
[recycled from last year...]
Across the board and the political spectrum, I am hearing the same thing from Russian experts: trust and confidence in the United States has not been lower since the end of the Cold War. In fact, it’s not a distrust of American motives that poisons the relationship (though a handful of Russian nationalists/hawks still cling to the notion that the US has cynical “grand designs” on the former Soviet sphere of influence) but a distrust of our competence to wield power responsibly [...]These takeaways from interactions with Russian elites actually sound much more optimistic than I would have expected, and Matt's policy recommendations are also a bit optimistic, but I suppose we must allow ourselves the audacity of optimism.
All in all, the current Russian perspective on the US is one of fear and insecurity–not because Russians think the US has evil intentions, but because they are certain we have no idea how to pursue our various noble-sounding global objectives without leaving utter chaos and destruction in our wake.
The traditional American Sovietologists harp on the difficulties and unpredictability of Russia's internal processes, which do not fit the usual Western criteria and stereotypes. Some analysts cannot accept the idea of a strong Russia, whether it be imperial or democratic. They propose that the West either take a wait-and-see approach or develop a new containment strategy.
Partnership opponents within Russia...reject cooperation with the West as inseparable from the democratizing of Russia, and view democratization itself as an obstacle to renewed authoritarianism and the forceful establishment of "order" within the territory of the former Soviet Union.
All the opponents of partnership - Russian and American - share the thesis that Russia is doomed to confrontation with the world around it and that East and West are fatally incompatible.
Russian foreign policy inevitably has to be of an independent and assertive nature. If Russian democrats fail to achieve it, they will be swept away by a wave of aggressive nationalism, which is now exploiting the need for national and state self-assertion.Not that the Putvedev years have been years of unadulterated "aggressive nationalism," but the guys in power have certainly learned to ride that wave.
And then I saw the following picture: a Georgian prisoner with his hands tied and shirt off, his hands had already gone blue, you couldn't see his eyes, he couldn't even cry, and the [South Ossetian] militants [бойцы, apparently police officers - trans.] were beating him. I went over to them and said, "What are you doing? You are mountain men [горцы - implying, apparently, that they should hew to some code of honor - trans.]. You can't beat a prisoner, his hands are tied." They looked embarrassed and said, "Sorry, comrade General."Without wanting to engage in too much Kremlinological tea-leaf-reading, one wonders what the publication of this interview means, given that it was published in a newspaper owned by Alisher Usmanov, the Kremlin-friendly oligarch and debt collector for Gazprom who - no doubt out of the goodness of his heart, and certainly not to win a natural resource tender - ponied up a billion rubles in aid for the post-war rebuilding effort in South Ossetia in September.
I told them to go get someone from the KGB. To take the Georgian away. Right away they untied his hands. And then the president showed up. He saw me, saw the prisoner and understood what was going on. And the first thing he did was run up to the prisoner and start kicking him. It turned my stomach. The guys from the police looked at the ground, they were ashamed.
Бизнес на гостях // 21 сентября в Москве закончилась перерегистрация иногородних. Теперь ходят слу открыть материал ... |
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Nationwide Movement 'For Putin' Flings Doors OpenAt the moment, the news feed on Zaputina.ru hasn't been updated to reflect the new initiative. My first thought is that, although Putin did attend university at LGU's law faculty, it's odd that he would become the public face of what seems to be some sort of nascent legal aid movement. After all, Medvedev was a practicing lawyer for much longer. Anyway, perhaps this is a meaningless bit of non-news, but it was an item that caught my attention.
MOSCOW, November 18 (Itar-Tass) - The all- Russia movement "For Putin" is opening public offices in all regions of the Russian Federation to improve the population's competence in matters of law, Co-chairman of the public movement. Lawyer Pavel Astakhov declared at a forum " In Support of Vladimir Putin's Course."
The public offices will provide juridical consultations to the population to improve their knowledge of law, Astakhov said. Such offices will be affiliated to Vladimir Putin' public reception rooms in regions, the lawyer added. Such public offices are needed as much as ever now because the population is concerned over the world financial crisis and consequences it might entail for the Russian economy, Astakhov said.
The Movement " For Putin" created a year ago fully supports the present course "Strategy-2020" and the initiatives voiced by President Dmitry Medvedev in his State of the Nation address to the Federal Assembly, Astakhov said.
Initiative groups in support of Vladimir Putin met in the city of Tver last November and organized a public movement "For Putin". Representatives from 80 regions, where meetings had been held in support of Vladimir Putin's course, attended the meeting. They elected a ten-strong Coordination Council that represents all the federal districts of the Russian Federation. Lawyer Pavel Astakhov, surgeon Renat Akchurin and Head of the trade union of workers of the agrarian -industrial sector Natalia Agapova were elected co- chairmen of the Coordination Council of the movement " For Putin".
The roadside bus stop serves a simple purpose – to show where the bus will stop and to provide some comfort and shelter for waiting passengers. One would think that the Soviets would have come up with one universal design for this community structure – simple, functional and cheap to mass produce. However, in many instances this was not the case, much time, effort and imagination went into many roadside bus stops. The sky was the limit with different shapes and design– blocks, domes, columns, towers, A-frames and archways, even ones shaped like birds, yurts and hats. If the bus stop was less bold and daring with its architectural design then the creators would often attract attention with decorating the structure with murals or mosaics.Rural Moldova is replete with such wacky and beautiful bus stops, many of them in a tragic state of disrepair. I would have photographed more of them, but when you're driving on an intercity trip your passengers (even when they're family) start to look at you funny when you pull over, hop out and start clicking away at every bus stop. Nevertheless, each of them is a treasure in its own right. My photos can't really hold a candle to Herwig's, but I was lucky enough to get real people in most of them. The full set, including some other roadside photos from this past summer, can be viewed here.
Alexandreni is one of those villages that I think has been subtly renamed in the post-Soviet years, from Alexandrovka. I am not 100% sure that's the case with the Alexandreni where this bus stop stands, but I know it's happened to at least one village of that name. Also noted on my last visit was a Dmitriovka --> Dumitreni renaming which has taken place in the last couple of years. Creeping Romanianization, indeed.
This looks to be a modern variation (i.e., built in the last 15 years) on the Soviet idea of crazy thematic bus stops. The bottle is an ad for Gura Cainarului mineral water, which is bottled just a short distance away.
“Gura Cainarului is part of our life!”, - and that isn't a simple advertising slogan, these words reflect actual situation. It is Gura Cainarului that during 8 years is the most popular and demanded product on Moldova's market of mineral waters.As you head out of Floresti, this bus stop is on your right-hand side. Take a left on the dirt road which intersects the "highway" at this bus stop, bounce along for a few minutes, and you can buy fizzy or flat water direct from the plant. Or you can just drink from the well that's hidden in this enormous stone bottle.Name of mineral water comes from location of this unique spring in the village Gura Cainarului of Floresti region. Spring No. 3 delivering Gura Cainarului water is flowing on the depth of 120 meters. Such depth ensures complete protection from external influences. Numerous layers through which the water raises to the surface saturate it with healthy minerals that are vital for human body.
Although the action had a strong racist element, the increasing problems spawned by the financial crisis gave the rhetoric an economic edge.And more photos from Nov 4's festivities, from the blog of Kommersant journo Ekaterina Savina.
"These are not gastarbaitery," said Boris Ivanov, a DPNI member, referring to the thousands of men and women who come to Moscow from Central Asia and the Caucasus to work in markets and construction sites. "These are strikebreakers," he said.
"Life is already very hard for us, and they come and bring down pay rates and make it even harder," he said, while those around him vigorously nodded their heads. "They are useful for the Kremlin and the oligarchs, because they work for less."
City Hall had authorized marches in three of the past four years, but this year authorities reacted strongly to the illegal marchers by deploying hundreds of truncheon-wielding riot police.
The reason behind the unwillingness of the city's authorities to sanction the march could be fear that it would lead to riots in the street, especially given the people's worries about the looming financial crisis, said Alexei Mukhin of the Center for Political Technologies.
Normalize relations with Russia. This may sound cold, but Russia is too important—on energy, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, peace in the Middle East, nearly everything—for our relations to get warped in a new Cold War over the integrity of South Ossetia.All sounds OK to me.
Moscow's aggression should not be blithely tolerated, but it's absurd to respond by, say, admitting Georgia into NATO. First, members are required to have recognized borders, which Georgia lacks. Second, do you—do any Americans—really want to go to war for Tbilisi? (This is what security alliances are all about.) Impose economic and diplomatic pressure. But also assure the Russians that we have no intention of further NATO expansion. Tell them we will proceed to deploy missile defenses in the Czech Republic and Poland if the system works (a nudge-and-wink signal that we probably will not proceed after all). This is not "appeasement," since we have—or should have—no interest in behaving otherwise.
Resume strategic arms talks, and demand in return that Moscow reaffirm the Reagan-era treaty limiting conventional forces in Europe, which Vladimir Putin has been threatening to abrogate. Putin has been riding high these past few years on the vast revenues brought in by high oil prices; the recent plunge and the crash of his stock market might make him more pliant. In short, the time is ripe for a policy of applying pressure where our differences matter and giving way where they don't.
Of course, Obama inherited a slew of thorny problems on the foreign policy front -- above all, a very unstable Iraq and a worsening situation in Afghanistan. But overall, we can expect a general improvement in the U.S. position and a global resurgence of trust in Washington -- with one large exception: Russia.
Russia is the one country with which improved relations are unlikely. Obama's administration will have to face the same divisive issues that confronted President George W. Bush. First, Obama has not definitively rejected U.S. plans to deploy elements of a missile-defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. Second, he supports the U.S. military presence in Central Asia and the expansion of NATO. Third, Obama's position on Georgia differs little from his rival John McCain's, and he will look just as unfavorably at any attempts by Moscow to increase its influence in the former Soviet republics. Fourth, energy resources and pipelines remain a source of constant rivalry as the United States seeks to circumvent Russia by sponsoring alternative oil and gas delivery routes from the Caucasus and Central Asia to the West. Finally, it is safe to say the hawkish advisers in Obama's campaign team -- namely, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke and former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski -- probably didn't paint Russia in the most positive terms.I continue to find it odd but not surprising to see Obama's list of foreign policy advisers - which was as large as 300 people at one point - so frequently cherry-picked to highlight those individuals who are seen as hostile toward Russia.
As for Russia, it is too early to speak of any warming of relations between our two countries under the Obama administration. Judging from his advisers, Obama will surely support the U.S. missile-defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic — particularly after President Dmitry Medvedev's state-of-the-nation address on Wednesday, in which he promised to deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad. Thus, it is far from certain that Russia and the United States will become closer partners under an Obama administration.
Most likely, both sides will be content to continue their ongoing selective cooperation on the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the fight against international terrorism. But the same old disagreements will remain over other former Soviet republics, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Kosovo, Iran, Iraq and over differing world views.
At the same time, Medvedev said during his address that Russia is not infected with anti-Americanism and does not want a confrontation with the United States. This was underscored when Medvedev emphasized the importance of modernizing Russia, which he said must include fundamental democratic changes. Tensions with the United States and its allies would heavily undermine the country's democratic development.
Confrontation with Russia is clearly not in the interests of the United States either. Obama's administration will not be conducting "cowboy diplomacy" as his predecessors did. Moreover, Obama understands that without Russia it would be difficult to resolve many global problems affecting key U.S. interests. There are certainly people in Obama's inner circle who are not favorably disposed toward Russia, but if they want to bolster U.S. interests and security, they will be forced to cooperate with Russia. The two countries can work together without having to be the best of friends.
And there are concrete reasons why Russia and the United States need to cooperate. The world is becoming more chaotic, and this is dangerous because we are armed to the teeth. Existing measures for ensuring the nonproliferation of nuclear and conventional armaments are ineffective. International institutions created under Cold War conditions are in crisis. The number and scale of conflicts is increasing around the world, including ethnic and religious clashes. Terrorism and poverty remain global powder kegs. State sovereignty gives rise to state egoism. The world community has lost its sense of solidarity and a common conception of good and evil. Foreign policy of nations increasingly favor selfish interests over universal values.
Such a world needs change. But without close cooperation between the leading powers — including the United States and Russia — those changes will not take place.
![]() ![]() В своем первом послании Федеральному собранию президент Дмитрий Медведев провозгласил кардинальную реформу государственной власти. Меняются сроки полномочий и роли президента, председателя правительства, парламента, федерального и региональных, и политических партий. Далее |
Pro-Kremlin Youths Take Backseat to Crisis
Moscow Times, 28 October 2008
By Francesca Mereu / Staff Writer
Last year, pro-Kremlin youth groups were all over television, promising then-President Vladimir Putin love and loyalty, picketing foreign embassies and harassing a hodgepodge of opposition activists.
As recently as July, state-run television showed First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov lecturing Nashi activists in economics at their summer camp.
But with the election season over and the government grappling with the financial crisis, youth activists have drifted from the political spotlight, busying themselves instead with fashion shows and city cleanups.
In this awesome video for the song “Gorbachov” by Russian metal band ANJ, former Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Gorbachev is an axe-wielding barbarian, destroying zombies who attack the hard working big breasted women of Mother Russia. It really is a thing of beauty. Actually it’s more than that. It’s the best damn music video ever created.Or, more succinctly:
Wow. Hot Russian women, Zombie Stalins, Gorbachov the barbarian, and erotic food innuendo. What else could you possibly need in a music video?Indeed. Judge for yourselves (click here to see the HD version):
Suffice to say it's half Russian History allegory as told through an old zombie movie made in the Soviet Union, and half animated Soviet Propaganda posters.This apparently made the rounds of RuNet a few months ago, and the link was emailed to me at that time by a fellow GVO Summit attendee. As I sifted through my neglected inbox today, I came upon this link and decided to check whether any of my fellow Russia bloggers have posted anything about this curious production. Apparently, no one did. Perhaps people found parts of it too tasteless, or the music accompanying the video too awful, to subject others to it; on the other hand, I would imagine that Sean could have a field day with some of the symbolism.
Peter the Great built his capital to face Europe, and Putin, don't forget, was mayor of St. Petersburg.
Starting in 2004, Russia began issuing passports to the residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a fact that today serves as one of the main pretexts for the ferocity of Moscow's military campaign.
[T]he West should make use of Russia's claim that its role in South Ossetia and Abkhazia is driven by the need to protect the populations there. If so, Moscow should have no objections to U.N.-sanctioned peacekeepers and observers moving into those two regions to replace the jerry-rigged system of "peacekeepers" that, until the war broke out, consisted of Russian troops, local separatist militaries and Georgian forces.
First of all, my friends at Global Voices Online have shown the strength of GVO's format by setting up a special page devoted to coverage of the conflict over South Ossetia and keeping it updated. Second, the New York Times has a dedicated topical page, which includes a link to their blog on the conflict, which links to various other bloggers covering the story, such as Paul Goble at Window on Eurasia. The NYT Moscow bureau's LiveJournal community collected comments on the crisis from Russian bloggers here and here. Also, the coverage by IWPR (including this Russian-language blog) - one of the most balanced internet resources on the region in times of peace and war alike - should not be missed, especially the wisdom of long-time Caucasus observer Tom de Waal.
If you're looking for the Russian point of view, check out RIA Novosti's topical page or this collection of official Russian government pronouncements.
Finally, here are some links compiled and circulated by the International Relations and Security Network in Zurich:
Media
Russo-Georgian conflict is not all Russia's fault, Christian Science Monitor
Georgia-Russia Conflict, by the BBC
In Depth: South Ossetia Crisis, by Financial Times
Blog posts
Putin's revenge, by FP Passport
Kosovo and South Ossetia, by Outside the Beltway
Danger Room: Georgia under online assault, by Wired
The Russian press, by the Duck of Minerva
Georgia, Russia and rethinking China, by the Oil and the Glory
Georgia, from the American side, by Registan.net
Publications
Georgia's South Ossetia Conflict - Make Haste Slowly, by the International Crisis Group
Russia / North Ossetia: Trends in Conflict and Cooperation, by swisspeace
Tbilisi Withdraws from the Joint Control Commission; Proposes New Format for South Ossetia, by the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program (CACI-SRSP)
Europe’s Unrecognised Neighbours: The EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, by the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Reintegration or Reconquest? Georgia’s Policy Towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the Context of the Internal and International Situation, by the Centre for Eastern Studies (CES)
Primary resources
Minutes of UN Security Council meeting on the situation in Georgia, 8 August 2008 (PDF)
Minutes of UN Security Council meeting on the situation in Georgia, 8 August 2008 (Audio)
Agreement on a Cease-Fire and Separation of Forces, 14 May 1994 (PDF)
Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz Conflict, 4 April 1994 (PDF)
UN Security Council Resolution 876: Abkhazia, Georgia, 19 October 1993 (PDF)
UN Security Council Resolution 881: Abkhazia, Georgia, 4 November 1993 (PDF)
UN Security Council Resolution 892: Abkhazia, Georgia, 22 December 1993 (PDF)
UN Security Council Resolution 896: On Possible Establishment of Peacekeeping Force in Abkhazia, Georgia and on Political Settlement of the Abkhazia Conflict, 31 January 1994 (PDF)
UN Security Council Resolution 906: On Extension of the Mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia and on Political Settlement of the Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, 25 March 1994 (PDF)
UN Security Council Resolution 993: On Extension of the Mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia and Settlement of the Conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia, 12 May 1995 (PDF)
Maps
Republic of Georgia Maps, by Perry-Castañeda Library
Online Maps of Current Interest, by Perry-Castañeda Library
Russia and Georgia at War: Day 2, by Daily Mail
Georgia, by the BBC
Ethnolinguistic Groups in the Caucasus Region, by Perry-Castañeda Library
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And a postscript: I wrote most of this post last Thursday but then wasn't able to complete and post it before taking off for the airport. Last night, thanks to the miracle of the Russian media sphere (perhaps a more powerful influence than the CIS in the post-Soviet space) I was able to watch the Sunday evening Vesti and Vremia roundups, which from what I could tell dealt almost solely with the conflict over South Ossetia.
The coverage was amazing in several ways. First, both my wife and I had moments where we walked into the room having heard a voice on TV without seeing the speaker, certain it was Putin. In both cases, it turned out to be the new, improved Medvedev, who seems to have repackaged his speaking style to be a tough, trash-talking clone of the man who installed him in the presidency.
Second, I was quite impressed with Vremia's use of footage from CNN and Russia Today - the effect was to legitimize the Russian government's position and ORT's coverage by, for example, broadcasting remarks by Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov not as filmed or interviewed by ORT, but as they appeared on CNN. The Russian PR machine has become much slicker since I last regularly watched the main TV news programs a couple of years ago.
Finally, while I don't think any YouTube clips ridiculing Russia's leaders have made it onto the government-owned channels recently, one of them (I can't remember which) aired at great length a mash-up making out Saakashvili to be basically a paranoid madman. No word on whether the producer of the clip was one of the Kremlin's media-making sausage factories or an actual amateur netizen.
[Update Aug 21] I was remiss above in not also directing anyone interested in further dissection of the conflict in Georgia to the many recent posts on Sean's Russia Blog on the subject. As always at SRB, the commenting is fast and furious, and some of it is even edifying. Something I'd write a separate post on if I had time, though, is Sean's appeal to the idea of "self-determination," which (unless further elaborated) is a concept about as precise and useful as "Marxism" or "fascism."
Without getting into the situation in South Ossetia, which - even if one could draw borders that wouldn't require further resettlements of Georgians - is hardly viable as an independent state, and without getting into the distinctions between the ideas of internal and external self-determination (which are broken down in the context of Kosovo here), I would simply pose the following rhetorical question: if the titular ethnic group makes up less than 20% of a region's population of roughly 500,000, and expels from the region well over 200,000 people not belonging to that group, should the remaining population be allowed to vote on questions of self-determination?