More on Khinshtein's witch-hunt

Earlier in this space we discussed (here and here) the campaign that's apparently being mounted by Moskovsky-Komsomolets-muckraker-turned-Duma-Deputy Alexander Khinshtein against members of the Yeltsin-era political-economic elite. As Khinshtein promised, after going after Mikhail Kasyanov, he set his sights on Vladimir Rushailo. Moscow News had an interesting article in the August 10-16 issue which included a rundown of theories on why this witch-hunt went down:

Open Season Declared on "Yeltsin's Family" Faction
By Nelli Monastyrskaya

[...] Theory 1: Putting the Squeeze on the "Family"

This is by far the most obvious theory. Both Mikhail Kasyanov and Vladimir Rushailo were high-profile figures in the entourage of the former president (Boris Yeltsin). It is known that rivalry between the "St. Petersburg clan" and the cabal of insiders dubbed the "Family" acquired a systemic character. Analysts attribute the ongoing campaign to discredit members of the "Family" faction to preparations for the 2007-08 elections. "Family" representatives might, in the run-up to the elections, try to stage a political comeback by rallying around a single presidential candidate - e.g., Mikhail Kasyanov. If this is indeed the case, it is quite likely that the campaign to discredit them is a political order designed to eliminate competition to the ruling establishment or its successors. Khinshtein himself actively flaunts this theory, saying that he is determined to show up all possible machinations with the real estate holdings of many other "Family" members. This simple explanation compels pundits to advance several more theories.

Theory 2: A PR Stratagem

If the charges against Mikhail Kasyanov are indeed politically motivated, then from the perspective of PR technology, the charges against Vladimir Rushailo and the "Family squeeze" explanation appear quite logical. Several "dacha" cases, following the same pattern and fitted into the theory of busting the "corrupt Family," are a cover-up for an operation to sweep clean the political field. The attack on Kasyanov alone, in the public's eye, is evidence of his viability as an opposition leader, automatically evoking sympathy among certain sections of the population.

Theory 3: Settling Accounts

The confrontation between Khinshtein and Rushailo began in 2000. When he was not as yet a State Duma deputy, Khinshtein, a journalist writing for the Moskovsky komsomolets daily, published a series of exposes on Gen. Orlov, a close associate of Interior Minister Rushailo. As a result, criminal proceedings were opened against Khinshtein over the use of a fake Moscow City Criminal Investigation Department (MUR) ID. The conflict was hushed up, but Khinshtein's relations with Rushailo are still less than friendly.

Theory 4: Rushailo's Performance as Interior Minister and Secretary of the RF Security Council

As RF interior minister, Rushailo was privy to highly sensitive, off-limits information which could have included compromising material, sleaze on some of the incumbent state and government officials or political figures. In this event, the "dacha case" could be a warning: It is dangerous to stir up a hornet's nest in the run-up to the presidential election.

Enough theorizing to make your head spin. The almighty Google is able to somewhat restore Khinshtein's reputation in my mind - I found a redeeming remark from him in a Mosnews article from last year about NTV's firing of Leonid Parfyonov:

Deputy and journalist Aleksandr Khinshtein was the only one of the United Russia faction who spoke of political motives in the NTV row. "The freedom of the press cannot be forced to conform to a military charter. One may like or dislike Parfyonov, but one cannot deny that his program was one of the most professional programs on television and its closure will deal a tangible blow to the Kremlin's reputation," he said.