Making me want to come back for more

A couple of people have emailed to ask whether I'm shutting "Scraps of Moscow" down now that I'm back in the US and engaged in the pursuit of a JD degree (an activity which doesn't leave a lot of time for whimsical contemplation of faraway places). I think I'm actually going to try to keep looking at coverage of Russia and sound off once in awhile, as well as posting pictures every now and then. I'll be back in Moscow for winter break anyway, and hopefully for at least a portion of next summer, so the city is never far from my thoughts.

Since I often use this space to provide critical observations about life in Russia, I feel like, in an effort to be "fair and balanced," I have to relate the story of my departure from Sheremetyevo-2 last Monday. Of course it was hectic, there were huge lines, etc., but I also experienced a couple of moments of human kindness which made me feel like I was being sent off with a smile. First, I went to declare some cash I was taking out of the country (this also had the handy result of allowing me to bypass the long line of people with nothing to declare waiting to clear customs through the "green corridor"). I received no hassle from the customs agent and went on to pass through the pre-check-in security (baggage X-ray and hand search, since our destination was the US). 10 minutes or more later, I see the customs agent come up to me and ask, "are you missing something?" I had left my videocamera on the customs desk, and this guy made the effort to come find me and make sure I got it and was not victimized by my own carelessness.

Then, as if that wasn't enough kindness (already more than I have ever experienced at Sh-2, and I've passed through there dozens of times), the Aeroflot check-in agent did not give me a hard time for having a bag that weighed 32.8 kilos, although the limit is 32 - AND she told me she might upgrade me to business class at the gate. Even though I lounged in the lounge for too long and was literally the last person to board the plane, she lived up to her semi-promise and put me in seat 1A. Just like Moscow, to make you feel like a downtrodden peon for 3+ years and then see you off like a king.

Anyway, I felt like that was a heartwarming tale to share, and also wanted to log on and make it known that "Scraps" is not going the way of the USSR - I'm keeping it together and will be posting here as often as time permits.

Oh, and to the couple of haters who have posted comments which require a response from me - I'll be posting those responses soon. Don't think you're getting the last word.

Suicide in the Russian military

Yesterday's Novye Izvestiia had an article about the high rate of suicide - not to mention accidental and other non-combat death - in today's Russian military. I have translated it below, and any errors resulting from the translation are mine alone.

With a machine gun and a noose around their necks.
By Nadezhda Krasilova

Every month, over 20 people commit suicide in the army.

Yesterday, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published figures which state that the crime rate in the army increased in July by 36% as compared with June. Since the beginning of the year, 158 servicemen have committed suicide. But human rights activists say that the army’s statistics are not consistent with reality, and that the MoD’s actual casualties in this time of peace are approximately three times the official figures.

Back at the end of July, Chief military prosecutor Alexander Savenkov was the first to announce the growth in the army crime rate. Prior to that, MoD reports suggested that crime in the army was steadily declining. For example, according to official figures, non-combat losses in 2004 were 954 versus 1286 in the year 2000. However, according to the Chief military prosecutor’s office, the amount of crimes committed in the army was steadily growing. The Chief military prosecutor released information that during the week from June 6 to 13 alone, 46 servicemen died and another 22 were injured in the “peacetime” army. In response, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov accused the Chief military prosecutor’s office of inefficiency and accused the Chief military prosecutor himself of failing to respect the verdict of a jury trial (the prosecutor had publicly criticized the verdict in the Ul’man case).

However, the military prosecutors’ criticism of the army leadership had to be indirectly taken into account, and Sergei Ivanov has decreed that henceforth the non-combat casualties of the army and navy will be published on the MoD’s official website. Yesterday, society had the chance to view the first such report where the MoD acknowledged a rise in peacetime losses. The official release states that the number of accidents and crimes in the Russian armed forces in July of this year was 1697, 36% more than in June. In all, since the beginning of this year, there have been over 9000 crimes and accidents. In July, 119 people in the services died, including two as a result of inappropriate treatment [hazing] (which killed 2 people in June also), 32 servicemen committed suicide (25 in June), 35 died in accidents (29 in June), and 15 as a result of careless handling of weapons (4 in June). Another 34 servicemen died in vehicular accidents, 7 died as a result of civilians’ criminal acts, and one due to negligence. In all, since the beginning of the year, according to the MoD’s figures, 158 servicemen have committed suicide (i.e., every month 20 leave this life willingly), 12 have died as a result of hazing, 153 in vehicular accidents, 147 in other accidents, and in 18 cases the cause of death was negligence.

In the opinion of human rights activists, however, even these figures provided by the military about crime in the army are understated. The Mother’s Right foundation told Novye Izvestiia that, according to their information, non-combat losses annually number around 3000 servicemen, and not 900-1100, as the MoD reports. This is because the military leadership does not count servicemen who die at home from illnesses received while in the army or those who go missing. Because of this, it’s not at all rare for a dead soldier to be retroactively demobilized and not make it into the MoD’s statistics. The Mother’s Right foundation was unable to explain the growth of suicides in July, since they only keep annual statistics and not monthly ones. They did, however, state that suicide is the main cause of death in the military, and that suicides make up 30 to 35% of all military deaths.

For purposes of comparison, US troops in Iraq (which I know number several times less than the total number of active-duty Russian servicemen, so the comparison is not perfect) suffered 406 "non-hostile" deaths during the period from March 2003 through July of 2005 (according to the iCasualties website).

Kommersant's Kolesnikov on Putin's flight of fancy

Kommersant's Kremlin correspondent, Andrei Kolesnikov, has an article in his usual tongue-in-cheek style about Putin's flight on Tuesday on a supersonic Tu-160 bomber (which I discussed at some length here, with a full rundown of coverage). This article is notable for several reasons. First, it's the only coverage where I recall seeing a serious inquiry into why the president might have wanted to do this - in doing so, Kolesnikov implicitly raised the question of whether it's normal for the leaders of large nations to engage in such risky behavior. He also mentioned the crash of a Tu-160 last year and recounted a conversation he had with the aircraft's designer, in which the latter admitted that he didn't know why the plane had crashed.

Also, the article has two interesting sidebars - "What has the Russian President piloted" and "What have world leaders piloted." Interestingly, two of the other "world leaders" who've engaged in similar flights are George W. Bush (the infamous "Mission Accomplished" stunt) and Mikheil Saakashvili. Finally, there's a series of answers from Duma deputies, political commentators, and the like, to the question "Against whom is Putin fighting a war?" It's all in Russian, and I hope Kommersant will translate this piece and put it on their English-language website, as they do with many of their better articles.

More follow-up

Earlier, I translated the results of a Levada Center poll dealing with issues that are of concern to the Russian population (here). Now, Mosnews has (in English) an interview with Yuri Levada himself in which he discusses the poll results.

Novye Izvestiia also had an article on Wednesday about this poll. An English translation was sent around in Johnson's Russia List but is not available on the JRL website. Here are a couple of excerpts:

Novye Izvestia
August 17, 2005
AS LONG AS PRICES DON'T RISE
By Andrei Gulyutin; Translated by Denis Shcherbakov

During the last few months, our fellow citizens have not been worried by politics, only about the economy. First of all, rising prices produces anxiety, as well as unemployment and setbacks in production. These are the results of the polls done by the Yuri Levada polling agency. Experts say that we are like the Chinese in this sense. [...]

The Chechen war is not even in the first ten of Russian fears. And the infringement of civil rights and liberties, for instance freedom of speech, does not disturb our citizens at all.

According to experts' opinions, such results speak about low level of social development of the society. "When respondents place monetary problems on the first place, that proves the fact that our country is an economically developing state," analyst of VIKA Alexander Generalov told us. "The same results were shown in China, as well as in several countries of the former socialist camp." At the same time, according to Generalov, the Czech Republic's citizens are not worried by economical problems, as their country in at the stage of economical rise. "Polls in that country in the 1990s indicated that the Czechs were worried about inflation and unemployment, but now foreign and social problems are in first place," Generalov notes. So, we are lagging behind the Czech Republic by ten years.

More on Khinshtein's witch-hunt

Earlier in this space we discussed (here and here) the campaign that's apparently being mounted by Moskovsky-Komsomolets-muckraker-turned-Duma-Deputy Alexander Khinshtein against members of the Yeltsin-era political-economic elite. As Khinshtein promised, after going after Mikhail Kasyanov, he set his sights on Vladimir Rushailo. Moscow News had an interesting article in the August 10-16 issue which included a rundown of theories on why this witch-hunt went down:

Open Season Declared on "Yeltsin's Family" Faction
By Nelli Monastyrskaya

[...] Theory 1: Putting the Squeeze on the "Family"

This is by far the most obvious theory. Both Mikhail Kasyanov and Vladimir Rushailo were high-profile figures in the entourage of the former president (Boris Yeltsin). It is known that rivalry between the "St. Petersburg clan" and the cabal of insiders dubbed the "Family" acquired a systemic character. Analysts attribute the ongoing campaign to discredit members of the "Family" faction to preparations for the 2007-08 elections. "Family" representatives might, in the run-up to the elections, try to stage a political comeback by rallying around a single presidential candidate - e.g., Mikhail Kasyanov. If this is indeed the case, it is quite likely that the campaign to discredit them is a political order designed to eliminate competition to the ruling establishment or its successors. Khinshtein himself actively flaunts this theory, saying that he is determined to show up all possible machinations with the real estate holdings of many other "Family" members. This simple explanation compels pundits to advance several more theories.

Theory 2: A PR Stratagem

If the charges against Mikhail Kasyanov are indeed politically motivated, then from the perspective of PR technology, the charges against Vladimir Rushailo and the "Family squeeze" explanation appear quite logical. Several "dacha" cases, following the same pattern and fitted into the theory of busting the "corrupt Family," are a cover-up for an operation to sweep clean the political field. The attack on Kasyanov alone, in the public's eye, is evidence of his viability as an opposition leader, automatically evoking sympathy among certain sections of the population.

Theory 3: Settling Accounts

The confrontation between Khinshtein and Rushailo began in 2000. When he was not as yet a State Duma deputy, Khinshtein, a journalist writing for the Moskovsky komsomolets daily, published a series of exposes on Gen. Orlov, a close associate of Interior Minister Rushailo. As a result, criminal proceedings were opened against Khinshtein over the use of a fake Moscow City Criminal Investigation Department (MUR) ID. The conflict was hushed up, but Khinshtein's relations with Rushailo are still less than friendly.

Theory 4: Rushailo's Performance as Interior Minister and Secretary of the RF Security Council

As RF interior minister, Rushailo was privy to highly sensitive, off-limits information which could have included compromising material, sleaze on some of the incumbent state and government officials or political figures. In this event, the "dacha case" could be a warning: It is dangerous to stir up a hornet's nest in the run-up to the presidential election.

Enough theorizing to make your head spin. The almighty Google is able to somewhat restore Khinshtein's reputation in my mind - I found a redeeming remark from him in a Mosnews article from last year about NTV's firing of Leonid Parfyonov:

Deputy and journalist Aleksandr Khinshtein was the only one of the United Russia faction who spoke of political motives in the NTV row. "The freedom of the press cannot be forced to conform to a military charter. One may like or dislike Parfyonov, but one cannot deny that his program was one of the most professional programs on television and its closure will deal a tangible blow to the Kremlin's reputation," he said.

Can't tell the players without a scorecard

I was poking around on the BBC's Russia Country Profile page today and found this useful primer on the affiliations of various Russian media outlets:

The press
* Komsomolskaya Pravda - mass circulation, outspoken daily, controlled by tycoon Vladimir Potanin
* Kommersant - liberal, business-orientated, controlled by tycoon Boris Berezovsky
* Moskovskiy Komsomolets - popular daily controlled by Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov
* Izvestia - popular daily controlled by tycoon Vladimir Potanin
* Rossiyskaya Gazeta - official government newspaper
* Nezavisimaya Gazeta - influential privately-owned daily
* Argumentiy i Faktiy - popular weekly
* Sovetskaya Rossiya - pro-Communist daily
* Krasnaya Zvezda - Defence Ministry newspaper
* The Moscow Times - English-language daily

Television
* Russia TV Channel - national network, run by state-owned Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (RTR)
* Channel One - national network, 51% owned by state, 49% by private shareholders
* NTV - national network, owned by gas monopoly Gazprom
* Centre TV - commercial, Moscow area
* Ren TV - Moscow-based commercial station with strong regional network

Radio
* Radio Russia - national network run by state-owned Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (RTR)
* Moscow Echo - influential private station
* Radio Mayak - state-run national network
* Russkoye Radio - major private network, music-based
* Voice of Russia - external service, broadcasts in English and other languages

News agencies
* Itar-Tass - state-owned, pages in English
* RIA-Novosti - state-owned, pages in English
* Interfax - private, pages in English

I'm hoping to have time before leaving Moscow to update my links to include more Russian media and information sources, and this is an OK start on that task, although there are definitely a few more I'd add. The main reason I want to improve the links on this site is a selfish one - I'm hoping to continue blogging about Russia from afar, and having a specific list of sites to visit regularly is one way to make that easier.

Russia's damaging inferiority complex

Alexander Golts, deputy editor of the excellent on-line publication Yezhednevny Zhurnal ("Daily Journal"), had some interesting comments in Monday's Moscow Times on the damaging impact of Russia's inferiority complex:

Russia's Economic Maneuvers
Moscow Times, Monday, August 15, 2005. Issue 3230. Page 8.
By Alexander Golts

Thirteen years ago, when Moscow and Beijing agreed that Russia would start shipping arms to China, the announcement made waves around the world. Military analysts began talking about the possibility of a new alliance between Moscow and Beijing that would take an anti-American tack.

Now these predictions appear to be coming true. On Thursday, Russia and China will commence their first joint military exercises, in which around 10,000 soldiers and officers will participate. [...]

In this complicated war game -- during which potential threats to the United States, China's biggest trading partner, are being meted out with great care -- maneuvers that can be interpreted in a variety of ways become all the more important. In any case, it is clear why Peace Mission 2005 is useful for China.

It is a lot less clear what these military exercises will do for Russia. It is not clear what exactly Moscow stands to gain from war games that present an apparent threat to the United States, a country with which Russia has a strategic partnership, as Russian authorities have announced on numerous occasions.

Yet, there is some clear-cut economic reasoning behind Russia's participation. China is the largest purchaser of Russian military hardware. Every year, it buys around $1 billion in weaponry from Russia. [...]

The military reasons why Russia is engaging in joint maneuvers with China are far more vague and nebulous. It seems that Russian military policy increasingly reflects the armed forces' inferiority complex. Without the resources to play a significant role in the Asian arena, Russia doing everything it can to make it seem as if it is an active participant in the region's affairs. In the process, Russia's leaders have resorted to anti-American saber rattling out of old habit.

For example, Russia's national security would only be enhanced if the coalition forces fighting in Afghanistan were finally to defeat the remnants of the Taliban. Yet at the recent summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, President Vladimir Putin suggested that the delegates discuss when coalition forces should be required to withdraw from military bases located in Central Asia. Not only do these bases supply the troops fighting in Afghanistan, but they also support stability in Central Asia itself, something which is also very much in Russia's interest.

In this instance, the desire to prove how important Russia is seems to have gotten the upper hand over common sense. Russia's participation in Peace Mission 2005 apparently has very similar motives.

Maybe a more personal version of this inferiority complex played some role in inspiring Putin's antics with the Tu-160 yesterday. There's certainly no common-sense reason for the leader of a so-called G-8 nation to risk his life playing fly-boy.

[Update:] The same Moscow Times op-ed page carried another insightful commentary piece about Russia's warming relationship with China, which it's clear that Russia is rushing into in order to restore its sense of being a world power. The reasoning must go something like, "well, we'll get together with the Chinese and show these Orange-Revolution-organizing Americans a thing or two."

At the Edge of the Middle Kingdom
By Andrei Piontkovsky

[...] Confrontation with the West and the development of a "strategic partnership" and effectively a military alliance with China will leave Russia not only marginalized but also subject to China's strategic interests. And it will lead in the end to the loss of control over the Far East and Siberia, first de facto and then de jure.

In an op-ed piece that appeared in Vedomosti in mid-July, Alexander Dugin, head of the International Eurasian Movement and one of Russia's leading apologists for "Asiope" (as opposed to Eurasia), called this a "great opportunity for Russia." In an earlier manifesto, Dugin wrote with pride: "In the 16th century, the Tatars passed the torch of Eurasian empire-building to Moscow."

Muscovy's Asiopeans have carried this torch for centuries now. But if they're honest with themselves, Asiopeans like Dugin have to understand that we're now in the process of handing it off. Five centuries is a good long stretch, after all, and in the 21st century, the time has come for Russia to make way for a much more promising builder of empires, the Middle Kingdom. Apparently, this is exactly what the leadership is preparing to do.

The Holy Asiopean Alliance of emperors Vladimir Putin and Hu Jintao is the alliance of a rabbit and a boa constrictor. Its outcome is inevitable, and it will be swift.

We've been so desperate to hold together the tatters of our own "near abroad" that we failed to notice that we have now become part of China's "near abroad."

That last sentence is all the more scathing because it's dead accurate.

Third term story gathers momentum

It's hard to say whether the country's leadership has figured out who it wants to be in the driver's seat after 2008, but last week's proposals from a couple of regional legislators to allow Putin to stay in office - covered extensively in this space - have certainly got the media talking. Tuesday's Moscow Times had a front-page story titled, "Signs of a 3rd Term Campaign."

A behind-the-scenes campaign appears to be revving up to make sure that Putin remains in office beyond 2008. As the clock slowly ticks down on Putin's final term, the chorus of support for a constitutional amendment could swell and help Putin's retinue to persuade the president that he should stay on, political analysts said. [...]

Putin has repeatedly spoken against amending the Constitution, but his most recent remarks could be interpreted as slightly more ambiguous, said Andrei Piontkovsky, an independent political analyst.

"It's another step in Putin's comments on the subject. This was the first time that the option was first mentioned in a positive context," he said.

"There has been strong pressure on Putin from his entourage to run for a third term, but he has strong hesitations," he said. "He understands the costs on an international level."

If Putin were to run under an amended Constitution, he would risk being likened to Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko and Uzbek President Islam Karimov, longtime leaders who have traded angry words with the West over democracy in their countries and the legitimacy of their regimes, Piontkovsky said.

Piontkovsky said the recent proposals appeared to have been orchestrated by the siloviki, a group of military and security officials who rode to power on Putin's coattails and want him to stay on.

But Dmitry Orlov, the director of the Agency for Political and Economic Communications, a think tank, said the regional legislators probably reacted to Putin's statements in Finland on their own. "They wished to reiterate their loyalty," he said.

Novye Izvestiia had an article which echoed that last thought (I haven't translated it yet, although I will if I have time tomorrow). The money quote in the article was from Vladimir Lysenko, President of the Institute of Modern Politics:

"These small-minded brown-nosers don't miss a single opportunity to demonstrate their loyalty to the leadership."

But the NI piece also allowed that there might be other forces working to "rev up" the third-term bandwagon.

Stick a fork in NTV

NTV is all done as a credible source of information. This has been clear to everyone else for awhile, probably, but I guess I don’t watch the Russian TV news as much as I used to. I guess this has been the case for a year or so now, but tonight I saw something that cemented the conclusion in my mind - NTV's news programs are no more credible than "Vremia" or "Vesti" on a good night. The brief midnight edition of their NTV's program “Segodnia” led off with a seven-minute report (out of the 15-minute total length of the broadcast) about Putin's flight today on a strategic bomber. There was ample footage of Putin in a flightsuit and helmet looking pleased with himself, as well as some shots of the always-obsequious-looking Fradkov sending off his boss. Clearly, this was the Kremlin-ordained top story of the evening, and without even watching the news on Channel One and Rossiia, I feel pretty sure it was the lead there as well.

And as for Putin’s mission itself, what can one say? I would love to see some poll data on Russians' reactions to this stunt, and I suspect that the overall response would be favorable - on the surface, it seems like sort of a cool thing for a president to do. The fact is, though, that it's a bit irresponsible for the head of state to risk his own head by participating in military training maneuvers, and people who are not actually in the military don't usually look good in various military helmets - just ask Michael Dukakis, whose ill-fated 1988 campaign for the US presidency was not helped by his appearing extraordinarily goofy riding around in a tank with a helmet on.

Obviously, today's "flight of the Putin" was a manufactured PR event, but the President was clearly enjoying himself - and the Russian media can clearly no longer tell the difference between a stunt and something that constitutes real news. Perhaps Putin can be excused - after all, he's just living out the fantasy of every KGB desk officer who fancies himself a warrior, and now that he's President, the big boys in the armed forces have to let him play with their toys. But it's hard to excuse the Russian "journalists" who gave this story such fulsome coverage. There is video of this event here from RBC, although my slow connection didn't permit me to actually view it; Lenta.ru has an item (under the category of "the day's top stories") with a photo from the Rossiia TV channel's coverage (headlined "The President's Supersonic Flight"); and, not to be outdone, Channel One (ORT) also has coverage on its website (titled, more dryly, "President Putin participated in military training exercises on board a Tu-160"), including video footage. As for English-language coverage, RIA Novosti has items here and here; ITAR-TASS has an article with a funny description of Putin's post-flight press conference; Mosnews has a story here; Reuters has a thorough article which discusses Putin's previous uses of military equipment as props for PR stunts; and China's state-run Xinhua news agency, perhaps in the new spirit of Russo-Chinese cooperation, also has a fairly thorough story.

According to an ITAR-TASS item an hour ago, the President and commander-in-chief has switched from air to sea and is now aboard the Peter the Great missile cruiser observing naval exercises in the Barents Sea. It's hard to imagine that there aren't any other problems in the country that require his attention, although I guess if I were in charge of an organization as dysfunctional as the Russian military, I might like to do some drop-by, in-person inspections myself once in awhile. But the very fact that he's willing to risk doing this shows that he's desperate to take people's minds off of the truly dilapidated state of much of the Russian military.

Update - Wednesday's Moscow Times has an article about Putin's sortie, titled "Putin Breaks Sound Barrier."

Luzhkov's future

The lead story in Monday's Moscow Times was about Mayor Luzhkov's plans to enter the fray in the upcoming City Duma elections:

Luzhkov Will Run for City Duma
Oksana Yablokova, Monday, August 15, 2005. Issue 3230. Page 1.

Adding fuel to what is shaping up to be a fiery election campaign for the Moscow City Duma, Mayor Yury Luzhkov said on Friday that he would run for a seat as the top candidate for the United Russia party.

I thought they "buried the lede" - American journalese for hiding a key element of the story toward the end of an article - when I saw this paragraph deep in the article, after the jump onto an inside page:

Luzhkov's candidacy does not necessarily mean that he will became a city legislator. Luzhkov and other prominent regional leaders ran for the State Duma in 1999 and 2003 elections with no intention of becoming deputies. They topped United Russia's party list in what was a clear attempt to garner more votes for the party.

But on Tuesday I heard more speculation that Luzhkov might actually want to become speaker of the Moscow City Duma (on the radio), or that this might be a result that's desirable to the Kremlin ("Moscow will ring in 2006 with a battle for power," Nezavisimaya Gazeta). Monday's MT article raised the first possibility but seemed to reject it:

Andrei Ryabov, a political analyst with the Carnegie Moscow Center, said Luzhkov might actually be interested in quitting two years before his term ended to become speaker of the City Duma. He said the Kremlin appeared to be chipping away at Luzhkov's hold on Moscow, noting that President Vladimir Putin made Valery Shantsev, Luzhkov's longtime deputy and a possible candidate to succeed him in 2007, the new governor of Nizhny Novgorod last week.

Ryabov, however, said it was more likely that Luzhkov would "use his authority to win the December elections and bring his men into the Moscow City Duma." "This will be the only way to retain his position at the helm of the city for some time longer," he said.

What does it all mean? I'd be lying if I said I thought I knew. But it will be interesting to watch the battle, if there is one, unfold, since Luzhkov has definitely been one of the great political survivors of the post-Soviet period.

What's worrying Russians?

Yuri Levada's polling outfit has published the results of a recent survey, which I think are pretty revealing. It will probably be translated elsewhere or commented on in English, but I took a few minutes to put it into English in order to share it here in its entirety:

Russians' Concerns.
August 15, 2005

In July 2005, the Yuri Levada Analytical Center (Levada Center) conducted a survey of 2107 Russians. One of the questions was "Which of the following social problems concern you the most, which do you consider the most acute?" Respondents could choose up to 5 or 6 [sic] answers.

1. Growth of prices [inflation] - 71%

2. Poverty, the impoverishment of the majority of the population - 53%

3. The growth of unemployment - 39%

4. Economic crisis, falling industrial and agricultural productivity - 33%

5. Increasing crime rate - 29%

6-7. Inaccessibility/unaffordibility of many forms of medical treatment - 29%

6-7. Growth of drug abuse - 29%

8. Growing cost/inaffordability of education - 27%

9. Sharp division [of society] into wealthy and poor, inequitable income distribution - 27%

10. Corruption and bribe-taking - 24%

11. Crisis in the areas of ethics, culture, and morality - 22%

12. Deterioration of the environment - 17%

13. The threat of explosions and other terrorist acts where you live - 15%

14. The weakness of the government - 11%

15. Abuses of power and the impunity of government officials - 9%

16. The arrival of immigrants and migrant workers - 7%

17. The military campaign in Chechnya - 7%

18. Growth in the rate of AIDS infection - 6%

19. Police brutality - 6%

20. Inability to obtain justice in a court of law - 5%

21. Growth of nationalism, deterioration of inter-ethnic relations - 4%

22. Delays in payment of salaries, pensions, stipends, etc. - 4%

23. Conflicts between different branches of government - 3%

24. Restrictions on civil rights and democratic freedoms (freedom of speech, freedom of the press) - 2%

Other - 1%

Unable to answer - 1%

The low percentage of respondents expressing concern about immigrants would seem to contradict additional recent polling data which got lots of media play earlier this week about the rise of racism and nationalism in Russia - e.g., "Racist Sentiments Grow in Russia - Survey" in Mosnews. And the relatively low number of people concerned about environmental issues also runs counter to another recent poll, which was written about (in English) by RIA Novosti under the headline "More than half of Russians think environmental situation is unfavorable - poll." I guess it all depends on how you ask the questions.

Coverage of this poll on Mosnews suggested that the story here is Russians' fear of inflation. I heard about this poll while listening to Echo of Moscow Radio, and their commentators' take on it was that the real story is the problems which do not seem to concern the people surveyed. I tend to agree, and this is what I think is revealing about the survey.

Perhaps not surprisingly, people seem to value other freedoms which came about after the collapse of the Soviet Union - the freedom to travel, to exchange currency, to engage in private enterprise - more than the freedom to express opposition to a government which seems to have been able to convince most citizens that it's doing an OK job.

Economic and real-life concerns are more important to people than freedoms which seem abstract - after all, as someone once told me, you can't eat newspapers; unfortunately, people don't realize that the absence of a free market of ideas in the political sphere does have an impact on the quality of the decisions made about economic policy and other things which have a more direct impact on one's pocketbook.

Memories of Uzbekistan

Hard to believe it's been almost a month since my trip down south. What's even more unbelievable is that I'll be leaving Moscow in less than a week. I'm trying to look ahead to the busy fall coming up, but it's easier and more pleasant to look back at the relatively carefree summer that's now coming to an end. In that spirit, I offer the photo at left, taken at 8:39pm on July 20 in Tashkent. It shows the full moon rising alongside the Hotel Uzbekistan. As with all photos on this blog, you can click on the image to view it in a larger format.

Latynina the novelist

I've expressed in the past my admiration for Yulia Latynina's political commentary. Misha is also a fan. Here are excerpts from a transcript of an NPR interview with Latynina ( via JRL) which deals more with the other kind of writing she does - fiction. And you can listen to the story on NPR's website here.

National Public Radio (NPR), "All Things Considered," August 9, 2005

[...] MARTHA WEXLER reporting: Yulia Latynina has become something of a brand name for Russians interested in politics. She publishes newspaper and online commentaries, and she has her own radio program called "Access Code." [...]

Listeners call in or e-mail their questions to the studio at Moscow Echo radio. Latynina seems to have the access code for the powers that be, and she boldly answers questions about the scandalous wheeling and dealing of the Russian elite. But the 37-year-old Latynina, a gutsy, energetic redhead, insists that she is first and foremost a novelist. Journalism, she says, is just a draft, a way to get information for the novels she churns out. Fiction, she says, can delve deeper into people's motives.

Ms. YULIA LATYNINA (Novelist): Since a lot of things that people do, it matters not so much what they do but also it matters very much why they do it. In this aspect journalism is totally incomplete because it cannot cover all facets of reality.

WEXLER: [...] People read her books not so much because they're great literature but to find out about the crooked world of Russian business. Critics wonder whether she's hiding behind thinly veiled fiction to avoid lawsuits or worse.

After early ventures into science fiction, Latynina began writing her economic thrillers, works like "Steel King" and "Industrial Zone." They reflected the post-Soviet battles over privatization. She's a student of Russian corruption and admits she's becoming gloomier.

Ms. LATYNINA: In Yeltsin's era you could be detained for committing some crime, pay money and be released. Now you can commit a crime, be detained, pay money, be released and within a week you will be arrested again because the guy whom you paid money wants more.

WEXLER: Latynina says it's wrong to underestimate the excesses of the oligarchs who emerged and profited under President Boris Yeltsin, but she finds something positive in their striving to acquire companies and increase the value of their shares.

Ms. LATYNINA: Now the people that surround Putin, they're not building private companies, neither for themselves, neither for their friends. Their ultimate goal is to rule and to control everything in the country, including private business, not that they want to nationalize the business. They just want to be paid by the business.

WEXLER: Latynina's latest novel is again set in a Russia where everything is for sale, including high-level government positions. But she's introduced a new element, Chechens plotting a terrorist attack of horrific proportions with the unwitting help of the security police. The Chechens battle other crime families for control of an oil plant. They want to turn it into a giant chemical bomb. The book is called "[Dzhakhannam], or See You in Hell."

Latynina says Russia never really assimilated Chechens and other peoples of the Caucasus, and after the Soviet Union collapsed these people filled the power vacuum with their ancient code of honor and clan loyalty. Latynina worries that the Chechen separatist campaign has turned into a religious war throughout the Caucasus and the commanders are Muslim clerics.

Whether it's her politics, her action-packed plot lines or her insider knowledge of Russia's business and power elite, something about Latynina's books has won her a respectable readership. The [Moskva] bookstore has placed "[Dzhakhannam]" on its best-seller table next to Dan Brown's "Da Vinci Code" in translation. The store carries 38,000 titles and in June "[Dzhakhannam]" was number 12 in sales. Martha Wexler, NPR News, Moscow.

Latynina's latest book is available for sale on-line here. The publisher's note on the page (I've translated it for your entertainment) reads as follows:

Yulia Latynina's new novel is not about economics and not about a terrorist act at an oil refinery. It's a novel about a society where there are no rules. Where official positions are bought and sold. Where the refinery owner gets rid of his partner with the help of some Chechens, and gets rid of the Chechens with the help of the FSB. Where the security services, instead of preventing a terrorist act, provoke one in order to win promotions. This novel is about a society which stands at the brink of a catastrophe more frightening than the most violent terrorist act.

The Economist (via JRL) has some good commentary on the tale of the rescued "Priz" minisub. Like their fellow Brits at the FT last week, they get right to the point on the weakness of the Russian navy. The last paragraph of the Economist piece also echoes - in a rather more withering fashion - the point made in last week's Moscow Times editorial about Putin's leadership deficiencies:

The Economist, August 13-19, 2005
The Russian navy [subscription required]
Potemkin fleet: The good news, and the less good news, from Russia's submarine drama

[...] The men survived because the Russians accepted foreign help at a moment when it could still make a difference. Five years ago they waited until there was no hope, and also tried to blame a non-existent foreign craft for hitting the Kursk. The psychological cost to Russia's top brass of last week's humility was considerable. But it is too soon to conclude that this reflects a new priority for human life over pride and secrecy. [...]

The biggest unchanged thing is the Russian navy itself. It plans to buy some of the remote-controlled gadgets used by the British rescuers. But, as Pavel Baev, a military analyst, says, the navy is in such poor shape that accidents of this sort are “doomed to happen again and again”. Between the Kursk and this week, another submarine sank in 2003, with nine lives lost. Last month, the flagship of a naval review in St Petersburg was damaged during a rehearsal.

The problem is that, even as the navy has shrunk from its Soviet size, the admirals still like to pretend that they can fight on the high seas, rather than using their limited means to prepare for more plausible tasks such as preventing poaching, or to care for and train their sailors. Mark Galeotti, of Britain's Keele University, says the result is a Potemkin navy, which can “just about pass muster so long as nobody shoots at it.”

Another similarity with the Kursk was the invisibility throughout the crisis of Vladimir Putin, Russia's president. For all his posturing and would-be authoritarianism, avoidance of responsibility is still an imperative for Mr Putin. Weakness and neurosis beneath a semblance of
power: the president and his navy have much in common.

More on the possibility of a third term in office for Putin

Last week, there was a lot of talk about an initiative by regional deputies in Primor'e to amend the constitution to remove the term limit on the Russian presidency (I covered the story here, here, here, and here). As it turns out, there was another, similar initiative originating outside of Russia's capital last week. Mosnews has the basic story:

St. Petersburg Lawmaker Suggests Constitution Amendment Allowing Third Term for Putin
Created: 12.08.2005 14:42 MSK

Lawmaker of the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly has brought in an initiative to change the Russian Constitution provisions on the third presidential term.

Igor Rimmer made a project of a bill on an amendment to the Constitution in order to increase the terms of the Russian president's authorities.

Rimmer's version of this amendment reads that "one and the same person cannot hold the post of the Russian president for more than three consecutive terms,"; Interfax news agency reported. Currently, it is impossible for a person to be president for more than two terms in a row. Vladimir Putin's second term expires in March 2008. [...]

Putin has recently said that he “maybe would like to” (run for president in 2008) but the Constitution did not permit to do so.

The only problem with this story is the last paragraph. If you look at the statement which Putin made recently (on August 2nd while on a visit to Finland - the full transcript of the press conference is available on the Kremlin's website here in English and here in Russian) and read it without too much cynicism - with less cynicism than I usually apply to Russian official statements, and less cynicism than I was applying to the Primor'e story last week - it seems like the response of someone who is not necessarily focused on serving a third term in office:

QUESTION: This is a question for President Putin. Your presidential term comes to an end in 2008. There has been plenty of speculation that you would like to stay in office beyond this date. Could you say something about your plans for the future?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: Perhaps I would like to stay in office, but our country’s constitution does not allow it. I think that what is most important for Russia today is stability, and we can achieve this stability only by respecting the laws that are in force and abiding by the constitution’s provisions. 2008 is still quite a long way off and I am sure that there is still much work to do [...]

So, possibly these regional deputies are loose cannons not encouraged by anyone in Moscow, and Putin is genuinely ambivalent about a third term. Pravda.ru has a somewhat lucid explication of this point of view:

Fabricating Vladimir Putin's third term in the office of the Russian President
Ivan Shmelev, 08/13/2005 14:46

The subject surfaced in Russian political discussions again, when a Finnish journalist asked Putin this question during his visit to Finland in the beginning of August. "Maybe I would like to, but the Constitution of Russia does not allow me to do it. I believe that stability is most important factor in present-day Russia, which can be achieved on the base of constitutional regulations," the head of state answered. Vladimir Putin stated back on 9 December 2003 that it was about time one should put an end to the rumors about the need to change the Constitution. [...]

Provocative initiatives continued stirring up the general public anyway. A member of the St.Petersburg Legislative Assembly, Igor Rimmer, developed a new project to amend the Russian Constitution, in which one and same person would not be allowed to take the post of the president for more than three terms in a row. The Central Electoral Committee rejected the initiative as well.

Despite the negative remarks from the committee and from the president himself, the Russian media decided to misinterpret the story and say that Putin would agree to change the Constitution. Furthermore, they believed that Putin would forget about the fact that only the next president would have a chance to use adequate amendments, if they were ever be introduced.

It is enough to look at the headlines, which certain media outlets used for their articles and reports: "Vladimir Putin wants to remain the president for the third time," - Echo of Moscow radio station; "Putin would like to keep presidency after 2008," - Gazeta.Ru. News headlines from Itar-Tass and RIA Novosti are a lot more peaceful against such a background: "Putin: The Constitution does not allow me to stay after 2008." Not even a word about the third term. [...]

Dwelling upon Vladimir Putin's third term on the position of the Russian president, Western journalists either forget, or are not willing to recollect the fact that such initiatives periodically occurred in the USA. Russia borrowed the USA's idea about the right for one and the same person to hold the four-year presidency twice in a row. When Ronald Reagan was elected president for the second time (1985-1988), many American scientists of politics set forth a suggestion to change the Constitution and let Mr. Reagan work for another four years.

President Putin has not made any statements about the third term. When someone uses the words of a deputy to prove the opposite, one should view such situation as a political provocation. If the words of all US congressmen were made a reality, the world would be waging World War VI nowadays.

I think the truth, as is so often the case, lies somewhere between the two versions of this story which are floating around. I doubt that the initiatives from Primor'e and St. Petersburg are part of a coordinated plan to get the ball rolling on a constitutional amendment; however, it's obvious that Putin and his inner circle are giving thought to who will run the country after 2008 and that one of the options is to leave the current president in office, which they could do in several different ways. Most likely, the country's leadership simply hasn't made up its mind (1) whether it's necessary or desirable for Putin to remain the country's leader after 2008, and (2) if it is, how best to make this happen. The one thing that is clear is that we'll hear lots more speculative coverage on this story (not necessarily the specific initiatives, but the larger question) before everything is said and done.

Lost in translation

I'm once again able to blog while watching TV in the comfort of my own home, although it's not quite as nice as the wi-fi setup at our old place on Tverskaya. Let me explain. We moved a month and a half ago to a temporary apartment in preparation for moving back to the US, and I've only just now realized that ROL online internet cards (which use dialup) aren't really that bad a deal, and 45.2kbps is a perfectly tolerable speed for many online tasks.

So, we're watching "Sex and the City" on NTV (where it's "Seks v Bol'shom Gorode," of course), and I couldn't help but noticing a moment where the usually excellent translators fell down on the job (like with many dubbed TV shows, on this one you can hear the original English-language dialogue, although it's quieter than the Russian-language voice-over) - Miranda is complaining to Carrie on the phone about some relationship problem, and in English she says, "I'm so f***ed up," which is translated as "Это так ужасно," which means roughly "This is horrible" in English. Not a very momentous observation, but I really just wanted to revel in the fact that I can now make such observations in real time. Thank you, ROL.

More on new money

Here is the Moscow Times’ take (from yesterday’s paper) on the introduction of the 5000-ruble banknote. It makes a couple of the points that I've seen before in one form or another, but it also gives a higher figure for the average Russian salary than was implied in an article from which I quoted in an earlier post.

5,000 Ruble Bill to Soak Up Cash
Moscow Times, August 11, 2005. Issue 3228. Page 1.
By Anna Smolchenko

The Central Bank said Wednesday it would introduce a new 5,000 ruble note in 2006, in a move to help soak up the increasing amount of cash circulating in the expanding Russian economy. […]

The need for the note stems from large cash turnover and the rise of average salaries in Russia, the Central Bank said in a statement.

With a value of around $170 at current exchange rates, the new bill has a higher value than the largest bill in the United States, reflecting the large amount of business done in cash transactions in Russia. Most Russians remain wary of banks and are renowned for using cash to pay for everything from apartments to cars.

For those bigger transactions, the new note will offer convenience, some experts say. For the average consumer or tourist, however, it could make the retail experience more difficult, as the 1,000 ruble bill can already be hard to break in many shops, others said.

"They are making it easier for themselves," said Vladimir Tikhomirov, an economist at UralSib bank. It will now be easier and cheaper for the Central Bank to deliver cash to Russia's oil-rich regions, where salaries are relatively high, he said. "Stashing money under mattresses" will also be easier, he said, referring to the average Russian's preferred method of saving.

The average monthly salary as of June was just under 9,000 rubles, according to the State Statistics Service, more than three times higher than five years ago. […]

The introduction of the new note is not expected to have any inflationary or other economic impact. "It's a wholly psychological thing for a country where everything is done in cash," said Richard Hainsworth, CEO of RusRating, a bank rating agency. […]

Novaya Gazeta on where the power lies in Uzbekistan

Novaya Gazeta - home to, among others, Anna Politkovskaya, perhaps the most accomplished chronicler of Russian war crimes in Chechnya - had an interesting article yesterday on the extent of the power wielded by the State Security Service, or SNB, in Uzbekistan. Reporter Rustam Murzaev seems to have done a good job of "following the money" - to use a phrase from American journalistic history - but of course some might conclude that this article, coming so soon after the announcement that the US is getting unceremoniously kicked out of its airbase in Uzbekistan (which I've discussed here and here), was planted by vindictive US agents. All I've done is translate the article into English from the original, which is available here on Novaya Gazeta's website. We translate, you decide.

Cotton Without a Single Gunshot
Rustam Murzaev, Novaya Gazeta, August 11, 2005.

A “quiet revolution” has taken place in Uzbekistan: power is now in the hands of the chairman of the National Security Service.

The chief security guard rarely becomes a grey cardinal. That is just too dangerous for the head of state. As a rule, the role of the special services in all CIS countries has been limited to the opportunity to provide mafia-style protection (kryshevat’) to various commercial enterprises. The one exception is the National Security Service (SNB) of Uzbekistan, the head of which has concentrated in his hands all real levers of state power.

Power shifts like this are known as “creeping coups.” At the time of his appointment ten years ago, few would have thought that SNB Chairman Rustam Inoyatov would be able to circumvent the system of checks and balances put into place by President Karimov and become the second most influential person in the country. Today he is the person who determines the government’s personnel policy, which means he bears personal responsibility for the actions of the people he’s put in place - including in Andijan.

Nationwide HR officer

In matters of politics Tashkent has always been slightly ahead of Moscow. It was here during the Soviet era that the first party corruption scandal took place, which in large part spurred on the perestroika movement. Uzbekistan was one of the first countries in the CIS where the authorities purged the political opposition by banning a couple of political parties. What’s happened in the country today is what democratic society has been warning us about for some time: the de facto authority has passed over to the siloviki. Moreover, this has happened in a way that’s quite consistent with recent trends in Russia: in the name of fighting corruption and terrorism.

The methods of running a country are little different from the laws of the free market. In order to control an enterprise or a country, it’s not necessary at all to officially occupy the top managerial position. It’s quite sufficient to gain control over the leading middle managers or government officials. Or you can get the personnel department under your thumb and install your people in the key management positions.

There’s no such thing as a former intelligence agent. Upon attaining power, modest KGB officer Inoyatov executed a standard “penetration” operation. Put more simply, he installed his own people in all government positions of any importance whatsoever. The top of the management pyramid is in Karimov's presidential staff [apparat]. That’s where State Advisor to the President on Personnel Affairs and SNB General Ravshan Shamshiev works, along with his deputy Umar Ismailov. The post of Secretary of the Council on National Security is occupied by another SNB General, Ruslan Mirzaev. The field offices are composed of the appropriate operational divisions of the SNB. Beyond this are the rank-and-file employees and reservists who work in the ministries and government departments. The network of this “secret service” covers practically all government organizations. And, wherever they may be, SNB employees are also occupied with their primary duties, i.e., the collection of information.

Agents correspond in coded notes only in the movies. SNB employees have a different reporting procedure – so-called obezlichki [from the Russian word obezlichka, which refers to a system of work where there is no individual responsibility for specific portions of work product - trans.]. In essence, these are run-of-the-mill denunciations [donosy] – unsigned and untitled. Everything goes into the file – from the ill-advised statements of this or that government official to his specific actions. And then, these obezlichki serve on the basis for personnel decisions. The fine sieve of constant scrutiny doesn’t let any dissident thinkers pass through. Any newly discovered opponents of Inoyatov are immediately recorded as such, with all of the consequences that follow from this. “The President trusts paperwork,” they say in Uzbekistan. And the paperwork is drawn up by the SNB. And not for free, either.

Bureaucratic price list

It’s possible that the system constructed by Inoyatov could actually strengthen the state, if it were not for corruption. The same corruption that the SNB is supposed to be fighting. The system of obezlichki, which is practically impervious to outside control, functions as a profitable commercial enterprise.

It’s a known fact that the appointment of a district [raion] administration head costs from 50,000 to 200,000 US dollars. The post of regional [oblast] head is more expensive – here the prices start at half a million “green.” Ministerial positions and management positions in government departments and other organizations are all for sale. For example, the presidential staff has the authority to designate the directors of district oil depots – these appointments are made personally by one of three SNB generals. In order to get someone appointed a rank-and-file refueler [at one of these depots], though, all that’s required is the approval of the “agency.” The volume of this market can be measured in the millions – a favorable obezlichka costs upwards of 5,000 US dollars, and Uzbekistan long ago surpassed its Central Asian neighbors in the amount of government officials it employs.

Of course, the SNB doesn't get by just on obezlichki. Providing mafia-style protection (kryshevanie) to the state as a whole does not preclude doing the same for certain sectors of the state’s economy. The method of making money is the same. To use the lingo of mystery novels, the SNB works through agents of influence. What’s more, some of these agents are high-placed government officials. For instance, the head of the country’s flour-milling industry Anvar Rakhimberdyev, former head of the Andijan regional Security Service Directorate and former chief SNB personnel officer, is a member of the SNB’s active reserve. The postal service is headed up by Rafkat Migmanov, former SNB chief of intelligence and counterintelligence. And the precious metals mining industry is controlled by former SNB Deputy Chairman Utkur Kamilov.

But the most important link in the management structure is SNB General Eler Ganiev, the current Minister of Foreign Affairs. The country’s entire foreign trade and foreign policy complex is in his hands, including large-scale investment programs. This means that he controls all of the country’s foreign currency inflows.

Dispute resolution, SNB-style

Converting one’s official position into personal income can only be done using commercial structures. In Uzbekistan, formerly the center of the USSR’s cotton production, serious money can be made only on the export of this product. Here the head of the SNB acted directly, without involving agents. Ganiev helped out – thanks to his protection, a company called Baltazia, which is controlled by Inoyatov’s relatives, quickly found its way onto the market of cotton sales to the Baltic states. According to some reports, in order to take care of this, the Minister even had to pay a visit to the capital of Estonia along with Inoyatov’s nephew. The competition took itself out of the game – a company belonging to Bakhadyr Ismailov, which had been active in this market, quickly shut down after a criminal case was opened against Ismailov.

The cotton business is a super-profitable one. It’s not so much the obvious demand for this product in northern countries. Aside from everything else, importers make money on simple category misallocation [peresortitsa], indicating low-quality cotton fiber in tax and customs documents instead of the actual higher-quality fibers involved.

This was not a particularly original scheme. For instance, in 2003-2005, US-registered companies called Suncape LLC and Texcom LLC signed contracts with the state foreign trade company Uzmarkazimpex, which is run by Kamalov, a close relative of SNB General Ismailov – contracts № 2003/06/39-Е and № 983/04/01/DBX for the delivery of fourth- and fifth-quality cotton fiber. The amount of each contract was 13.3 million US dollars. After that, it was simple sleight-of-hand – instead of the low-grade cotton indicated in the contracts, the buyer received first- and second-quality cotton fiber. The profit resulting from the category misallocation was around 10 million US dollars, completely tax-free.

Of course, those transactions were not entirely victimless. The SNB staff employee responsible for Uzkhlopkoprom, who tried to stop the deals from going forward, was fired inside of a day with no explanation. The head of the SNB’s directorate for fighting corruption, Colonel Vladimir Radjabov, was also driven out of the SNB, after trying to get to the bottom of the particulars of a contract between Belgian company Louis Dreyfus and the foreign trade company Uzprommashimpex, which is run by the brother of SNB personnel directorate head Guzairov. Here there was a larger sum of money at stake – according to specialists, around 15 million US dollars.

The siloviki do not live by cotton alone. According to some reports, the country’s security services are directly involved in supplying Uzbekistan with counterfeit cigarettes sold under the Pine brand, which are manufactured in underground factories in Afghanistan. According to the most minor estimates, the profit from trade in these counterfeit goods amounts to tens of millions of US dollars. There’s also a company called Benif, which is run by the brother of Inoyatov’s wife, Ergashev, whose deputy is his son Sharif. This company, with the support of the head of the SNB, has practically monopolized the supply of petroleum products, natural gas, and construction materials to Afghanistan. And the SNB does not shy away from simple mafia-style protection rackets. For example, a company called Fertex, which imports chemicals, suffered a classic shakedown – the head of the company was first frightened with audits and then easily convinced to pay a bribe.

The bottom line

There’s probably no point in focusing so much attention at Rustam Inoyatov’s business dealings. Representatives of many CIS countries’ security services are involved in “entrepreneurship.” What’s more important is that in creating an arrangement that works to his own benefit, the head of Uzbekistan’s SNB has built up the entire system of government around it. President Karimov is, practically speaking, cut off from any sources of objective information. Having lost the ability to react quickly to the changing situation in the regions, the president has become a captive of his “chief security guard.” At the same time, each additional outburst of popular anger only strengthens Inoyatov’s personal power.

Strong security services cannot work in a weak state. Sooner or later, they begin to dictate their conditions to the politicians. This is why it’s misguided to call the events in Andijan a “first Uzbek revolution.” A change in power in Uzbekistan has already taken place without demonstrations and gunfire – practically speaking, for several years all power here has already been in the hands of the special services.

[Update - Turns out there's another English-language version of this article online, here at Ferghana.ru. Thanks to Laurence for pointing this out.]

Hate crimes in Russia

The Kommersant article about the diplomatic row between Russia and Poland which I linked to yesterday has a very interesting sidebar. Its intent is to question why Putin made such a fuss over the attack on Russian diplomats' kids in Warsaw, but it also serves to highlight how many hate crimes take place in Russia. Not that this is news to anyone familiar with life in this country. Note that in nearly all of the incidents listed, the victims were people of color. This list includes only incidents involving diplomatic personnel which were covered in the media, which means it's just the tip of the iceberg in terms of racially motivated hate crimes. The somewhat stilted translation belongs to Kommersant.

Unfriendly Acts which Couldn't Be Qualified as Crime

The reaction of the Russian authorities seems rather strange, all the more so since outrages against diplomats and members of their families are not so rare in Russia, even if we confine ourselves to the cases informed by the mass media.

On the night of April 10, 1998, three persons unknown assaulted the third secretary of the embassy of Tajikistan in Moscow, stealing his documents and 80 roubles. The culprits disappeared without a trace.

On April 8, 1998, some patriotically-minded citizens in St.Petersburg attacked the consul of Latvia and took him to a secret place where he was flogged. The corporal punishment was videofilmed.

On August 24, 1998, in a Moscow dwelling house a drunken neighbour attacked the ambassador of Congo to Russia. The diplomat with bruises was brought to hospital, and the scoundrel was detained by the police.

On the night of April 17, 1999, three drunken men stopped the car of the assistant of the Chinese military attache in Moscow, beat him and ran away. The Chinese officer informed the police, and the hooligans were eventually apprehended.

On July 1999, a drunken man attacked the counsellor of the embassy of Benin in Moscow, struck him and when he fell to the ground kicked and beat him. The culprit was stopped and arrested by the police.

On December 10, 2000, three skinheads assaulted and beat the second secretary of the embassy of Japan in Moscow, breaking his nose. The scoundrels ran away. The embassy sent a note of protest to the Russian Foreign Ministry.

On February 2, 2002, a group of young men dressed in black jackets with swastika assaulted and beat the third secretary of the embassy of Kenya. They ran away.

On August 5, 2002, six teenagers assaulted the 16-year-old son of the first secretary of the embassy of Cameroun. They beat the boy who had to be taken to hospital. The embassy sent a note of protest to the Russian Foreign Ministry. The police apprehended the culprits.

On November 7, 2002, six persons unknown beat the ambassador of Ghana to Russia and his car driver. The Russian Foreign Ministry denounced the assault and expressed regret.

On June 16, 2003, eight teenagers assaulted the counselor of the Chinese embassy, beat him, took his Panasonic tape recorder and ran away.

On the night of June 1, 2004, several men beat the sons of the attache of the Libyan embassy in St.Petersburg. One of them died in hospital later. The embassy sent a note of protest to the Russian Foreign Ministry. The culprits have not been found.

On June 8, 2004, the son of the Mongolian consul general was killed in Irkutsk by persons unknown.

On December 27, 2004, an unknown man struck the wife of the first counsellor of the Mongolian embassy in Russia. The woman was brought to hospital with a serious brain injury. The results of the investigation have not been disclosed.

"Russian Transparency Remains Submerged" - FT

I found this interesting commentary piece via the Inopressa website, which translates western media coverage of Russia into Russian, which I found (in this instance) via Echo of Moscow's website.

Russian transparency remains submerged
By Neil Buckley Published: August 11 2005 03:00

When baby-faced captain Vyacheslav Milashevsky saluted and blinked in the daylight last Sunday after being rescued from his mini-submarine trapped on the ocean floor, Russia appeared to have learned from the Kursk submarine disaster in 2000. A few days later, however, those conclusions are starting to look premature.

The Kursk's sinking, five years ago tomorrow, led to the death of all 118 men on board, despite some having survived the initial explosion in one of the nuclear submarine's torpedo tubes. [...]

This time, the navy went public on the incident and its apparent cause, quickly sought international aid and, crucially, allowed British, American and Japanese rescuers to rapidly reach the site off Kamchatka. Captain Milashevsky and his six crew members aboard the AS-28 mini-submarine that had got tangled in a fishing net were saved.

In a front-page headline echoed in many Russian newspapers, Novaya Gazeta commented: "One lesson of the Kursk has been learned: people's lives are more important than military secrets."

If that moral message had been absorbed, Russian commentators noted, it was an important moment for a country where human life has long been cheap.

But since the rescue it has become clear that the Kursk's lessons have been at best partially assimilated. The incident has also highlighted that, while TV news may have been neutered during Mr Putin's presidency, Moscow newspapers retain the capacity for strident criticism, even if most do not reach far beyond the capital.

This observation about the media is right on the money - this is a point that's not made often enough, and one that's sometimes distorted. Unfortunately, the existence of a few outspoken newspapers with relatively small circulations in Moscow does not make for a free press.

The Russian navy, it has emerged, confirmed the incident only 24 hours after the submarine became trapped, after an anonymous caller tipped off a Kamchatka radio station.

"Again there was an attempt at hiding information, at censorship," said Nikita Belykh, leader of the opposition Union of Right Forces party, yesterday.

The navy's initial explanation, moreover, was only partial. The submarine's propeller had got wrapped in a fishing net. But it occurred while the vessel was inspecting or trying to repair a $1bn (€809m) subsea antenna designed to track foreign submarines, in whose anchor cables the submarine then became enmeshed.

And after the foreign rescue crews departed - with the apparently heartfelt thanks of Sergei Ivanov, Russia's defence minister - debate raged in some political and naval circles over whether they should have been invited, or were even needed.

Captain Valery Lepetyukhin of the navy's emergency rescue service suggested to a press conference that conditions on the stranded mini-submarine had not really been all that inhospitable. The British Scorpio submarine that cut it free had merely speeded up an operation the Russians could have completed themselves, he insisted.

I can only observe that this was an easy comment to make once the sailors were safely on terra firma. Prideful defensiveness, probably a manifestation of an inferiority complex, on the part of Russian officials is nothing new, though, and it's probably not going away any time soon.

Dmitry Rogozin, leader of the nationalist Motherland party, told Ekho Moskvy radio that bringing in foreign rescuers had revealed the subsea antenna's location and caused "damage to national security and the Russian state".

Rogozin can always be counted on for a paranoid and offensive comment at a time like this.

Many newspapers spotlighted the cash-strapped state of the Russian fleet. Komsomolskaya Pravda, noting the navy's lack of rescue equipment and that a Scorpio submarine cost only $1.5m, added: "Any 'new Russian' could lose that in a bad night at the casino." [...]

The problem, unfortunately, is not solely a financial one. Russia has plenty of money in the stabilization fund at the moment, and I understand they're now going to buy a Scorpio or two of their very own. The Scorpios can't deploy or manage themselves, though, and unfortunately the Russian military's problems are organizational and systemic, and serious enough to create a situation in the future where the Navy has the equipment but can't get it to the right place in time, or some critical maintenance on the equipment has been neglected, etc. For a leadership that is motivated primarily by avoiding responsibility and blame, there always seems to be enough of the latter to go around.

Will he or won't he?

Andy at Siberian Light has a thorough discussion of the possibility that Khodorkovsky might mount a jailhouse campaign for a State Duma seat, which is definitely worth checking out. Kommersant has fresh coverage of this story today in English ("From the Cell to the Chamber"), including the following forecast on how things might play out if Mikhail Borisovich does decide to take the plunge:

The only one obstacle that can prevent Mikhail Khodorkovksy from running for the Duma seat may be the Moscow City Court’s expedited hearing of the appeal against the verdict of the Meshchansky Court. Should the conviction be upheld, Khodorkovsky will lose his eligibility for office. If the consideration of the case in the second instance gets protracted, the former head of YUKOS may have time to get registered and even be elected, which is not that unlikely given that the Universitetsky district has steadily voted for right-wing candidates since 1993. However, even in this case the Duma’s majority, represented by the pro-Kremlin United Russia party, is sure to strip the new deputy of his immunity from the further prosecution and to give the Moscow City Court a chance to see the YUKOS case through.

Commentator Leonid Radzikhovsky has an opinion piece in the excellent Ezhednevny Zhurnal which deals all at once with and analyzes several developments surrounding Khodorkovsky and Yukos. I've translated a couple of paragraphs which deal with the possibility of the jailed oligarch running for the Duma:

"And God Disposes" 11 August 2005, 11:59am

[...] Another story related to MBKh [Khodorkovsky] is his possible candidacy to become a [State Duma] deputy. It's clear that MBKh won't be allowed for one reason or another to participate in elections - after all, the authorities didn't put him in jail so that they could see him in the Duma! But what's much more interesting is something else: what would his real chances be if he were able to stand in an election after all? I don't know what percentage of voters would vote for Khodorkovsky for President, but in any list of local district candidates he would be the best known, the most sensational, and the most scandalous, and this alone already halfway guarantees success.

And the [voters'] choice would not be a simple one. Voting "against" [Khodorkovsky], you would thereby be voting "in favor of" - in favor of his remaining in jail. Possibly, such a situation could cause even supporters of [Khodorkovsky's] sentence to waver, after all it's one thing to agree in general, and another thing entirely to personally sign such a sentence (and a vote "against" would in fact be a personal, albeit anonymous, signature under the sentence). On the other hand, the people [narod] are not sentimental when it comes to billionaires, and, Khodorkovsky's "left turns" [a reference to one of Khodorkovsky's recent article in Vedomosti] notwithstanding, just keep repeating, "they'll lock you up anyway, but don't you steal!" [Russian idiom that I'm not sure I've translated 100% correctly - trans.]

Well, and the most important thing: this would be not just a vote on the "Khodorkovsky question," but on the "Putin question," it would to some extent show the real feelings of people toward the authorities and to their most implacable foe. If Khodorkovsky (as many are certain) were to receive an insignificant percentage of votes, this would become for him both a personal drama (his illusions about the people would be destroyed) and a sobering moment. But if he were to come close to winning or actually make it into the Duma, then that would be a small political earthquake, and perhaps a portent of larger tremors.

What a pity that this unique poll, this unique socio-political and psychological experiment, won't take place. And, of course, it won't take place. [...]

Radzikhovsky, then, is certain that ways will be found to prevent Khodorkovsky from actually standing in a by-election or an election, and I tend to agree with him. I do hope that Mikhail Borisovich moves forward with this, though, because it will be interesting to see how exactly the authorities manage to shut his candidacy down.

If they use clumsy enough methods (and based on the Russian authorities' track record on dealing with situations like this, they probably will), all they'll do is cement Khodorkovsky's reputation as a modern-day dissident and a political prisoner. For this reason, the cynic in me thinks that he should go ahead and start campaigning - it will be good for his image in the long run. And the idealist in me also thinks he should do it, to exercise his rights as a citizen and to continue to bring attention to the inanity of his imprisonment. Along with many other Russia-watchers and Russians, I eagerly await further developments in this story.

Rainy Day Blogging

It's strikingly colder in Moscow today, and a steady rain has been falling for the past couple of hours. Looking out over Leningradsky Prospekt before I left the apartment, I noticed that once again the rain has caused some odd foamy substance to form on the roadway. I photographed this phenomenon back in July:



Must be something caused by the pollution in this town getting activated by rainfall after a dry spell.

I got a bit damp as I made my way to the OGI cafe on B. Dmitrovka St., luckily I was not disappointed - they do, in fact, have free wi-fi as claimed by Yandex's hot-spot directory, which, since these things change rapidly, is not always 100% accurate.

Looks like I'll be able to spend today following up on some of the stories that I covered yesterday. I was going to go check out the leftist youth protest planned for today near the Ministry of Internal Affairs building on Gazetny Pereulok, but I think the rain will keep me from doing that. Hopefully the protesters will be more resolute. Apparently NBP activists or supporters were planning to turn up, so I was expecting to see some police beat-downs and/or arrests. But it's too damp outside for my sandals and short-sleeved shirt, even with an umbrella.

Uzbekistan in the news

OK, one more item before the free-wi-fi-having cafe closes down for the night and kicks me out. My sister thoughtfully sent me a virtual clipping from the Washington Post the other day - Jim Hoagland's column on the closure of the US airbase in Uzbekistan, titled "Ousted from Uzbekistan." This column also ran in the Moscow Times, which often reprints columns that deal with Russian or former-Soviet issues from influential US newspapers.

I couldn't find any mention of this by the Central Asia experts over at at Registan, although I'm sure they'll get around to it, since it seems significant to have a heavyweight columnist devote an entire piece to this often overlooked part of the world. Maybe they didn't bother because Hoagland's column is too generalist for them, plus it seems to basically be just a way for "official Washington" - Hoagland's phrase - to air its version of what happened:

Ousted From Uzbekistan
Our Global Strategy Trips Over Cold War Reflexes
By Jim HoaglandSunday, August 7, 2005; Page B07

If you can supply energy to world markets, do you really need the United States and its conflicting priorities and bureaucracies, along with all that yammering about human rights and democracy? For Islam A. Karimov, the dictatorial ruler of Uzbekistan, the answer is a big NO.

Karimov's recent order to the United States to cease operations at the K2 air base and pull its troops out of his Central Asian republic within six months came only after he had reached new understandings on energy and other subjects with the leaders of China, Russia and his immediate neighbors. Tyrant and butcher Karimov may be; fool he is not.

Karimov received assent or encouragement -- official Washington is not sure which -- from Russian President Vladimir Putin and from China's collective leadership to stick his thumb in Uncle Sam's eye by closing the base, a move that complicates the resupply of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. [...]

The speed and the studied shrug with which Washington greeted the Uzbek president's expulsion seem to reflect not only a bowing to Uzbek sovereignty but also an assessment that Karimov's political viability is running on empty. The former Soviet bureaucrat is playing a losing and possibly short-lived hand at home, in this view.

He superficially resembles a 21st-century Mobutu Sese Seko, Ferdinand Marcos or Erich Honecker. Those Cold War-era satraps became more trouble than they were worth to their superpower patrons when they were openly repudiated by their own people. Communicating their expendability was often more a matter of calculation than of conscience.

Because the United States is reaching so deeply into the former Soviet sphere of influence to fight Islamic extremism, Washington does not have wholly owned clients there. Actions or words from Washington that undermine Karimov (or his autocratic neighbors) also affect Putin's hold on power in the Kremlin in a direct way.

This makes Washington's support for human rights abroad a more complex but even more important undertaking than it was in the Cold War. How other nations, and particularly Islamic nations, treat their citizens is today the substance, not just the form, of international relations.

A 21st-centure Erich Honecker. Ouch. A zinger worthy of the wittiest wags in Foggy Bottom. The full text of the column (linked above) is definitely worth reading. I'm not really equipped to comment on the conclusions, but there do seem to be some insightful observations in the piece.

A rather different take on the developments in Uzbek-American relations was offered in a Moscow Times column last Friday ("Shifting Forces Along the Silk Road"), which offers more insight into China's role in the region. Definitely worth a read.