American Interests in the Caucasus by Sergey Markedonov

Kavkazskii Krai - Transit Routes, originally uploaded by lyndonk2.

Below is an original translation of a recent article which I thought was important enough to spend time rendering in English. I have added hyperlinks to some of the items cited by the author. The original article is here.


American Interests in the Caucasus
Sergey Markedonov, Polit.ru, May 13, 2010

The immediate reason for writing this article was my telephone conversation with a correspondent of the Voice of Russia radio station. The journalist for the state-owned station was interested in an article by Alexander Cooley and Lincoln Mitchell, two American specialists from Columbia University. The political scientists’ article, subtitled “Action Memorandum” and addressed to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, concludes that a serious reformatting of America’s foreign policy toward Georgia and Abkhazia is necessary. You read correctly, Cooley and Mitchell consider Abkhazia as a separate policy actor (and not just an object of policy), with which a constructive relationship should be developed, without, however, formally recognizing Abkhazia’s independence. “Engagement without recognition” is the formula used by the Columbia University specialists. It is also worth noting that their piece was published under the heading “Off the Beaten Path” in the influential publication The American Interest. [1]

Certainly it is pleasant to see a state-run radio station that broadcasts overseas taking interest in foreign intellectual discourse. One can only welcome the familiarization of Russian journalists with the opinions of their foreign colleagues, without which an adequate understanding of the expert and policy community in the U.S. and Europe would be impossible. But I was puzzled by the tone of the question: “Does this signal a change in American policy priorities in the Caucasus?” What can we conclude from this question? That Russian journalists and experts (and this isn’t the first time I’ve heard such a question) genuinely believe that any article by an American professor or consultant represents an expression of the American government’s will. In the post-Soviet republics people take a similar approach toward the statements of Russian experts. In both cases such assessments are far from the truth. But the situation with Russia merits a separate article, and here we will focus on the American situation in greater detail. Especially since the understanding of it in our country is of practical significance. Failing to fully understand (or to understand at all) how the American government, decision-making systems, and academic community function, we make quite substantial mistakes in our foreign policy.

For example, in 2007, there was a lively discussion in the U.S. about American participation in the Baku-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Kars railway project. The Bush Administration was interested in this project, and no less a luminary than Matthew Bryza of the State Department (who was responsible for the South Caucasus) spoke about it as though it were a done deal. Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress was against the plan because it was opposed to increasing the international isolation of Armenia, an American ally. This topic was the subject of a representative roundtable discussion in Russia, where highly placed political analysts close to the government with utter seriousness asserted that Washington would support the project because the Administration was in favor of it. Attempts to explain to my colleagues that Congress is not the “voting department” of the White House were unsuccessful. To the contrary, they met with responses along the lines of, “But in Russia the Duma would never go against the Kremlin.” The whole point is that the American Congress is not the Russian Duma, which is why the ambitious railway plan was ultimately not supported by Washington. But a lack of understanding of the decisionmaking process in the U.S. created an inaccurate “picture” of the prospects of this particular project.

Unfortunately, those [Russians] who attempt to elucidate American foreign policy actions in the Greater Caucasus also fail to fully understand the debates among American specialists about this unsettled region. Aside from the association of political scientists with American passports en masse with the positions of the U.S. State Department, Russian experts and journalists suffer from an additional affliction – one that is, alas, quite widespread. They try to simplify the positions of American political scientists regarding the “Five-Day War” and its aftermath by presenting them as patently pro-Georgian. This leads to not entirely sensible actions. For instance, in the summer and fall of 2008 our politicians and journalists talked of practically an “informational conspiracy” against Russia during the hot August days in South Ossetia. Then in the fall of 2009 the same people expressed their surprise at the “balanced report” of the E.U. expert commission headed by Heidi Tagliavini. In the first case the incorrect assessment led to an extremely and unjustifiably inflated anti-Western hysteria, in which our mass media played into the hands of hawks in Washington and Brussels by portraying the events of 2008 as a confrontation not with the Georgian leader but with a “combination attack” of the Western world arrayed against “a Russia rising from its knees.” In the second case our surprise was again misplaced, because Tagliavini’s “balance” was suggested long before the official publication of her commission’s report. Quite simply, there was nothing to be surprised at.

To be clear, of course there are some American writers who are genuinely sympathetic to President Mikhail Saakashvili and view him and Georgia under his leadership as a “beacon of democracy.” Ronald Asmus, a well known and influential student of transatlantic security issues, devoted his entire book to this idea. In A Little War that Shook the World (published and widely presented in January 2010), the author states that “the origins of this war do not lie in the details of local ethnic rivalries between Georgians on the one hand and Abkhaz and South Ossetians on the other, or even the future status of these provinces.” In Asmus’s view, at the root of the events of 2008 lay “Tbilisi’s desire to break free of what had been a quasi-colonial relationship with Moscow and to become part of a democratic West.” (pp. 8, 216). As a matter of fact, this is the methodology used to construct [Asmus’s] assessments of the situation in the Southern Caucasus during the period leading up to the tragic events of that hot August of 2008. Abkhazia and South Ossetia are viewed not as independent figures but solely as instruments of Russia’s “offensive policy” and barriers to Georgia’s movement towards the West (pp. 54, 63-64). Russian policy toward the two formerly rebellious autonomies is regarded as a “creeping annexation” of Georgian territory, and “passportization” is seen as a politico-ideological justification for Georgia to cause “damage” (p. 42 [sic]). The introduction to Asmus’s study was written by Strobe Talbott, also a well known personality in contemporary American policy and analytical circles, the president of the Washington-based Brookings Institution who served as Deputy Secretary of State in 1994-2001: “I can even imagine [this book] will have resonance in Moscow, where thoughtful but well-connected and in some cases well-placed Russians are – quietly and cautiously – pondering the lessons, consequences and implications for the future of their government’s constant troublemaking in the Caucasus and, in particular, its mauling of Georgia in August 2008.” (p. xi). Thus, the introduction immediately indicates the book’s frame of reference for the reader: Russia is the “bad guy” and Georgia is the “good guy.”

However, judging all of American political science based on a single book (although quotations from it were eagerly posted by Russian websites) is a thankless task! Admittedly, it’s a thankless task in general to talk about a “unified Western approach” to the Five-Day War. On August 11, 2008 (while the fighting was still taking place), in an interview with Salon’s Glenn Greenwald, prominent Caucasus expert Charles King of Georgetown University said, “I think it's very simplistic to see this as the Russian autocratic bear trying to snuff out this small beacon of democracy. There are bigger issues…that are at stake here as well.” That same day Prof. King, in an article in the Christian Science Monitor (the publication with the second-largest circulation in the U.S. [sic]) appropriately headlined “Russo-Georgian conflict is not all Russia's fault,” wrote, “Russia must be condemned for its unsanctioned intervention. But the war began as an ill-considered move by Georgia to retake South Ossetia by force. Saakashvili's larger goal was to lead his country into war as a form of calculated self-sacrifice, hoping that Russia's predictable overreaction would convince the West of exactly the narrative that many commentators have now taken up.” Several lines later King concludes, “For Georgia, this war has been a disastrous miscalculation. South Ossetia and Abkhazia are now completely lost. It is almost impossible to imagine a scenario under which these places – home to perhaps 200,000 people – would ever consent to coming back into a Georgian state they perceive as an aggressor.”

Subsequently King examined these points in greater detail in his academic publications. Steven Pifer, former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine (who by the way works with Talbott at Brookings), told the Los Angeles Times on August 13, 2008, that “Saakashvili gave the Kremlin an opportunity when he sent troops into the separatist region of South Ossetia last week in an effort to reassert Georgia's sovereignty.” Nikolai Petro, a professor at the University of Rhode Island and an assistant on Soviet issues in the State Department under George H.W. Bush, published an article in May 2009 entitled “The Legal Case for Russian Intervention in Georgia,” in which he asserts that practically all aspects of Russia’s operation in the Caucasus in August 2008 were consistent with international law and with Russia’s mandate as a peacekeeper. And in 2008 Lincoln Mitchell, who we mentioned at the beginning of this article, published a book with the telling title “Uncertain Democracy [the word “uncertain” can be translated [into Russian] as “dubious,” “unstable,” “unreliable” – S.M.]: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia’s ‘Rose Revolution’.”

Therefore, we should not oversimplify the American expert community’s understanding of Russian motives and actions in the Caucasus, especially if we are mindful of the anti-Russian phobias and fears that are present in American society (which we should ourselves be working much more actively to break down). Only then will we avoid unexpected surprises and discoveries and minimize inappropriate actions.

In any event, Cooley and Mitchell’s article is valuable not only in the overall context of American political science. It proposes some interesting arguments which deserve serious attention. The authors start by pointing out that since August 2008 the U.S. and the E.U. have consistently refused to accept Russia’s decision to recognize Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence. And this policy, in their view, has failed, while there has been no success in developing an acceptable relationship with the two disputed regions. Cooley and Mitchell assert that “these territories are almost certainly lost to Georgia, possibly for decades,” and that Russian influence there “has increased rapidly and substantially.” Thus, “[u]nless the United States changes its approach, the Russian Federation will soon completely absorb Abkhazia and South Ossetia.” In order to prevent such a scenario, the Americans together with the E.U. must “urgently…end the current policy of isolation with respect to these territories and replace it with one of ‘engagement without recognition.’”

What methods do Cooley and Mitchell propose for this? In the section of their article subtitled “Abkhazia First” they discuss the serious differences between the two de facto states on Georgian territory. In their opinion, Abkhazia already has certain “attributes of statehood” while sparsely populated South Ossetia, “landlocked between Georgia and Russia,” is difficult to imagine as a full-fledged state. Consequently, the American specialists suggest that Abkhazia should be the first priority in terms of building bilateral (multilateral, if we take into account the U.S., E.U. and other Western integrative structures) relations. But what about Georgian territorial integrity? In Cooley’s and Mitchell’s opinion, Georgia’s territorial integrity has a “specific meaning”: this concept is correctly applied to describe the Georgian SSR, but not contemporary Georgia, since in reality such “integrity” “simply does not exist.” The authors do not seek to toss the project of “restoring Georgian territorial integrity” overboard, but they note in a politically correct way that this is a long-term project. And although such a resolution of the conflict would be “ideal,” it would not be constructive and doesn’t make sense to discuss it in terms of specific time frames.

The alternative proposed by Cooley and Mitchell consists of several elements. First, “engagement” without a guarantee of formal legal recognition. By this the American political scientists mean introducing a practice of issuing entry visas to Abkhazian officials (even those traveling on Abkhazian internal passports!) for them to participate in conferences, seminars and forums. The treatment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) could serve as a precedent for such a policy. “Even though Washington does not recognize the TRNC as a sovereign state, it recognizes TRNC passports for the purpose of travel and visa applications.” The second element is a diversification of Abkhazia’s economic ties. Here Cooley and Mitchell propose activating the Abkhaz diaspora in Turkey and other Western countries. Third, the American authors propose using a familiar mechanism: non-governmental structures and civil society. “Engagement without recognition is the only policy realistically able to prevent Abkhazia’s full absorption into the Russian Federation, thus preserving a chance for the territory to be restored to Georgian sovereignty. The more coordinated that policy is between the United States and the European Union, the more efficacious it will be,” conclude Cooley and Mitchell.

One cannot help but see several of sensible and realistic assessments in their framework. Among these is an understanding of the relative nature of Georgian “territorial integrity” and the impossibility of its restoration in the short term (and of its complete restoration in general). The authors also rightly point out the difference between Abkhazia and South Ossetia (and in fact at the outset these two projects were developed to pursue different policy goals). Cooley and Mitchell do not forget to mention the ethnic excesses in Abkhazia (the expulsion of the Georgian population) but also add that stronger demands for refugee return from Georgia only serve to turn the current population of Abkhazia more resolutely against Tbilisi. Their arguments might force not only theoreticians but also policymakers in Russia to stop and think about how it might be possible to accommodate both Russian interests in Abkhazia and Abkhazia’s own foreign trade interests. Otherwise even without the interference of any “third parties” friction and conflicts are inevitable.

But Cooley and Mitchell’s main point (one might even call it their matrix of reasoning) raises a number of questions. The authors present their concept (a more detailed version is to be published separately later) as a mechanism for combating Russian ambitions in Abkhazia and in South Ossetia, even though they understand that Georgian sovereignty in these areas is problematic and mention it more as a nod to tradition than anything else. But does a naval base in Ochamchire or an air base in Gudauta (both of which still haven’t been properly outfitted) threaten any U.S. interests? Today there are many experts in the United States and in Europe who smugly accuse Moscow and Beijing of seeking to play a “zero-sum” game. Cooley and Mitchell’s position, however, is in essence precisely a call to play that old, familiar game. It turns out that a strengthening of Russia in Abkhazia automatically strikes a blow against America’s standing. But where, in what part of the world? In Georgia, where the U.S. today has total support, or perhaps in Ukraine or other corners of Eurasia? Or in the Middle East? And if not, then is it really worthwhile for Washington to focus so much on Tbilisi’s support? Especially when it has so many shared strategic interests with Russia (e.g., Afghanistan and Iran).

Meanwhile, the Cooley-Mitchell approach loses the thread of the Georgian-Abkhazian game itself. After all, Russia’s relationship with the West in this area of international politics is a function, and not the foundation, of Abkhaz-Georgian relations. And today’s Abkhazian elite is much more radically disposed toward Georgia than Russian embassy officials in Sukhumi or the people responsible for Abkhazia in the presidential administration or in the [Russian] White House. And even if we can imagine a break between the Kremlin and the Abkhazian elite, and a growth of the latter’s interest in the West (which is happening even in an atmosphere of good relations with Moscow), this would not mean an increase in their affinity for Georgia. At the same time, American experts (even those who genuinely seek to figure out the tangled web of politics in the Caucasus and don’t believe in Saakashvili’s inherent democracy) for now admit the following fact only through gritted teeth: Abkhazian Georgia-phobia and Abkhazian nationalism have their own roots, bases and traditions, including ones not connected with Moscow and with Russian “imperial” policy. Even if Abkhazia were to befriend the West instead of the Kremlin, friendship with Georgia still wouldn’t be in the cards, at least not in the context of a relationship within the formal legal boundaries of a single state. As a neighbor, Abkhazia will inevitably sooner or later reach a stage of constructive and perhaps even friendly relations with Georgia.

And of course Abkhazia can simultaneously be “with us and with them.” This alternative didn’t occur to the American specialists (or perhaps they forgot about it?). There could be a mutually beneficial partnership with Abkhazia along the lines of “engagement without recognition, but also without contraposition” (to Russia, of course).

Attempts to unilaterally isolate Russia (or “contain” it) are inconsistent with American interests. Unless, of course, one understands those interests in the traditions of the Cold War.


[1] The American Interest (AI) is a bimonthly magazine published since 2005. It was founded by several members of the editorial board of another well-known American publication, “The National Interest,” who disagreed with that publication’s editorial policy. AI is devoted to issues of international policy, world economy and security. The chairman of the magazine’s executive committee is philosopher Francis Fukuyama; the chief editor is Orientalist professor Adam Garfinkel, who was a speechwriter for Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice in the George W. Bush administration.

More almost unbridled optimism (tempered by a reality check at the end)

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Vedomosti
May 26, 2010
TURN TO THE WEST (translation courtesy of JRL)
Moscow abandons the policy of isolationism and aspires to genuine rapprochement with the West
Author: editorial
MOSCOW IS DEMONSTRATING WILLINGNESS TO EXECUTE A WESTWARD TURN IN FOREIGN POLICY

Modernization of the country proclaimed by the national leadership necessitates dramatic changes in foreign policy. Some of the latest developments plainly show Moscow's resolve to abandon world power's arrogance and isolationism and develop fully fledged cooperation with the Western community.

The impression is that Russian politicians aspire to relations of trust and ultimately to integration with Europe. The recent thaw in the relations between Moscow and Warsaw for example has little to do with personal sympathies between the Russian and Polish premiers or even with the Smolensk plane crash. The very tone of foreign policy statements and documents is different now.

Participation of NATO representatives in the military parade in Moscow on May 9 became another signal that confirms the trend. "Effective use of foreign political factors for long-term development of the Russian Federation" is a document leaked to and published by the Russian Newsweek. Its authenticity was confirmed by experts and lack of denials from the Foreign Ministry itself.

The document in question was not Russian response to the new international strategy of American President Barack Obama. On the other hand, it did signify a serious change in tactics. Soothing sermons concerning "the isle of stability" gave way to realization that recovery from the crisis necessitated "advancement of relations and interaction with the leading world and regional powers" including establishment of "alliances for modernization" with "major partners in West Europe and with the European Union in general."

Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov promotes political rapprochement with the advanced countries. His piece "Euro-Atlantics: Equal Security" featured in Defense Nationale (France) made an emphasis on the fact that "Russia is an integral part of Europe" and pointed out that "Russia's foreign policy is based on philosophy of cooperation." There was another key nuance in Lavrov's piece: Russia was not going to enter into confrontations with the West. Instead, it would merely wait for "natural processes to set conditions for convergence at the level of estimates and practical policies."

All these changes in the Russian foreign policy are attributed to two factors. The United States and Europe finally agreed to bear in mind Russia's legitimate interests in the post-Soviet zone. The Kremlin in the meantime discovered that modernization of domestic economy without foreign assistance would be an exercise in futility. Nurturing old wrongs and hurts was not the best way of attracting foreign investments and technologies. Development of political trust was.

Better relations with Europe and the United States will bring about unequivocal consequences for Russia and, broader, all of the post-Soviet zone. Everything comes down to interpretation of the term economic and political "convergence" and its degree. The Russian-EU convergence Lavrov mentioned might facilitate development of European institutions in Russia - supremacy of the law, independence of courts, and inviolability of private property.

On the other hand, certain part of the Russian establishment regards the so called "European choice" merely as a free access for the state and major companies to Western technologies and credits, as a gateway to visa-free travel about Europe to purchase real estate there. Some circles in Moscow will probably try to use cooperation with the West to conserve the existing clannish system with all its thoroughly negative features like corruption and selective access to resources.

Chopping open a "window of opportunities"

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Nezavisimaya Gazeta (translation courtesy of JRL)
www.ng.ru
May 24, 2010
A "WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITIES" IS OPENED
Progress in American policy: Washington starts taking into account the legal interests of Moscow
Author: Sergei Rogov
[A "window of opportunities" opened for normal mutually beneficial interaction of Moscow and Washington in the future was opened. Along with this, the Russian-American relations remain fairly fragile.]

For 18 months Russia and the US were on a verge of a new cold war. Now it is possible to say that relations between the two countries have reached the highest point in the last 15 years.

After the end of the cold war the US and Russia declared strategic partnership frequently but every time these declarations did not come true. It would be wrong to blame only the Americans for the promises that did not come true. In any case, the main reason was unwillingness of Washington to take into account the legal interests of Moscow. Since the middle of the 1990s, the US permanently put Russia in front of the fait accompli. NATO expansion, attempts to weaken the Russian influence in the post-Soviet space, withdrawal from the antimissile defense treaty and unilateral use of military force contrary to the international law norms manifested unwillingness of the US to build equal relations with Russia.

Hence, many people in Russia took the reload declared by the Obama Administration skeptically suspecting that declarations would not be confirmed by real deeds again. However, now it is possible to speak about real progress in the American policy when the US starts taking into account the interests of Russia in approach to a number of key issues in reality and not in words.

1. Washington gave up the paternalist tone towards Moscow. The Obama Administration demonstrated readiness for a constructive dialog and search for compromise mutually acceptable solutions for the accrued problems.

2. A new treaty on strategic offensive arms was signed. Unlike the Moscow treaty of 2002, it does not impose unilateral concessions on Russia but enables us to maintain a balance of strategic nuclear forces on the parity basis and preserves and improved mechanism of checking.

3. Last year, the Obama Administration cancelled or froze all programs of strategic antimissile defense. It has shifted the emphasis on the regional antimissile defense that cannot threaten the Russian intercontinental ballistic missile. The US will stay in the framework of the treaty on antimissile defense de facto until the end of the current decade. This means that the model of mutual nuclear deterrence will be preserved.

4. The matter of adoption of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO that the Bush Administration had considered a priority was postponed. The new strategy of NATO evidently does not give up the idea of further expansion of the bloc but puts the main emphasis on development of military cooperation with Russia.

5. Although the US refuses to recognize the CIS a zone of "privileged interests" of Russia giving up of rigid confrontation has begun in this aspect too. Washington took political changes in Kiev and Russian-Ukrainian rapprochement quietly. After the new revolution in Kyrgyzstan Russia and the US did not support different clients but helped the new government.

6. There appeared the first signs of positive economic changes. Hearings of the possible abolishment of the Jackson-Vanik amendment took place in the US Congress for the first time in many years. The Administration submitted an agreement on cooperation with Russia in the field of nuclear technologies ("1-2-3 deal") to the Congress again. The US lifted the sanctions from Rosoboronexport and MAI. Serious negotiations on acceptance of Moscow to WTO were restarted, although it was not quite clear yet if Russia was going to join this organization independently or together with other members of the Customs Union. There are also certain changes in the stance of Russia. We signed an agreement on transit of military cargoes and personnel through our territory to Afghanistan. Russia also supported moderate economic sanctions against Iran for which the US struggled.

A "window of opportunities" opened for normal mutually beneficial interaction of Moscow and Washington in the future was opened. Along with this, the Russian-American relations remain fairly fragile. It is impossible to rule out that ratification of the treaty on strategic offensive arms may be ruined. Opponents of Obama accuse the White House of unjustified concessions to Moscow in the aspects of verification, tactical nuclear weapons and antimissile defense.

Discussion of economic issues in the Congress will be equally difficult. A state visit of President Medvedev to the US will take place a month later. This is a good opportunity to consolidate the achievements and to plan further steps for development of the Russian-American cooperation in the near future despite the disagreements about some issues.

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Social Networking in Russia

A bit of a cut-and-paste post here - a couple of translated articles courtesy of Johnson's Russia List, and some awesome graphics from Yandex kartinki, all dealing with the always-interesting topic of social networking in Russia.

Young Russian professionals choose social networks - survey

MOSCOW, May 25 (RIA Novosti)-More than half of Russian Internet users (52%) have accounts in several social networks, a poll by the Russia Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) published on Tuesday revealed.

Sociologists portrayed the typical social network user as a resident of Russian northwest administrative district (71% of them have accounts in the social networks), aged from 18 to 24 (75%), highly-educated (57% have a higher education), and financially stable.

The poll shows that the most popular network among Russians is Vkontakte with more than 75 million registered accounts. Almost one-third of the respondents (31%) visit it daily and another 23% visit the site on a weekly basis.

The second most popular Internet spot for Russian networkers- is Odoklassniki.ru. Twenty-one percent of the users visit it daily, 28% - weekly.

Unlike Odoklassniki.ru, Vkontakte allows the posting of music and video, which the networker can share with the friends and manage his or her account by changing privacy settings.

According to the survey, other social networks are not so popular amid the Russian audience. The micro-blog network Twitter is used by only 13% of the respondents, blog-generating site Blog.ru - by 14%, Facebook and MySpace are familiar to only 15% of the respondents.

The poll was held on April 3-4, 2010, with 1,600 respondents in 140 localities of 42 regions. The margin of error is 3.4%.

_______________________________________


Social Networking Sites Becoming Political, Alarming Authorities

Yezhednevnyy Zhurnal
http://ej.ru/
May 18, 2010
Commentary by Marina Litvinovich, under the rubric "In the Opposition/The Wild Ones": "The Miners Are in Contact"

Social networks are the egg in which the needle is kept, and along with it -- the death of Koshchey (fairy tale monster). Koshchey is not so much Putin as he is the established social order (which, it is true, has nothing in common with order in the sense of harmony). The social order built in Putin's time presupposes the absence of self-willed and self-reliant citizen unification and action and proceeds from the idea that everything that is happening with the society should be approved and financed in the Kremlin, and then shown in approved form on television. Public action a la Putin is a youth army of many thousands which is brought in to stand on Academician Sakharov Prospekt, who is turning over in his grave for the umpteenth time at this spectacle. The young people usually are standing to confront some kind of color threat: the planners apparently proceed from the principle of "if not skills, then numbers," and each time bring in more and more people to do the "confronting," while who they are confronting remains unclear to this day. The personification of confrontation usually ends up with good-natured bouts of drinking in the neighboring courtyards, and this is despite that fact the all the local wine stores have been closed since morning.

However, as many people predicted -- and I was one of them -- the Internet is creating a completely new structure of public space. This has become especially noticeable in the last two years thanks to the growth and development of the social networks. Millions of new social cells -- groups, communities, circles, and associations -- have arisen on the Russian (more accurately Russian-language) Internet at the websites VKontakte (In Contact), Odnoklassniki (Classmates), Meyl.ru (Mail), and LiveJournal. These communities and groups structure Russian society in an absolutely new way: the ordinary urban Internet user today voluntarily belongs to at least 2-3 communities, but at the same time is not and has never been a participant in any public association or group in reality. It is considered natural for young city-dwellers to "belong to groups" on the Internet, but completely unnatural for them to join a party or become a member of some association. This is largely because membership in Internet groups does not obligate you to anything in particular except voluntarily receiving information, and entry to and departure from them is simple. However, here is an interesting fact: if there is a threat to some interest of the given group, it mobilizes instantly and is frequently ready to move from the virtual world to reality.

With the arrival and spread of social networks, we absolutely unexpectedly received in Russia an enormous civil society consisting of millions of virtual groups. The construction of a civil society, which Russia has been seeking for many years now, was not assisted by any state efforts or international grants: it was facilitated by a simple leap forward in Internet technologies -- the transition to web2.0. And it is not so bad at all that many of the groups that have arisen on the networks are comical like, for example, the large society of people who lick yoghurt lids. Suffice it to glance at the lists of public organizations in the United States or in Europe -- strange organizations are met there too, such as the Foundation To Rescue Cows in Great Britain or the Movement To Resist Aliens from Other Planets in the United States. I will go further -- if something begins to threaten yoghurt lids, we can receive a vigorous, ready-to-act community that rises to the defense of its interests, even such unusual ones.

There are many political, human rights, and social communities in the networks. But they are not so large. The large communities are those created on the territorial or fan principle. Experience shows that in critical situations it is these communities that become the main sources of information and help people unite their efforts and move to actions offline, that is, in reality. When it was decided to revoke the license of the television channel "2x2," hundreds of fans and viewers who adored the Simpsons and "South Park" went into the streets with posters in defense of the channel. People far from politics were organized for public actions thanks to the users of the VKontakte network who originally belonged to the "2x2" Channel fan group.

After the accident at the Sayano-Sushenskaya GES (Hydro Power Plant) operational information that was different from official reports could also be gotten from users of the VKontakte network, who organized a group to exchange information on survivors and victims.

A recent example is provided to us by the situation in Mezhdurechensk, where after the explosion at the Raspadskaya Mine, the rally, the clashes with OMON (special-purpose police), and censorship of the mass media, the primary debate and exchange of information and opinions developed in the community "Devoted to the Miners of the City of Mezhdurechensk" at the mail.ru website and in a group on this same subject at VKontakte. Both communities had existed for a long time and joined people on the territorial-vocational principle. The first has more than 6,000 participants, while the second has more than 5,000. It was in fact online in the community on mail.ru that the first report appeared that clashes with OMON had begun on the railroad tracks. These same communities went very quickly from discussing "what is happening" to "what is to be done" and, inevitably, to political topics and conclusions. Words that formerly had been heard only from the mouths of the non-system opposition began to be heard from the mouths of ordinary people. And this alarmed the fighters against extremism (E Center) and the FSB (Federal Security Service). The administrator of the VKontakte group was summoned to the organs and they took his password, which makes it possible to manage user profiles and groups. Power over the group was seized, its name was changed, the group was made closed (originally admission to the group had been free and open), and all information and exchanges of opinions were deleted. Several users who made pictures of screens were able to document the process of the disappearance of information and the irreversible metamorphoses with the group.

The group on mail.ru still exists, but no one is giving any guarantees that they will not treat it in the same way. This is actually the first time that the security structures worked out a procedure for a "raider takeover" of a group on the social networks. "All it took" for this was to put strong pressure on the administrator so he would give up the password. And "pressure" is something the "siloviki" (security officers) know how to do -- it is not brain work.

State and security structures have been concerned with the subject of controlling the Internet for years now. They usually talk a great deal about the fight against pornography, but during the commotion they deal with politically undesirable websites and bloggers. And the fight is not against "wheels," but rather against individuals: bloggers are being put in jail, and as we now see, they are pumping out their passwords with threats. It is like some kind of "war and the Germans," and every blogger or group owner is a potential female radio operator Ket (Cat). I think that in the near future the "siloviki" will try to incorporate this new and promising area of the fight against their own people.

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Discouraging words

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This article from Nezavisimaya (original is here, the translation below is courtesy of JRL) is not encouraging, particularly on the issue of peacekeepers.  However, I suspect Gamova - especially given her habit of spinning stories about these regions in what are supposed to be straight news pieces - is not quite accurately reflecting Moldovan elite opinion with respect to the Kozak Plan:

Nezavisimaya Gazeta
May 13, 2010
MEDVEDEV AND YANUKOVICH TO OPEN TRANS-DNIESTER REGION
Runaway Moldovan province pins a good deal of hopes on the new Ukrainian authorities
Author: Svetlana Gamova
THE EVE OF DMITRY MEDVEDEV'S VISIT TO UKRAINE: THE TRANS-DNIESTER REGION EXPECTS SUPPORT FROM KIEV NOW ALONG WITH THAT FROM MOSCOW

Presidents of Russia Dmitry Medvedev and Ukraine Victor Yanukovich will make a joint statement regarding the Trans-Dniester region during Medvedev's visit to Ukraine on May 17-18.

A source within the Foreign Ministry said that the statement in question would declare coordination of efforts in Trans-Dniester conflict resolution. (Both Russia and Ukraine are guarantors and intermediaries in the process.) Quite importantly, there are almost 150,000 Russians and 100,000 Ukrainians living in the self-proclaimed Trans-Dniester Moldovan Republic. Medvedev once promised Trans-Dniester leader Igor Smirnov that the locals with Russian passports could count on Russian protection. Smirnov called it the most important guarantee the self-proclaimed and non-recognized republic had.

Insiders say that the joint statement to be made by Russian and Ukrainian presidents will reiterate their stand on the matter of peacekeepers: they should be left where they are. It is going to be an answer to the idea regularly brought up by Kishinev to replace the existing peacekeeping contingent in the Trans-Dniester region comprising Russian, Moldovan, and local units with foreign policemen or observers.

The Trans-Dniester parliament (Supreme Council) in the meantime hopes that installation of the new regime in Ukraine will mean an end to the blockade. Aided by then President of Ukraine Victor Yuschenko, the Moldovan authorities were able to close the border for goods and produce from the Trans-Dniester region in 2006. EU observers have manned the Trans-Dniester part of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border ever since. Without Russian aid, the region would have never survived.

"That Yanukovich wants no EU experts or whoever on the border is common knowledge. I suspect that he will do everything now to prevent prolongation of the Europeans' mandate. The Ukrainian border with the Trans-Dniester region will open then," said Arkady Barbarosh, Director of the Center for Social Policy (Kishinev).

"The EU has never wielded any clout or possessed any leverage with the region in question. Its Eastern Partnership initiative does not even promote any such objectives," said Alexander Rahr of the German Foreign Policy Council. "Russia would like to return to the region, of course, but with Yuschenko in Kiev it was impossible. It is different now. Moscow will probably reanimate Kozak's Plan, and Yanukovich will raise no objections."

"Moldova is not going to accept Kozak's Plan because it stands for continued presence of the Russian military on the Moldovan territory," Barbarosh said.

Considering the attitude of the powers-that-be currently in Kishinev, there is no chance to reanimate the Kremlin's plans first designed in 2003. The parliamentary election in Moldova this autumn may change everything. The Moldovan political establishment is already castigating ex-President Vladimir Voronin for the dismissal of Kozak's Plan. Marian Lupu, leader of the Democratic Party which is part of the ruling alliance nowadays, said that official Kishinev had failed then to consider all implications and made a mistake. Were it not for this mistake, there would have been no wine embargo that crippled Moldovan economy, he said.