VLKSM > Nashi

The 90th anniversary of the Komsomol is being celebrated more than one might expect, but it seems that the contemporary VLKSM-wannabes are not feeling as much love as they were a year ago. Read the full article for the punch line at the end...

Pro-Kremlin Youths Take Backseat to Crisis
Moscow Times, 28 October 2008
By Francesca Mereu / Staff Writer

Last year, pro-Kremlin youth groups were all over television, promising then-President Vladimir Putin love and loyalty, picketing foreign embassies and harassing a hodgepodge of opposition activists.

As recently as July, state-run television showed First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov lecturing Nashi activists in economics at their summer camp.

But with the election season over and the government grappling with the financial crisis, youth activists have drifted from the political spotlight, busying themselves instead with fashion shows and city cleanups.

There are no plans for a crisis-themed protest.

"We might organize something soon," Nashi spokeswoman Kristina Potupchik said of possible events concerning the crisis. "We have a meeting Friday. We will decide then."

Nashi is now working on "long-term projects," Potupchik said, adding that there are "fewer political reasons" for the mass demonstrations that the group organized during the December State Duma elections and the March presidential vote.

Nashi activist Antonina Shapovalova, who designed pro-Putin bikinis for the group, showed off her collection during the recent Moscow Fashion Week, Potupchik noted.

Nashi's top projects include promoting the patriotic children's movement Mishki, or Bear Cubs, tolerance programs and blood drives, she said.

"These are long-term and real projects, not one-day events," she said.

The plans are, however, unquestionably less confrontational than Nashi programs a year ago, when the group organized patrols -- accompanied by police and known as druzhinniki -- to head off any anti-Kremlin protests.

Now druzhinniki, members of a volunteer corps that dates back to Soviet times, are making different kinds of rounds. Recently, the volunteers removed political ads from the streets of Yaroslavl following local elections on Oct. 13, said Alexandra Valtinina, a spokeswoman for the volunteers.

"People were tired of seeing all those billboards, and we decided not to wait for communal workers to do the job," Valtinina said. "We cleaned everything up."

Nashi burst onto the political scene in 2005, staging a 50,000-member rally in Moscow to commemorate the 60th anniversary of Victory Day. The group was broadly seen as a response to the youth-led protests that helped bring pro-Western President Viktor Yushchenko to power in Ukraine.

Last year, the group noisily picketed the Estonian Embassy following a feud over the relocation of a Soviet-era war memorial in Tallinn. It has also been accused of harassing former British Ambassador Anthony Brenton after he attended an opposition conference.

Nashi founder Vasily Yakemenko left the group last year to head up the Youth Affairs Committee, which is in charge of the country's youth organizations.

A woman who answered the phone at the committee Monday said Yakemenko was unavailable for comment and referred all inquiries to Potupchik.

Nashi's fellow pro-Kremlin youth groups have been comparably tranquil since the end of the election cycle.

Vladimir Nasonov, spokesman for the United Russia youth group Young Russia, said "mass action" is not a wise tactic during times of crisis. He echoed President Dmitry Medvedev's accusation that the Unites States "set up" other countries in the current global financial crisis.

"Our duty is to defend the powers that be in case of large protests against the government," Nasonov said. "We need to back them, because the policy of those people living on the other side of the ocean should be blamed and not our government."

Andrei Groznetsky, a spokesman for Mestniye, another pro-Kremlin youth group, said youth movements were politically active only during the election season.

Both Young Russia and Mestniye appear to be focusing on more nationalistic issues.

Young Russia will hold a demonstration to "protect the Russian language" on Nov. 4, People's Unity Day, Nasonov said.

Mestniye, meanwhile, is devoting its energy to "fighting against illegal immigrants who work as unofficial cab drivers," Groznetsky said.

Both Nashi and Mestniye plan to hold demonstrations on People's Unity Day. The Nashi event, called "Blanket of Peace," will be held on Vasilyevsky Spusk, near the Kremlin.

After United Russia recaptured a constitutional majority in last year's Duma elections and Medvedev won a landslide victory in the March 2 presidential election, Nashi and other pro-Kremlin groups have denied suggestions that they might fade into political oblivion.

In March, several young people took to the streets to distribute rolls of toilet paper embossed with the logo of Kommersant after the newspaper quoted an unidentified Kremlin official as calling Nashi activists "jubilant street punks" and saying their services were no longer needed.

Also printed on the toilet paper was the cell phone number of the author of the article. Nashi denied any involvement in the stunt.

Yury Korgunyuk, a political analyst with Indem, a think tank, said the Kremlin needs all the resources it can get to deal with the current economic crisis, meaning that there will be few funds left over to finance youth groups.

"The markets are in chaos, and there are no bankers or businessmen the Kremlin can ask for money like before," Korgunyuk said. "What can the Kremlin ask of [the youth groups] now? To hold a sit-in in front of the American Embassy and scream, 'Down with the crisis?'"

In fact, Nashi is planning a Nov. 2 protest outside the U.S. Embassy in conjunction with Halloween, Potupchik said.

Nashi activists will bring pumpkins to protest "what the Americans did in South Ossetia, in Afghanistan and in other conflicts," Potupchik said.

The name of someone who died in one of these conflicts will be written on each pumpkin, she added.

More on Nashi

NEWSru.com has an interesting article on the developing and increasingly violent conflict between newly formed Kremlin puppet movement "Nashi" and the only truly activist political opposition in Russia today, Eduard Limonov's National Bolshevik Party (unlikely heroes, to be sure). I've translated it for all of y'all non-Russian-speakers who might be interested:

The NBP has asked the Prosecutor General's office to open a criminal case against the leader of "Walking Together" and "Nashi" Vasily Yakemenko
Published on 14 April 2005, 21:20

Members of the National Bolshevik Party have filed a formal request with the Prosecutor General's office demanding that a criminal case be opened against Vasily Yakemenko, leader of the "Walking Together" and "Nashi" movements. NBP leader Eduard Limonov made this statement to journalists on Thursday at a press conference at the Rosbalt news agency.

According to him, the reasons for this demand were Yakemenko's numerous statements in the press about the start of a battle with Limonov's National Bolsheviks and the subsequent аttacks on the NBP office in Moscow and on party members. "16 Nashisti [members of 'Nashi'] have already been arrested after these attacks, and we have succeeded in getting criminal charges filed," said Limonov.

NBP lawyer Vitaliy Varivoda explained that the NBP is demanding that the Prosecutor General's office file charges under Article 282 of the Criminal Code (organization of an extremist society). "It is obvious to us that the attackers all used similar methods, that all of the attacks on the NBP were organized and used instruments such as hacksaws and gas," said Varivoda. According to the lawyer, if a court eventually declares "Nashi" to be extremists, that would lead to a ban on the organization.

In an interview with Echo of Moscow [radio station], Limonov admitted that he is more interested in the role of the Kremlin, which has created all of these movements, than in Mr. Yakemenko himself. That said, the National Bolsheviks are not planning to respond to "Nashi" in kind.

Meanwhile, 46 National Bolsheviks are currently in jail, according to Eduard Limonov. This includes the NatsBols who have been charged with seizing the Health Ministry and the reception area of the presidential administration.

NPB members suspect "Nashi" of organizing at least three large-scale attacks. On January 29 at 10:00 the NBP headquarters was attacked. There were roughly 40 attackers. They arrived in a minivan; in addition there were two automobiles with tinted windows near the building which had not been seen parking there previously and which vanished right after the attack took place.

The attackers shouted nazi slogans and were armed with wooden clubs - shovel handles which had been sawed in half, from which the price tags hadn't even been removed. Two NBP members were beaten, but the attackers were unable to gain access to the headquarters, thanks to a well-organized defense. The NatsBols were able to detain five of the attackers. The militia, which arrived a bit later, took all five to the Lomonosovskoe precinct. Charges were filed against those detained under Article 213 ("hooliganism").

On March 5, a group of unidentified young people using a saw broke into the NBP's heаdquarters on Maria Ul'ianova Street. The National Bolsheviks barricaded themselves in the building, and the attackers poisoned them with gas. According to the NBP, the attackers were accompanied on this occasion by a cameraman from [state-owned] Channel One. The militia was informed of the attack, however officers did not arrive at the scene until two hours after they were called.

According to NBP press secretary Aleksandr Averin, law enforcement detained nine of the participants in the attack on the NBP's bunker. The rest of the attackers were able to escape. Also seized were six baseball bats, two crowbars, and gas cannisters.

The NBP claims that the marauders were diligently videotaping a dozen syringes and twenty bottles of vodka that they brought with them. In addition, they beat the NatsBol who was guarding the bunker, Chechen War veteran Yakov Gorbunov, with a baseball bat. He suffered a broken jaw and an injury to one of his eyes.

The NBP claims that members of the new pro-Kremlin movement "Nashi," created under the aegis of the presidential administration, were behind these incidents. Sources in the NBP told NEWSru.com that the attack itself was carried out by football hooligans from the Moscow "Gladiators" gang, hired with funds provided by "Nashi."

Recall that at one of his press conferences Vasily Yakemenko proclaimed that the main task pf "Nashi" would be to battle the "nazis," which according to him includes the NBP.

NBP member Yakov Gorbunov, a victim of the attempted storm of the NBP bunker on March 5, was attacked on April 10 in Moscow. Near Maria Ul'ianova Street, unknown persons jumped him from behind and beat him about the head with metal bars, after which they got into a nearby car
and drove off.

NBP sources believe that this was "Nashi" taking revenge for the fact that Chechen War veteran Yakov Gorbunov had testified against them regarding the recent attack on the NatsBols' bunker. As a result of his testimony, charges were filed against the participants in the March 5 attack.

This article is suspiciously one-sided, but maybe that's just because Yakemenko couldn't be bothered to comment, what with the "Nashi" launch festivities today and all. The report is worth checking out even if you can't read the Russian, as it has a great photo of Yakemenko looking rather pathetic.

Speechless

The text says:
"Vladimir Putin, let's continue to work together in the future!" and
"Chief Teddy-Bear, take care of the little children!"
[image source]

Speechlessness - or a brief, shocked (resigned?) obscenity - has been the response of many Russians and Russia-watchers to the latest brick in the pro-Kremlin wall.

The good news? "Restless Bears Have Found a Job for Putin," reports Moskovsky Komsomolets. The bad - or at least profoundly questionable - news? Those "bears" are children aged 8 to 15, who will now have the chance to be involved in a nationwide movement called "Teddy Bears" ("Mishki"). The new organization has been rolled out in the midst of a circus-like frenzy of pro-Putin demonstrations in Moscow. According to the Nashi website (all of the quoted texts in this post are my translations):

On the 6th of December over 35,ooo commissars and activists from the Nashi movement, the "Our Election" (Nashi Vybory) all-Russian youth program, the All-Russia youth education project "Cadres for modernizing the country," the interregional child-youth movement "Mishki," the "Shapovalova" designers' project, and the federal programs Our Army ("Nasha Armiia"), Friendship Lessons, Blood Group, Voluntary Youth Militia, Our New Education, and Hiking, came [to Moscow] to congratulate the President, and also to present their plans for the future.

Actually, it would seem that the powers-that-be initially positioned the busing of provincial youth to Moscow for several days and kitting them out in Putin ponchos at least in part as a way to have a bulwark against the "orange infection" - at least, that motivation is expressed in a Nashi flyer that came out just before the elections. Another funny thing about Nashi's version of events in the paragraph quoted above is that nearly all of these groups and "programs" are parts of or organized by Nashi. But I guess there is strength not only in numbers (and official sanction!) but also in lots of bombastic names.

One thing officials should remember - people care less and less about slogans and politics, but Muscovites always care about anything that will impede traffic. And apparently Nashi's antics throughout the city in recent days have caused lots of probki. Gazeta.ru's story about this was titled "Teddy Bears Lock up the Center" and was illustrated with a picture of a traffic jam and a map showing road closings. Kommersant had a story about the traffic-diverting meeting involving Mishki:

Yesterday on Bolotnaya Square the childrens' movement "Mishki" made itself known for the firs time. The movement is for children from 8 to 15 years old, and their counselors [вожатые - for which my dictionary actually gives "young pioneer leader," so strong is the association] are Nashi commissars. According to the organization's internal hierarchy, a counselor who is able to organize ten events with children is called a "Restless Bear" ["медведь-шатун" - a term for a bear which has woken up for hibernation], and one who unites children from ten apartment buildings is a "Polar Bear." The most senior counselors carry the title of "Brown Bear."

According to the movement's organizer, Yulia Zimova, "Mishki" have organized mainly in the regions [i.e., not in Moscow or SPB], and the parents of the children involved have nothing against their children's participation in public life. On Bolotnaya Square "Mishki" recorded a video message to Vladimir Putin. In it, they called on the president to head up their group, "since he is the most important Teddy Bear in Russia," and asked him to "assign the group a developmental vector."

"I would like to note that any forced participation of schoolchildren in political life is prohibited by law in this country. Especially considering that this took place during the school day," Moscow City Council Deputy Evgenii Bunimovich told Kommersant. "Russia always had enough good sense not to get children mixed up in politics. And today this is happening, and it is horrible."

Representatives of the parties and movements which, according to Nashi, had planned to foment an "orange revolution" in Moscow, told Kommersant that the actions of the pro-Kremlin youth was just bewildering. "The authorities have dishonestly won this election, and no children will make them any more legitimate. [...]" thinks SPS's Boris Nemtsov.

"I would be interested to talk to the city authorities, who swore that they would never permit mass events in Moscow that would cut off traffic downtown," added Denis Bilunov, executive director of Unified Civil Force and a co-organizer of the "Dissenters' March" that was dispersed on November 24.

Kremlin-friendly (or so it seems to me, at least on the CIS issues that I follow) news portal RosBalt.ru had the following to say about Mishki:

Little Teddy Bears Ask Putin to Be Their Megasuperbear

The Mishki movement appeared in September and unites children from 8 to 15 years old. The counselors - high school students - have their own "positions"... the apex of the hierarchy is the "brown bear."

"That is a megasuperbear, who can with his skill and experience solve children's problems in a particular city - for example, someone who can organize the construction of a playground," said the organizer of "Mishki," who is also a Nashi commissar, Yulia Zimova, in an interview with Trud.

"We expect to succeed," said Zimova. "Even if the President doesn't become the leader of Mishki, we hope that he will still support us one way or another."

Mishki already participates fairly actively in pro-Kremlin demonstrations organized by Nashi. For example, they were present at the demonstration celebrating Putin's birthday [Mishki's LJ identifies this as the source of their first press mention] with posters reading "Thanks to Putin for our stable future."

One blog commenter responded to that last quote by recalling a phrase from the 20th century: "Thank you, Comrade Stalin, for our happy childhood!" At least one other commenter on a different internet forum had a similar thought:

"We've already been through this, and it was thanks to Comrade Stalin for our happy childhood. Except that then it was much more sincere, and now it's done to order and for money."

Another commenter questioned the age bracket involved:

I also remember that they used to accept people at age 14 into Komsomol, i.e., into a totally adult socio-political organization. And here it's "plush teddy bears" until age 15. This is some kind of retarded infantilism.

Yet another commenter on the same forum went off:

Can't you see where this is all headed? I support the right of any party to freely campaign. BUT NOT A MONOPOLY!!! What difference does it make - teddy bears, jerboas, or baby crocodiles? If you pound something into a child's unformed head from the age of eight, he'll accept it uncritically as the truth. This is straight-up zombification of children.

Others took a more humorous tack, and tried to come up with nicknames for this new organization (all based on puns that aren't really translatable) : "путинята" or "едросята," proposed one commenter at that same forum. At another forum, proposals for pejorative nicknames were "Putin's Hamsters," "HitlerJungend" (rather unoriginal, since Nashi has already been slapped with this somewhat over-the-top label), and "Медвебрята", "Медвеонеры" and "Медвемольцы" (puns using the word for "bear" with the words for "recruit," "pioneers," and "Komsomol"). On both forums, people lamented the fact that children so young are apparently the subject of a political "hearts-and-minds" campaign.

Would you trust this man with your children?

Most likely, Russian parents have new Minister of Youth Vasily Yakemenko (ex-Nashi head commissar) to thank for the expansion of Nashi's ambit to include the pre-teen set. A Radio Svoboda interviewer got one of the participants to say a few embarrassing things about the way they got kids involved (not-very-good Google translation), and that account suggested that the "Young Russia" group might also have been involved in organizing Mishki's Moscow meeting.

I decided to see whether this new "movement" has a website. Mishki.ru got a "server not found" message, but then I thought that maybe this group uses the same cringe-inducing top-level-domain as Nashi's website. Sure enough, punching in Mishki.su got me to the freshly-baked website of this teddy bear of a youth group, says it has been online since November 21. The website, though, looks like it's still in beta. The front page has impressive, appealing graphics of bears cavorting in red neckerchiefs (a la the Soviet-era Young Pioneers), but the "contact" page lists just some nonsense characters - here's a screenshot, since that's likely to change:


On the section of the site called "Media about us," the only link at the moment is to what appears to be Mishki's official LiveJournal blog, the profile page of which provides an abbreviated mission statement:

We are the All-Russian [sic - even though it's called "Interregional" elsewhere] Child-Youth Movement "MISHKI" [Nashi also likes to write its name in all-caps sometimes, not because it's an abbreviation, but just 'cause, I guess]. We invite you to connect with the future of your country, to touch the creation of the history of Russia - to not allow the loss of the young generation.

Every generation can make a contribution to the country's development. Today, practically a whole generation of Russian citizens has grown up not feeling responsible for the future of their Motherland. At best, they will leave behind graffiti in courtyards, at worst, nothing at all will be left after them. We are people who believe in the future generation and who think that their fate is in our hands. The fate of Russia is in our hands.

The LJ itself has an odd header with what looks like a cartoon version of the Sydney, Australia, skyline; and a couple of posts like this one with photos of children doing wholesome-looking things and not much text. And although that "mini-manifesto" is a bit bombastic and self-important, I certainly can't argue with the principle of raising kids to be conscious of their debt to their society and country. It's a different matter whether this type of consciousness-raising should be a task for a political party that already dominates the public discourse.

At the moment, there's something wrong with the text spacing on the page describing the organization's "Manifesto," but it's nothing a quick edit by a good web designer couldn't fix. The Manifesto itself - or the document on the page labeled "Manifesto" - offers a lot of nice thoughts on values - volunteerism, physical fitness, etc. - and how to inculcate them, but toward the end it depicts something so involved that I can't imagine much of it ever being done in real life by volunteers. It also offers a lot of insight into what values are most important to the people who have set up this organization, and what kind of citizens and country they hope to create (strange numbering as in the original, though I have introduced line breaks for clarity in some places):

III. Once you have earned their trust - start building a state: the Courtyard Democratic Republic
1. The building of a state can start with having the children do what adults do in real life. Children always want to try themselves out at adult tasks.
The children can be actors and play in a theater, or anchors and cameramen and film the courtyard news [...]

1. When you start to build a democratic republic, it doesn't necessarily have to function as a state economically at first. It all depends on what the children want.

The economy should involve around 100 people. Every child should know that, for example, in stairwell 5 of building 7 between the first and second floors, every day between 19.00 and 20.30 the Courtyard Bank, Employment office, and Tax Inspectorate will be open. If he wants to earn Mishkarubles, he can go to the Employment office, where someone will give him a job. For example, if there's going to be a play the next day, then he can set up the chairs for 15 rubles, make the set for 40, or for 30 Mishkarubles take a role in the play. The child takes on the job, gets the money on the day after he works, pays a tax, for example, one Mishkaruble. At the end of the week or month the Leading Mishki conduct an auction, where the little Mishki can buy theater or movie tickets, flash-drives, picture frames, etc. - it depends on the interests and age of the children.

When the children get used to this system, you can build a real state - the President and government of the Courtyard will plan the budget for the month, based on which one or another ministry will conduct events in the courtyard, government employees will get a salary, and some will even be able to open their own companies, for example a firm that does homework assignments, or open their own private bank.

1. When the republic grows to include several courtyards, you can set up a big parliament, buy up land in the courtyard, found an inter-courtyard state television station, hold beauty contests, set up advertising companies, walls of honor for Mishki and Little Mishki.

Before the launch of any courtyard democratic republic, a seminar will be conducted with all organizers who are Leading Mishki in your city.

IV. The Unique thing: the city becomes a single united state of children, where they are the main citizens and are responsible for everything. Now your children have opened real companies, they defend in election campaigns their projects to improve life in the courtyard, they earn money and pay taxes. They are learning management, learning to think independently and make decisions. Now your task is to introduce their projects into the system of regional government. Teach them not to be afraid to live in the adult world, to achieve the goals they have set. [...]

Based on a successful small model, any child, and then teenager and adult, will build a larger model. The model of his city, his state. And even if in that model not everyone will be a government employee, the rest will one way or another be representatives of nationally oriented businesses, or socially responsible entrepreneurs. A country where the children are occupied and involved is assured to have great success. To be the best. To be beloved.

It struck me that a lot of these things - having a "government" and even sometimes a "TV station" are things that kids experience through their schools in the U.S. Strangely, this document says nothing about using the school as an organizing principle.

"Chief Teddy Bear - Take Care of the Children!"
[image source]

Confusingly, the section of the website titled "For Mishki" also has a document that is labeled a Manifesto. Maybe they just accidentally swapped the two texts when they put the site together. This document must be the actual manifesto, for it contains principles rather than a specific plan of action:

Why Now?

A country's prosperity, as a rule, is accompanied by a the mass development of a children's movement. The wise ruler ["Мудрый правитель" - I'm not making this up] wants to know into whose hands the country for which he is responsible will fall, and the residents want to be sure of what will happen tomorrow. Today, we have something to pass along to the next generation - the ability to cope with difficulties, achievements, experience, knowledge, faith in Russia. We can instill much in the generation that will follow us: tolerance, collegiality, the ability to empathize and survive, independence and responsibility. And most important: the ability to be a human being and a patriot. This is not simple, as we know. But it is necessary. After all, this will allow us to create the Russia of our dreams.

The manifesto document talks about developing creative talents, promoting a healthy way of life and charitable work, patriotism and professional preparation, and other worthy things for a youth organization to do. And then it ends with a bang (my translation, italics in original):

A child-youth courtyard movement is something that has never been done before. Perhaps a children's courtyard movement is the very path which will lead us to the development and consolidation of not just new traditions, but also an interesting, kind mass culture. It's possible, that we will raise the sort of citizens, who will be able to take to the streets nationwide and demand that TV shows which degrade the personalities and minds of their children be taken off the air. The Little Mishki who grow up and become Mishki, will preserve the country, the people, history, and culture.

We will raise the sort of citizens who will be a source of pride not only to us, but also to other countries.

Fascinating indeed. But for a post titled "Speechless" I've gone on at great length about this embryonic children's organization - who knows if it will go anywhere? I'll end the post with a bit more info from the MK article I mentioned above:

One of the "Restless Bears" is 18-year-old Masha from Sochi. But she spoke in a way not entirely appropriate for her age: "Sood Uncle Putin will resign, he won't have anything to do, and he'll accept our offer!"

The counselors plan to politically enlighten the children in their charge: "At eight years old it's pointless, but we'll tell the older ones about the 'orange' threat."

As far as Mishki's funding, people in the organization say that the counselors are volunteers and that parents help out with the supplies. But it's doubtful that transporting a thousand citizens to Moscow was within the parents' means. We have heard that the "Restless Bears" are sponsored by large banks and regional businesses.

Can the pro-Kremlin enthusiasts at least leave children alone? If things keep going in this direction, soon the members of "Teensy Bears" [“Медвежулечки”] will be rolled out onto the street in strollers, and after them we'll have pregnant women as members of "Clumsy Embryos" [“Косолапые эмбриончики”]...

Story of the day - Nashi are here

One of the top stories on Segodnia at 22:00 (NTV's nightly news show) tonight - right after the story about the secrecy-cloaked, large-scale special forces raid today in Grozny - was the official launch of the much-discussed "Nashi" ("Ours") youth movement. Recycled Kremlin toady Vasily Yakemenko - leader of the apparently mothballed "Idushchie Vmeste" ("Walking Together") movement - appeared on the presidium as one of the organization's five "komissars" (yes, that's the name they are using for the organization's leadership).

The festivities were disrupted when Olga Shanina, a member of Eduard Limonov's National Bolshevik Party, ran onstage and tried to douse the "Nashi" leadership with water . According to NTV's report, Yakemenko later, uh, tastefully joked that the protester had "already been shot." Charming.

Here is a somewhat stale but still relevant report on the early development of "Nashi":

RFE/RL, March 2, 2005 Analysis: Walking With Putin By Julie A. Corwin

The pro-Putin youth movement Walking Together announced on 1 March that it has created a new youth movement called Nashi (Ours). According to a press release published on pravda.ru, which quotes Walking Together founder Vasilii Yakemenko, the goal of the new "anti-fascist" movement is to put an end to the "anti-Fatherland union of oligarchs, anti-Semites, Nazis, and liberals." Several Moscow-based newspapers reported the goal of the new group is actually a bit more specific: to eventually replace the party of power, Unified Russia.

The movement's rallying cry is preventing the introduction of foreign control in Russia. Moskovskii komsomolets" on 24 February reported that it obtained documents outlining a "grandiose plan for the creation of a new youth movement" whose goal is to save the motherland from colonization by the United States. The daily quotes Walking Together leader Yakemenko as saying that "organizations in Russia are growing, on the basis of which the U.S. will create groups analogous to Serbia's Otpor, Georgia's Kmara, or Ukraine's Pora. These groups are Eduard Limonov's National Bolshevik Party and Avant Garde Red Youth."

Yakemenko, 33, initially denied in interviews with Ekho Moskvy and "Kommersant-Daily" on 21 February that a new youth movement was in the works. However, later reports detailed Yakemenko's speeches at meetings in cities across Russia, such as Kursk, Orel, and St. Petersburg. According to "Moskovskii komsomolets," Yakemenko told students in Kursk that "Europe long ago asked itself the question: Who will be working at European gas stations, Turks or Ukrainians? This question now has been decided in favor of the Ukrainians. In the final analysis, for practically its entire history, Ukraine has been a colony. It's just that previously it was a Russian colony and now it is an American colony."

[...]In an interview with "Vremya novostei" on 1 March, [leader of Yabloko's youth movement Ilya] Yashin suggested that "one of the tasks of the 'Nashisti' is to intimidate the opposition youth so that they are afraid to attend public meetings. He said that in the last couple of months there have been several clashes between the members of the political opposition and unaffiliated people. Yashin told gazeta.ru that former members of Walking Together along with skinheads in athletic clothing were the main attendees at the Nashi congress. [...]

According to the Moscow-based newspapers, the real architect of Nashi is not Yakemenko but deputy presidential-administration head Vladislav Surkov. Surkov reportedly met with some 35-40 youths in St. Petersburg along with Yakemenko on 17 February to talk about setting up Nashi, according to "Kommersant-Daily" on 21 February. RosBalt confirmed that Surkov was indeed in St. Petersburg on 17 February; however, Yakemenko denied everything. Surkov was widely credited with masterminding Unified Russia's victory in the 2003 State Duma elections. He has now reportedly become disillusioned with his old creation as well as with Motherland [Rodina], which was originally created to take votes away from the Communist Party.

If Surkov is indeed seeking an alternative to Unified Russia, then that might explain the secrecy surrounding Nashi's creation. The presidential administration still needs obedience from Unified Russia members in the State Duma and elsewhere, which may be less forthcoming if they realize that their political careers are about to be cut short. In an interview with kreml.org on 1 March, Viktor Militarev, vice president of the National Strategy Institute, said that he thinks that Walking Together faltered as an organization because it was held together only by money and not by an ideology. Similarly, Unified Russia could have been a "powerful pro-presidential party that served as a repository of the people's hopes for the president and hostility for the thieves, oligarchs, and corrupt bureaucrats. Instead of this, we have a parody," he concluded.

However, with Nashi, Yakemenko has recently been taking a smarter approach, according to Militarev. "For example, Yakemenko has given lectures to youth activists in which he described the American authorities as our geopolitical opponent and said that Russia needs to defend itself." According to Militarev, this is a more effective doctrine than "Putin is our president and he is always right." Writing in politcom.ru on 22 February, Tatyana Stanovaya suggests that the Kremlin's presidential campaign in 2008 may assume the features of Yeltsin's 1996 race when Yeltsin managed to come from behind because of the "Red threat."

"In 2008, the Kremlin might also motivate citizens to vote not 'for' (an unpopular president) but 'against' (this time against the Orange threat) and the 'geopolitical appetites of the West' and 'the powerful subversive network within the country.'" However, if INDEM foundation analyst Yurii Korgunyuk is correct, then Nashi proponents are not pursuing a cynical election ploy. He told "The Moscow Times" on 25 February that the "Kremlin has a paranoid fear of what happened in Ukraine happening here."

Hmmm. Cynical or paranoid. Take your pick. Either way, it's hard to see a positive side to the rise of this latest Kremlin-created movement. An excellent article by Masha Gessen on Nashi from last month is also worth reading:

Moscow Times, February 28, 2005
Kremlin Youth Encourage 'Us' to Get 'Them'
By Masha Gessen

Imagine for a minute that in some country other than Russia -- say, in the United States, or in Britain -- there appeared a political organization that called itself "Us." Not U.S. as in the United States, not Us as in Us Magazine, but Us as in "us vs. them." Imagine further that this is an organization that supports, and is evidently supported by, the country's current government.

Now imagine the hue and cry, the outrage of all the righteous people who argue that an organization that openly divides its own country into those who are "us" and those who are "them" is despicable -- and a government that supports and even inspires the use of the rhetoric of war against its own citizens is criminal. [...]

Unfortunately, it today's Russia, we no longer have to imagine it. Except that the "outrage of all the righteous people" seems a bit muted - after all, they're not the ones in charge of the TV stations.

Yakemenko, though, has some outrage of his own; talking about a brochure to be published shortly by "Nashi," he proclaimed, "Definitely, Khakamada, Ryzhkov, and Kasparov - that is to say, all those who consider it possible to march with fascists - all of them will definitely be named in the brochure." I can't wait.

Happy (belated) Birthday, Mr. President...

"Наши" натянули одеяло на Владимира Путина // Прокремлевская молодежь поздравила президента с днем рождения Вчера около 10 тыс. активистов движения "Наши" поздравили на набережной Тараса Шевченко с днем рождения президента Владимира Путина. Руководство движения объяснило замерзшим и вымокшим под дождем подросткам, что господин Путин на выборах в Госдуму должен победить сразу и безоговорочно, а не просто набрать "какие-то 50%". Чтобы сделать господину Путину приятное, "Наши" подарили ему 200-метровое "одеяло мира" и пообещали взять под свой контроль все избирательные участки страны. открыть материал ...

Well, it's not quite a serenade from Marilyn Monroe, but Putin received robust birthday wishes from Nashi on Sunday. As usual, the Russian-language version of Kommersant's article on the birthday demonstration is more thorough than the English version from their website. I don't read any ulterior motive or message into this, no doubt it's just an economy of translator resources on Kommersant's part. I've translated a couple of the more interesting bits from the original that didn't make Kommersant's summary translation.

For one thing, the Russian-language article included some of the chants shouted down from the stage - chants like "Putin, we are with you!"; "Putin is an eagle!; and "Two, twelve, two thousand seven - Putin, stay with us forever!" ("Два, двенадцать, две тысячи семь -- Путин, останься с нами насовсем!"), referring to the date of the Duma elections. It also included an interesting tidbit about the banner on the stage, which read "December 2nd - the election for Russia's national leader during 2008-2012." A few photos from the event, courtesy of Kommersant, can be found here. Robert Amsterdam also has a photo from the event and links to a Moscow Times article in which Putin is quoted as saying, "You know, as a rule I don't hold any parties, but this year is an exception." I wonder if Prime Minister Zubkov was at Putin's side during the celebration, as he has been in the past (according to Anticompromat, and yes, I know I posted this before, but it was buried in my ridiculously long post about Zubkov):

V. Putin invites V. Zubkov to his birthday parties (in 2000 [Zubkov] "...was summoned to [Putin's] birthday party at the Podvor'e restaurant in the city of Pavlovsk (there were only 21 guests)" - "Polit.ru", Nov 2, 2001, citing Kommersant). At one of Putin's birthday parties, accurding to Profil' magazine, V. Zubkov even participated in extinguishing the candles on the cake ("Profil'", Jan 26, 2004).

Anyway, here is the abbreviated English translation of Kommersant's article about the Nashi celebration:

Pro-Kremlin Youth Celebrate President's Birthday
October 8, 2007

About 10,000 members of the Nashi (Ours) movement gathered on Taras Shevchenko Embankment in Moscow yesterday to mark Russian President Vladimir Putin's birthday, which was rainy and chilly. Nashi leaders told the crowd, which came from at east 20 regions of Russia, that the president must win in the State Duma elections next month, “and not by some 50 percent.” The crowd carried signs reading “Putin is stability,” “Putin is peace in Chechnya,” “Putin is the Olympics,” “Putin is the stabilization fund” and “Putin is Sakhalin 2” and was entertained by techno remixes of Soviet pop hits.

Nashi leader Vasily Yakemenko, who is also a member of the state committee on youth, declined to speak to journalists at the event. “They complained about the rain and cold in the back rows,” Yakemenko told the crowd from the stage. “But I want to say that I remember the 1990s, when bandits ruled the streets, the country's budget was approved by Americans at the International Monetary Fund and Berezovsky and Khodorkovsky declared war in Chechnya. And I want to say that we cannot allow that to be repeated and the election of the national leader depends on us!”

The Russian Orthodox branch of Nashi ordered prayers for the president's health in all the main churches in Moscow.

Here we have a summary version of many of Nashi's greatest hits - cult-of-personality-level hero-worship of the leader ("Putin is the stabilization fund"), Americaphobia, myth-making about the '90s, fallen-oligarch-bashing, making the youth feel powerful ("the election of the national leader depends on us!"), and of course religion in service of the state. One bit that was omitted from Kommersant's English-language translation was this interesting exchange between the journalist and a Nashist:

"Are you enjoying the party?" I asked a young man dressed in a warm coat and hat.

"Well, it's so-so," he unexpectedly admitted, "We were brought here from Kovrov [250 km from Moscow], and here it's rainy and cold. I want to go home."

"Will they at least feed you?" I asked sympathetically.

"Where would they do that?" he became totally sad. "When they were giving us our instructions, they said to bring money and a lunch box [тормозок]."

"Bring what?!"

"You know, a lunch box, a package with food from home."

So much for Nashi's vaunted perks for the members. I guess a free trip to Moscow is all the provincials got out of Putin's birthday. Another bit:

Mr. Yakemenko finally set out the main points: "The President has made the difficult decision to head up the United Party candidates' list. But he can't do it alone,* and not everything depends on United Russia, either. And Putin can't just get some 3o% or even 50% of the votes. He must win immediately and unconditionally. And we, the Nashi movement, will help him do this!"

The crowd no longer shared his enthusiasm. The freezing and soaked young men and women were standing three and four to an umbrella, and many of them were shivering. On the pavement lay a piece of posterboard that had been dropped by someone, which had "Putin is our national leader" written on it with a marker. No one wanted to pick up the soaked and dirty poster, but everyone was also afraid to tread on it, so people stepped around it carefully.

*a strange thing to say, given that Putin is alone on United Russia's party list.

Kommersant also offered a brief video report from the festivities:

But it seems that not everyone thinks VVP's birthday should be something special. Echo of Moscow Radio conducted a survey (call-in and online - neither of which, of course, is scientific) asking the question, "Do you think Vladimir Putin's birthday should be a 'red-letter day' on the calendar?"

Results of the call-in voting:

1.	67	8%	yes
2.	793	92%	no
3.	0	0%	hard to say

Results of the internet voting (2869 total votes):

1.	421	15%	yes
2.	2365	82%	no
3.	28	1%	hard to say

For some reason, the very fact that they asked this question made me think of a little ditty that I learned back in the mid-1980s while attending a Soviet school:

Всегда мы помним Ленина
И думаем о нем
Мы день его рождения
Считаем лучшим днем

We always remember Lenin
And think of him
We consider his birthday
To be the best day

That old-time propaganda with a new, modern twist

Sean blogs about recent youth-politics events in Russia and discusses a recent Nashi-sponsored event in Moscow called "Связной Президента" ("Connecting with the President" as Sean translated it, or "President's Liaison Officer" as ITAR-TASS translated it in their report).

Last week I saw a post on the LJ community ADVЁRTKA (devoted to images of and commentary on various ads - which I found via Vilhelm Konnander's blog - thanks, Vilhelm!) asking if anyone knew what a sticker-based guerrilla marketing campaign (techniques now as familiar in Moscow as in Western capitals - ah, globalization...) with the words "Связной Президента" was selling. Commenters speculated that it might be an upcoming film or book (well, one jaded commenter just said, "the font is shit. and by now I could spit on whatever they're PR-ing.").

But now we know what was actually being promoted - another Nashi PR-aktsiia. Even more interesting was a link posted in the comments of that ADVЁRTKA post, to a site where someone has posted the official event brochure with the following comments (I've translated the poster's comments and added links):

An event ["акция"] organized by the youth movement "Nashi" and involving thousands of people will take place on March 24-25 in Moscow. 10,000 [Nashi] comissars will gather in Moscow, living for two days in tent village on Sakharov Pr-t (this is practically a shortened 2007 version of Seliger). On the 25th they will all be walking around the city and offering passers-by to send an SMS to Vladimir Vladimirovich's mobile (strangely, during the last "direct line" broadcast with the President he said that he doesn't use a mobile phone) and receive an answer.

Just as they did before the event ["акция"] with the Santa Clauses, Nashi's print-shop has published a bright, colorful brochure for the commisars, explaining the crux of the event and the consistency of its participants' actions.

I wonder how much Sviaznoi [the chain of mobile phone stores] dropped on this... what great advertising!

The juiciest page of the brochure to me was this one (click to enlarge):



The money bags are labeled "To our friend Limonov," "To Kas'yanov," and "To Mr. Belykh." Soviet propaganda art techniques meet modern liberal-bashing! Actually, I think I've seen things like this before in Zavtra. What is new here is not just that from 1991 and up until a couple of years ago such imagery could be seen only in venues like Zavtra and maybe in the imagination of Vladimir Vol'fovich; it's also of great interest that while the cartoon bone is being thrown - predictably - to Khakamada, the dollar bill is labeled "Rogozin"! Rogozin's fall from official grace is old news, of course, but to suggest he's on on the take from Western sources given his politics...? I guess to Nashi's youth vanguard - and their actual, slightly older, comissars - they are all the same: irrelevant meddlers in the country's pursuit of the course set by Putin.

The brochure also makes the statement that "in another eight years, food will be rationed in the US and distributed only on holidays" and suggests that the upcoming Russian elections are recognized in the US as "the last chance to establish external rule in Russia." The US, of course, wants to do this in order to "sponge off our [Russia's] resources."

The whole brochure - exhorting "Nashisty" from the regions to come to Moscow and take part in this event - plays on some sick blend of provincial desire to visit Moscow and take part in a mass event; technophilia (with all the cell phone action); patriotism (not that there's anything wrong with that, per se); and anti-Americanism (that's the part I have the biggest problem with). It even manages to revert to the favorite Soviet move of referring back to World War II as relevant for contemporary discourse (without wanting to dishonor the memory of WWII and the blockade, in 1980's Leningrad WWII was more often used as an excuse for why this or that building was still "na remont" or why so many people downtown still lived in communal apartments).

Unlike some other bloggers, I don't use the term "Soviet" lightly. But this brochure, well, how can I put it? To paraphrase Pushkin, "Здесь советский дух - здесь совком пахнет!"

[Update: a paraphrase more true to the original meter from "Ruslan & Liudmila" occurred to me: "Совковый дух - совком здесь пахнет!" And check out this great electronic concordance of Pushkin's works.]

An addendum on translation - Multitran offers several translations of "sviaznoi": contact, orderly, messenger, communication agent, runner, go-between, and liaison officer (TASS chose its term of translation well, although I like "Connecting with the President" also). Sviaznoi is a mildly linguistically interesting word in that it's an adjectival form used as a noun.

The idea of using Nashi partisans as electronic "go-betweens" to/from the President (the passers-by receive special SIM-cards which will also be able to receive "all essential information about the movement's activities," per this description of the event) is an intriguing modern take on the Soviet idea of a loyal vanguard, though it's supposedly an exercise in "modern democracy" ("sovremennaia demokratiia").

Nash Feminizm?

OK, so this is quite visually arresting:

[image source]

The young lady - or at least part of her - is proclaiming, "VOVA! I am with you!" This was part of a Nashi-sponsored fashion-show-cum-rally (at least, that's what it looked like, judging from other pictures, which are replete with Nashi's alarm-clock logo, something the Nashisti casually appropriated from their ostensible ideological opponents, Ukraine's Pora). Commenters on the post where I saw the picture above had a variety of reactions, including:

Is MTS rebranding again? (in reference to the red-and-white color scheme shared by Nashi and a major Russian mobile telephony provider);

I get it, I get it! They're a mixture of pioneers and cheerleaders.

Nice panties, what does Putin's wife think of this?

Our answer to Uggs. (in reference to the young lady's striped valenki)

Other commenters noted that it's time to change the label - to Dima, or to Medved - or responded with variations on the olbansky word песдец - and one noted that the placement of the label was "If we consider the symbolism....not very proper."

The antics of Nashi can hardly startle one anymore, but this is sort of a new level of tastelessness, fetching though the ladies involved may be. It got me thinking about feminism, truly a dangerous road for me to go down, so I'll admit right away that I'm out of my depth in such topics and apologize ahead of time in case I offend anyone.

The thing is, feminism is one of those "Western" ideas that many Russians condemn based on a flawed understanding of the concept. The Russian stereotype of feminists can probably be summed up as "manly-dressing, unattractive women who get offended when you try to open doors for them." Now, much of this has to do with the wonderful fact that Russian women are brilliant at maintaining dignity and power even while observing certain gender roles and playing along as though they really believed it were a man's world.

But I would venture to say that at least some of it has to do with the fact that many people are uncomfortable with this "foreign" idea - feminism and female empowerment - and the changes it might represent, the aspects of essential "Russian-ness" it might leave behind, and therefore feel the need to discredit such a threatening, new, "Western" idea. In fact, I would go so far as to say that the idea of feminism* in Russia may even be as discredited as the idea of democracy.

Thus, while "feminism" in Russia conjures up (false) images of militant, asexual shrews, who in actuality represent an extreme and perhaps imaginary fringe of the movement, "democracy" also conjures up (false) images of people who mainstream Russians have been taught by the mainstream Putin-era political discourse to refer to as the "demshiza" (democratic schizos), "dermokraty" (shitocrats), or "demokrady" (demo-thieves) - in other words, the people who allegedly** brought the country the collapse and poverty of the 1990s.

As I said at the outset, I'm out of my depth here, and perhaps it's a fool's errand to try to turn a T&A pic with a suggestively placed label into some kind of pseudo-thoughtful discussion. But I figured I'd give it a shot.


*Not that there's just one "idea of feminism" in the rest of the world. Actually, this Nashistka's choice of outfits, which might get her blackballed from some feminist circles in the US as a traitor to the sisterhood who allowed herself to be objectified in the service of a male-dominated political system (I mean, talk about "the personal is political"!), might also be hailed by "stripper feminists" - no doubt this Putinista was thinking, while freezing onstage in that bikini, "By deploying femininity as a tool I [am] exposing it as a construction."

Seriously, though, I have no idea about these ideologies, and probably not much room to speculate on as a guy, even as a "sensitive, caring, romantic 90s kind of guy" (anyone else remember that funny turn of phrase?). So I decided to ask Natalia Antonova, the first person I thought of when I pondered who a reliable source about post-Soviet feminism might be. I've emailed her and asked her to respond in the comments here. We'll see if she can take time away from her own writing, commenting, and general saving of the world with the written word to pontificate in this space.


**I say allegedly because in fact the initial collapse and poverty of the 1990s was largely a carryover from the overprinting of rubles and price controls which were in effect in the USSR right up until 1991. What happened later in that decade is often blamed on people like Chubais, but why then is someone like Medvedev - who policy-wise seems like basically a market liberal like Chubais (actually, an ultraliberal like Chubais, according to Maxim Kalashnikov :-) ) - being designated Putin's heir?

Seriously, is it just me or is it kind of funny to hear Gryzlov talk about the Chairman of Gazprom being the "most socially oriented candidate" (I wonder if he meant, "from among the group acceptable to Putin"?) leading a government focused on raising people's quality of life. It's almost as funny as the idea of that famous "statist with a US passport" (and founder of a "youth movement" that's both less famous and less Soviet than Nashi, one with pre-Soviet roots) Boris Jordan "consider[ing] the life of an average citizen" from his near-oligarchic height.

Soldiering on

There is a lot of comment around the blogosphere about the recent events in Tallinn. See here and here for Siberian Light's take; Global Voices also has coverage. Here's my small and unoriginal contribution, from today's bne newsletter.

Russia-Estonia stand off
Rencap, Russia
Tim Brenton
Thursday, May 3, 2007

The week-long stand off between Russia and Estonia reached a new level yesterday (2 May) when demonstrators from the Nashi youth group stormed a newspaper office in Moscow in order to disrupt a press conference being held by the Estonian Ambassador to Russia, Marina Kaljurand. The ambassador called the press conference to criticise Russian authorities for failing to protect her rights as a diplomat as laid out in the Vienna treaty against what she claimed were intimidation tactics used by the youth group.

Members of Nashi, the youth arm of United Russia, have been camped outside the Estonian Embassy for the past six days since the Estonian government removed a war memorial to Soviet soldiers from the centre of Tallinn and moved it to a cemetery outside the city. Estonia claims the memorial was becoming a focal point for clashes between Estonian nationalist groups and ethnic Russians living in the country. While Russia claims the move is yet another symptom of anti-Russian feeling in Estonia and disrespect for the dead. The Russian Orthodox Patriarch yesterday called the move "a sin"; and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has sent an extremely strongly worded letter to a number of his foreign counterparts complaining about the move.

The Nashi youth group is widely seen as being a tool of a faction within the Kremlin. Recently there have been cyber attacks on a number of Estonian government Web sites, which the Estonians claim originated from within the Kremlin.

However strange this saga may appear, it could be symptomatic of a number of things. Firstly, that Russia now feels in a powerful enough position to take on the Baltic States which have long been the most independent and anti-Russian former members of the Soviet Union. Secondly, yesterday's clash demonstrates a nervous political situation in Russia, where relatively minor events result in overly strong, possibly politically motivated reactions, in our view.

All Twittered Out?

[image source]

It looks like the Twitter phase of what many (especially social media evangelists) are calling the "Twitter Revolution" has passed. According to Nicu Popescu:

Twitter is no longer useful. It has become a victim of its own popularity. If during the first day Twitter had live news from the main square, today Twitter has become a collection of spam. New messages appear every half-second, and the avalanche of information and messages buries any useful information.

Unimedia had the following update this morning (and more interesting updates since - check them out here):

(UPDATE 10:16, April 9, local time) Central Ellection Comittee has allowed the opposition parties to verify the voters lists. The opposition has 4 days starting today, Thursday.

While I'm no expert on the conduct of color revolutions, it would seem that this keeps the election results "in play," i.e. they remain something that can be credibly contested, over the weekend, which is perhaps a good thing for those among opposition parties and protesters who have the stomach for spending more time in the streets voicing their legitimate grievances. On the other hand, it may not be a good thing for the many Moldovans who would rather see a calm resolution to this crisis - preferring "stability," democracy be damned - since the opposition has not shown an ability to resist official provocations and conduct sustained, peaceful protests of the kind that achieved success in Ukraine.

During the next few days, I'd imagine both the authorities and the opposition will be jockeying for position, and the more cynical individuals involved (which some accounts suggest is a category that includes much of the opposition) may see if there are side bargains they can strike with the Communists, since it seems the latter now have the upper hand.

Meanwhile, Unimedia reports that Gabriel Stati, one of the businessmen accused of financing the protests has reportedly been arrested in Odessa, lending credence to Voronin's claims that the backers of the "revolution" have fled the country, so perhaps the behind-the-scenes score-settling among the elites is underway.

Unimedia's Romanian-language page is slightly more current than the English version and reports on two disturbing developments today - students who were involved in the protests being hauled out of their classes and driven away in BMWs and several Romanian reporters getting deported (RIA Novosti is also covering the latter story, no doubt Russia's image-makers love it when the former republics show themselves to be chips off the old block and help overshadow Russia's own bad acts).

Worth reading around the net - another roundup post of blog coverage by Veronica at Global Voices; a brief post by Moldovarious, which also has two sets of photos; and Komsomolskaia Pravda's coverage (in Russian, headlined "Uprising in Chisinau Organized by the Children of Migrant Workers") - don't miss their photo of Natalia Morari at the protests wearing an "I [heart] Barack Obama" t-shirt (amazing, assuming it's not photoshopped, and I have no reason to believe it is except that it plays so well into the hands of those who like to see any protest or political opposition in a post-Soviet country as an American plot). Hey, I love BHO too, but - even granting that the protest Morari's group co-organized was peaceful and probably well-intentioned - it doesn't look like the folks who looted buildings in downtown Chisinau were really after "change we can believe in."

I leave you with a story (apparently intended to be a straight-news item, although it reads a bit like an opinion piece) from today's Moscow Times, which has an interesting take on the situation in Moldova.

Moldova Underscores Failed Russian Policy
09 April 2009
By Nabi Abdullaev / The Moscow Times

Anti-government protests in Moldova this week unfolded in a similar manner to Western-backed uprisings that toppled governments in Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and Serbia in recent years.

But what should worry the Kremlin is not the threat of a similar uprising at home but the fact that both Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin and the opposition groups turned to the West instead of Russia to mediate the conflict, analysts said Wednesday.

Because of the shortsightedness of Russian diplomacy and its failure to project its own "soft" power, the Kremlin faces the possibility of being sidelined once again in a former Soviet state that it considers to be within its realm of influence.


"The policy mistakes are clear and were much discussed after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine," said Nikolai Petrov, a political analyst at the Carnegie Moscow Center, referring to the weeks of street protests in what was once Russia's strongest post-Soviet ally. The 2004 protests resulted in pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko winning the presidency over the Moscow-backed candidate.

Despite the Kremlin's awareness of its mistakes, it has failed to become a big, benevolent partner to West-leaning former Soviet states since then, resorting instead to energy blackmail and military threats, like with Georgia, Petrov said. This has fueled anti-Russian sentiment among the opposition in those countries, he said.

Moldovan opposition groups took to the streets to demand a vote recount after the Voronin-led Communist Party swept weekend parliamentary elections. The protests turned violent Tuesday, with young people ransacking and looting the president's office and parliament. The authorities regained control of the situation Wednesday.

In Moscow, the Foreign Ministry portrayed the protests as a foreign-sponsored plot to overthrow Voronin, who like other long-serving post-Soviet leaders has enjoyed strong support from the Kremlin.

"Judging by the slogans shouted in the squares and the many Romanian flags in the hands of the organizers of this outrage, their aim is to discredit the achievements made toward strengthening Moldova's sovereignty," the Foreign Ministry said in a statement Wednesday.

The statement was apparently referring to the Romanian flags waved by some protesters and scattered calls for Moldova to be united with neighboring Romania.

Voronin himself denounced the protests as a Romanian-backed coup attempt, announcing that Moldova would introduce a visa regime with Romania and declaring Romania's ambassador to Moldova persona non grata.

He and the opposition asked European governments to intervene.

The EU has agreed to send a special envoy to Chisinau to monitor events, but there has been no talk of any direct role, a diplomat close to talks told Reuters.

Youth-backed color revolutions that ousted deeply entrenched leaders in Serbia in 2000, Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004 and Kyrgyzstan in 2005 have ignited fears in the Kremlin, prompting a clampdown on the opposition and nongovernmental organizations and the creation of pro-Kremlin youth groups, including Nashi, to absorb youth political activism.

"The street tactics used in Moldova were that of a color revolution, but these developments are of no threat for us," Nashi leader Nikita Borovikov told The Moscow Times on Wednesday. "Regime change in our country is impossible because Russia's leadership is not passive and cowardly."

Nashi, which once brought tens of thousands of young people onto the streets, and other pro-Kremlin youth groups have kept a low profile after the ruling United Russia party cemented its grip on power in parliamentary elections in 2007.

While the current economic crisis has sparked some anti-government protests, none has come close to posing a challenge to the status quo.

So instead of worrying about whether Russians might catch the anti-government fervor from Moldova, the Kremlin needs to ponder why Voronin and the opposition have turned to the West to resolve their differences, analysts said.

Moldova's decision to shun Russia reveals a longtime fallacy of Russian diplomacy, where the Kremlin unequivocally stands by incumbent leaders in post-Soviet states and largely dismisses contacts with other political forces there, said Yulia Belikova, an analyst with the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies, a think tank that consults the Russian government on policy issues.

She said Russian officials needed to start working with opposition groups in other former Soviet republics, especially in Moldova. Moldova was separated from Romania by Soviet leader Josef Stalin in 1940, and the country has drifted back toward Romania after the Soviet collapse.

"If we're going to speak in terms of a color revolution, the West doesn't need to export it to Moldova. It is already there in the form of Romanian cultural and political influence," Belikova said.

This week's protests might also make it harder for Russia to mediate in Moldova's dispute with its Russian-leaning breakaway republic of Transdnestr, analysts said. It is one of the only post-Soviet conflicts where Moscow has portrayed itself as playing the "good cop" in seeking a resolution -- a role it has taken pains to highlight after its brief war with Georgia last August over Tbilisi's attempt to regain control of its breakaway region of South Ossetia.

President Dmitry Medvedev invited Voronin and the Transdnestr leader Igor Smirnov to Moscow earlier this year for negotiations.

The events in Moldova might give more power to the Transdnestr separatists, who could accuse Voronin of political weakness and an inability to curb Romanian nationalism.

The developments in Moldova also differ from a color revolution because the West is not openly supporting the opposition. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the continent's top human rights body, reiterated on Wednesday elections observers' findings that the elections were fair.

The Kremlin will further shape its response to the protests after information surfaces about whether they were instigated solely by the Moldovan opposition or whether they were supported by Romania and other Western players, said Sergei Mikheyev, an analyst with the Center for Political Technologies.

At the moment, it seems unlikely that European powers or the United States would want to push for regime change in Moldova, Europe's poorest country located off major trade and energy routes, and risk spoiling their improving ties with Moscow, Mikheyev said.

"But we all have seen in the past how the West has assured Russia of its best intentions but at the same time acted to upset Russia's interests," he added.

День Победы...Путина?

Does the way this photo was shot remind you of anything? [image source]

An interesting thing about this era of "tandemocracy" that seems at least for the moment to be upon us - even more than usual, everything can be seen (at least) in two ways. Putin's policy-laden speech to the Duma could be (a) a way for him to show that, in contrast to Medvedev, whose inaugural speech seemed relatively empty (notwithstanding the banalities about human rights and freedoms and the law; mentioning these things is not necessarily indicative of a change or "thaw," after all the idea of "free people in a free society" was prominent in Putin's 2004 inaugural speech and "dictatorship of the law" was a theme dating back to early in Putin's first term), Putin will continue to be the policymaker-in-chief; or (b) a soon-to-be Prime Minister making a speech about domestic policy fully appropriate for someone in his position.

The proposal of an oil tax reduction could be (a) Putin's way of showing the oiligarchs that he is the one who can continue to provide them with goodies (and, again, a way of underscoring who calls the shots on the issues the elites are really concerned about - hint: those issues are not "freedom" and "law") or (b) a thoughtful way to help President Medvedev's first term get started off on a note of optimism. Putin's uncontrolled laughter at Zhirik's silliness in the Duma on May 8 (truly, the court jester amusing the sovereign(s)) could be either (a) the relieved laughter of a man who has had the weight of governing Russia lifted from his shoulders, or (b) the nefarious chortling of a man who finds himself amused by the high position occupied by such a clown within the system he has set up and intends to continue to control.

Allowing Zyuganov's critical speech to the Duma to appear on Channel 1 could be (a) a good way to demonstrate the existence of an opposition while not giving media time to anyone who could actually be a viable independent contender for the presidency in the future or (b) an actual indication of some sort of "thaw" with respect to criticism of the government appearing on the major TV channels. I could go on, but I've probably already lost even my 10 regular readers by this point.

Only time will tell if Medvedev turns out to be his own man as President or simply a "Prezik" to be used by Putin like a condom ("prezik" in Russian slang) to stay safely inside the Russian body politic and later disposed of. Please forgive the metaphor - I'm hardly the first to think of it, and doesn't it work, at least to a point?

[image source]

It's possible that May 8, 2008, will come to be seen as the day Putin began to fade from the scene; at the moment, though, it seems more likely that we'll look back on it as the day VVP changed chairs but kept pulling most of the same strings. The focus of the endless Kremlinoputinology will now turn to the relationship between Vova and Dima and will no doubt include much speculation about when VVP might start thinking about returning to the Kremlin.

One bit of speculation so far has been that the calendar of elections might be changed so that the parliamentary and presidential elections don't fall in the same year, which could entail a new presidential election in 2010, by which time the Constitution could already have been amended to allow for 7-year presidential terms. Putin could serve two of those and be ready for a hard-earned retirement. It's all idle speculation at this point, though.

In any event, from outside Russia, there seems to be hope for a change, hope that the dyarchy will eventually reveal rifts within the ruling elite and the result will be some sort of pluralism - or at least a lurch in the direction of a more cooperative posture towards the West, one that recognizes that interests can coincide and that "defending Russia's national interests" does not always have to mean playing the spoiler to America or resisting what Western countries want. From inside Russia, this prediction seems as good as any other I've seen:

In the circus they only keep the little bears until they're three years old, after that they mature and are unmanageable and extremely aggressive.

There's no doubt that "Operation Successor" has up to now been as successful as its authors could have hoped. If one takes the maximally cynical view of Putin, one must assume he'll be watching Dima like a hawk to make sure the latter doesn't "pull a Putin" and develop a mind of his own. If one believes that Putin is contemplating fading from the scene in a couple of years, well, his first appearance as PM doesn't really suggest a man who's thinking about hanging it up, but perhaps there will be a trend in that direction.

In any event, the country will have a chance to contemplate all of these things today while celebrating the victory over Germany 63 years ago. All seems set for Victory Day. By happy coincidence (actually, the date of Medvedev's inauguration is consistent with the past two inaugurations, so the timing wasn't specially arranged for this year), Putin's confirmation as PM came just in time for the country to celebrate with a long weekend.

It's a well-known fact that Moscow doesn't believe in tears. Apparently,
though, Moscow does believe in gigantic, man-made phallic symbols.
[image source]

So, after convincing the nation to "slit'sia v ekstaze" and vote overwhelmingly for Medvedev, Russians will have the chance to "spit'sia v ekstaze" while enjoying what will no doubt be wall-to-wall TV coverage of the military parade in Moscow. One has to ask whose victory is really being celebrated, especially given the somewhat controversial decision to return this year to the Soviet practice of displaying missiles and other hardware in the Victory Day parade.

Photo from Nashi's 2007 summer camp at Lake Seliger.
The banner says, "There will be sovereign democracy!"
[image source]

Adding to the impression that Putin & Co. are celebrating their victories in the 2007-08 elections is the fact that, just like after a military victory, various heroic veterans have recently been rewarded for their service to the fatherland (or, as Gazeta headlined its story on this, "For Servicing the Fatherland"):

KREMLIN AWARDS POLITICAL SUPPORTERS (RFE/RL, April 28, 2008)
President Putin has signed a decree awarding state orders to a number of Kremlin-friendly analysts, political commentators, and media figures, "Kommersant" reported on April 26. According to the decree, which was reportedly signed earlier this month, the order For Service to the Fatherland, first degree, was given to IMA public-relations group head Andrei Gnatyuk.

The same award, second degree, was given to All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion Director Valery Fyodorov, former Nashi leader and current State Youth Affairs Committee Chairman Vasily Yakemenko, and Effective Politics Foundation head Gleb Pavlovsky. The same decree bestows honorary certificates on Channel One head Konstantin Ernst, All-Russia State Television and Radio Company (VGTRK) head Oleg Dobrodeyev, NTV head Vladimir Kulistikov, Center for Political Forecasting Deputy Director Vitaly Ivanov, and a number of activists in the pro-Kremlin youth movement Nashi. According to "Kommersant," the awards are directly tied to the contributions the recipients made to the victory of Unified Russia in the December 2007 Duma elections and Medvedev's victory in the March presidential election. Gazeta.ru reported on April 25 that Gnatyuk's IMA group oversaw the implementation of both election campaigns.

This should reinforce the conventional wisdom that VTsIOM polls on Russian domestic politics should be taken with a grain of salt. With respect to the executives from state-run TV channels, it simply underscores the obvious: they are the President's colleagues, his valued partners in the important task of keeping the masses properly mis- and underinformed; and they have been given a little pat on the head for smoothly managing the media environment during the recently concluded electoral cycle. Never mind that what Putin likely perceives as the main "victory" - the avoidance of a "colored revolution" - was, given his government's substantial genuine popularity, probably such a remote possibility as to really only exist as "cockroaches in his head," to use the Russian expression about personal hang-ups.

Anyway, the Kommersant article cited by RFE/RL digs deeper and describes the Putin Administration's recent tradition of taking care of the friendly journalists at state-run TV channels by bestowing government awards upon them (my translation):

In November of 2006, for the first time in the history of television President Putin gave a large group of TV employees (more than 100 people) awards phrased "For making a large contribution to the development of Russian teleradiobroadcasting and for long-time fruitful work." The formal reason for the awards was the 75th anniversary of broadcasting in the country. Among those receiving awards were predominantly employees of the three federal TV channels - Channel One, Rossiia, and NTV.

"For Services to the Fatherland" orders of the fourth degree were awarded to six people, including Mr. Ernst and Mr. Dobrodeyev. Mr. Kulistikov also received an Order of Honor. Half a year later in June of 2007, almost as many employees of the federal TV channels, mostly from Rossiia, NTV and TV Center (TVTs) received orders and medals of various ranks with the same phrase as the one used the year before for their colleagues.

The tradition actually seems to go back at least three years now - back in March 2005, I posted about Sergei Ivanov giving awards to then-ORT reporter Margarita Simonyan and her colleague from RTR. Simonyan's real reward, of course, turned out to be her chance to head up the Russia Today project. After all, nothing says "thank you" - in any language! - like the chance to manage the cash flowing into a government project. Kommersant also notes that Yeltsin officially thanked several hundred people after the 1996 elections, including members of the media, but there was no "For Service to the Fatherland" award at that time (it was introduced in 1999).

Regrettably, I haven't had much time in recent weeks to browse around and see what the Russian blogosphere is saying about all of this. Ilya Barabanov had a simple "no comment" about the awards story.

My photo, taken in late Dec. 2005 in Moscow.
An explanation of the meaning for non-Russian-speakers is here.
The photo is part of a large set of my photos of Moscow stickers,
graffiti and other "street art" which can be viewed here.

Notwithstanding the criticism which must be present in the RuBlogosphere (though as I mentioned, I haven't had time to survey it recently as much as usual), I doubt too many Russians really feel as negatively about Putin's latest victory as the folks who made the sticker shown above; certainly opinion polls suggest the percentage of people who view the current state of affairs negatively is quite low indeed. For the time being, that's true even of polls conducted by pollsters who haven't received awards for services rendered to the fatherland.