Musings on the mess in the military

I've written before about Pavel Felgenhauer, the always-interesting "independent defense analyst." I've just read a rather long article of his that is all about the state of the Russian military and the bottom line of changes in its leadership in the past few years. His conclusion is that there hasn't been much actual change, to put it mildly. The article was in a pretty obscure publication about which a bit must be said.

When we were living up in Boston, I got onto the mailing list for "Perspective," a somewhat interesting newsletter published by the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology & Policy at Boston University. It comes out rarely (between 2 and 4 times a year), so sometimes the articles are published with substantial delay. For example, there's an article in the October-November 2005 issue talking about reactions around the CIS to the Rose and Orange Revolutions, and it talks among other things about the reaction of "Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev" (I wonder where that one-time champion of democracy is today? Under suspicion, that's where.) without mentioning the Tulip Revolution of March 2005, which turned Akayev out of office rather unceremoniously. The only conclusion can be that the article was written before March, i.e., that at least 6 or 7 months elapsed before it was published.

All of that digression is just to note that I'm not sure how current Felgenhauer's article is, but I found it interesting enough to want to quote it at length here. You can read the whole article here, and my shorter but still lengthy edited version below. To sum up, former Chief of the General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin spent his time in the top post "involved in intrigue, in personal showoffs and occasional binge drinking"; and his replacement, Yuri Baluyevsky, is so competent that during negotiations with the Chinese over last summer's joint military exercises, and during the exercises themselves, "Baluyevsky was visibly at the helm, while [Defense Minister Sergei] Ivanov appeared on the scene briefly as the blabbing figurehead - that in fact he is." Nevertheless, the top military leadership is not engaging in meaningful reforms but is merely "busy misappropriating tens of billions of petrodollars that are being pumped into the defense budget."

Felgenhauer discusses the personalities a bit, but more importantly he has some very lucid things to say about the implications for military reform in Russia and addresses such questions as whether there is now (or ever will be) civilian management of the military in Russia. The article is peppered with sharp observations about things like how "laws passed by parliament are never of much importance" in Russia and how the growing number of contract ("volunteer") soldiers in Russia's army is nothing but a "typical Putinite Potemkin village-style reform that will cost the budget billions, while not solving any real problems." The bottom line? "Within the Russian military something is constantly changing, but the basics do not seem to change at all."

[Read more...]

"Russia's Imperial General Staff," Pavel Felgenhauer
Perspective, October-November 2005, page 1

In July 2004, General Anatoly Kvashnin - number two in the Russian military hierarchy - was dismissed as Chief of Russia's all-powerful General Staff after seven years of holding the job. The ouster ended a public brawl between Kvashnin and his immediate superior Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, appointed by President Vladimir Putin in 2001.

Before taking on Ivanov, Kvashnin publicly locked horns with the previous Defense Minister (1997-2001) Marshal Igor Sergeyev and eventually succeeded in ousting him. During his tenure, Kvashnin often made reckless public statements. In June 2003, Kvashnin surprised the nation by announcing publicly that the Russian military was in a "post-critical state" and had degraded into a rabble of thieves and crooks. [...]

There was much talk of a profound contraction of responsibilities of the General Staff after Kvashnin's ouster and of a "strengthening" of the role of the Defense Ministry. On June 19, commenting on the dismissal of Kvashnin and the appointment of his successor - General Yuri Baluyevsky - as Chief of the General Staff, Ivanov told journalists: "Putin and I believe that the General Staff must concentrate on long-term planning of the future development of the Armed Forces and the modeling of the wars of the future, while working less on current matters in the units and crisis managing."

In May 2004, in the annual address to a joint session of both chambers of parliament, Putin not only talked of "modernization of the army" being a national priority, but also specifically mentioned "civil control" of defense spending as essential to reform. Putin's pronouncements strongly indicated a serious change in our military, since meaningful "civil control" is surely impossible, while an omnipotent General Staff continues to be in charge.

Were Putin and Ivanov serious, when calling for reform? Today, over a year later in October 2005, it's clear that it was all just talk, that a personality clash between Ivanov and Kvashnin masqueraded as something more serious. [...]

Baluyevsky is a much less ambitious person than Kvashnin and at the same time, a much better military top staff professional. During the years that Baluyevsky was Kvashnin's number two in the General Staff, he was running the entire outfit, while Kvashnin was involved in intrigue, in personal showoffs and occasional binge drinking. (Baluyevsky, as well as Ivanov, according to overall Russian standards of general officer alcohol consumption, may be called teetotalers).

Baluyevsky's lack of ambition has made his relations with Ivanov much smoother than Kvashnin could ever manage. For more than a year there have been no public spats between the General Staff and the Minister. At the same time, Baluyevsky's professional and organizational capabilities have in fact accelerated the role of the General Staff in decision-making. For example, during the arduous negotiations with the Chinese military over joint exercises that eventually took place in Aug. 2005 on the shore of Tsingtao peninsula south-west of Beijing, and during the actual execution of the maneuvers, Baluyevsky was visibly at the helm, while Ivanov appeared on the scene briefly as the blabbing figurehead - that in fact he is.

Since Baluyevsky was in fact running the General Staff under Kvashnin, it would be unreasonable to expect that policies and procedure would change dramatically, when after many years of working the show behind the scenes, a person finally becomes number one and officially in charge. The Law on Defense was rewritten and direct references depicting the role of the General Staff were dropped, but in real life, this did not change much. In Russia, laws passed by parliament are never of much importance. The ruling bureaucracy interprets the laws and issues its own executive ordinances on how they should be implemented. Parliament does not have any power to control how laws are interpreted or implemented, it cannot censure any minister, and it does not have the power to subpoena any executive official to give evidence under oath. [...]

After the demise of the Soviet Union, President Boris Yelπtsin was pressed to appoint a genuine civilian as Defense Minister, but balked at the idea to have a fellow politician with political ambitions in charge of the Russian (Soviet) military machine. General Igor Rodionov was retired in 1996 to pose for several months as a "civilian Defense Minister," former KGB General Ivanov is today playing the same role, but the Soviet structure of the Defense Ministry, and General Staff have been preserved since 1991 without much change. [...]

Russian military intelligence - GRU, as big in size as the former KGB and spread over all continents - is an integral part of the General Staff. Through GRU, the General Staff controls the supply of vital information to all other decision-makers in all matters concerning defense procurement planning, threat assessment and so on. High-ranking former GRU officers have told me that in Soviet times the General Staff used the GRU to grossly, deliberately and constantly mislead the Kremlin about the magnitude and gravity of the military threat posed by the West in order to help inflate military expenditure. There are serious indications that at present the same foul practice is continuing. [...]

The Russian/Soviet top military administration has demonstrated remarkable consistency in structure, procedure and strategic intentions during periods of unusual change in Russia, and the total dominance of the General Staff in decision making has been preserved the whole time. This has provided stability and continuity of command within our military. All major players seem, at present, to be content to keep it as it is: The military chiefs mind their own affairs without much control and do not in any way threaten the Kremlin, while staying busy misappropriating tens of billions of petrodollars that are being pumped into the defense budget.

In many public speeches Putin and Ivanov called for the creation of a more compact, well-armed, modern military. At the same time, our high brass still insists upon sustaining a mass mobilization armed force with relatively cheap, mass-produced tanks and guns. The legacy of World War II is still considered, in our military academies, as the finest of modern military tactics, operational art and strategy. Suggestions that drastically would cut numbers in exchange for increasing quality are dismissed as pro-Western diversions that are intended to "disarm Russia" in the event of an imminent U.S.-lead NATO invasion.

The end result is a "strategic compromise" that merges irreconcilable patterns of military planning and development. Russia is trying at the same time to have a Soviet-type mass army of conscripts and reservists, while at the same time attempting to assemble hundreds of contract solders to form new professional units. As a result, Putin and Ivanov get the worst of both: An old Soviet-type armed force with a Soviet command structure that is continuing to decompose, and in essence, has lost the ability to fight the "big wars" it was built to fight. Any mass mobilization is now a dream, since the reservists are not trained and the heavy weapons in the storage bases are old and mostly dysfunctional. The "permanent readiness" units are also equipped with the same old weapons and inadequately trained.

Deputy Defense Minister General Alexander Belousov told journalists in September 2005 that 70 percent of contract soldiers recruited today are in fact conscripts that sign on after half a year of conscript service. The forced redressing of conscripts into "volunteer contract solders and sergeants" is a typical Putinite Potemkin village-style reform that will cost the budget billions, while not solving any real problems. [...]

Within the Russian military something is constantly changing, but the basics do not seem to change at all