Felgenhauer is, as always, disparaging of the current Russian regime, and, as is usually the case, he makes a good case for why this regime is worthy of disparagement. I commented on the impression this sometimes creates in an earlier post. However, his writing is tight - I wanted to cut paragraphs out of this one in order to avoid another long post, but I couldn't find anything to cut. Lean and mean. Check it out:
Novaya Gazeta, No 20, March 21 - 23, 2005
ROLLER-COASTER: Russia will have to withdraw from the Caucasus
Author: Pavel Felgengauer
Translated by A. Ignatkin
Positions of the Russian military in the Caucasus appeared invincible only a decade ago, in 1995. An accord was signed with Azerbaijan on the use of the Gabala radar, an element of the Soviet missile attack early warning system that enabled Moscow to "see" the south. A military-political
alliance with Yerevan, Armenia, was made. Russia had over 15,000 servicemen in Georgia, and Russian border guards manned the border with Turkey in 1995.
Everything has changed. Armenia is choosing between Iran and the United States to lean on because it does not feel it can rely on Moscow, Azerbaijan hopes for establishment of NATO bases on its territory, the parliament of Georgia demands withdrawal of Russian military bases... and Moscow is at a loss.
Retaining all external tokens of military, political, and economic domination of the Caucasus, Moscow has failed to accomplish anything by way of solutions to the Karabakh, Abkhazian, or South Ossetian problems. The parliament of Georgia refused to ratify the treaty on military bases. Efforts to put the conflicts on hold were undertaken, but these efforts did not enable Russia to retain the favorable atmosphere or its own influence.
Hostilities in Chechnya tied up all more or less combat ready units Russia retained and demonstrated the Kremlin's growing military weakness. The Caucasus ruling elites got the impression that Russia was not settling local conflicts first and foremost because it lacked the strength and the will to do so. Traditional economic ties with Moscow maintained the semi-impoverished condition but did not facilitate development of the countries of the region.
In 2002, the Kremlin began distributing Russian passports in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, clearly preparing for annexation of the territories at a more convenient moment. Georgia found itself without a choice because Russian military bases on its territory became the fifth column. That was how official Moscow set up a no-win situation in the Caucasus, a situation in which every new step would only escalate tension. There is lots of military hardware at the Russian bases in Georgia (the 12th in Batumi and the 62nd in Akhalkalaki) - 114 tanks, hundreds of armored personnel carriers and battle infantry vehicles, artillery pieces... only 4,000 or so servicemen, most of them locals.
Mixed formations comprising Russian commanders and local servicemen are not reliable by default. Should the Georgians decide to take over the bases, resistance will be light - if any. The Duma in Moscow is screaming in fury, claiming that Tbilisi must be taught a lesson. How? Russia is tied up in Chechnya where it has to reinforce its troops in fear of Shamil Basayev and Ramzan Kadyrov alike. Even a complete economic blockade of Georgia is impossible. The West will come to Tbilisi's help, and particularly Turkey. Bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki were established against Turkey, and Ankara will be happy to see them become history. It will only up its own clout with the Caucasus. Along with everything else, the US Senate is determined to demand from Moscow an unconditional withdrawal from Georgia and Trans-Dniester region in return for its membership in the World Trade Organization.
Russia is facing a choice between a hopeless conflict on the one hand and a shameful but rapid withdrawal. Very soon now, Moscow will only retain in the Caucasus small enclaves in Abkhazia and South Ossetia - strategically pointless dens of smugglers and criminals. But even that will not last. Sooner or later, through war or not, but Tbilisi assisted by the West will reestablish its control over them.
As a matter of fact, the Caucasus is but a single example. The growing discrepancy between the weakening capacities and colossal aspirations are decidedly turning Russia into a global laughing stock. The Russians always swell with pride over absolutely anything nowadays only in order to cringe in shame soon afterwards and start whining about dual standards.
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