts of Abkhazia, fought against Russian troops.

Highly-placed people I spoke with in Sukhum told me that even before the August events representatives of Western countries in private conversation hinted on occasion that Abkhazia's main problem was its pro-Russian orientation. "If the Abkhazes turn their faces to the West, anything is possible, including international recognition" -- according to my interlocutors that is how these emissaries talked.

"If the 'restoration' of Georgian rule is a fantasy, accordingly it is essential to prevent Abkhazia from finally falling under Russia's power," the journalist Neal Ascherson writes in his article entitled "Abkhazia and the Caucasus: the West's Choice," which was posted on the Open Democracy website. "The West is facing an urgent need to arrange direct contacts with Abkhazia -- economic, social, and cultural contacts -- and to get access to Abkhaz ports. That will help Abkhazia emerge from isolation."

News from the Field

As for South Ossetia, in the opinion of Western analysts it has fewer grounds for independence. Small territory, small population. And geographic position: South Ossetia is a "dagger aimed at Tbilisi," an ideal launching point for an invasion of Georgia. But the main thing is that North Ossetia is located in the Russian Federation. In this connection (I am again speaking on the basis of the words of participants in events who hold high positions in the Ossetian elite) on numerous occasions the Ossetians have been told unofficially that if North Ossetia unites with South Ossetia and withdraws from Russia, such a united Ossetia could well expect international recognition.

This idea is not at all as utopian as it seems.

In Tskhinval today we observe a paradoxical situation. While South Ossetia, its people, and the whole elite are entirely dependent on our maintenance -- in the war-ravaged republic nothing is working, there are no domestic sources of income at all, and even its security depends entirely on Russia -- Moscow cannot resolve a single significant problem there. Not even monitor the expenditure of its own money or protect its own people. Moscow (and according to my information the Russian premier personally) was even unable to get Mr. Kokoyty to dismiss South Ossetian officials who were caught stealing and whose names were known. The story of former health minister Nuzgar Gabarayev, who distributed Russian financial aid, is illustrative. His name has already become part of the language in the republic. After Moscow protege Vadim Brovtsev sent Gabarayev into retirement, President Kokoyty appointed him his own state counselor. Evidently an indispensable personage. Even more illustrative is the story of General Barankevich, who Moscow wanted very much to appoint to be head of the MVK (interdepartmental commission on the restoration of South Ossetia), but COULD NOT. In other words, in this case terribly dependent and very proud Tskhinval, living entirely on our money, was actually able to influence our internal personnel policy. At the same time we cannot influence Tskhinval's. I would say that this is the apotheosis of impudence.

There is an analogous situation in Abkhazia, where Moscow is unsuccessfully trying to get the property rights of Russian citizens who were illegally deprived of their housing restored. In order to avoid misunderstanding, I will emphasize that we are not talking here about the property of Georgian refugees. Their problems should be the subject of bilateral talks between Georgia and Abkhazia. It is those for whom the Russian government is fighting, principally Russians, Armenians, Greeks, and the like. Many of them never left Abkhazia at all.

In these very days another scandal has flared up. Sukhum rejected a document sent to it by the MID RF (Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs) entitled "Concept of the Work of the Joint Russian-Abkhaz Commission on Questions of Restorin g the Property Rights of Citizens of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Abkhazia." We will recall that the decision to form such a commission was reached in Moscow after an article published in MK (Moskovskiy Komsomolets) made the problem a matter of public record. Before this, according to our information, the MID RF and the Russian Embassy in Sukhum had sent several diplomatic notes to the Abkhaz side (dated 25 November 2008, 19 March 2009, 22 April 2009, and 31 July 2009). President Medvedev and foreign minister Lavrov discussed the problem with the president of Abkhazia. Sergey Baghapsh pointed out to the chiefs of local administrations the necessity of "taking a hard line with seizures of property." However, nothing happened. Not one of the protagonists of our article has gotten his apartment back at this point.

At the same time strange articles are appearing in the Abkhaz press in which the plans to form the commission are called "anti-state and anti-Abkhaz," while giving people back property that was fraudulently taken from them is considered a threat to the Abkhaz people. The Abkhazes never tire of repeating that their foreign policy must be multi-vectored, that they are not some pathetic outpost of Russia, but a sovereign state with its own interests. Thus if there is a change in the West's position on the issue of Abkhaz independence, Moscow stands a good chance of being left empty-handed.

And if we close our eyes to the problems that already exist in relations with our Abkhaz and Ossetian partners, it is not impossible that some day museums "of the Russian occupation" will open on the central squares of Sukhum and Tskhinval.

God forbid, of course.

More on "peacekeepers" vs. "occupiers"

[image source] 
GUAM appears to be DOA, of course, but the article below suggests some degree of 
coordination between MD and GE's Russia policies.  I'm not sure I buy it, particularly as
I think the article overstates Acting President Ghimpu's influence on MD foreign policy.
And is wanting Russian troops to leave territory one claims as its own sufficiently strange
of a policy preference as to suggest that it must be the result of a coordinated campaign?

Nezavisimaya Gazeta [translation courtesy of JRL]
August 2, 2010
KISHINEV AND TBILISI NEVER NOTICED MOSCOW'S PROTESTS
Moldova and Georgia demand withdrawal of the Russian military from what they call their territories
Author: Svetlana Gamova
MOLDOVA AND GEORGIA COORDINATE THEIR RUSSIAN POLICIES

Their relations with Russia already soured, Moldova and Georgia got international support. The matter concerns the report on arms control agreements the U.S. Department of State published last Wednesday. The document mentioned presence of the Russian troops on the territories of Moldova and Georgia without their consent. By and large, the thesis in question repeated what State Secretary Hillary Clinton had said about occupation of Moldovan (Trans-Dniester region) and Georgian (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) territories by the Russian military. This statement was made when acting president of Moldova Mihai Ghimpu signed a special decree calling the Russian contingent in the Trans-Dniester region "occupiers" and demanding its withdrawal. The Russian Foreign Ministry then reiterated Moscow's official stand on the matter and gave the floor to Gennadi Onischenko of the Rospotrebnadzor.

Onischenko's words made it plain that Kishinev's objections to the presence of the Russian military in the Trans-Dniester region might cost it dearly. Russia suspended import of Moldovan wines - just to make the point. The Moldovans arranged negotiations to discuss the matter but the effort was wasted. That was when Clinton made her statement and urged Russia to start honoring its obligations. Her words killed the last chance the Moldovans might have had then to reactivate wine export to Russia.

Russian Foreign Ministry called "incorrect" U.S. Department of State's speculations on the presence of the Russian military in Moldova and Georgia. "There are no Russian soldiers in Georgia. As for Abkhazia and South Ossetia on whose territories Russian military bases operate with their consent, these countries are
neither parts or Georgia nor signatories of the Treaty on Conventional Armed forces in Europe." The Foreign Ministry reiterated that Russian peacekeepers were on the Dniester in accordance with the agreement between Russia and Moldova (July 21, 1992). The Moldovan authorities demand withdrawal of the Russian
military contingent and peacekeepers from the self-proclaimed Trans-Dniester Moldovan Republic in the hope to replace them with an international police force.

In any event, official Kishinev studiously ignored all objections and protests from Russia. Moreover, it chose to comment on the conclusions drawn in the U.S. Department of State's report in application to the conflict with Tiraspol. Kishinev no longer accepts the terms formulated by Moscow (conflict resolution first, evacuation of the military afterwards). Moldovan Ambassador to Romania Yuri Renice told the Romanian newspaper Adevarul, "Synchronization of the Russians' withdrawal with Trans-Dniester conflict resolution is a thoroughly counterproductive approach...Presence of the Russian military collides with the principle of neutrality promoted by the Constitution. Most Trans-Dniester residents stand for reintegration of the territory."
Trans-Dniester Foreign Ministry in the meantime appealed to the UN to recognize sovereignty of the Trans-Dniester Moldovan Republic in the light of the recent ruling of the International Court of Justice regarding Kosovo. "Our position is clear: the Trans-Dniester region is part of Moldova," said Renice.

Georgia took Washington's position as a clear confirmation: there are no sovereign Abkhazia and South Ossetia, there are but regions of Georgia occupied by Russia. Ghimpu said that he would pay an official visit to Tbilisi before long. It is clear that Kishinev and Tbilisi intend to coordinate their Russian policies.

American Interests in the Caucasus by Sergey Markedonov

Kavkazskii Krai - Transit Routes, originally uploaded by lyndonk2.

Below is an original translation of a recent article which I thought was important enough to spend time rendering in English. I have added hyperlinks to some of the items cited by the author. The original article is here.


American Interests in the Caucasus
Sergey Markedonov, Polit.ru, May 13, 2010

The immediate reason for writing this article was my telephone conversation with a correspondent of the Voice of Russia radio station. The journalist for the state-owned station was interested in an article by Alexander Cooley and Lincoln Mitchell, two American specialists from Columbia University. The political scientists’ article, subtitled “Action Memorandum” and addressed to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, concludes that a serious reformatting of America’s foreign policy toward Georgia and Abkhazia is necessary. You read correctly, Cooley and Mitchell consider Abkhazia as a separate policy actor (and not just an object of policy), with which a constructive relationship should be developed, without, however, formally recognizing Abkhazia’s independence. “Engagement without recognition” is the formula used by the Columbia University specialists. It is also worth noting that their piece was published under the heading “Off the Beaten Path” in the influential publication The American Interest. [1]

Certainly it is pleasant to see a state-run radio station that broadcasts overseas taking interest in foreign intellectual discourse. One can only welcome the familiarization of Russian journalists with the opinions of their foreign colleagues, without which an adequate understanding of the expert and policy community in the U.S. and Europe would be impossible. But I was puzzled by the tone of the question: “Does this signal a change in American policy priorities in the Caucasus?” What can we conclude from this question? That Russian journalists and experts (and this isn’t the first time I’ve heard such a question) genuinely believe that any article by an American professor or consultant represents an expression of the American government’s will. In the post-Soviet republics people take a similar approach toward the statements of Russian experts. In both cases such assessments are far from the truth. But the situation with Russia merits a separate article, and here we will focus on the American situation in greater detail. Especially since the understanding of it in our country is of practical significance. Failing to fully understand (or to understand at all) how the American government, decision-making systems, and academic community function, we make quite substantial mistakes in our foreign policy.

For example, in 2007, there was a lively discussion in the U.S. about American participation in the Baku-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Kars railway project. The Bush Administration was interested in this project, and no less a luminary than Matthew Bryza of the State Department (who was responsible for the South Caucasus) spoke about it as though it were a done deal. Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress was against the plan because it was opposed to increasing the international isolation of Armenia, an American ally. This topic was the subject of a representative roundtable discussion in Russia, where highly placed political analysts close to the government with utter seriousness asserted that Washington would support the project because the Administration was in favor of it. Attempts to explain to my colleagues that Congress is not the “voting department” of the White House were unsuccessful. To the contrary, they met with responses along the lines of, “But in Russia the Duma would never go against the Kremlin.” The whole point is that the American Congress is not the Russian Duma, which is why the ambitious railway plan was ultimately not supported by Washington. But a lack of understanding of the decisionmaking process in the U.S. created an inaccurate “picture” of the prospects of this particular project.

Unfortunately, those [Russians] who attempt to elucidate American foreign policy actions in the Greater Caucasus also fail to fully understand the debates among American specialists about this unsettled region. Aside from the association of political scientists with American passports en masse with the positions of the U.S. State Department, Russian experts and journalists suffer from an additional affliction – one that is, alas, quite widespread. They try to simplify the positions of American political scientists regarding the “Five-Day War” and its aftermath by presenting them as patently pro-Georgian. This leads to not entirely sensible actions. For instance, in the summer and fall of 2008 our politicians and journalists talked of practically an “informational conspiracy” against Russia during the hot August days in South Ossetia. Then in the fall of 2009 the same people expressed their surprise at the “balanced report” of the E.U. expert commission headed by Heidi Tagliavini. In the first case the incorrect assessment led to an extremely and unjustifiably inflated anti-Western hysteria, in which our mass media played into the hands of hawks in Washington and Brussels by portraying the events of 2008 as a confrontation not with the Georgian leader but with a “combination attack” of the Western world arrayed against “a Russia rising from its knees.” In the second case our surprise was again misplaced, because Tagliavini’s “balance” was suggested long before the official publication of her commission’s report. Quite simply, there was nothing to be surprised at.

To be clear, of course there are some American writers who are genuinely sympathetic to President Mikhail Saakashvili and view him and Georgia under his leadership as a “beacon of democracy.” Ronald Asmus, a well known and influential student of transatlantic security issues, devoted his entire book to this idea. In A Little War that Shook the World (published and widely presented in January 2010), the author states that “the origins of this war do not lie in the details of local ethnic rivalries between Georgians on the one hand and Abkhaz and South Ossetians on the other, or even the future status of these provinces.” In Asmus’s view, at the root of the events of 2008 lay “Tbilisi’s desire to break free of what had been a quasi-colonial relationship with Moscow and to become part of a democratic West.” (pp. 8, 216). As a matter of fact, this is the methodology used to construct [Asmus’s] assessments of the situation in the Southern Caucasus during the period leading up to the tragic events of that hot August of 2008. Abkhazia and South Ossetia are viewed not as independent figures but solely as instruments of Russia’s “offensive policy” and barriers to Georgia’s movement towards the West (pp. 54, 63-64). Russian policy toward the two formerly rebellious autonomies is regarded as a “creeping annexation” of Georgian territory, and “passportization” is seen as a politico-ideological justification for Georgia to cause “damage” (p. 42 [sic]). The introduction to Asmus’s study was written by Strobe Talbott, also a well known personality in contemporary American policy and analytical circles, the president of the Washington-based Brookings Institution who served as Deputy Secretary of State in 1994-2001: “I can even imagine [this book] will have resonance in Moscow, where thoughtful but well-connected and in some cases well-placed Russians are – quietly and cautiously – pondering the lessons, consequences and implications for the future of their government’s constant troublemaking in the Caucasus and, in particular, its mauling of Georgia in August 2008.” (p. xi). Thus, the introduction immediately indicates the book’s frame of reference for the reader: Russia is the “bad guy” and Georgia is the “good guy.”

However, judging all of American political science based on a single book (although quotations from it were eagerly posted by Russian websites) is a thankless task! Admittedly, it’s a thankless task in general to talk about a “unified Western approach” to the Five-Day War. On August 11, 2008 (while the fighting was still taking place), in an interview with Salon’s Glenn Greenwald, prominent Caucasus expert Charles King of Georgetown University said, “I think it's very simplistic to see this as the Russian autocratic bear trying to snuff out this small beacon of democracy. There are bigger issues…that are at stake here as well.” That same day Prof. King, in an article in the Christian Science Monitor (the publication with the second-largest circulation in the U.S. [sic]) appropriately headlined “Russo-Georgian conflict is not all Russia's fault,” wrote, “Russia must be condemned for its unsanctioned intervention. But the war began as an ill-considered move by Georgia to retake South Ossetia by force. Saakashvili's larger goal was to lead his country into war as a form of calculated self-sacrifice, hoping that Russia's predictable overreaction would convince the West of exactly the narrative that many commentators have now taken up.” Several lines later King concludes, “For Georgia, this war has been a disastrous miscalculation. South Ossetia and Abkhazia are now completely lost. It is almost impossible to imagine a scenario under which these places – home to perhaps 200,000 people – would ever consent to coming back into a Georgian state they perceive as an aggressor.”

Subsequently King examined these points in greater detail in his academic publications. Steven Pifer, former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine (who by the way works with Talbott at Brookings), told the Los Angeles Times on August 13, 2008, that “Saakashvili gave the Kremlin an opportunity when he sent troops into the separatist region of South Ossetia last week in an effort to reassert Georgia's sovereignty.” Nikolai Petro, a professor at the University of Rhode Island and an assistant on Soviet issues in the State Department under George H.W. Bush, published an article in May 2009 entitled “The Legal Case for Russian Intervention in Georgia,” in which he asserts that practically all aspects of Russia’s operation in the Caucasus in August 2008 were consistent with international law and with Russia’s mandate as a peacekeeper. And in 2008 Lincoln Mitchell, who we mentioned at the beginning of this article, published a book with the telling title “Uncertain Democracy [the word “uncertain” can be translated [into Russian] as “dubious,” “unstable,” “unreliable” – S.M.]: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia’s ‘Rose Revolution’.”

Therefore, we should not oversimplify the American expert community’s understanding of Russian motives and actions in the Caucasus, especially if we are mindful of the anti-Russian phobias and fears that are present in American society (which we should ourselves be working much more actively to break down). Only then will we avoid unexpected surprises and discoveries and minimize inappropriate actions.

In any event, Cooley and Mitchell’s article is valuable not only in the overall context of American political science. It proposes some interesting arguments which deserve serious attention. The authors start by pointing out that since August 2008 the U.S. and the E.U. have consistently refused to accept Russia’s decision to recognize Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence. And this policy, in their view, has failed, while there has been no success in developing an acceptable relationship with the two disputed regions. Cooley and Mitchell assert that “these territories are almost certainly lost to Georgia, possibly for decades,” and that Russian influence there “has increased rapidly and substantially.” Thus, “[u]nless the United States changes its approach, the Russian Federation will soon completely absorb Abkhazia and South Ossetia.” In order to prevent such a scenario, the Americans together with the E.U. must “urgently…end the current policy of isolation with respect to these territories and replace it with one of ‘engagement without recognition.’”

What methods do Cooley and Mitchell propose for this? In the section of their article subtitled “Abkhazia First” they discuss the serious differences between the two de facto states on Georgian territory. In their opinion, Abkhazia already has certain “attributes of statehood” while sparsely populated South Ossetia, “landlocked between Georgia and Russia,” is difficult to imagine as a full-fledged state. Consequently, the American specialists suggest that Abkhazia should be the first priority in terms of building bilateral (multilateral, if we take into account the U.S., E.U. and other Western integrative structures) relations. But what about Georgian territorial integrity? In Cooley’s and Mitchell’s opinion, Georgia’s territorial integrity has a “specific meaning”: this concept is correctly applied to describe the Georgian SSR, but not contemporary Georgia, since in reality such “integrity” “simply does not exist.” The authors do not seek to toss the project of “restoring Georgian territorial integrity” overboard, but they note in a politically correct way that this is a long-term project. And although such a resolution of the conflict would be “ideal,” it would not be constructive and doesn’t make sense to discuss it in terms of specific time frames.

The alternative proposed by Cooley and Mitchell consists of several elements. First, “engagement” without a guarantee of formal legal recognition. By this the American political scientists mean introducing a practice of issuing entry visas to Abkhazian officials (even those traveling on Abkhazian internal passports!) for them to participate in conferences, seminars and forums. The treatment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) could serve as a precedent for such a policy. “Even though Washington does not recognize the TRNC as a sovereign state, it recognizes TRNC passports for the purpose of travel and visa applications.” The second element is a diversification of Abkhazia’s economic ties. Here Cooley and Mitchell propose activating the Abkhaz diaspora in Turkey and other Western countries. Third, the American authors propose using a familiar mechanism: non-governmental structures and civil society. “Engagement without recognition is the only policy realistically able to prevent Abkhazia’s full absorption into the Russian Federation, thus preserving a chance for the territory to be restored to Georgian sovereignty. The more coordinated that policy is between the United States and the European Union, the more efficacious it will be,” conclude Cooley and Mitchell.

One cannot help but see several of sensible and realistic assessments in their framework. Among these is an understanding of the relative nature of Georgian “territorial integrity” and the impossibility of its restoration in the short term (and of its complete restoration in general). The authors also rightly point out the difference between Abkhazia and South Ossetia (and in fact at the outset these two projects were developed to pursue different policy goals). Cooley and Mitchell do not forget to mention the ethnic excesses in Abkhazia (the expulsion of the Georgian population) but also add that stronger demands for refugee return from Georgia only serve to turn the current population of Abkhazia more resolutely against Tbilisi. Their arguments might force not only theoreticians but also policymakers in Russia to stop and think about how it might be possible to accommodate both Russian interests in Abkhazia and Abkhazia’s own foreign trade interests. Otherwise even without the interference of any “third parties” friction and conflicts are inevitable.

But Cooley and Mitchell’s main point (one might even call it their matrix of reasoning) raises a number of questions. The authors present their concept (a more detailed version is to be published separately later) as a mechanism for combating Russian ambitions in Abkhazia and in South Ossetia, even though they understand that Georgian sovereignty in these areas is problematic and mention it more as a nod to tradition than anything else. But does a naval base in Ochamchire or an air base in Gudauta (both of which still haven’t been properly outfitted) threaten any U.S. interests? Today there are many experts in the United States and in Europe who smugly accuse Moscow and Beijing of seeking to play a “zero-sum” game. Cooley and Mitchell’s position, however, is in essence precisely a call to play that old, familiar game. It turns out that a strengthening of Russia in Abkhazia automatically strikes a blow against America’s standing. But where, in what part of the world? In Georgia, where the U.S. today has total support, or perhaps in Ukraine or other corners of Eurasia? Or in the Middle East? And if not, then is it really worthwhile for Washington to focus so much on Tbilisi’s support? Especially when it has so many shared strategic interests with Russia (e.g., Afghanistan and Iran).

Meanwhile, the Cooley-Mitchell approach loses the thread of the Georgian-Abkhazian game itself. After all, Russia’s relationship with the West in this area of international politics is a function, and not the foundation, of Abkhaz-Georgian relations. And today’s Abkhazian elite is much more radically disposed toward Georgia than Russian embassy officials in Sukhumi or the people responsible for Abkhazia in the presidential administration or in the [Russian] White House. And even if we can imagine a break between the Kremlin and the Abkhazian elite, and a growth of the latter’s interest in the West (which is happening even in an atmosphere of good relations with Moscow), this would not mean an increase in their affinity for Georgia. At the same time, American experts (even those who genuinely seek to figure out the tangled web of politics in the Caucasus and don’t believe in Saakashvili’s inherent democracy) for now admit the following fact only through gritted teeth: Abkhazian Georgia-phobia and Abkhazian nationalism have their own roots, bases and traditions, including ones not connected with Moscow and with Russian “imperial” policy. Even if Abkhazia were to befriend the West instead of the Kremlin, friendship with Georgia still wouldn’t be in the cards, at least not in the context of a relationship within the formal legal boundaries of a single state. As a neighbor, Abkhazia will inevitably sooner or later reach a stage of constructive and perhaps even friendly relations with Georgia.

And of course Abkhazia can simultaneously be “with us and with them.” This alternative didn’t occur to the American specialists (or perhaps they forgot about it?). There could be a mutually beneficial partnership with Abkhazia along the lines of “engagement without recognition, but also without contraposition” (to Russia, of course).

Attempts to unilaterally isolate Russia (or “contain” it) are inconsistent with American interests. Unless, of course, one understands those interests in the traditions of the Cold War.


[1] The American Interest (AI) is a bimonthly magazine published since 2005. It was founded by several members of the editorial board of another well-known American publication, “The National Interest,” who disagreed with that publication’s editorial policy. AI is devoted to issues of international policy, world economy and security. The chairman of the magazine’s executive committee is philosopher Francis Fukuyama; the chief editor is Orientalist professor Adam Garfinkel, who was a speechwriter for Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice in the George W. Bush administration.

The Caucasus in 1842

Caucasus1842, originally uploaded by lyndonk2.

This is the latest in an ongoing series of Caucasus maps (note that some other maps will probably also be caught by the "Maps" label, but most are from this endlessly interesting part of the world).

Map of 1993 fighting in Georgia

[image source]

I'm not sure how accurate this map is (I found it on Wikipedia, a website which is often a good reminder that you get what you pay for), but it's interesting and I decided to post it in keeping with my practice of posting maps, especially maps of the Caucasus. Full-sized version can be found here.

Traitor, deserter, adolescent bumbler - or just a regular guy?

[image source]

Strange things are afoot in Georgia. According to today's Moscow Times:

A Russian soldier said Tuesday that he deserted from his unit in separatist South Ossetia and sought asylum in Georgia because of unbearable living conditions, including poor treatment and scarce food.

"I wasn't captured by Georgian police," Alexander Glukhov said in an interview at a McDonald's restaurant in the Georgian capital, Tbilisi.

"I ran away because I couldn't stand the conditions I was living in," he said. "I want to stay here."

Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Alexander Drobyshevsky said earlier that Glukhov had been "seized by Georgian agents in the Akhalgori district of South Ossetia and taken to Tbilisi." Russia demands Glukhov's immediate release, Drobyshevsky said by telephone in Moscow.

Georgian Interior Ministry official Shota Utiashvili said Glukhov had handed himself over to Georgian police on Monday, complaining that the major of his unit had been beating him. "We did not detain him. He is free and can do whatever he wants," Utiashvili said. [...]

Glukhov, 21, said he was deployed in South Ossetia on Aug. 9, the second day of the war. "But I didn't take part in military operations myself. I was assigned to dig ditches and that sort of thing," he said.

He said that if he were to return to Russia, he would not want to resume his military service. "I'd just like to go home," he said, adding that he had not considered the consequences of his actions when he fled his unit more than a week ago.

When a reporter asked to see Glukhov's military identification card during the interview, Georgian Interior Ministry spokesman Shota Khizanishvili, who was present, said the card was at the ministry. He confirmed Glukhov's identity. Glukhov had earlier explained his reasons for deserting on Georgian television and displayed his ID.

Drobyshevsky suggested that Georgian agents had coerced Glukhov into making the televised comments.

"If a soldier is threatened or subjected to physical or emotional and psychological pressure, he could say absolutely anything," Drobyshevsky said.

Not surprisingly, this story is today's most blogged-about topic, according to Yandex. drugoi posted the above picture and opined, "He's no traitor, of course. He's just a fool, an adolescent, a little boy. He shouldn't be in the army, he should still be making mud pies in the sandbox."

Georgian blogger cyxymu posts video from Georgian TV and links to Glukhov's interview with Ekho Moskvy and this interesting post by Russian blogger shurigin, who appears to be a veteran and blames the whole incident on mismanagement of the military in general, and the higher command's neglect of the Russian troops in South Ossetia in particular: "The problem is that the troops in SO have been practically abandoned. It's a complete mess there [Бардак дикий]. Units are wintering in old, raggedy tents. The supply situation is horrible."

[UPDATE 1/29 - the Russian MoD is now executing a climb-down from its earlier allegations that Glukhov was kidnapped from his unit by the Georgian special services.]

Meanwhile, closer to home, a Georgian politician in exile in Northern Virginia has a column slamming Saakashvili in today's Moscow Times. Is it too cynical to entertain the possibility that Saak may have flipped from "our SOB" to Saddam-ville in less than a year, and that Georgian Chalabis are already being groomed Stateside? Actually, I think it is too cynical, but I couldn't resist raising the possibility. And just as, over the years, no one ever went broke underestimating the intelligence of the American people, in recent years few people have gone broke overestimating the cynicism of American foreign policy.

The Caucasus in 1927 - "New Political Boundaries"

Caucasus 1927, full-sized version available here.

South Ossetian Shakeup?

«Не место этому президенту в Южной Осетии» // Бывший секретарь совбеза республики о конфликте с Эдуардом Кокойты Герой войны в Южной Осетии, бывший секретарь совбеза республики АНАТОЛИЙ БАРАНКЕВИЧ рассказал спецкору “Ъ” ОЛЬГЕ АЛЛЕНОВОЙ о причинах своего увольнения, конфликте с президентом Кокойты, а также о кадровой и экономической политике Цхинвала. открыть материал ...

Kommersant has run a lengthy interview with former Russian army general and former South Ossetian de facto Minister of Defense which puts the region's president, former wrestling champion and phys. ed. teacher Eduard Kokoity, in a rather unflattering light.

General Anatoly Barankevich is one of the examples cited in recent years by Western observers in order to highlight the fact that South Ossetian secessionism at some point shifted from "self-determination" to a situation where the determination of key personnel appointments took place in Moscow. There were other former (or seconded) Russian officers serving in the territory's de facto government, but he was among the most prominent. And now he has come out with an interview mocking Kokoity's flight from Tskhinvali during the five-day war and relating tales of a reconstruction effort paralyzed by corruption.

One of the more damning excerpts reads as follows (my translation, hopefully Kommersant will put this on their English-language website but they haven't done so yet) - Barankevich is relating a scene he observed at a police station in Dzhava on August 10th:

And then I saw the following picture: a Georgian prisoner with his hands tied and shirt off, his hands had already gone blue, you couldn't see his eyes, he couldn't even cry, and the [South Ossetian] militants [бойцы, apparently police officers - trans.] were beating him. I went over to them and said, "What are you doing? You are mountain men [горцы - implying, apparently, that they should hew to some code of honor - trans.]. You can't beat a prisoner, his hands are tied." They looked embarrassed and said, "Sorry, comrade General."

I told them to go get someone from the KGB. To take the Georgian away. Right away they untied his hands. And then the president showed up. He saw me, saw the prisoner and understood what was going on. And the first thing he did was run up to the prisoner and start kicking him. It turned my stomach. The guys from the police looked at the ground, they were ashamed.

Without wanting to engage in too much Kremlinological tea-leaf-reading, one wonders what the publication of this interview means, given that it was published in a newspaper owned by Alisher Usmanov, the Kremlin-friendly oligarch and debt collector for Gazprom who - no doubt out of the goodness of his heart, and certainly not to win a natural resource tender - ponied up a billion rubles in aid for the post-war rebuilding effort in South Ossetia in September.

I somehow doubt that Eduard Kokoity is feeling comfortable in his presidential chair.

Unvacation

Since a few of my handful of regular readers may be wondering why I've let the blog go dark at such an eventful time, please allow me to explain. In recent weeks, we've been moving out of our apartment in DC, preparing to move to London. Last Thursday, we left DC for a month's vacation in Moldova, which of course also necessitated a bunch of packing. All of this came right on the heels of the bar exam, and since I had been focused on that all summer I guess I wasn't really prepared to be slapped in the face with all of the tasks presented by a relocation. It is whiny, to say the least, to complain about being stressed out at a time when there's just been a war on and people lost their homes and lives, but there you have it. I have come to think of the past month as my summer unvacation; hopefully the month to come will feel more like a vacation.

Anyway, judging from the sharp increase in visitors to this blog over the last couple of weeks (people have been checking out the maps of the region I've posted recently, especially this one), a lot of people have been using the internet to seek information about the war in Georgia. This may be a good thing or it may not - judging from what I've seen in the few mainstream media outlets I've had time to read/watch/listen to over the course of the conflict (I haven't been online much), only the laziest pundits and pontificators have refrained from weighing in on the crisis. Sometimes it is fruitful to hear a generalist's take on a region one follows closely; but often, it shows that the people who have to say things to fill air time and write things to fill column-inches are not always so careful when it comes to the facts. On just one day last week, reading two op-ed pages, I found a glaring error on each:

The most obvious one was in Richard Cohen's WaPo column from last Tuesday. Spot the mistake:

Peter the Great built his capital to face Europe, and Putin, don't forget, was mayor of St. Petersburg.

I don't think I have to elaborate for regular readers of this blog.

The other flubs were erroneous oversimplifications in a WSJ op-ed titled "How the West Can Stand Up to Russia," written by two guys from AEI, one of whom heads up something called the program on advanced strategic studies. Perhaps he operates on such an advanced level that he finds small details to be irrelevant when making sweeping generalizations; unfortunately, the history of the conflicts in Georgia is laden with seemingly trivial details and distinctions which turn out to be crucial to understanding what has actually happened there and what one can hope for in the future. Two passages from this piece caught my eye - here's the first:

Starting in 2004, Russia began issuing passports to the residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a fact that today serves as one of the main pretexts for the ferocity of Moscow's military campaign.

The authors are absolutely right to touch on this issue, which had often been glossed over in mainstream media accounts of the conflict but can no longer be ignored even by the press now that, for example, Medvedev named the goal of protecting "Russian Federation citizens" first when listing Russia's goals in going to war with Georgia in a public statement last week. I have done a lot of research on this interesting issue as it relates to Abkhazia (see a brief write-up of it here, a publication is forthcoming soon), and peak period when Russian passports were being handed out there was actually in 2002.

This may seem trivial, except that it undermines one of the authors' points, namely that Russia became substantially more hostile toward Georgia once Saakashvili replaced Shevardnadze. Hostility did increase, of course, based on Russia's aversion to colored revolutions and perhaps on the now well known personal beef between Putin and Saak, but Russia was quite willing to work on drawing Georgia's secessionist regions closer to its breast by handing out passports even under Shevardnadze.

If one can pinpoint a turning point in Russia's approach to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it was not so much the Rose Revolution as it was Russia's pacification of Chechnya, after which Russia - having ensured its own territorial integrity - began to seem more willing to undermine that of its neighbor. Unfortunately, these authors prefer to emphasize a false narrative of the Shevardnadze period as some pro-Russian continuation of "Soviet Georgia" (meanwhile, I recall attending a speech by Shevardnadze at Harvard back in 2000 or 2001 when he was so pro-U.S. it made me uncomfortable) and Saakashvili as Georgia's democratic savior. The truth is, of course, far more complex.

The second flawed passage from the op-ed was this one:

[T]he West should make use of Russia's claim that its role in South Ossetia and Abkhazia is driven by the need to protect the populations there. If so, Moscow should have no objections to U.N.-sanctioned peacekeepers and observers moving into those two regions to replace the jerry-rigged system of "peacekeepers" that, until the war broke out, consisted of Russian troops, local separatist militaries and Georgian forces.

I tend to agree that an international peacekeeping force in both regions would be an excellent next step, although Russia is unlikely to allow it and the West cannot exactly just parachute one in. Also, it's an open question whether any Western nations would be prepared to contribute troops to such a force. More importantly, the authors of the piece appear to assume similar peacekeeping situations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. De facto, it's true that in both regions the Russian "peacekeeping" forces have failed to keep up even the pretense of neutrality.

Formally, however, it's important to remember that the Russian forces in Abkhazia are there under a UN mandate (I've heard this was a quid pro quo for Russia agreeing to the deployment of US peacekeepers in Haiti) and are observed by a contingent of actual blue-helmets (the Russian press often refers to its semi-legitimate peacekeepers as "blue-helmets," but they are not in fact UN forces) under the command of UNOMIG. The peacekeeping structure in South Ossetia since the end of hostilities has been formally administered by the OSCE and by its very structure has been less favorable to Georgia.

Pointing out the difference may seem like a nitpick, but details are important in a scrap over a region where the population is only 70,000 (a fact which, by the way, makes all of the comparisons to Kosovo - where the population is roughly 30 times larger - seem a bit ridiculous). In any event, while it's an accurate description of the pre-war situation in South Ossetia, it's more than misleading - it's flat-out wrong - to suggest that the description of a peacekeeping system of "Russian troops, local separatist militaries and Georgian forces" ever applied to Abkhazia.

Since I'm not going to have time to do any sort of roundup or collection of my own thoughts on the crisis (which are, at the moment, as jumbled as the situation on the ground in Georgia), I will conclude with a few links to internet resources with worthwhile coverage.

[image source]

First of all, my friends at Global Voices Online have shown the strength of GVO's format by setting up a special page devoted to coverage of the conflict over South Ossetia and keeping it updated. Second, the New York Times has a dedicated topical page, which includes a link to their blog on the conflict, which links to various other bloggers covering the story, such as Paul Goble at Window on Eurasia. The NYT Moscow bureau's LiveJournal community collected comments on the crisis from Russian bloggers here and here. Also, the coverage by IWPR (including this Russian-language blog) - one of the most balanced internet resources on the region in times of peace and war alike - should not be missed, especially the wisdom of long-time Caucasus observer Tom de Waal.

If you're looking for the Russian point of view, check out RIA Novosti's topical page or this collection of official Russian government pronouncements.

Finally, here are some links compiled and circulated by the International Relations and Security Network in Zurich:

Media
Russo-Georgian conflict is not all Russia's fault, Christian Science Monitor
Georgia-Russia Conflict, by the BBC
In Depth: South Ossetia Crisis, by Financial Times

Blog posts
Putin's revenge, by FP Passport
Kosovo and South Ossetia, by Outside the Beltway
Danger Room: Georgia under online assault, by Wired
The Russian press, by the Duck of Minerva
Georgia, Russia and rethinking China, by the Oil and the Glory
Georgia, from the American side, by Registan.net

Publications
Georgia's South Ossetia Conflict - Make Haste Slowly, by the International Crisis Group
Russia / North Ossetia: Trends in Conflict and Cooperation, by swisspeace
Tbilisi Withdraws from the Joint Control Commission; Proposes New Format for South Ossetia, by the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program (CACI-SRSP)
Europe’s Unrecognised Neighbours: The EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, by the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Reintegration or Reconquest? Georgia’s Policy Towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the Context of the Internal and International Situation, by the Centre for Eastern Studies (CES)

Primary resources
Minutes of UN Security Council meeting on the situation in Georgia, 8 August 2008 (PDF)
Minutes of UN Security Council meeting on the situation in Georgia, 8 August 2008 (Audio)
Agreement on a Cease-Fire and Separation of Forces, 14 May 1994 (PDF)
Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz Conflict, 4 April 1994 (PDF)
UN Security Council Resolution 876: Abkhazia, Georgia, 19 October 1993 (PDF)
UN Security Council Resolution 881: Abkhazia, Georgia, 4 November 1993 (PDF)
UN Security Council Resolution 892: Abkhazia, Georgia, 22 December 1993 (PDF)
UN Security Council Resolution 896: On Possible Establishment of Peacekeeping Force in Abkhazia, Georgia and on Political Settlement of the Abkhazia Conflict, 31 January 1994 (PDF)
UN Security Council Resolution 906: On Extension of the Mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia and on Political Settlement of the Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, 25 March 1994 (PDF)
UN Security Council Resolution 993: On Extension of the Mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia and Settlement of the Conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia, 12 May 1995 (PDF)

Maps
Republic of Georgia Maps, by Perry-Castañeda Library
Online Maps of Current Interest, by Perry-Castañeda Library
Russia and Georgia at War: Day 2, by Daily Mail
Georgia, by the BBC
Ethnolinguistic Groups in the Caucasus Region, by Perry-Castañeda Library

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And a postscript: I wrote most of this post last Thursday but then wasn't able to complete and post it before taking off for the airport. Last night, thanks to the miracle of the Russian media sphere (perhaps a more powerful influence than the CIS in the post-Soviet space) I was able to watch the Sunday evening Vesti and Vremia roundups, which from what I could tell dealt almost solely with the conflict over South Ossetia.

The coverage was amazing in several ways. First, both my wife and I had moments where we walked into the room having heard a voice on TV without seeing the speaker, certain it was Putin. In both cases, it turned out to be the new, improved Medvedev, who seems to have repackaged his speaking style to be a tough, trash-talking clone of the man who installed him in the presidency.

Second, I was quite impressed with Vremia's use of footage from CNN and Russia Today - the effect was to legitimize the Russian government's position and ORT's coverage by, for example, broadcasting remarks by Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov not as filmed or interviewed by ORT, but as they appeared on CNN. The Russian PR machine has become much slicker since I last regularly watched the main TV news programs a couple of years ago.

Finally, while I don't think any YouTube clips ridiculing Russia's leaders have made it onto the government-owned channels recently, one of them (I can't remember which) aired at great length a mash-up making out Saakashvili to be basically a paranoid madman. No word on whether the producer of the clip was one of the Kremlin's media-making sausage factories or an actual amateur netizen.

[Update Aug 21] I was remiss above in not also directing anyone interested in further dissection of the conflict in Georgia to the many recent posts on Sean's Russia Blog on the subject. As always at SRB, the commenting is fast and furious, and some of it is even edifying. Something I'd write a separate post on if I had time, though, is Sean's appeal to the idea of "self-determination," which (unless further elaborated) is a concept about as precise and useful as "Marxism" or "fascism."

Without getting into the situation in South Ossetia, which - even if one could draw borders that wouldn't require further resettlements of Georgians - is hardly viable as an independent state, and without getting into the distinctions between the ideas of internal and external self-determination (which are broken down in the context of Kosovo here), I would simply pose the following rhetorical question: if the titular ethnic group makes up less than 20% of a region's population of roughly 500,000, and expels from the region well over 200,000 people not belonging to that group, should the remaining population be allowed to vote on questions of self-determination?

More maps of the Caucasus

A friend of mine who's based in Tbilisi has emailed me these four maps: three interesting German maps of the changing political geography of the Caucasus (sorry, I don't know the source or copyright holder), and a fourth one (also quite interesting in its own way) which goes more toward the present-day situation in a small part of the region.

Histrorical Georgia 1774-1878, full-size version available here.

Histrorical Georgia 1917-1936, full-size version available here.

Histrorical Georgia 1936 - 1959, full-size version available here.

South Ossetia Areas of Control (geor-SO), full-size version available here.
Areas controlled by South Ossetian de facto authorities in red, areas controlled by Georgia in blue.
Here's one good backgrounder on the conflict, and here's another fairly interesting brief.

More maps of the Caucasus, as well as my general disclaimer about how, while I think the old maps are fascinating, I'm also convinced they are a fairly unhelpful lens through which to view the resolution of current territorial conflicts, can be seen here.

Even more Caucasus maps

I found one last book with scan-worthy inlaid maps in my attic archives - Kavkazskii Krai - Putevoditel' (Caucasus Territory - Guidebook) by Sergei Anisimov, from 1928. The book's largest and perhaps most spectacular map - a map of Caucasus tourism routes - is something I'm still trying to stitch together from four digital files, since the original was too big to scan in one piece, even on a large flatbed scanner. But the ones which scanned in easily are still quite lovely and - as with many artifacts of the Caucasus - susceptible to being invested with all kinds of meaning.

Anisimov - Kavkazskii Krai - Cover

The coolest of the maps I was able to scan in would have to be this map of Caucasus transit routes, which bristles with all kinds of quaint station-names, including Tikhoretskaya, a station made famous as the destination of the train in the beautiful and haunting song sung variously by Alla Pugacheva in the classic movie "Irony of Fate" (Ironiia Sud'by) (a subtitled video of the song from the movie, with Barbara Bryl'ska lip-synching to Pugacheva's singing, is at 7:45 of this clip (part of a medley of songs from the movie, the second part of which is here) and a clip of just the song, without subtitles, is here) and by Vladimir Vysotsky.

Kavkazskii Krai - Transit Routes, full-size version here.

[update July 15]

Another interesting thing about this map is that it shows the state of railways in Abkhazia in the 1920s - when there wasn't a single line in the region. Wikipedia has more on the history of Abkhazian rail transport. The rail line through the region has of course has cropped up as a relevant point in the conflict resolution talks (and as the subject of a few interesting online photo essays documenting the crumbling infrastructure) a number of times over the years and has more recently become a convenient excuse for Russia to increase its troop presence in the region.

[/update]

Also of interest is this map of the Caucasus' always controversial ethnography. This 1928 snapshot is the sort of thing that proponents of secession in Abkhazia and South Ossetia like to roll out to verify (perhaps not without justification) that "once upon a time, these lands were ours." Often this is accompanied by the tongue-twisting - and often mind-bendingly employed - word "autochthonous."

Kavkazskii Krai - Ethnographic Map, full-size version here.

This map of the Caucasus' geological zones is perhaps interesting in its own right, but I found the most interesting aspect of it to be that it measures longitude in degrees from Pulkovo.

Kavkazskii Krai - Geological Map, full-size version here.

And I'm including this map of Tbilisi Tiflis mainly because it is a cool-looking, old-timey map, which is ultimately the spirit that motivates much of my map-scanning, although I am sure one could do an interesting analysis of the street names - which ones had already been changed by the Soviets by the late 1920s, which ones would later be changed, etc.

Kavkazskii Krai - Tiflis Map, full-size version here.

See all of the maps I've posted here.