when I compared Viktor Zubkov's nomination to the post of Prime Minister (he's since been approved by the Duma, which was never in doubt) to Mikhail Fradkov's unexpected appointment as PM several years ago - the more intriguing comparison is with Putin's own appointment to the position of PM in 1999, with a similar amount of time left before the next presidential elections. The
that the similarities between Putin's appointment in 1999 and Zubkov's last week were "striking." RFE/RL actually had a little reminiscence on the 8-year anniversary of Putin's appointment to the Prime Ministership by Yel'tsin in August, entitled "
One huge difference between the scenario then and the one today is that Boris Yel'tsin was by 1999 a leader broken by ill health and the turbulence of the 1990's, and it was impossible to imagine him staying on for another four years - not to mention that he would have been unelectable in 2000 - Putin is healthy enough to think beyond the 2008-12 presidential term to the next election cycle when he could run for President once more (since the Constitution only prohibits more than two
terms in office), and Putin is not only popular enough to be re-elected himself in 2008 if the Constitution is somehow amended or disregarded but also powerful enough to guarantee the election of just about any plausible candidate next March based on his endorsement.
My safe prediction of last week has indeed turned out to be correct - there has been a great deal written about Zubkov and the meaning of his appointment, though I still think it's impossible to tell what it means for now and perhaps until the Duma elections, or at least until United Russia's party meeting at the beginning of October.
As for Kremlinology, Garry Kasparov had a column in today's Wall Street Journal suggesting that criminologists, not Kremlinologists, are what's needed to analyze Putin's ruling style.
Be that as it may, many media outlets (and, apparently, the insiders they quoted) were surprised by Zubkov being nominated instead of Ivanov. According to the AP's Sept 12 story, Zubkov's nomination "appeared to have caught much of the Russian political elite off-guard." One RIA Novosti commentator put it this way:
[T]he spate of learned commentaries and penetrating analyses flooding the internet and the press will not be able to cover up the experts’ initial bewilderment, no matter how close they were or alienated from the Kremlin.
Actually, that article, by Alexander Arkhangelsky, is worth reading in its entirety both for its insights and its lyrical tone:
One thing is certain – a new brainteaser has been presented: an exquisite sphere inside another sphere inside another one. Observers, analysts, supporting characters, competitors, foreigners, enemies and friends are all bewildered by the exotic contraption and wondering what it might mean. In the meantime, the inventor passes unnoticed behind their backs. He is the only one who knows what is going on, whether the object has any meaning or none at all, besides giving him an opportunity to fade away unchallenged and undefeated.
Seven years ago, Boris Yeltsin also resigned undefeated. But his manner of behavior was very unlike Putin’s. Yeltsin would change his mind at will, overruling his earlier decisions. He would reshuffle the deck in the middle of the game, dramatically changing the status quo. Yeltsin had the unpredictability of a lion lying in ambush. The new epoch’s style is different, no longer leonine, but vulpine, indirect. Only one thing is perfectly clear: we have been shown once again who is the master of the house. No one knows, unfortunately, whether this house is in order; whether its foundation is solid or made out of sand; whether it will have a new guardian or not; whether its storerooms are full or empty; whether it will be renovated and, if so, who will pay for it. Let’s not even try to guess.
RFE/RL still has a Sept 12 headline (visible in the sidebar of this article at the time of this post) that reads "Fradkov Departure Likely To Clear Stage For Ivanov," though the link leads to an error message ("This article is no longer valid or you entered wrong URL"). No longer valid, indeed. Jamestown listed some of the sources who turned out to be wrong in pre-anointing Ivanov:
Just a day before Fradkov’s resignation, Moscow Times published an article by noted Russian political pundit Yevgeny Kisilev in which he, too, predicted that the next prime minister would be Sergei Ivanov. As soon as Fradkov’s resignation was announced, all observers, including figures such as Gleb Pavlovsky, head of the Effective Policy Foundation and renown for his close ties with the Kremlin, and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, leader of the Liberal-Democratic Party and deputy chair of the State Duma, insisted that Putin would choose Ivanov.
So perhaps Putin just got sick of hearing about how everything was already decided (hey, he's supposed to be the decider, remember?) and decided to throw his inner circle - and the world - a bit of a curveball.
Kommersant's caption: Financial Monitoring Service chief Viktor Zubkov (left) has managed to jump higher than First Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov (right) thanks to experience that comes with the age.
My caption: Zubkov and Ivanov - who's smiling now? [source]
RFE/RL had a couple of Sept. 12 articles about Zubkov: "Surprise Candidate Could Indicate Putin's Indecision" and "Putin's Nomination For Premier Stuns Political Elite."
Sean Guillory of Sean's Russia Blog inaugurated his new relationship with Pajamas Media by writing about the Zubkov nomination for their website. The next day, Sean speculated (back on his own blog) further about the move:
[I]f Zubkov indeed becomes a presidential “dark horse,” there might lie the genius of choosing him rather than one of the presidential front runners, Sergei Ivanov and Dmitiri Medvedev. The latter two are big fishes in the pond, who, without a doubt, have their own khvosty (tails) of patrons and clients trailing behind them. Having one of them lead the show will only tip the balance in favor of one faction over another. But naming an technocratic “outsider” like Zubkov might be the perfect solution to maintaining a delicate balance. After all, the Russian elite has class and political interests to maintain, and creating a situation that could spill into elite civil war is bad for everyone’s business. What a better way to keep the juices of elite prosperity flowing than to appoint someone as faceless, uninspiring, and technocratic as Putin was when he was named Prime Minister in 1999? Because if there is any lesson that should be learned from Putin’s tenure as President, it’s that his power stems from his ability to keep the forces balanced; to let the elite have their cake and eat it too. So in the end perhaps the search of a “successor” is really about finding the right manager.
Slate's Today's Blogs also featured the Zubkov news on Sept 12, observing that "bloggers became Kremlinologists" in speculating about the meaning behind Putin's tapping Zubkov. Slate linked to Nikolas Gvosdev's Washington Realist blog, which noted on the 12th that
It's difficult to see Zubkov as being the designated "heir" to become president. It is important to note that if one looks at the last years of the second term of the Yeltsin Administration, a series of prime ministers were appointed, in part to keep the political establishment off balance.
This also gives some "breathing room" if the overall succession issue has not been settled by having another technocratic prime minister in place for the next several months, while negotations would continue over how power would be distributed. Remember, the lesson many in the Russian elite learned from the Orange Revolution of 2004 in Ukraine was that when the elite is divided and cannot reach consensus, the system becomes destabilized.
Gvosdev had a post the next morning titled Zubkov: The Placeholder Theory, which drew another interesting comparison, albeit from a bit farther afield than Ukraine:
I've been reminded by one of my readers that I should not rule out a scenario that is drawn from the analogy I often make between Putin's Russia and the set-up of the PRI in Mexico.
A little history. Plutarco Elias Calles, unable to run again for president of Mexico, made himself the Minister of War (no term limits) and got recognition from all the factions to be Mexico's "political chief". He then from behind the scenes ruled through a series of presidents--Emilio Portes Gil, Pascual Ortiz Rubio, and Abelardo Rodríguez--all of whom would serve for a time, and then resign.
Slate also linked to the eXile's blog post (observing that "The only thing that set Fradkov apart" from other recent Russian PMs "was his striking resemblance to Porky Pig") and to analysis by Dmitri Trenin at the Carnegie-affiliated Passport blog ("Putin will probably beat any analyst at [the name-guessing] game..."), as well as to Publius Pundit's somewhat over-the-top post (written by LR, natch), which was headlined "Once Again, Putin Spits on Democracy."
The eXile's blog had a later post chronicling over a decade of professed devotion to fighting corruption by top Russian officials, in honor of Zubkov's anticipated focus as PM and background as financial crimes monitor, comparing the perpetual Russian fight against corruption to America's "War on Drugs":
The point is that Russia's newest War On Corruption is as doomed and corrupt as America’s endless War On Drugs campaigns - and just as politically useful.
Surprisingly on a similar page with the eXile, LR had a post which discusses Zubkov's potential "war on corruption" ("it's possible...he's just blowing neo-Soviet smoke") and relates stories of personal meetings with Zubkov from an anonymous source (who characterizes the new PM as "by far the most likeable ex-sov I’ve ever met to this day.").
A Kommersant opinion piece revisited the "Operation Successor" discussion and, comparing Putin's plight to that of long-serving leaders Tony Blair and John Howard, had sort of a fresh take on why Putin might not want to stay around for four more years (at least not starting in 2008):
When analysts try to understand why Vladimir Putin does not want to run for the third term, they usually think it is because the president is too tired to amend the Russian Constitution. Or, he does not want to cause uproar in G8 countries where leaders do not normally get their powers prolonged. Both arguments sound convincing, but we can add one more. It is the prospect of obsolescence, a pressing problem for any political figure who wields power in a country with any kind of popular vote and at least a theoretical possibility of an alternative to the incumbent leader. In the so-called Successor Operation Vladimir Putin strives to give a facelift to his regime, which will help him not only avoid “obsolescence” but also return to power fresh and new.
Time's Sept. 12 article referred to the Zubkov nomination as "Putin's Surprise Power Play" and had the following to say (after quoting an unnamed "savvy Russian official" as presciently predicting the government's dismissal but incorrectly saying that Ivanov would be the new PM):
In his fiscal capacity, Zubkov has played a crucial role in dismantling the Yukos oil giant, now taken over by the state. He has also groomed another top fiscal cop — his son-in-law Anatoli Serdyukov, once a furniture dealer and now Russia's Defense Minister. Serving under Zubkov, Serdyukov proved himself a ruthless and efficient fiscal sleuth. Putin installed him at Znamenka (Russia's Pentagon) to make up for what his other protege, Defense Minister and later First Deputy Premier Sergei Ivanov, had failed to accomplish — to make sure that the Kremlin, rather than the military brass, controls the cash.
Before Zubkov's emergence, the front-runners in the presidential succession race had been First Deputy Premiers Sergei Ivanov and Dmitri Medvedev. Since the entire cabinet resigned Wednesday, neither man is assured of recovering even those positions. Although Medvedev controls the economic powerhouse Gazprom, he lacks political heft. Ivanov, former KGB-FSB Colonel-General and close confidant of Putin, had appeared too smug lately that he had his ever-vigilant old friend's continued support for the top job.
Zubkov not only controls cash, but he also enjoys support of the most radical faction of the Kremlin Siloviki (the hard-line and hard-nosed conservative law enforcers and military brass who call the shots under Putin). This faction is led by another Putin confidant, Deputy Chief of the Presidential Staff Igor Sechin; former KGB Lieutenant-General Victor Ivanov, another Deputy Chief of Staff (in charge of cadres); and former Prosecutor General, now Minister of Justice Vladimir Ustinov.
But while Zubkov has been installed in the job that makes him Putin's heir apparent, the question remains whether he's actually being tapped for the succession. That's a question to which even Putin himself, increasingly anxious to find a way to maintain his power despite the requirements of the constitution, may not yet have the answer.
Others have suggested (see below) that Putin is actually setting Zubkov up to be a counterweight to Sechin et al. And who knows whether Putin is "increasingly anxious" or not - more likely, he's just trying to avoid becoming a lame duck.
As Robert Amsterdam writes,
[I]t is far too early for Putin to tip his hand. If he learned anything from his rise up through the ranks of power, he would understand that Russian political leaders wait until the last minute possible to reveal their preferred successors, and promote decoys to attract the attacks of their opponents.
Russia Monitor had a roundup-type post (sort of like this one, but more timely) and concluded,
The contest is probably still between Medvedev and Ivanov. Russian sources also share this view. Furthermore, as I have argued before, Putin may in fact not choose a 'successor' and thereby encourage an actual *gasp* political campaign.
Siberian Light's entry on the new PM had a few interesting comments, and Putinwatcher at Perspectives on the New Russia had the following to say on the blizzard of commentary following the announcement of Zubkov's nomination:
Most of the western press is now speculating about what most of the Russian insiders, independent press, and blogs have been talkiacng about for at least a year - that the two major contenders for the Russian presidency - Medvedev (head of Gazprom and also first deputy prime minister) and Ivanov (also first deputy prime minister and leader of the security services branch of the Russian government) are not the only two men who might succceed Putin (potentially because they threaten Putin's return to the political scene in 2012 by their powerful positions and reputation) and, as a result, Putin might appoint a little known successor to succeed him so that he can stay in power in an informal way.
This fits with the thinking of Wally Shedd of the Accidental Russophile:
[I]f Putin plans a return to the presidency in 2012, it would serve his purposes to nominate someone less powerful and entrenched than either Ivanov or Medvedev. After all, why would either one of those candidates step aside for Putin 2012?
Indeed, Putin may wish to promote an older (Zubkov is 66), less ambitious successor out of a fear that he might get frozen out by a stronger replacement. Putinwatcher's conclusion, however, is that the new PM is not necessarily meant to be the answer to the 2008 question:
More likely, Zubkov is a trusted associate of Putin who is also a reflection of the growing power of the security services people in the Russian government. This says more about Putin's attempt to consolidate power than about a new successor. Keep tuned though, it is gonna get more interesting.
That's something on which we can all agree - Russia-watching is rarely dull, especially during the runup to a handoff of power.
Zubkov's Wikipedia page has, not surprisingly, expanded a bit in the past week, as has the extensive entry on him at Vladimir Pribylovskii's Anticompromat website - it links to an up-to-date index of articles on Zubkov which has material going back to 1999.
Anticompromat notes that Zubkov was the president of the St. Petersburg ski racing federation (Федерация лыжных гонок, not sure if I'm getting the name of the sport write in English) and also has the following tidbits from Zubkov's past with VVP:
V. Putin invites V. Zubkov to his birthday parties (in 2000 [Zubkov] "...was summoned to [Putin's] birthday party at the Podvor'e restaurant in the city of Pavlovsk (there were only 21 guests)" - "Polit.ru", Nov 2, 2001, citing Kommersant). At one of Putin's birthday parties, accurding to Profil' magazine, V. Zubkov even participated in extinguishing the candles on the cake ("Profil'", Jan 26, 2004).
Nosemonkey/Europhobia played up the connections with Putin and the guys from Piter:
[Zubkov's] only previous attempt to gain proper elected office was running for governor of St Petersburg in 1999 - where he only managed fourth place. [...]
Zubkov’s campaign manager back in 1999 was one Boris Gryzlov - currently Speaker of the Duma and leader of far and away the biggest political party, United Russia - despite having only moved into high-profile politics for the first time in 1999, coincidentally the same year that his fellow St Petersburger Putin suddenly burst onto the scene.
Gryzlov is also little-known, despite being a major political figure and routinely described as “a close ally of Putin”. One thing that is known, however, is that he went to school with both former head of the FSB (the successor to the KGB) Nikolay Patrushev [...]. To top it off, Gryzlov’s business partner is one Viktor Ivanov, Putin’s deputy head of the presidential staff, and another former KGB man. [...]
And concluded:
Zubkov, in other words, would make an ideal presidential caretaker during the term in which old Vlad is constitutionally unable to stand for office. Come 2012, he could step down and our man Putin sweep back into the Kremlin on waves of populist glory.
The Moscow Times also played up the old connections, headlining one piece "Zubkov, Putin Go Way Back," quoting Sergei Ivanov:
"He is someone whom I know quite well, and he is a man who, as we say in Russian, has worked without making any noise. ... He is perfectly competent," Ivanov said on NTV television.
When Zubkov worked with Putin in the St. Petersburg administration, Putin used to refer to him using the formal "vy" form, while Zubkov used the more familiar "ty," said Stanislav Belkovsky, a political analyst with the Council for National Strategy.
"As a bureaucrat, he taught Putin basic bureaucratic skills," Belkovsky said.
Ivanov's quote is interesting because it ever-so-slightly hints that the man who may still be Putin's chosen successor was also taken by surprise - Zubkov worked with so little noise that his appointment may have surprised Ivanov as much as it surprised Vedomosti and the numerous "Kremlin insiders" quoted by various media as certain that Ivanov would glide into the Prime Minister's chair. I'm not sure what words Ivanov used in Russian, but for some reason this quote also made me think of a bit of an old Vysotsky song:И вовсе не было подвоха или трюка,
Вошли без стука, почти без звука,
Пустили в действие дубинку из бамбука -
Тюк!- прямо в темя - и нету Кука.
The Economist commented, "Any government shake-up provokes questions, but rarely such a resounding one of "Who?'" Edward Lucas's article recalls Fradkov as "colourless and weightless, at least politically speaking," and therefore "an ideal prime minister in the Kremlin’s eyes." Lucas notes that the "exact reasons for his resignation on Wednesday September 12th and replacement by a little-known tax official, Viktor Zubkov, are unclear; so far the Russian proverb, nyet faktov, tolko versii (there are no facts, only theories) is an apt one."
Actually, Kommersant financial reporter Liza Golikova seemed to have a pretty good idea about who Zubkov is:
While our editorial staff was discussing the Cabinet’s resignation on Wednesday, I was nearly the only one who [had seen] the prime-minister-to-be in person. Moreover, I’ve seen him several times, and every time not in Russia. It is because I frequently visit international financial conferences, and so does Viktor Zubkov. It was his duty to combat money laundering and to improve Russia’s image among the international community. Zubkov did his duties well. [...]
Several years ago in the Novo-Ogarevo presidential residence, Vladimir Putin asked Viktor Zubkov to carefully handle the data in possession of his federal agency. “You have very important powers. You have a large amount of information, and it should be a priority of your activities to protect that information,” the president said back then. It seems to me that Zubkov still remembers that request.
He always wears a white shirt, and sometimes a dark-blue one, on especially official occasions. He wears his tie in a simple ‘choker’ knot. He doesn’t have any second pairs of shoes, cuff-links, pink shirts, or multicoloured ties. He is dressed in a Soviet-like modest style. His suit must have been made by Bolshevichka factory, but I do not insist, I don’t know for sure.
Besides, Viktor Zubkov is one of those rare state officials who did not get mixed in the so-called conflicts of interests, unlike our key ministers, for instance. They struggle in intra-governmental intrigues, do not greet each other in halls, they exchange cutting remarks during conferences. Meanwhile, Zubkov never does all that. Everyone who knows him says that Viktor Zubkov talks equally to everybody, despite ranks. [...]
As an acquaintance of mine said yesterday, Zubkov knows the ‘aim!’ order. When he receives it, he shoots. And he never misses his aim.
In all, not an entirely unattractive portrait - Kommersant has a page of biographical information and Zubkov quotations on important issues ("Direct Speech") entitled "Who is Mr. Zubkov?" I found a couple of these interesting but so old that they shouldn't be taken too seriously:
On ways to tackle the financial crisis
“Several shops raised prices on imported electronic goods. We have recorded these cases and warned directors that we are going to come and check all their papers for the past three years and eight months.” August 19, 1998
On ways to solve the Chechnya issue
“This use of force will kill all our people. I believe that we must consider the question [on Chechnya’s secession], make the real border and then deal with other problems.” At TV debates, September 9, 1999
Russia Blog had a fairly extensive post about Zubkov ("a surprising, but nevertheless logical candidate for the position of a Prime Minister") and the prospects for the presidential election next March.
Slate's Anne Applebaum argues that it doesn't matter who winds up being Russia's next president - it's the process that's important:If Zubkov (or someone else) becomes president following an orchestrated media campaign, falsified elections, and with Putin hovering constantly in the background, we'll know he really is a place-holder. If Zubkov (or someone else) manages to garner some genuine support, both among voters and within the Kremlin, we'll know to take his views seriously. If Putin remains president—well, we'll know what that means too. Already, the fact that no one outside the Kremlin's inner sanctum has any idea what the succession will look like is a bad sign. It's hard to talk about "rule of law" in a country where power changes hands in such a thoroughly arbitrary manner.
By the same token, the nature of the presidential campaign will also reveal a lot more about the state of contemporary Russian political thinking than the biography of the winner. We will learn, for example, whether the Kremlin intends to go on paying lip service to democracy or is soon intending to abandon the charade altogether. The frequency with which rules are broken; the language used about the Kremlin-ordained candidate and his opponents; the number of times said opponents are allowed to appear on television; all this will explain more about Russia's future political orientation than any analysis of the candidate's political beliefs...
But all of the Russia-watchers want to know now, so they can lay down their bets! Actually, to my surprise, it looks like Unibet has closed its much-discussed wagers on the Russian presidential election - they're nowhere to be found on the online bookmaker's website, and I received an email from Unibet on Sept 20 confirming that "since they are not on the website, we are not accepting any wagers." Before shutting down the action on the 2008 question, they added (in response to a couple of emails from me) Naryshkin to the line at 8-t0-1 and Serdyukov at 20-to-1.
Anyway, Unitrade never had among its choices someone who has to be a surer shot than people like Berezovsky (who was included) at being "the next president of the Russian Federation" (the title of the wager, if I recall correctly) - namely, its current president. Via The Register, I learned that an outfit called Intrade is running a futures market based on next year's presidential election - such markets have been good at predicting outcomes in US elections in the past, if I recall correctly - and in any event they are entertaining.
In this case, a month ago Putin was trading slightly below Medvedev, and both were far behind Ivanov, but at last check he's jumped into the lead and Ivanov is even with Medvedev. Even though that somewhat mimics the conventional wisdom after Zubkov's appointment - that Ivanov's bubble has burst, at least temporarily - I wouldn't place too much predictive power in this market: Zubkov isn't even on the list, long-long-shots (with high Western name recognition) like Yavlinsky and Nemtsov are, and it's probably a fairly thin market. After all, people with real money to wager on the handling of Putin's sunset months and the successor question can place their bets on the RTS.
And if it were up to the Russian people, with no Constitution to constrain them, Putin would be a good bet next March, according to this article from the day before Fradkov resigned:
No Successors Needed RBC Daily, September 11, 2007
Voters dislike them all
The best successor to Putin would be Putin himself
Author: Rustem Falyakhov - Summary prepared by Hayk Sargsyan of CDI
The All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) approached 1,600 respondents to compile its August-September trust rating. As usual, President Vladimir Putin is far ahead of all other politicians: 58% of respondents say they trust him. Dmitri Medvedev and Sergei Ivanov, senior deputy prime ministers and potential successors, scored 19% each. [...]
It was the other VTsIOM opinion poll, dealing with presidential candidates, that left analysts somewhat speechless. If an election were held this week, Medvedev would have scored 2% of the vote, with 3% for Ivanov (with the statistical margin of error at 3.4%!). In other words, citizens trust the Kremlin's favorites - but don't see either of them as a president....Putin is different, of course. Sixty-three percent of respondents would have voted Putin without a moment's hesitation. [...]
Experts maintain that citizens fear change and therefore refuse to take the risk of betting on any successor.
Kremlin insiders may be feeling the same way!
NYT caption: ENIGMA: In Soviet days, might Vladimir Putin have asked, from left,
Sergei Ivanov and Mikhail Fradkov and, from right, Dmitri Medvedev and Viktor
Zubkov, to Red Square with him and the bearded old Bolshevik Mikhail Kalinin?
Illustration by Wes Duvall [source]
A weekend NYT article provided some interesting reflections on the art - it's certainly not a science - of Kremlinology:
KREMLINOLOGY during the cold war sometimes seemed to have as much rigor as astrology, offering up prophesies about an opaque nation by surveying all manner of ungainly texts, dubious statistics, retouched photos and back-room whisperings. Perhaps it was folly to predict the new Soviet leadership or policies based upon which apparatchiks clustered around Brezhnev on the parade stand in Red Square, but what else was there?
You can detect a similar desperation in Moscow these days in the attempts to divine what President Vladimir V. Putin has in store for his nation in the six months before the next presidential election. While Russia in the Putin era is a far more open society than the Soviet state, the inner workings of the Kremlin are as confounding as ever. [...]
Now, whatever Mr. Putin’s grand plan turns out to be, this much seems clear: He feels that the more he reveals, the more he diminishes his own power in the next presidential succession. Once he anoints a candidate, he is a lame duck, and he wants to forestall that as long as possible.Dmitri Peskov, Mr. Putin’s spokesman, was asked about the various presidential possibilities. He smiled and said that almost all were, well, possible.
“If anyone tells you that ‘I know!’,” he said, “he will be lying.”
Putin's recent conversations with members of the Valdai discussion group added many more statements to the mess of tea leaves already in the mix. Journalist Andrei Kolesnikov, a veteran at covering Putin, had an excellent report from the conference (although, as a Russian journo, he wasn't allowed into the "behind-closed-doors" sessions, he seemed to get the story from those who were) - unfortunately, Kommersant's English-language version omits out a lot of the editorializing that makes Kolesnikov's reporting so fun and insightful to read. Here is my translation of the section of the article titled "At least five people may run for President" (the full article in Russian is here):
Then the President told everyone what kind of a person Viktor Zubkov is. It's extremely unlikely that any of us might meet such a person in our day-to-day lives. I can't remember Vladimir Putin ever saying about anyone as many ecstatic words in a five-minute period as he did about Zubkov. In all their public appearances with Vladimir Putin, Sergei Ivanov and Dmitri Medvedev probably didn't get a tenth as much praise, maybe not even a hundredth as much.
Viktor Zubkov is a professional, he's clean-living, has common sense, is responsible and wise. He's a person with both a strong character and with a great deal of experience.
"Could he become president?" Vladimir Putin returned the [reporter's] question rhetorically. "Yes, he could...just like any other regular citizen of the Russian Federation!" he finished somewhat triumphantly. He, of course, is not a regular citizen of the Russian Federation...
Vladimir Putin continued, somewhat thoughfully, "But Zubkov didn't say that he would run, he said that he might run. That's a measured answer, there's still work to be done to get through the [Duma] elections..."
And Vladimir Putin retold Viktor Zubkov's own answer to the question about whether he would run for president to the participants in the discussion so closely to its original text that it could even have appeared that Putin wrote Zubkov's answer himself.
Moreover, it was a truly enthusiastic retelling. Vladimir Putin likes absolutely everything about Viktor Zubkov. So, things are much more serious than they might have appeared a day or two ago. [the article is dated Sept 15]
Vladimir Putin's retelling of Viktor Zubkov's biography was also worthy of attention, even exaggerated attention. The tone Putin used was the tone used in relating the biography of a person by someone recommending that person for membership in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, assuming that in the regional committee office there were people for whom the person's worthiness for such a high position was not obvious.
"Back in the day, they sent him to the very worst collective farm, which was dying out, and he made that enterprise the best in the Soviet Union... He is an unassuming man," said the President, "he doesn't talk about this. Then they sent him to an association of collective farms, also the worst one, and he made it the best..."
The Moscow Times, in a story curiously titled - like the English version of Kolesnikov's piece - "Putin Talks of 5 Possible Successors," had the following roundup of pundit opinions:
Putin -- possibly worried about accusations of authoritarianism -- might be backing away from an earlier promise to name a preferred successor and will offer voters a choice of three or four of his loyalists, said Sergei Mikheyev, a political analyst with the Center for Political Technologies.
"And it is possible that after eight years of an active and relatively young Putin, Russia's cautious voters would prefer the aged and conservative Zubkov over the younger and dynamic Medvedev and Ivanov," said Dmitry Orlov, an analyst with the Agency for Political and Economic Communications. "Dispersing support behind these various candidates would be rational for Putin at the moment." The uncertainty over Putin's preferred successor may become clearer after United Russia holds a conference Oct. 2 to finalize its federal ticket in the upcoming State Duma elections, said Masha Lipman, an analyst with the Carnegie Moscow Center.
"Whoever is there with [party leader Boris] Gryzlov and [acting Emergency Situations Minister Sergei] Shoigu could claim more legitimacy than others as a future Russian president," she said.
Zubkov said Thursday that he would not join any party. The law, however, does not preclude him from running on a party ticket in the Duma elections.
With his promotion, Zubkov had already become the front-runner, surpassing Ivanov and Medvedev, said Olga Kryshtanovskaya, who tracks Kremlin politics at the Russian Academy of Sciences.
Another possible scenario is that Zubkov, at 66 not a young man at all by Russian standards, could retire after a year or two on the job, claiming fatigue or ill health. In any event, the new PM's advanced age, while it might make him a hard sell at the ballot box (unless his role as a seat-warmer for Putin could be telegraphed to the electorate) probably makes him the ideal person to keep Putinism alive until Putin can return in 2012. In conversation with the Valdai Group, Putin did not rule out running in 2012. [the Kremlin's transcript of Putin's meeting with the Valdai Group is available in Russian along with audio and video of the event; a partial version has been posted in English]
The main question, I guess, is whether Putin, with this nomination, has anointed his successor or whether this represents another delay in that choice.
Consider the problems facing Putin - a short-term problem of becoming a lame duck (which could happen if it became a sure thing that Ivanov was going to be the successor) and perhaps a long-term problem of preserving his chances of being able to return to the Kremlin in 2012. Putin's potential lame duck problem is actually a problem for Russia in a way that such a situation would not be in a political system with better developed institutions (see, for example, this article asking whether Putinism can survive Putin and this one on the "coming de-Putinization of Russia").
Therefore, it may be with the country's best interests at least in part in mind that Putin seems determined to keep his potential heirs and all the analysts on their toes until the last possible minute. It's probably more of a personal problem for Putin, though, since I think that the public and the markets would be content with a designated and well-known successor who they could be sure would carry the torch of Putinism forward.
With Zubkov as PM, Putin remains the "decider" at the center of things - he can more easily pull the plug on Zubkov than he could on a Prime Minister Ivanov or Medvedev, and in that event he could install one of those two front-runners or even step up himself. And if he does decide to throw the mighty "administrative resource" Zubkov's way in the presidential race, well, who knows?
By refusing to choose between the major contenders even at this late date, Putin continues to avoid lame-duck status and - yes - even keeps open his option to stay in power after March 2008. He's said so many times - including last week to the Valdai Group - that he won't do this that it's hard to fathom he will, but stranger things have happened. And whether Putin plans to exercise the option or not, all options have value, and Putin is shrewd to make sure he stays in the driver's seat as long as possible, especially since it's unclear whether the system he has created can function without him at the helm. The idea of crowning Zubkov President, which is surely in Putin's power, might also be appealing because it keeps Putin's options open throughout the 2008-12 presidential term - after all, a man in his late sixties might easily be convinced that he is sufficiently fatigued or ill to retire after a year or two of the grueling presidential schedule.
Mark "The New Cold War" MacKinnon suggested the following in late August, after the Kremlin published photos of a buff-for-his-age topless Putin fishing and being a manly man (the post was titled Problematic Putin Porn):
The question that comes to mind, though, is why are we being shown these pictures now. After all, Vladimir Vladimirovich is stepping down next year, heading into graceful retirement at age 55. Right? With presidential elections just half a year away, shouldn't we be pondering the pecs of Sergei Ivanov and Dmitriy Medvedev, Mikhail Kasyanov and Garry Kasparov?
Why is Komsomolskaya Pravda still telling kids to "Be Like Putin" on its front page? Is it because you're not going anywhere after all, Vladimir Vladimirovich?
Though I make no claim to being a political strategist (it's Mark McKinnon - no relation - who used to work for George W. Bush), I have to agree with Yevgenia Albats who worried aloud on her Эхо Москвы show that the pictures - which ominously were posted on the official Kremlin website - might be the strongest statement yet that Putin is planning on sticking around after his second term expires next year.
These photos are campaign material, pure and simple. They're meant to show the Russian public (and the world) that Putin is fit and ready to remain at Russia's helm past 2008, if he so chooses. [...]
The decision to publish the Putin porn tells me they haven't yet found anyone "cooler" than Vladimir Vladimirovich and that "Operation Successor" as its known inside the Kremlin, may be morphing into "Operation Incumbent."
Some have suggested that Putin's elevation of Zubkov to the position of PM is of a piece with the promotion of Zubkov's son-in-law, Anatoly Serdyukov, to the position of Defense Minister, and represents something new. According to the anonymous Polittechnologist who posts on Robert Amsterdam's blog,
Vlad has come up with a brilliant plan. Bring a third force into the Kremlin – unprepossessing people who even seem to be devoid of any substance at first glance. But they will be loyal to him (so he thinks) to their dying day. Imagine if you’re the director of a furniture factory and suddenly you’re appointed Minister of Defense??? [...]
[Putin]’s creating a new “family” around himself. At first I’d thought that his family was Sechin and Ustinov, whose respective children are already living together in marital bliss. Now I’m seeing a new family. Serdyukov (minister of defense) and Zubkov (prime-minister) are also related by marriage. [...] And Vlad needs just such a family – loyal and without any ambitions. After all, Vlad’s college buddies might just recall that they had once gotten better grades than him and decide that they deserve better now. But former subordinates who have suddenly been so unexpectedly blessed won’t.
Never mind that Serdyukov resigned as Defense Minister on Sept 18 (though there's already speculation that he'll receive another "worthy" official position; and he's not the only one leaving - Kommersant forecasts that Medvedev will move to Gazprom, though that may be a promotion, and it's likely that unpopular Health Minister Zurabov and possibly Minister of Economics German Gref will also be gone; Gryzlov has suggested that those in the cabinet who are United Russia members will stay in). Presumably under this versiia the goal is a clan with more staying power than the Yel'tsin "family." The anonymous Polittechnologist goes on to forecast "with a great deal of confidence" that Putin "has decided to go for a third term."
Jamestown's Pavel Baev suggests that
Putin saw the need to expand the choice beyond this dull duo and at the same time sought an escape from the dilemma of either finding a strong successor or securing the continuity of his course (Vremya novostei, September 18).
Toward that end, he carefully orchestrated the rise of a new political clan in the shadows of the seemingly all-powerful siloviki or “power players” from the FSB, the Ministry of Interior, and other power structures. Most of these political unknowns worked with him in St. Petersburg in the early 1990s and then moved to various agencies involved in financial and tax monitoring and investigations, so perhaps a new expressive Russian word mytar (tax man) would enter the vocabulary. [...]
Whether the Zubkov-Serdyukov clan succeeds in carving out a roomy niche for itself in the Kremlin walls and filling it with fast-swelling ranks of sycophants, or its influence is cut short by Nikolai Patrushev, the head of the FSB, Igor Sechin, the deputy head of the presidential administration, and other “heavy weights” is yet to be decided.
On the other hand, Andrei Smirnov, also writing for Jamestown, stated that "There is no doubt that Zubkov was put forward by the siloviki" and that "Zubkov’s appointment demonstrates that the siloviki are concentrating ever more political power in their hands." So it's difficult to know if any of the often contradictory conspiracy-type theories swirling around are plausible. In any event, Amsterdam suggests that Zubkov should not be underestimated:
Indeed, through his prior role as anti-money laundering czar, one must assume that Zubkov is by no stretch a weak figure. He surely has detailed knowledge of sensitive information about virtually all of the leading Russian officials who have established political power bases upon riches and influence attained via their stewardship of state-controlled energy companies. Zubkov may be a more powerful arbiter of the Kremlin’s competing clans than many are assuming him capable of.
All in all, it is far too early and there is not enough information to make reliable predictions at this point – but what seems clear to me is that the fighting between the Kremlin’s competing groups is getting more and more intense, and Putin’s status as a hostage to these disputes makes for a powerful reminder of the most critical weaknesses of Russia’s model of sovereign democracy and the vertical of power.
Possibly weighing lightly in favor of Putin keeping his options open is the ambiguous ad campaign with billboards proclaiming "Putin's Plan - Russia's Victory!" But while they seem to be promoting VVP, these billboards are probably actually ads for United Russia's Duma campaign, reports Global Voices - in a post which includes some comic relief about the Zubkov nomination. Apparently Lenta.ru published a story online identifying the new PM nominee as "Viktor Pipiskin" (the harried journalist couldn't remember Zubkov's name and thought it was just a draft) which stayed online for awhile.
Anyway, amidst all the speculation - much of it (including some quoted above) by people who may not be in a position to know anything more than someone with an internet connection - it seems like the smart money is not betting on any one scenario yet. Much of the pontificating about Zubkov (again, including much of what I've quoted above, lest it seem I'm just eating it all up) tells you more about the pontificators than about the subject of their pontification - i.e., people and outlets which tend to be pessimistic about Russia see this as reason for more pessimism; people and outlets which see Putin's course as positive don't find too much to criticize; and of course some of the stuff is just written because newspapers have to fill column-inches and blogs have to post things.
At the end of the day, perhaps Putin simply hasn't made up his mind yet about 2008 and 2012. Putting Zubkov in as PM allows him to stall for time in the short term, while leaving open his options to designate a better-known successor closer to March.
Incidentally, one thing I haven't read much about is the fact that the presidential election has been scheduled for March 9 of next year. This is a bit unusual, since the day after the election, Monday the 10th, will be a holiday (the 8th is, of course, Women's Day, and in Russia, holidays which fall on Saturday are usually carried forward to the following Monday). In 2004, the presidential election was on March 14; in 2000, it was on March 26. Perhaps the election was moved up another week because otherwise it would fall on some religious holiday or for some other benign reason; but it's hard to think the planners in the Kremlin didn't think of the fact that an extra day off after the election (and the fact that everyone will have been celebrating the day before the election) might make it easier to, ah, achieve the desired outcome, whatever that turns out to be.
[Note: I can't believe this post turned out to be so lengthy. Unfortunately, Blogger does not have an easy-to-use cut feature, so the whole post will be on the front page. Fortunately, I think I've figured out a Blogger hack that enables the use of a cut feature. If you read - or even scrolled - this far, you must really be interested in Russia. Thanks for reading and please feel free to comment.]
