Chisinau then and now

From the NY Public Library's online image collection
(which actually has a whole collection of Chisinau postcards from circa 1889)

Chisinau Arch and Cathedral - 2, originally uploaded to Flickr by chewbud.

Smacking the extended hand

[image source]

See below for further evidence that Putin lacks either the ability or (more likely) the inclination to play well with others. Although Lenta convincingly argues that Putin was misquoted on the "limited mental capacity" part (though not the preceding comments), the fact remains that VVP seems unable to get past the fact that admitting Russia's IT sector might be able to use Dell's help to develop does not mean that Russians - or their IT specialists, who are indeed some of the best in the world - are "invalids."

As I've pointed out in the past, the only people who suffer when Putin rejects offers of assistance from abroad are Russian citizens. I doubt the inflated sense of patriotism which some of them derive from Putin's displays of attitude will compensate in the long run for the opportunities many of them have missed out on thanks to a government that wants to be the only benefactor its people know.

After so many years of watching him, it's hard to be surprised at such a stupidly cocky comment, but it's still jarring:

Putin-Dell slapdown at Davos

The Russian prime minister tells the Dell CEO: 'We don't need help. We are not invalids.'

By Peter Gumbel, Europe editor
January 28, 2009: 2:34 PM ET

DAVOS, Switzerland (Fortune) -- Ever since Vladimir Putin rose to power in 2000, his political opponents and entire countries have learned to their cost that he has a tough, demeaning streak. Wednesday it was Michael Dell's turn.

At the official opening ceremony of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Putin, now Russian Prime Minister, delivered a 40-minute speech touching on everything from why the dollar should not be the sole reserve currency to how the world needed to enter into a smart energy partnership with Russia. Then it was time for questions. First up: Dell. He praised Russia's technical and scientific prowess, and then asked: "How can we help" you to expand IT in Russia.

Big mistake. Russia has been allergic to offers of aid from the West ever since hundreds of overpaid consultants arrived in Moscow after the collapse of Communism, in 1991, and proceeded to hand out an array of advice that proved, at times, useless or dangerous.

Putin's withering reply to Dell: "We don't need help. We are not invalids. We don't have limited mental capacity." The slapdown took many of the people in the audience by surprise. Putin then went on to outline some of the steps the Russian government has taken to wire up the country, including remote villages in Siberia. And, in a final dig at Dell, he talked about how Russian scientists were rightly respected not for their hardware, but for their software. The implication: Any old fool can build a PC outfit.

Using lists to think about the bilateral relationship under BHO

Obama's honeymoon period appears to be lending itself to lists in the minds of analysts - here's a list-driven piece by Steve Biegun, the McCain campaign's Russia guy and someone with a Russia background including studying the language in college, working there for the IRI in the early 1990s and serving on the Board of Directors of Ford, a company which has enjoyed a great deal of success in Russia.

And the article below by Nikolai Zlobin (the translation, which is not perfect, is from today's JRL - the original Russian is here), which is as insightful as his analyses of the bilateral relationship usually are, also runs down a list.

Vedomosti
January 28, 2009
US-RUSSIA: SIX BARRIERS
NIKOLAI ZLOBIN ON BARRIERS AND ILLUSIONS IN THE RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Discussions continue in Moscow on how Barack Obama's election
the US President will change everything in the Russian-American
relations now. Most of these discussions are based on the
following thesis: friction in the bilateral relations was fomented
by mistakes of George W. Bush's policy, vexation of Washington
with the growth of Moscow's clout with the world and its efforts
to check this growth, installation of a ring of hostile states
along the Russian perimeter, neglect of Russian interests, and so
on. More often than not the discussions end in the conclusion that
it is up to Washington now to mend its ways and remedy the
situation. I fear that this approach is erroneous. Moreover, it
constitutes a dangerous self-deception, one fraught with new
disappointments and conflicts.

Bush's policy was anything but anti-Russian. In fact, he was
probably the most pro-Russian president one could wish for. His
only fault in the relations with Russia was that he paid it
considerably less attention that Moscow would have preferred. Even
so, the US establishment kept criticizing Bush for what it thought
was pampering of Russia and for attaching what it thought was too
much importance to it.

As a matter of fact, all difficulties in the bilateral
relations stem from their own unbelievably asymmetric nature.
America is of considerably more importance to Russia than Russia
is to America - both politically and economically.

This asymmetry keeps growing. On the one hand, Russia
accounts for under 1% of the US foreign trade turnover and
therefore cannot count on being seen by the new US Administration
as a critical partner in the effort to survive the crisis. On the
other, Washington believes that all this alleged growth of
Russia's clout with the world is something of a myth really,
something cultivated in Russia itself and needed for exceptionally
domestic purposes. Neither in the shooting war with Georgia nor in
the gas conflict with Ukraine later on did Russia secure any
support abroad, within the international community or even within
the Commonwealth. No state lacking allies and partners may aspire
to any growth of its international influence and clout.

This growing asymmetry offers persuades me that Obama will
focus on Russia any more attention than his predecessor did.
Paying it lip service is more likely. That's fact number one.

Number two. The US establishment is more or less uniformly
anti-Russian. On the one hand, American elites understand that
Russia is not an adversary they should lose any sleep over or
waste time and effort to develop defense from. On the other, they
know that Russia being what it is cannot really hope to be an ally
or friend of America so that there is no overwhelming need to go
out of their way to improve relations with it. Moscow's opinion
will carry considerably less weight for Obama than opinions of
Berlin, Paris, or even Warsaw. Political values of Russia will
keep putting more and more distance between it and America with
Europe. These latter have no leverage with Moscow and perceive no
practical necessity to be seeking any. Mutual distrust will keep
growing. Claims that Washington was the puppet-master that
engineered the gas conflict with Ukraine recently only served to
convince the US establishment that the Russian authorities were
quite paranoidal in their attitude toward the United States. The
situation being what it is, trust Obama not to promote a policy
with regard to Russia that will clash with the general disposition
Washington feels toward Moscow.

Number three. The United States honestly does not think that
the responsibility for the deteriorating relations with Russia
rests with it. It will rather accept a diametric assumption. The
list of Washington's complaints against Russia is longer than
Moscow's against the United States. The widespread opinion in
Washington is that Bush's Russian policy - fraught with numerous
mistakes as it was - was nevertheless quite rational. Moreover, it
is not as if Washington had any bright ideas on how to change this
policy. The impression is that neither can Moscow boast of any
such ideas or political will to promote them.

Number four. Obama the politician is absolutely different
from Bush. On the one hand, Obama is a typical specimen of the
Chicago political machine, one known for coldly rational and
sometimes even purely administrative approach to politics. On the
other, Obama is more self-assured and self-sufficient that his
predecessor could even hope to be. Unlike Bush's, his foreign
policy will never be based on any psychological stuff like
sympathies or antipathies.

Number five. General public in the United States does not
care about improvement of relations with Russia. No forces
interested in better relations with Moscow are to be found among
US businesses, civil society, academic circles, journalist
community, or the military. And by the way, neither has Russia
lifted a finger to change this state of affairs. As a result,
Russia is absent from the US market of lobbying and it is this
market exactly that defines priorities of the new US
Administration to a considerable extent. And since improvement of
relations with Moscow is not even regarded by Washington as a
priority, how can Russia expect Obama to push other matters aside
in order to concentrate on Moscow and relations with it? General
public in Russia itself is not exactly hot on betterment of
relations with America. It is common knowledge meanwhile that this
situation is a result of a deliberately promoted policy. In a
word, it only serves to convince Washington not to waste its time
on Russia.

Number six. There is no point in expecting a serious revision
of America's relations with individual foreign states prior to a
revision by the new US Administration of the very basis of
American foreign policy. And, also importantly, without clear
signals and practical steps on the part of the mentioned
individual foreign states. Signals from Moscow never convinced
Washington that Russia was ready to meet it halfway.

That there are spheres and areas where Russia and the United
States cannot help cooperating goes without saying: from nuclear
arms and technologies control to international security and war on
terrorism, from ecology and space exploration to humanitarian
projects and Afghanistan. It stands to reason to expect
effectiveness of the American-Russian cooperation in these areas
to be higher now with Obama in the Oval Study. Actually, Obama
himself promised it in the inauguration speech. In any event,
belief that improvement of the bilateral relations is Washington's
singular task now and that Obama is itching to become friends with
Moscow is a dangerous delusion.

USDRUB

The ruble made a dramatic, if predicted, move lower today. Below is an article from Vedomosti on the subject as well as a link to their slideshow documenting the evolution of the dollar-ruble rate over the years. You can track the rate using Google Finance here.

35 руб. за доллар Сегодня на российском валютном рынке вновь драматические события — рубль дешевеет с самого начала торгов. Курсы доллара и евро в ходе торговой сессии (расчеты «сегодня») достигали 35 руб. и 45,88 руб. — оба значения исторические максимумы. Далее

Как менялся курс доллара Сентябрь 1999. Фото: Е. Стецко

And a post on businessneweurope's Moscow Blog asks, "Is it really that bad?"

Rating the media - and the governors

Medialogia, a useful ratings website I've followed in the past (which, however, seems not as frequently updated now that the election cycle is over) has a couple of interesting recaps of the Russian media market. The most comprehensive is the rating of newspapers and magazines most frequently cited in the Russian media in 2008. Interestingly, four of the top ten newspapers and five of the top ten magazines are either foreign or are Russian editions of foreign publications (albeit with local talent and content). Medialogia also has a rating of the most authoritative internet media for the fourth quarter of last year.

Also quite interesting is the ranking of governors by mentions in "central" news media for December 2008 (excerpt above). It's predictable that Luzhkov and Matviyenko would head up the list, but the drop-off in number of mentions once you get outside of the two big cities is precipitous.

Also, the previous month's bronze medalist, that connoisseur of track suits and Hummers, Ramzan Kadyrov, was knocked down a peg in December by erstwhile opposition leader and new governor of the Kirov region Nikita Belykh. Belykh's appointment occasioned much hand-wringing among the opposition about whether he was selling out or on the contrary taking an opportunity to demonstrate that politicians from the non-United-Russia camp can be successful as managers - or whether, on the third hand, he was being set up for failure by the powers-that-be by being given the governor's spot in a struggling region.

Moscow street art - the final upload

Last December I finally finished uploading all of my photos of graffiti and other "street art" from my years in Moscow. The final (for now) set contains nearly 900 photos, including stickers, stencils, scribbles, high art, political statements, etc., most of which date from late 2004 - mid-2005 and the summer of 2006. Only a few of them were ever uploaded to my now-dormant blog dedicated to such photos. These are some of my favorites, or at least the ones most readily identifiable as being именно from Moscow:

Traitor, deserter, adolescent bumbler - or just a regular guy?

[image source]

Strange things are afoot in Georgia. According to today's Moscow Times:

A Russian soldier said Tuesday that he deserted from his unit in separatist South Ossetia and sought asylum in Georgia because of unbearable living conditions, including poor treatment and scarce food.

"I wasn't captured by Georgian police," Alexander Glukhov said in an interview at a McDonald's restaurant in the Georgian capital, Tbilisi.

"I ran away because I couldn't stand the conditions I was living in," he said. "I want to stay here."

Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Alexander Drobyshevsky said earlier that Glukhov had been "seized by Georgian agents in the Akhalgori district of South Ossetia and taken to Tbilisi." Russia demands Glukhov's immediate release, Drobyshevsky said by telephone in Moscow.

Georgian Interior Ministry official Shota Utiashvili said Glukhov had handed himself over to Georgian police on Monday, complaining that the major of his unit had been beating him. "We did not detain him. He is free and can do whatever he wants," Utiashvili said. [...]

Glukhov, 21, said he was deployed in South Ossetia on Aug. 9, the second day of the war. "But I didn't take part in military operations myself. I was assigned to dig ditches and that sort of thing," he said.

He said that if he were to return to Russia, he would not want to resume his military service. "I'd just like to go home," he said, adding that he had not considered the consequences of his actions when he fled his unit more than a week ago.

When a reporter asked to see Glukhov's military identification card during the interview, Georgian Interior Ministry spokesman Shota Khizanishvili, who was present, said the card was at the ministry. He confirmed Glukhov's identity. Glukhov had earlier explained his reasons for deserting on Georgian television and displayed his ID.

Drobyshevsky suggested that Georgian agents had coerced Glukhov into making the televised comments.

"If a soldier is threatened or subjected to physical or emotional and psychological pressure, he could say absolutely anything," Drobyshevsky said.

Not surprisingly, this story is today's most blogged-about topic, according to Yandex. drugoi posted the above picture and opined, "He's no traitor, of course. He's just a fool, an adolescent, a little boy. He shouldn't be in the army, he should still be making mud pies in the sandbox."

Georgian blogger cyxymu posts video from Georgian TV and links to Glukhov's interview with Ekho Moskvy and this interesting post by Russian blogger shurigin, who appears to be a veteran and blames the whole incident on mismanagement of the military in general, and the higher command's neglect of the Russian troops in South Ossetia in particular: "The problem is that the troops in SO have been practically abandoned. It's a complete mess there [Бардак дикий]. Units are wintering in old, raggedy tents. The supply situation is horrible."

[UPDATE 1/29 - the Russian MoD is now executing a climb-down from its earlier allegations that Glukhov was kidnapped from his unit by the Georgian special services.]

Meanwhile, closer to home, a Georgian politician in exile in Northern Virginia has a column slamming Saakashvili in today's Moscow Times. Is it too cynical to entertain the possibility that Saak may have flipped from "our SOB" to Saddam-ville in less than a year, and that Georgian Chalabis are already being groomed Stateside? Actually, I think it is too cynical, but I couldn't resist raising the possibility. And just as, over the years, no one ever went broke underestimating the intelligence of the American people, in recent years few people have gone broke overestimating the cynicism of American foreign policy.

Black PR or market manipulation?

This fake ad (image source - advertka LJ community) was apparently stuck up all over the Moscow metro in recent days. It appears to be an exhortation by TV personality Vladimir Soloviov to invest in Sberbank. The text above the photo reads, "In 2008 I made $2,000,000 with Sberbank." And below the photo, "You can do it too! After all, I'm just as ordinary as you."

Soloviov, who appears to be even more self-absorbed than your average TV host, is convinced that this is part of a campaign to discredit him in the eyes of the public, alleging that it's government-funded. And perhaps it is, I don't know what controversies he's been embroiled in as of late, and the text of the "ad" is not exactly flattering to Soloviov (the final line could also be translated as "I'm just as simple as you."

My first thoughts (most likely incorrect but more interesting than a theory as mundane as black PR) upon reading about a fake ad using a public figure to pump the idea of investing in Sberbank were (1) maybe someone's trying a low-budget way to goose SBER's share price (but it's not as if the Moscow Metro is full of retail investors in the stock market); and (2) I doubt that anyone made $2m on Sberbank last year, unless it was by short-selling the stock, which since the start of 2008 has underperformed even the collapsing RTS index.


[UPDATE 1/29: having seen this additional (obviously fake) ad involving Soloviov, which shows him promoting a sketchy-looking weight-loss method, I am more inclined to agree that someone is just trying to make him look bad.]

Polemics and paranoia about a love-hate relationship

Sometimes the back-and-forth between scholars and self-appointed pundits at JRL can be entertaining. The excerpt below is from Andreas Umland's response to this critique of his article (full version here) about anti-American sentiment in Russia - I'm eliding the details.

Whoever knows Russian and had the opportunity to watch, for a week or so, the foreign affairs reporting of the two main Russian TV stations ORT and RTR might also start to "like the word 'paranoia'." Because that is exactly what Russia's politicians, journalists, pseudo-scholars, and other public figures are cultivating, on a daily basis, in Russian mass media today. Thus, Vladimir Putin's recent assessment that the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict has been instigated by the Bush administration has raised only few eyebrows, in Russia. Who else than the amerikantsy could be behind the costly confrontation between the two Slavic brother-nations?

Many Russian opinion makers seem to think that the more unpleasant an international (and, sometimes, even national) event is for Russia, the more likely it is that the US is somehow behind it. Scores of Russian intellectuals and politicians appear to actually "need" America for the definition of their homeland: Russia is what the US not is, and the US is what Russia is not. The longer these intellectuals and politicians will have access to Russian mass media the deeper such views will sink into Russian discourse already heavily contaminated with xenophobia and conspirology. My prediction is, therefore, that ­ should Putin continue to shape Moscow's information policies ­ Russian popular anti-Americanism will grow further, in the future. Whereas Western and Central European views of the US will, after the end of the Bush Jr. Administration, significantly and lastingly improve, the "Obama effect" may be only brief, in Russia.

I tend to agree that the anti-Americanism one encounters in the Russian mainstream is sometimes breathtaking. However, it's strange that amidst all of the dislike of the amorphous concept of "America," one still often encounters acceptance of or even affection for things American. drugoi had a post about this a while ago, in which he asked whether Russians' attitude toward the US might be similar to the way you feel about "a woman you really like who won't let you get close to her." I'm not sure it's as simple as that, but the seven pages of comments to his post provide at least some insight as to the range of opinions existing among the more vocal segments of the Russian blogosphere.

Nostalgia

tema has an interesting post about the visual design of Soviet agitprop materials (which he calls monotonous, "communist shit") that includes the above photo of Moscow's Dom Knigi, which is still there on Novyi Arbat. Dom Knigi is not even my favorite Moscow bookstore, and today it doesn't look anything like it did in 1967, when the photo was taken, but it still made me want to pay the place a visit.

Street art from Russia's northern capital

CIMG4062, originally uploaded by lyndonk2.

Late last year, I finally uploaded the rest of my graffiti photos from St. Petersburg. The full set is here.

Beer Patriotism

[image source]

This sort of funny poster plays on the concept "beer alcoholism" (Пивной алкоголизм), a social ill that has been lamented on talk shows and by concerned columnists all over Russia. Apparently the modifier is required because beer-drinking has only recently become a sign of alcoholism in the Russian consciousness, and it is indeed true that the advent of drinkable beer (as opposed to nasty Zhigulyovskoe) in Russia has led to a strong upswing in consumption of the suds.

Another worthwhile clipping

From today's JRL (original article in Russian is here) - Furman's analysis of the near abroad is always worth a close read:

Nezavisimaya Gazeta
January 21, 2009
Article by Dmitriy Furman: "The Policy of the Siamese Twins"

We do not have separation of powers or even a diarchy. We have highly hampered powers.

Another scandal has broken out in the European home. Everyone lives in tranquility in this home and everyone is friendly to some extent. Wailing can always be heard near the eastern entrance, however. Many people live on this side of the building, but when the shouts are heard, everyone knows it is not Ukraine bickering with Belarus, not Latvia fighting with Lithuania, and not even Armenia arguing with Azerbaijan (they were at war and they still "do not say hello to each other," but they do not start any scandals either). It is Russia "getting up off its knees" and fighting with one of its neighbors.

We Rail Against the Social Order

This happens for a variety of reasons -- because Estonia moved the Bronze Soldier, because we do not like Moldovan wine, because we support the separatists in Georgia, and certainly because of the prices of the gas we deliver and the transit fees for this gas. We are more or less accustomed to gas controversies, but this time the scandal acquired colossal dimensions, affected all of the people in the building, and is being discussed in every household.

The argument that these scandals are neurotic in nature and give Russia exactly what it does not want (the anger of its neighbors, who dream of being less dependent on it and having less to do with it in general, and the Western countries' treatment of it as a "problem state," with which "something has to be done") is self-evident. The connection between this policy (if it can be described as such) and the evolution of our social order is also quite obvious. On the one hand, our order is the main cause of our isolation and the reason for the impossibility of our integration into the alliances of the developed democratic countries and for the danger of the expansion of these alliances. On the other, the disappearance of the opposition in our country and the total unanimity of our main media outlets are a sign of the atrophy of critical thinking, which can restrain neurotic impulses and correct behavior. All of this is understandable, but something else is less understandable: the reason that our conflicts with our neighbors acquired this unprecedented intensity after Putin left office as the president.


First, Second, Third

The fundamental outlines of our foreign policy, just as the fundamental outlines of our sociopolitical system, took shape before Putin took office. Putin's personal mindset (we can recall his image of the boy walking toward a hostile group, clutching a piece of candy in his "sweaty fist," hoping to exchange it for something better but knowing it might be taken away from him instead) and his professional habits were ideally suited to our public thinking and those established outlines. Our second president strengthened and thoroughly developed everything that was put in place when the first president was in office. The futility of that policy, in which we were driving ourselves into a corner, was already fairly obvious after Putin took office. Furthermore, there was a sense that Putin's increasing anxiety and irritability toward the end of his term were connected with his vague awareness of that futility, and his decision to leave office was due partly to his realization that the next stage of development would require a different person, someone with a different mindset and a different image. It was no coincidence, of course, that when Putin named his successor, it turned out to be a man who was of the same stature (which evidently was extremely important), but did not have the same social origins and the same mindset. He was not as stiff, he was not at all neurotic, and he had some righteous and liberal tendencies. There was every reason to expect the new president to make some "corrections" in the policy line.

In democratic systems, the opposition waits for each mistake the government makes, exaggerates it, and strives not to be ignored. The government, knowing that elections are on the way, strives to avoid mistakes and has to listen to criticism and take it into consideration. If it is unable to adjust its policy line, it ceases to be the government and someone else makes the adjustments instead. The system of democratic rotation is a mechanism built into the society for the constant adjustment of the policy line and the correction of mistakes.

This mechanism does not exist in undemocratic systems. Even in these systems, however, the policy line is periodically adjusted. In tsarist Russia, each new tsar made some changes in policy. The new tsar was the new man in charge, he could look at policy from a new standpoint, and he had no reason to stubbornly defend the obvious mistakes of his predecessor. After all, they were not his mistakes. This also happened in the Soviet era. As soon as Stalin died, his successors ended the futile Korean war, and the thaw began soon afterward. Why did the change of presidents in today's Russia not lead to policy adjustments? Why did it actually intensify its most dangerous aspects instead? Why did we start moving more quickly toward an impasse instead of trying to avoid it?

Side Effects

We have already caused ourselves colossal damage in the two conflicts of the "early Medvedev era." As a result of the Georgian conflict, Georgia, under any president whatsoever, will be Russia's enemy for many decades, and we do not have the slightest idea of what should be done about Abkhazia and South Ossetia (which even Belarus has chosen not to recognize). As a result of the gas conflict with Ukraine, we not only lost our good reputation (although these fine points are no longer relevant here), but also lost billions of dollars and will lose tens of billions more in the future-- an amount many times the sum we ever could have gained from Ukraine. We abruptly intensified our isolation tenfold. We strengthened the tendency toward European integration, which is something we did not need at all, because it is more convenient for us to take advantage of the conflicting interests of various European countries. The gas conflict also revealed the surprising inertia and ungainliness of our policy line. It is obvious that the conflict did not have to happen. The agreement Putin and Tymoshenko recently reached could have been concluded in December. When it became completely obvious that it was time to end the conflict, when Europe was freezing and moaning, we could have concluded the agreement and turned the gas back on in a day or two, but this is the third week that nothing has been done.

I think the reason for the intensification of our propensity for conflicts and our sluggishness is the highly peculiar situation of the tandem Putin created. Putin decided to abide by the Constitution and give up the presidency. But he could not give up his power, as Yeltsin did, and he chose to become the prime minister. It would have been psychologically difficult and even dangerous for a man as young and healthy as Putin to give up all of his power. Besides this, Putin probably thought he could consolidate the government, help the young president, and guarantee the continuity of policy by taking office as the prime minister. He attained his goals, but the attainment of any goal often has unforeseen side effects. By changing offices, Putin created a situation hampering his friend and successor, himself, and our entire political mechanism.

We now have a president who was chosen by his prime minister, and the removal of this man from office would be incredibly difficult for the president in the psychological and political sense. By the same token, even if the prime minister regrets his choice, he has virtually no chance (at least until 2012) of getting rid of the president he chose. Our ruling tandem is "fused together by a single goal" and is even something like a set of Siamese twins, and any operation to separate the two would be extremely dangerous and frightening to both of them and to our entire political system.

There is no doubt whatsoever that our rulers are friends and that Putin chose a man he trusts more than anyone else as his successor. There are certain situations that objectively breed conflict, however, and they are stronger than we are. We must not think, for example, that the members of the Stalinist Central Committee Presidium "made a mistake" when they elected Khrushchev, or that Khrushchev was a villain, planning from the very start to destroy the people who had put their trust in him and with whom he had shared whole barrels of wine at Stalin's dacha. It is just that all of them were in a situation in which conflict was inevitable, and Khrushchev's victory was the highly probable outcome. The same can be said of many historical conflicts between friends and colleagues -- from the conflicts between the Roman triumvirs to Yeltsin's conflict with Rutskoy and Khasbulatov.

Trapped by Each Other

Putin and Medvedev are friends, but they have ended up in a situation which is objectively uncomfortable, painful, and conflict-prone. It is a situation in which neither can make a single move freely, because the people around them are waiting with a sinking heart for any sign of real or imaginary disagreements between the rulers, and any sign of disapproval of one partner in the tandem could give rise to an extremely painful conflict with unpredictable results and to overall destabilization, which both men dread. Putin and Medvedev are very different people, and there are signs of their differences of opinion, if not disagreements. Medvedev may have said it was wrong to "create nightmares for business" at the very time that Putin was "creating nightmares" for Mechel, for example, and Medvedev even expressed his dissatisfaction with the excessively bureaucratized government recently. These statements probably were not meant to send any particular message, however. At a time when the president's decision truly could have sent this kind of message, Medvedev, who obviously is not an evil man, nevertheless did not pardon Svetlana Bakhmina.

Any attempt at the adjustment of the policy line would be extremely difficult and dangerous in this situation. If Putin had simply gone away, as Yeltsin did, Medvedev could have made some changes in our policy and could have blamed various difficulties on the burdensome legacy he had inherited, as Putin had done earlier and Yeltsin had done before him (every president inherits a burdensome legacy). He cannot do any of this, however, because Putin did not go away. If the prime minister had not been Putin, Medvedev could have sent him packing and then gone on to make some changes in policy and to blame everything on the man he fired. But Putin cannot be removed from office! If, on the other hand, Putin had stayed in the president's office, there would have been less chance of policy adjustments, but they nevertheless would exist. It is difficult to admit one's own mistakes, especially for a man who only hears words of praise and support from every direction. It is possible, however. Now there is no possibility of this being done by Medvedev or by Putin.

The present situation is not a lawful democratic case of the separation of powers or even a case of diarchy. This is a case of severely hampered powers. Medvedev cannot be a normal, fully empowered president as long as Putin is the prime minister. Putin, a man who was just recently referred to as the national leader and whose face was on the T-shirts handed out to Nashi members, cannot be a normal prime minister, modestly working on the crisis-ridden economy and waiting to be dismissed. They are fused together. Siamese twins have to synchronize their moves. They have to move together along an appointed route, not deviating from it in any way. It is logical that the leading member of the tandem is Putin, if only because all of the current conflicts are continuations of conflicts that existed when he was the president. He has already mastered the proper reactions and he is more familiar with our common route leading to an impasse.

The gas conflict could have been resolved quickly. If Medvedev had done this, however, it would have signified indirect criticism of Putin. Some people would have been certain to say that Putin raised Russia up off its knees, but Medvedev is a weak man who makes concessions. Others would have said that Putin led us into a blind alley and Medvedev had led us out of it. If, on the other hand, Putin had done this himself, it would have been an admission of his own mistakes. Theoretically, this would have been possible for President Putin, but it is not something Prime Minister Putin can do. As a result, the conflict acquired unprecedented dimensions, and a problem that could have been solved in a day at a loss of a few billion is now taking weeks to solve at a loss of tens of billions.

Our ship of state is sailing in an unknown direction. Neither Putin nor Medvedev knows where they are sending it. Of course, even in the absence of a distinct route, the captain of a ship can change course if he sees reefs. If, on the other hand, there are two captains and they are Siamese twins, their reactions are slowed down and they lose control of the ship. The storm of the crisis is ahead. The losses we incurred during the gas crisis as a result of this loss of control are only the beginning.

Budapest walls (and other surfaces) from last summer

I finally uploaded a couple of sets of photos from my time in Budapest last summer (at the awesome GVO summit). One of them contains graffiti from the city (samples below) and the other contains various city scenes.

Click on the images to see larger versions:

Note the homeless person's bed (or convincing art installation, though given the amount of homeless people I saw there I'm pretty sure it was the real, depressing deal) in a pedestrian underpass in the last photo. I do realize this photoset isn't particularly on-topic for this blog - it's something I would have in the past posted at my Moscow Graffiti blog, but since that is pretty much dormant I'm posting it here.

"Moscow is the place to be, especially now"

After living in the heart of Moscow for nearly four years, some part of me always thinks it would be cool to go back for another stint. This recent MT article, however, while displaying much putting on of brave faces, didn't exactly make it seem as though this would be the easiest time to be there. An interesting time to be there, no doubt, but when in the past 20 years hasn't been?

Expats Digging In for Long Haul
Moscow Times, 21 January 2009
By Nadia Popova / Staff Writer

Although Russia has found itself among the countries worst-hit by the global financial mayhem, expatriates living here seem to be casting their lots with their adopted country, hunkering down through the economic malaise in hopes of brighter times ahead.

Hurt by salary cuts, the weakening ruble and looming dismissals but equipped with the experience of the 1998 default, expats say they are here to stay.

Many foreigners are paid in rubles, a currency that has lost almost 26 percent of its value against the dollar since July. And with debts and other obligations back home calculated in dollars and euros, some are feeling the pinch.

"I am paid in rubles, so I have to permanently watch the currency rates to hedge my risks," said the UralSib chief strategist Chris Weafer. "We are now facing triple risk of salary cuts, dismissals and currency-rate related losses."

Russian law requires Russian companies to pay salaries only in rubles. And although foreign-owned businesses are exempt, many working in Russia have switched to a ruble payroll over the last two years, said Yevgeny Reizman, a partner at Baker & McKenzie, which advises foreign companies in Russia.

"Now, when the ruble is getting weaker, with every passing day it --becomes harder for foreigners to pay their taxes, mortgages and kids' school fees in their domestic currency," said Neil Cooper, head of the Russian-British Chamber of Commerce.

Adding to the sob story, foreign professionals are witnessing the loss of the sometimes extravagant perks they had grown accustomed to before the financial turmoil.

Gone are the days of $200 restaurant bills charged to the company tab and limitless calls on the corporate cell phone.

Now employees of both domestic and foreign companies are finding their receipts scrutinized and their airline tickets decidedly economy class.

But the most painful problem, foreign employees say, is the reduction of their salaries and bonuses.

"My salary was cut by 15 percent in December," said a foreign specialist working at a Russian investment bank, who asked not to be identified, citing the privacy of the matter. "And I think there will be further cuts in spring as business conditions deteriorate."

Florian Hoser, Lufthansa's director for finance and administration in Russia, has seen similar cuts. "In some foreign companies, bonuses are not being paid, as the budgets of 2008 have not been met," he said.

"The attraction of an overseas posting is either job experience or the possibility of getting paid more than at home," the specialist said. "Under these conditions the only experience many are getting is a crash course in how to make ends meet."

While many firms are forced to reduce wages just to balance the budget, experts say some companies are overreacting, cutting wages first and asking questions later.

"Sometimes the impression is that some of the foreign employers overreact on the crisis because of the market's psychological pressure," Reizman said.

"For example, in December many foreign employers were planning around a 10 percent salary cut. But now they are cutting 20 percent or even more despite the decrease in the economic standing of the company was generally not worse than expected," he said.

But if the economy has been maligned in many respects, foreigners can at least take advantage of the now-affordable housing market. The economic downturn has caused rental prices in Moscow to drop, and tenants and prospective renters are now able to get a better deal than before.

"On the positive side rents are more easily negotiable," Hoser said.

Rental prices have fallen off, with apartments plummeting in cost from 20 percent to 30 percent since July, depending on the class of apartment, according to Penny Lane Realty. Business premium apartments that the firm used to sell for $12,000 a month now go for $8,000.

Yet every silver lining has a dark cloud. Some expats invested in the real estate market while it was booming, hoping to cash in on what seemed like Moscow's most lucrative sector.

Real estate prices have plunged in recent months, sending the average Moscow apartment price down to $5,186 per square meter from $6,122 per square meter since November, according to the real-estate analytical center IRN.ru.

"I bought an apartment in the center of Moscow late in 2007 and considered it a very good investment at the time," said Luca Gandino, who was recently laid off by Jones Lang La Salle.

Sberbank analysts expect apartment prices to drop by 50 percent in dollar terms by the end of this year.

"I know a lot of foreigners who came to work here and bought an apartment when the Russian real estate market was a never-ending upward spiral," Cooper said. "It is not that rosy now."

Other foreign professionals, while safe in their own jobs, look upon the current situation with a twinge of guilt.

"All of us here live with a thought saying 'I'm a very expensive guy,'" said the head of the Moscow office of a U.S. machinery-building company, who requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the issue.

"They rent an apartment and a car for us, pay for our kids' kindergarten," he said. "I recognize that it all costs my company a lot of money."

Despite the challenges, many expats say they aren't going anywhere.

Although Gandino was laid off by Jones Lang La Salle in December, he never doubted that he would stay in Russia.

"Moscow is the place to be, especially now," Gandino, a former associated partner at the development consultant said.

Hundreds of expats who have been given pink slips over the last few months think the same way.

The Russian-British Chamber of Commerce has been inundated by the resumes of laid-off professionals, mainly from the real estate, construction and banking sectors.

"The prospects here are way better than at home," Cooper said. "Russia is way more developed than 10 years ago when the default struck, so we believe in a quick recovery."

Until then, expats will stick around and think about brighter days — or try to.

"When the crisis broke out in 1998, you could hide from it, just leaving your office," Weafer of UralSib said. "Now, with your BlackBerry on, the crisis is always with you, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week."

Crisis and unintentional comedy

R.I.P.

barabanch has a post about the impact of the economic crisis on the Russian media sector - not his first on the topic, as media in Russia, as elsewhere, have been shedding staff, scaling back publication schedules, and going belly-up for months now. This time, the unfortunate news is that the online magazine Izbrannoe has stopped publication. It will be missed by many, among the things I appreciated about it during its less-than-two-year life span was its publication of Nashi and DPNI propaganda materials which might not otherwise have reached a broad audience.

Meanwhile, unintentional comedian and United Russia shishka Boris Gryzlov has a very simple way of addressing the crisis: denial. According to RIA Novosti, "[Gryzlov] observed that the global financial crisis is called 'global' because it's happening outside of Russia." Right. And if you believe that, I've got a class A development project in Moscow for you to invest in.

"The most anti-American film ever to come out of Russia"

From today's Johnson's Russia List (the footnotes are unfortunately omitted):

OSC [US Open Source Center] Analysis: Russia: Big Budget Film Denigrates US To Highlight Russia's Benevolence as World Player
January 22, 2009

The new Russian film "Strangers," financed by the pro-Kremlin Just Russia party and shot mostly in English in Egypt and Morocco, promotes Russia as a God-chosen peacekeeper on a mission to graciously forgive the US and the Muslim world for their shortcomings. The focus on Russia's moral superiority sets the film apart from recent big budget productions, bent on parading Russia's physical might. (a) But just like the threatening image of Russia, its non-threatening image depends on negating the US. (b) Various media sources connected the film to the Kremlin's campaign to justify its "peace-enforcing" position on Georgia. Producers drew on new media to promote the film, greatly improving the film's visibility despite box-office failure.

[UPDATE: A more optimistic view of Russian cinema]

When accused of plagiarizing a US film poster, director Yuriy Grymov insisted his new film "Strangers" is a parody of Hollywood cliches as well as the cliches of US foreign policy (sostav.ru, 12 January)

Boasting a budget of $8 million, large by Russian standards, Strangers earned a meager $245,801 following its 13 November release (Kinopoisk.ru, accessed 8 January). (1) Despite failure at the box office, two months after its release the film continues to resonate in the blogosphere and traditional media.

Unlike the majority of Russian filmmakers who rely on federal money but try to gloss over their political leanings, director Yuriy Grymov, himself a member of Just Russia's Central Committee, boasted about his political affiliation.

On the website of Just Russia, Grymov publicly expressed special thanks to Sergey Mironov, speaker of the Federation Council and chairman of Just Russia, for his support in making the film (Spravedlivo.ru, 3 July 2008). (2)

In an interview with the weekly tabloid Sobesednik, Grymov said his production company YuG was created under the auspices of Just Russia, which also assisted the crew of Strangers with finding military consultants specializing in Middle Eastern affairs (12 November 2008). (3)

Marketing portal Sostav.ru named Strangers the most anti-American film ever to come out of Russia (25 November 2008). (4)

Set in what a pro-Kremlin source identified as the "Tajik-Afghan border without the steppe," where Russian peacekeepers struggle to maintain order, the film "exposes" the superficial nature of American philanthropy and values, embodied by five American medics sent by a large pharmaceutical company to test a vaccine on Muslim children (Evrazia.ru, 6 November 2008). (5) In addition, the American characters cause the death of a Russian soldier by refusing medical aid and kill a Russian surgeon who saved one of the Americans.

The film's plot and characters reflect the agenda of Just Russia.

In particular, the film reflects Just Russia's ongoing effort to dispel the "myths" of Russia as an aggressor and dictator. To this end, the Russian characters in the film act humbly in everyone's interests and die at the hands of the Americans whom they help.

In addition, Just Russia's focus on traditional family values as the foundation for a healthy society is reflected in the film's explicit criticism of the US as forsaking these values. Observers interpreted the five American characters - a heterosexual couple with infertile husband, an interracial gay couple, and an older single woman - as a cross-section of American society (Novaya Gazeta, 16 November 2008; Gazeta.ru, 13 November 2008). (6) (7) Spotlight on Yuriy Grymov Yuriy Grymov (strana.ru, January 12)

Yuriy Grymov (b. 1965) is a pioneer of Russian advertising and political PR, and a prominent film and television director and producer. Grymov has been a member of Just Russia's Central Committee since February 2007. His most notable efforts included Boris Yeltsin's election campaign, Yukos' image campaign, the 2003 public relations campaign for the Russian Party of Life, and the 2006-2007 advertising campaign for Russia's telecommunications giant MTS (Grimov.ru, accessed 21 January). (8)

Since 2001, Grymov has been the head of the youth programs of the Federation of Internet Education, started by Yukos. From 2001 to 2004, Grymov was editor-in-chief of Yukos' magazine Fakel - an important educational platform for Internet users and, reportedly, Yukos' head Mikhail Khodorkovskiy's platform for "raising an electorate" (Akzia.ru, 12 January). (9) Grymov's affiliations with the Kremlin and the oppositional Yukos prove his political agility. Grymov received two presidential awards for "contribution to developing Russian democracy" (1996) and for contributing to Internet education (2003).

Recently, Grymov was called on by pro-Kremlin media to comment on the effects of the financial crisis on the Russian marketing and film industries (Strana.ru, 13 January). (10) He also voiced support for Just Russia's proposal to form a television supervisory council (Spravedlivo.ru, 25 September 2008). (11)

Laundry List of Russian Anti-Americanism

In Strangers, Grymov incorporated many anti-American cliches circulating in Russian media and developed a few of his own. In particular, his attack on American sexuality warrants attention in view of Just Russia's promotion of traditional family values. As is the case with other anti-American sentiment in Russia, the film's focus on the Americans' "sexual handicaps" lays bare Russia's own anxieties: in this case, about the declining birthrates and the devaluation of traditional family.

In the film, none of the five American characters are capable of producing offspring without outside help. Sexual frustration breeds misplaced vengeance and lies.

The infertile American husband kills the innocent Russian surgeon and not the armed Arab lover of his wife. He then proceeds to blame the murder on "terrorists." The gay couple seeks to adopt an Arab boy who recoils in horror when he catches the two kissing. The older single woman takes her frustration out on the "uncultured" Muslim children.

Grymov's message got through to the viewers. Among others, LiveJournal blogger Yasharbek recapped the message of the film as follows: "Americans are a fallen nation. They do charity for money. Their families are immoral. Husbands are impotent. Wives cheat. The strong men are gay with midlife crisis. The women are lonely and pathologically sex-deprived" (11 November 2008). (12)

Independent-minded Nezavisimaya Gazeta criticized Grymov for ascribing qualities typical of all humans to Americans: "Why is hitting someone with a bottle over the head a purely American murder? But of course there is whiskey in that bottle, not vodka. Did Americans also invent homosexuality and then spread it around the world?" (13 November 2008). (13)

In addition to infertility, adultery, homosexuality and repressed sexuality, Grymov picked the following "American qualities" for ridicule: Americans act in exaggerated and even grotesque manner in "Strangers" (Chuzhiemovie.ru, 8 January)

Imposition of democratic value
Scapegoating
Ignorance of other cultures
Consumerism
Political nearsightedness
Egocentrism
Obsession with fitness
Teamwork (presented as inauthentic imitation of real human bonding)
Pragmatism (sticking to 9 to 5 schedule even when delivering humanitarian aid)

In interviews, Grymov expanded the list to include "the batman complex." While commending his US crew for their professionalism and critical attitude toward the Bush Administration, he said that on the set the actors "still behaved like Batmen," incapable of portraying humiliation. Grymov concluded that "mentally, Americans are always 'the saviors of civilization'" (Izvestia.ru, 14 December 2007). (14) The film humanizes and victimizes the Russian characters (Chuzhiemovie.ru, 8 January)

By contrast, the Russians, represented by a group of sappers and an imprisoned (by the Arabs) surgeon, display the following "traditional" Russian qualities, strongly tinted with the values of the Russian Orthodox Church, whose thematic role has greatly increased in recent state-sponsored films:

Humility
Pacifism
Self-sacrifice
Forgiveness
Ability to see "the big picture"

Anti-Americanism permeated the film's aggressive promotional campaign, littered with slogans "Banned for US release" and "The real face of American democracy" (sf--maniac.livejournal.com, 31 December 2008). (15) Most notably, a month prior to the film's release, a rumor that the staff of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice did not recommend Strangers for US release aired on St. Petersburg television station 100 TV and spread to other Russian media (8 October 2008). (16) The station linked this "decision" of the US State Department to the upcoming US elections.

Director Yuriy Grymov in a cameo appearance as a "mujahideen," looking more like a Russian Orthodox monk in "Strangers" (blog.empireonline.ru, 25 November 2008)

Grymov told the pro-Kremlin online newspaper Dni.ru that although he was not aware of any such ban on his film, he was not surprised: "Lately the US displays oversensitivity in reacting to any kind of criticism" (13 October 2008). (17)

Among others, independent culture portal OpenSpace.ru ascribed the rumor to Grymov himself, calling it "a classic virus advertisement" (20 October 2008). (18) Mass circulation daily Novyye Izvestya dismissed the rumor as Grymov's "usual" stunt (25 November 2008). (19)

However, another mass-circulation daily Moskovskiy Komsomolets reported with all seriousness that "according to some sources, Ms. Rice disliked the excessive naturalism of the film," as well as the fact that it was slated for a wide release in the Arab world (23 October 2008). (20)

The critical reaction to Strangers in mainstream media did not easily split along the traditional conformist/nonconformist divide. With few exceptions, both pro-Kremlin and independent media criticized Grymov for blatant anti-Americanism. At the same time, those reviewers who put the film in a broader context were reluctant to discount it.

In a rather indecisive review, centrist newspaper Trud described the film as "straightforward" and even "crude," while suggesting that there is definite use for such cinema, whose style imitates its subject matter: "The film Strangers... looks just as simple and straightforward as the road which the world has to follow according to George Bush" (14 November 2008). (21)

Prominent weekly news magazine Kommersant-Vlast, while not rating the film too highly, certified neutrally that the film contributed to building a certain "cultural-political space, where Americans, Vietnamese, Arabs, Europeans, and other nations remote from God run around without aim, while the Russians observe from above with lenient pity" (18 February 2008). (22)

The reaction to the film in the blogosphere, whose public influence and marketing role are growing in Russia, suggests strong anti-American sentiment. The majority of over 400 blog entries on LiveJournal, Russia's major blogging platform, either praised the film or deemed it an immediate cult classic "so good because it is so bad." A number of posts rejected the film's bluntness, yet displayed no sympathy to things American.

A number of bloggers who claimed they'd been to the US, found the film authentic. Blogger lady--bychkova recommended Strangers to "those who'd been to America but were not able to get to love it" (5 January). (23) Blogger last-gunfighter said "I've been working with Americans for 16 years and I authoritatively proclaim: the portrait of the enemy is accurate" (7 January). (24)

Blogger no4le9l6ka who appeared to be well-versed in cinema said that the film's major problem consisted not in its message but in its delivery, insisting that the film fell short of creating identifiable characters: "If you declared war, make sure you aim better" (30 December 2008). (25)

Blogger leru--mek said that the film has "an honorable aim" but the audience is wrong: it would have been much more useful if it were aimed at Georgians and Ukrainians (18 December 2008). (26) Russia's War with Georgia and "Strangers"

The power struggle of the "global-thinking" Russians and the "nearsighted" Americans taking place "somewhere in the East" caused a number of observers to count the film as a justification of Russia's official stance on the August conflict in South Ossetia. These observations inspired the film's promotional slogan: "The most relevant film of the year."

A. Dni.ru said the film "resounded as an echo of Osettian events" (19 November 2008). (27) In two other reviews under the rubric "The Federal Premier," Dni.ru promoted the film with telling titles: "Americans Tested a Vaccine on Children" and "Yuriy Grymov Predicted America's Downfall" (11 November 2008; 5 November 2008). Both reviews indicated that the film harmonized with the August events in South Ossetia "if purely through the combination of circumstances."

A. Among unofficial sources, blogger Shaktir jokingly accused Grymov of inciting the Georgian-Ossetian conflict to promote his film. She commented that the Americans in the film "blindly proceed, just as the situation in Iraq and South Ossetia demonstrated" (KinoKadr.ru, 15 September 2008). (28) Promotional Use of New Media, Innovative PR

The film's highly non-traditional promotional campaign, created by Grymov who is a trend-setter in political and social PR, reflects the importance of new media and citizen journalism in Russia, where the blogosphere is still seen as a free medium as opposed to the compromised traditional media. Most notably, Grymov arranged a free closed pre-screening in Moscow for the bloggers of LiveJournal, the primary blogging platform in Russia. The screening was followed by a Q&A session with the director.

According to LiveJournal blogger lu-lu85, approximately 600 bloggers attended the screening, yielding over 250 LiveJournal postings immediately following the 10 November screening. (29) The number of postings grew to over 400 by 13 January.

Following the screening, LiveJournal blogger Sholademi, who worked for the Central Elections Committee during the Duma and presidential elections in 2007, polled LiveJournal users to determine whether Americans were "ours" or "strangers": 97 (65.5%) of 148 respondents answered "strangers," while 51 (34.5%) responded "ours." (30) A photo report by LiveJournal user live--report indicates that majority of LiveJournal bloggers who attended the screening were between the ages of 18 and 35 (11 November, 2008)

Other inventive uses of new media, ascribed to Grymov and Just Russia, mimicked the techniques that the Kremlin allegedly uses to fight the opposition.

The news website of telecommunication giant Akado (formerly Renova Media), owned by Kremlin-linked oligarch Viktor Vekselberg, reported that those bloggers who spoke negatively of the film were flooded with bots (Akado.ru, 20 November 2008). (31)

A number of bloggers accused Grymov of paying "PR cyborgs" to rate the film positively and post positive reviews (blog.empireonline.ru, 13 November 2008). (32) Release in Arab World?

Three weeks prior to Strangers' release, video-sharing site Life.ru posted an explicit scene from the film involving a female US doctor and Arab soldier (24 October 2008). (33) Titling the video as "The Sex-Revenge of the Iraqi Soldiers," Life.ru reported that this video was circulating among Iraqi soldiers via cell-phones and that it was extremely popular. The same day, RBC special correspondent Yelena Rykova published an article in the online publication Russian Business "Why is War Needed in Advertising?" in which she provided a link to the video, saying that "the Iraqi government is facilitating the dissemination" of the video (rb.ru, 24 October 2008). (34) Currently the video is circulating on the Russian and Ukrainian Internet, drawing thousands of viewers (Spynet.ru, Tabloid.Vlasti.net, accessed 14 January).

Grymov's claims that the film received wide circulation in the Arab world appear false. Only two Arab sites have been observed to carry information about the film: Arab-language Kurdish site based in Sweden Irakna.com and Egyptian news site News.Egypt.com. The latter site published an article entitled "Russian Film Criticizes American Policy in the Middle East and Its Marked Attempts to Determine World's Fate," which mentioned Grymov's appearance on Arab satellite television (15 December 2008).

Жертва Телевидения*

While the video below (titled "Attention: Lukashism is hazardous to your health" by the person who posted it to YouTube) shows an individual who is an extreme case, it nevertheless is instructive to anyone who wonders why political opposition is so unsuccessful at gaining traction in places like Russia and Belarus.

There are many reasons, of course: incompetence of the opposition overall, lack of an appealing platform or practical solutions, limited access to media or the "administrative resource," and opposition leaders who refuse to cooperate with each other. But one very important reason is the potency of government propaganda, which portrays any non-loyal opposition as externally funded and dedicated to the collapse of the state, and the susceptibility of certain segments of the population to that propaganda.

The interview subject here talks at various times about shooting, skinning alive, and gassing to death those who protest Lukashenko's rule, and makes repeated and irate references to their American funding, before completely losing it at the end and cursing out whoever is doing the interview. Apparently this was filmed in either early or late 2008 in Gomel', Belarus.

This comes via drugoi - where commenters pointed out that this clip did not actually appear on Belarusian TV and wondered whether the person shown might be mentally ill (watch the clip and you'll see that's not an outlandish question).

*With apologies to Vysotsky.

Druzhina

[image source]

"Europe will sit and cry without [our] ga..."

...loshes"


For some reason I found this old poster advertising galoshes to be quite appropriate for the current "gas war," since it reflects at least a couple of factors exacerbating the crisis - Russia's glee at possessing something Europe needs, and Russia's concurrent need for others to recognize the degree to which it is needed.

This comes via the fascinating Strange Maps blog, which I found thanks to Opinio Juris.

The Caucasus in 1927 - "New Political Boundaries"

Caucasus 1927, full-sized version available here.

Vedomosti Vid on the Russian budget

An interesting, though not particularly in-depth, report into Russia's budgeting woes - apparently the official budget for 2009 contemplated an average oil price of $95/bbl, with the worst-case scenario pegged to $50/bbl. Even that now seems like it may be unrealistically high, as Kazakhstan, for example, recalculated its budget based on a $40/bbl assumption last fall and (according to this video) is now using an estimate of $30/bbl for 2009.

The Russian government is trying to figure out how (or how far) to revise the oil price forecast downward, but may not formally revise the budget. The presenter notes that this difficult decision will ultimately be up to Putin and concludes that Russia may have two budgets this year - a magical one and a real one.