The most important thing....

[image source - a Wired story about how espionage just doesn't pay like it used to]

The headline below is correct - clearly, spies are about to become the most important thing.



Vedomosti
June 28, 2010
SECURITY IS NOT THE MOST IMPORTANT THING [translation from JRL]
At the summit in Washington: Russia is more interested in economic and technological cooperation with the US
Author: Alexei Nikolsky, Natalia Kostenko

Only four of the ten joint statements of Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama released after completion of the visit of the President of Russia to the US are connected with international security. The parties confirmed the need for ratification of the treaty on reduction of strategic offensive arms (START) signed in Prague in April and agreed to continue exchange of data about missile launches and creation of a system of global monitoring of these launches in the future and spoke "in favor of strengthening of the regime of control over conventional arms in Europe." The latter means solving of the problems related to the conventional forces in Europe treaty (CFE). Russia froze its participation in the CFE in 2007 after the new NATO members refused to ratify its modified version. The US and Russia also adopted a statement on combating of terrorism (it was decided to organize joint military exercises), on Afghanistan (transit there through Russia will be broadened) and on Kyrgyzstan (for the soonest stabilization and establishment of democracy). A source in the Russian delegation says that the statement on Kyrgyzstan means that both countries that have military bases in Kyrgyzstan will abstain from unilateral steps and will have consultations about the measures that should lead to destabilization of the situation.

Of the remaining six statements two have a humanitarian nature and four deal with economy and development of technologies, for example, entrance into WTO. The two agreements on Skolkovo signed during the visit of Medvedev are dedicated to the same topics.

According to the source in the Russian delegation, the statements in the field of security were promoted by the American party more, whereas the Russian delegation put an emphasis on economic cooperation. The source added that the US persistently proposed continuation of nuclear disarmament in the form of the measures for limitation of tactical nuclear weapons, but Moscow looked at this process more cautiously and was not sure that it would receive benefits from it.

Dean of MGIMO Ivan Safranchuk says that such attitude of Moscow is quite explainable. Security topics related to nuclear weapons and third countries like Iran, North Korea and Afghanistan have dominated in the Russian-American relations for a long time. Having adopted a course at modernization, Russia saw a different benefit in relations with the US and was not enthusiastic about a return to recalculation of warheads.

The gas flap in the broader context of Belarusian-Russian relations

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Russia-Belarus Relations at a Political 'Standoff'

Gazeta
www.gzt.ru
June 21, 2010
Article by Fedor Lukyanov: "Russia's Conscience" 
[Translation from JRL - note: see here for another comment on this story]

The latest conflict between Moscow and Minsk is no surprise to anyone, because there has already long been no trace of the "union fraternity." But the present-day opposition does not look like the previous rounds. The general context has changed, which has also influenced the logic of behavior of the parties.

The difference in Russian-Belarusian relations from Russia's relations with other neighbors consists of the fact that they were based on an economic foundation. This may seem like a paradox, because, since the late 1990's, Moscow and Minsk were specifically in a political union and practically always held identical positions on questions of foreign and domestic policy. But this alliance was predominantly declarative in nature. However, thanks to the presence of the Union State, political differences were formally removed and did not require special regulation, including with the aid of economic levers of effect (as was the case with, say, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and the Baltic countries).

The bilateral conflicts of the zero years, which were sometimes very acute, always had the same essence: Attempts to convert political unions into economic dividends. On the part of Russia, the discussion centered around acquisition of Belarusian assets that were necessary for restoration of former Soviet production chains. On the part of Belarus, the goal was to ensure maximal subsidization of the national economy on the part of Moscow. And although the outwardly transitory clashes of Russia and Belarus were reminiscent of the similar Russian-Ukrainian scenario, they did not have the political aftertaste that was characteristic of the latter.

Today, relations have taken on the nature of political opposition. Aleksandr Lukashenka openly spoke out against the Kremlin in an acute and extremely dangerous crisis: The overthrow in Kyrgyzstan and the events that followed it. Having supported Kurmanbek Bakiyev and given him the tribune of the CIS (the ex-president is speaking out in the Minsk staff headquarters of that organization), and in fact accusing Moscow of supporting the overthrow of a legitimate head of state, the Belarusian leader has cast doubt upon Russia's right to post-Soviet leadership. Moreover, this is happening at a moment when objective prerequisites have arisen for such leadership. The other subjects of big world politics are immersed in their own problems and, in essence, do not object to Moscow's sorting out all of the problems on the territory of the former USSR that everyone else has grown tired of.

In prior years, all efforts - intellectual, political-diplomatic, economic, and even military - were aimed at proving to foreign players in the West that Moscow had a predominant influence in that part of the planet. The course was crowned with success, partly because of the consequences of the world crisis, but nevertheless... And here, it turned out that there was no well thought-out plan for restoring leadership. And Lukashenka himself assumed the role of a sort of "conscience of Russia," constantly pointing out to Moscow the inconsistency and contradictory nature of its policy.

The non-recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was reminiscent of Russia's former position on Kosovo, which Moscow rejected in the case of Georgia. Defense of Bakiyev underscored the fact that the interim government, supported by Russia, has no legal basis, that everything that it does is, strictly speaking, unlawful, and that Moscow shares responsibility for the lawlessness. The refusal to join the Customs Union is a confirmation of the unequal nature of integration, under which the strongest partner makes too few steps toward the weaker ones. Finally, the gas conflict exposed the double standards of Russia: It opts for concessions to Kiev, which is not included in any associations with Moscow, yet makes access more difficult for Minsk, which is formally its closest ally.

Lukashenka says all this publicly, with his inherent talent and convincingness, and also rather willfully juggling the facts. Obviously, the President of Belarus is not fighting for the law and justice in general - he is building his own independent line of defense against Russian pressure by raising the stakes in case of a "big deal."

An independent line is needed because he cannot count on the support of Europe, to which Russia's opponents on the post-Soviet area usually appeal. And this is not because Batka's ("Batka" is nickname for Lukashenka, meaning "Father" - translator's note) authoritarian practice does not suit the West - it would close its eyes to this. Actually, the European Union had begun to clearly "warm up" to Minsk even before the Russian-Georgian war, and the process was accelerated after August of 2008. But the economic - and then also political - crisis of the European Union reduced its activity on the post-Soviet area to a minimum. Brussels and the capitals of the leading states clearly cannot be bothered with this now. Belarus, of course, will try to revive the European phobia against Russian energy imperialism, but the repercussions will not be comparable to the previous "gas wars." Furthermore, the volumes of transit through Belarus are many times less than through Ukraine. It is summer now, and what Europe wants most of all is not to be distracted from the battle over the euro.

Minsk evidently understands this, and so it intends to rely on its own efforts. Lukashenka is holding some trump cards. Aside from the Customs Union, which remains a key priority for Moscow, these now also include the CSTO. Russia needs this organization for legitimization of possible actions in Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus is fully capable of imposing a veto. Especially since Lukashenka's position on Bakiyev (we cannot change the status-quo) finds if not support, then at least the tacit understanding of his counterparts - Islam Karimov, Emomali Rakhmon and Nursultan Nazarbayev. All of them fear to one degree or another that, if Russia is allowed to intervene in domestic affairs, sooner or later this will also affect them.

For Moscow, the conflict with Minsk this time is also primarily political. Integration projects - the creation of the Customs Union, the strengthening of the CSTO - are attempts by Russia to use the world situation and the absence of interest of other players to stop the expansion of other centers of power (EU, China, US) on the post-Soviet area. As strange as it may seem, it is specifically Belarus that has become the main obstacle in the path of realization of this goal, especially because Lukashenka cannot be called either anyone's puppet, or a Russophobe dreamer.

Russia's relations with Belarus today are at a crossroads. It is no accident that the Russian envoy to Belarus, Ambassador Aleksandr Surikov, stated that, if Minsk refuses to join the Customs Union, Moscow may return full customs control to the border between the two countries. This is logical. The project of the Union State in the form in which it was once devised by Boris Yeltsin and Aleksandr Lukashenka has fully exhausted itself. Now there must be a qualitative change. Either this is the beginning of real step-by-step integration, which the Customs Union project envisions. Or it is a return to the fully autonomous existence, with total re-computation (deliveries, transit, duties, markets, payment for military facilities, etc.).

Then again, the second variant would be a political defeat for Russia, because it would demonstrate its inability to convince even its closest ally of the benefit of cooperation. For Belarus, this is also fraught with difficulties: Without preferential conditions and subsidies on the part of Moscow, the Belarusian economy would find itself in an extremely difficult position, and it does not have anyone in particular to count on.

The current opposition of Moscow and Minsk is a war of nerves. Russia needs to prove at any cost that it is capable of overcoming any opposition and achieving its set goals. Belarus must stake out the status of a privileged partner, with whom one must come to agreement seriously and with full respect. And the standoff continues.

(Begin boxed material) Fedor Lukyanov

Lukyanov's biography is an example of how devotion to a beloved cause becomes a guarantee of success. He began his activity in the foreign broadcast editorial office of Moscow Radio. After that, he worked at the newspaper, Segodnya, and later assumed the duties of deputy chief editor of the newspaper, Vremya Novostey. In 2002, Lukyanov headed up the journal, Russia in Global Politics. A year later, he became a member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy. Lukyanov has a rare hobby - political caricature of the Soviet period. (End boxed material)

Resetting, Reloading and Rolling up Sleeves

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Rossiiskaya Gazeta
June 21, 2010 [translation from JRL]
"ROLLED-UP SLEEVES" SUMMIT
An interview with Russian Ambassador to the United States Sergei Kislyak
Author: Andrei Shitov

Question: What can you say about the forthcoming Russian-American summit?
Sergei Kislyak: It is going to be an important visit indeed, the first official visit of our president to the United States. President Dmitry Medvedev visited the United States on many occasions already but they were not official visits.
     Agenda of the visit is known. The presidents will discuss a broad range of issues including arms control, of course. Still, there is more to the bilateral relations between Russia and the United States than arms control. There is a colossal potential for economic contacts. Russia's interest in innovations and advanced technologies is well known as well. I reckon that the presidents will discuss it all.

Question: The Americans sometimes call the forthcoming meeting an innovations summit...
Sergei Kislyak: Yes, this is going to be an important component of the summit. All the same, it is wrong to assume that innovations are all the presidents will be discussing.

Question: What will it be - a discourse over strategic cooperation or something more specific than that?
Sergei Kislyak: First and foremost, we have a presidential commission. Its working groups comprising ministers and deputy ministers already discuss specific projects. I'm convinced that the report on the work of the commission to be presented to the heads of states will become a solid foundation of our strategic cooperation. It is strategy that the presidents will be discussing.

Question: Will the report be published?
Sergei Kislyak: Work on the report continues and diplomats have a rule: they never make declarations on whatever is not complete yet. In any event, a good deal of information on the progress made by the commission will be made available to general public.

Question: Will any economic documents be drawn along with the report?
Sergei Kislyak: Some points will be made but I cannot say in what form, yet. It might be a joint statement, for example.

Question: What about political documents then?
Sergei Kislyak: Not every summit inevitably ends in adoption of some major document, you know. The presidents seem to trust each other which is fine. It enables them to listen to each other and to pool efforts rather than work at cross purposes. It is more than an exchange of opinions. It sets the tone and atmosphere of political relations between our countries.

Question: Well, perhaps, you could say something more definite about the expected results of the summit?
Sergei Kislyak: Lots of matters are on the agenda. Some of them will be addressed and solved, others will not. There are traditional items like nonproliferation and war on terrorism, there are others that are important too. There are no rules saying that every summit ought to end in a joint statement on every item on the agenda. What counts is that work continues. We would like to see the Americans participating in innovation programs in Russia, and I hope that the summit will encourage it.
     There are trade talks as well. It will be wrong to assume that they will be concluded in time for the summit. Work continues. In any event, it is going to be a working summit meaning that the presidents will be addressing genuine problems rather than going through the motions for the benefit of public relations.

Question: How would you appraise the current state of the Russian-American relations?
Sergei Kislyak: I came to the United States after the Georgian aggression against South Ossetia. Relations between our countries at that time were probably the worst ever since the end of the Cold War.
     The new Administration came to the White House with its own views on international affairs and, among them, relations with Russia. The situation started changing, and changing fast. Barack Obama suggested a "reload" and he meant it. So did we, for that matter. It is hardly surprising of course considering common challenges Russia and the United States are facing. The "reload" is bearing fruit already. Our relations are more sincere now. Our counties listen to each other.
     It does not mean, of course, that we always agree with each other. We do not. What counts, however, is that we discuss whatever we disagree on in a civilized manner.

Question: Does the term "reload" really apply to what is happening in the bilateral relations?
Sergei Kislyak: It was perfect once, when it was necessary to extricate our relations from the tight corner they had been in. The way I see it, the period of "reload" is over now. I'd say that what we are doing now is establishing solid partnership.

Question: What changes in the American approach are particularly important to Russia?
Sergei Kislyak: Signing of the START treaty was quite important an event. It is not the reduction as such that really matters. What matters is that this document demonstrates cooperation between Russia and the United States in strategic stability maintenance. It was made plain by the very nature of the talks and their atmosphere. I hope that both signatories will ratify the document soon.
     Readiness of the US Administration to take an unbiased look at the American ballistic missile defense system in Europe is also important. What Washington intends to develop in Europe causes no concerns. Military clarity and stability along our borders improved some. Anyway, the Cold War is over and I do not think that it will ever return.

Question: Has the Russian diplomacy responded to changes in the U.S. policy?
Sergei Kislyak: But of course. We took the "reload" seriously and backed our resolve with specific decisions and programs. Our American colleagues were permitted to ferry their military to Afghanistan via Russia. This is something that would have appeared impossible only recently. We are thinking at this point over what else we can do to help the Americans because a lot of matters that have an effect on our security are related to Afghanistan.
     I do not think that our attitude toward America changed greatly from what we were prepared to do for it in the past. I'd say that the Americans finally saw the error of their ways and began working on amelioration of our relations.

Question: Are there issues Russia and the United States prefer to stay away from?
Sergei Kislyak: As I said already, we do not agree on absolutely everything. South Ossetia is one such issue. Predictable security of Europe is another. The Americans like to give us chapter and verse on democracy. On the other hand, they themselves are not exactly lily-white from the standpoint of human rights.
     No, I do not think that there are any issues our countries are afraid to approach. There are issues that are priorities because they are important for both our countries.

Suspicion of the Westward Turn

 Given their partner publications, perhaps the tone of this Vedomosti editorial shouldn't be surprising.

[image source]

Website Fears Russia's 'Turn West' Aimed at Preserving 'Corrupt' System
Vedomosti
www.vedomosti.ru
May 26, 2010
Editorial: "Turn West" (Translation courtesy of JRL)

The modernization of Russia declared by the country's first person dictates fundamental changes in foreign policy. A number of events confirm that Moscow is abandoning the fat years' great power arrogance and isolationism and striving for full-fledged cooperation with the West.

It seems that Russian politicians are striving for more trusting relations and, in the future, even for integration with Europe. For example, the recent warming of relations between Moscow and Warsaw is connected not only to the personal sympathies of the premiers and the catastrophe involving Poland's aircraft No. 1 near Smolensk. The tone itself of foreign policy speeches and documents has changed. The participation in the 9 May Victory Parade in Red Square by NATO country military units and its conclusion with Beethoven's "Ode to Joy" -- united Europe's anthem -- are symbols confirming the trend.

The "Program for Effective Use of Foreign Policy Factors for Purposes of Russia's Long-term Development" published the in the magazine Russkiy Newsweek (the document's authenticity is confirmed by experts and the lack of the MID's (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) denials) must not be considered as our response to American President Barack Obama's new international strategy. The program, however, suggests a very substantial tactical correction. The understanding that "reinforcing relations of interdependence with leading world and regional powers . . . including the creation of 'modernization alliances' with our main West European partners and with the European Union as a whole" will help Russia emerge from the crisis has arrived to replace self-satisfied statements about an "island of stability."

Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov is talking about the need for political rapprochement with advanced countries. In the article "The Euro-Atlantic: Equal Security for All" published the other day in the French magazine Defence Nationale, the minister emphasized that our country "is an integral part of Europe" and pointed out that "the philosophy of joint work lies at the foundation of Russia's foreign policy." Yet another key of the article is that Russia will not get into confrontation with the West and when necessary will wait while "natural processes create the conditions for convergence at the level of assessments and practical policy."

Two reasons caused the changes in Russian foreign policy. Europe and the US agreed to take Russia's interests in the post-Soviet space into greater consideration. Simultaneously, they recognized in the Kremlin that they will not succeed in modernizing the Russian economy using their own efforts and resources. Adults posing as an offended adolescent -- this is not the best way to attract western investments and technologies. And this means that political trust is needed.

It is another matter that closer relations with Europe and the US may lead to ambiguous consequences for Russia and, speaking broadly, for the post-Soviet space. The problem is in the understanding of the term "convergence," meaning rapprochement of different economic and political systems, and the degree of this rapprochement. Convergence with the European Union, of which Lavrov spoke, may accelerate the creation in Russia of European institutions -- the supremacy of the law, the independence of the courts, and the inviolability of private property.

There is, though, reason to fear that part of the Russian establishment views the future "European choice" exclusively as the state and major corporations' free access to Western technologies and credit lines, as the possibility of one's own going about Europe without a visa, buying real estate, and maintaining high standards of consumption. Moscow probably is trying to use cooperation with Europe in order to, by attracting resources and technologies, preserve the present system: clannishness, corruption, and access to resources through the electoral system.

Causes of Xenophobia in Russia Analyzed

Dec. 27, 2005

Causes of Xenophobia in Russia Analyzed (translation courtesy of JRL)
Moskovskiy Komsomolets
http://mk.ru
May 25, 2010
Article by Valeriy Fedorov, general director of All-Russia Public Opinion Research Center: The Distinctive Features of Our National Xenophobia. Why Some People Living in Russia Do Not Like Other People Living in Russia and Foreigners

A mixture of races, cultures, and languages is common in today's world. Globalization has left its mark not only on the megalopolises, but also on the dacha zones and even the most remote oblasts and rayons. The Chinese and Koreans are not a problem on Sakhalin Island, but the uncontrollable stream of immigrants from Central Asia is arousing concern. Black-skinned waiters in cafes in Voronezh, the capital of the chernozem zone, have ceased to be unusual and are now a common sight. A former student from Africa who has settled down in Volgograd Oblast almost became the head of a rayon in last year's election. And no one is surprised anymore by the Armenian or Azerbaijani cafes that have become centers of gravity for their respective emigre communities in Pereslavl-Zalesskiy, a city which has been Russian since time immemorial.

Cultural and ethnic diversity, according to social scientists, facilitates the circulation of information and the exchange of innovations, encourages more rational behavior by individuals, and leads to the development and increasing complexity of the society as a whole. Life in a multi-ethnic society raises so many more issues than life in a mono-ethnic society, after all, and obliges people to be more considerate of one another and more circumspect and prudent in communication with people who do not resemble themselves. This life is extraordinary, diverse, and rich, but it is also less predictable and often entails more risks. These risks are diverse and there are numerous reasons why people of some races and nationalities are suspicious, dismissive, and afraid of others. And the ones who are afraid or dismissive are many in number: When VTsIOM (All-Russia Public Opinion Research Center) asked respondents to name "the nationalities and ethnic groups arousing irritation or hostility in you," only 56 percent replied there were none, while 35 percent named those ethnic groups.

What are the reasons and motives for inter-ethnic tension, irritation, and hostility? A few years ago, economic factors were the most common explanations in public opinion polls: Respondents would say that people of other nationalities (primarily immigrants, but also people from the Russian North Caucasus) were taking jobs away from the native residents. Today this is a much less common reason, however. Many people evidently have realized that the new arrivals are doing the kind of work for the kind of salary the native resident would never want. The ban instituted a few years ago to keep non-citizens of Russia from working in retail trade also had an impact, eliminating what had been one of the most irritating factors in inter-ethnic relations since the final years of the USSR.

There is another economic reason, but it is also partly social: the prevalence of certain ethnic communities in specific fields of business, the monopolization of these fields by associations formed on ethnic grounds. It is actually impossible for an "outsider" to break into these fields. In contrast to the former reason, this one still exists and still bothers people.

In this context, it is worth remembering that our society as a whole has acquired so many internal divisions in recent years that some researchers are already calling them classes: the lawyer class, the law enforcement class, and the deputy class.... Each of these classes lives by its own private rules, firmly supports "its own people" in their conflicts with "outsiders," and is highly selective in its acceptance of people from outside the class. When this kind of social division is supplemented with linguistic or family divisions, it can close off the entire field of activity to people wishing to enter the field or even to look into the field from outside. We know that the most bloody and brutal practices in our army usually can be found in units where "hazing" has been replaced with "ethnic affiliations."

In spite of this, the cultural factor still generates more inter-ethnic tension than socioeconomic factors: distinct differences in the appearance and behavior of members of other nationalities. Some are set apart by their inability to speak Russian well, others wear unusual clothing, and still others (these make up the largest group) behave in ways that seem odd in our society. This is most conspicuous in the "packs" of young people who amuse themselves by shooting into the air, for example, or by engaging in amateur car racing on the city streets. The "alien" stereotypes therefore are constantly reinforced by the inappropriate behavior of these "aliens" instead of gradually disappearing as people gain personal experience in communicating with representatives of other cultures. When people hear about examples of this behavior in the media or simply "through the grapevine," they are seriously exaggerated and make a profound impression because they fit so well into the traditional matrix of perceptions: "Others are aliens, and aliens are dangerous." That is how these negative attitudes take root in people's minds.

Respondents also voice another complaint in the polls: "These people usually lack even the rudiments of culture and do not know the right way to act." It is true that a new arrival, especially one from a small town or a rural community, has trouble getting used to urban life and it can take a long time for yesterday's peasant to stop keeping chickens or a sheep on his balcony. Many jokes were made about this even in the Soviet era. We can only rely on time and the education of the next generation -- the children of the new arrivals, who will act and feel like genuine urbanites -- to eliminate this problem.

On the other hand, it is interesting that the residents of rural communities, who are less likely for many reasons to travel outside their communities and less likely to see people of other races and nationalities, are more likely to say they "do not like the appearance, behavior, and character traits" of people of other nationalities. The residents of the capital cities, who are accustomed to differences in appearance and language, criticize the "aliens" for "not caring about customs and standards of behavior."

Whereas the first case is one in which people accustomed to the traditional culture have a negative reaction when they encounter unforeseen circumstances, the second case reveals the reluctance of urbanites to accept the irritating behavior of strangers they regard as boorish.

Now we can move on to the main thing. The most common response to the question of why members of other ethnic groups arouse animosity and suspicion was this: "I avoid them because of the threat of terrorism."

The terrorist acts in Moscow revived the fears of not only terrorists in general, but also the environment and territories giving rise to them. The Caucasus is the first place meeting this description for most people in Russia. This probably is the main reason that 32 percent of the respondents who were asked to judge the state of inter-ethnic relations in our country said they had become more strained and less tolerant in the past year. Only half as many -- just 16 percent -- expressed the opposite opinion.

The results of a similar poll in 2005 actually were worse: 41 percent in contrast to 17 percent. In other words, we actually could say that inter-ethnic relations in Russia have displayed positive changes. This conclusion can only be tentative, however: There are still so many stumbling blocks and hidden obstacles in this highly sensitive area. Regrettably, this is most evident in the capital -- in Moscow: 51 percent of the Muscovites said that inter-ethnic relations in the city are strained, troubled, and even conflict-ridden.