More follow-up

Earlier, I translated the results of a Levada Center poll dealing with issues that are of concern to the Russian population (here). Now, Mosnews has (in English) an interview with Yuri Levada himself in which he discusses the poll results.

Novye Izvestiia also had an article on Wednesday about this poll. An English translation was sent around in Johnson's Russia List but is not available on the JRL website. Here are a couple of excerpts:

Novye Izvestia
August 17, 2005
AS LONG AS PRICES DON'T RISE
By Andrei Gulyutin; Translated by Denis Shcherbakov

During the last few months, our fellow citizens have not been worried by politics, only about the economy. First of all, rising prices produces anxiety, as well as unemployment and setbacks in production. These are the results of the polls done by the Yuri Levada polling agency. Experts say that we are like the Chinese in this sense. [...]

The Chechen war is not even in the first ten of Russian fears. And the infringement of civil rights and liberties, for instance freedom of speech, does not disturb our citizens at all.

According to experts' opinions, such results speak about low level of social development of the society. "When respondents place monetary problems on the first place, that proves the fact that our country is an economically developing state," analyst of VIKA Alexander Generalov told us. "The same results were shown in China, as well as in several countries of the former socialist camp." At the same time, according to Generalov, the Czech Republic's citizens are not worried by economical problems, as their country in at the stage of economical rise. "Polls in that country in the 1990s indicated that the Czechs were worried about inflation and unemployment, but now foreign and social problems are in first place," Generalov notes. So, we are lagging behind the Czech Republic by ten years.

More on Khinshtein's witch-hunt

Earlier in this space we discussed (here and here) the campaign that's apparently being mounted by Moskovsky-Komsomolets-muckraker-turned-Duma-Deputy Alexander Khinshtein against members of the Yeltsin-era political-economic elite. As Khinshtein promised, after going after Mikhail Kasyanov, he set his sights on Vladimir Rushailo. Moscow News had an interesting article in the August 10-16 issue which included a rundown of theories on why this witch-hunt went down:

Open Season Declared on "Yeltsin's Family" Faction
By Nelli Monastyrskaya

[...] Theory 1: Putting the Squeeze on the "Family"

This is by far the most obvious theory. Both Mikhail Kasyanov and Vladimir Rushailo were high-profile figures in the entourage of the former president (Boris Yeltsin). It is known that rivalry between the "St. Petersburg clan" and the cabal of insiders dubbed the "Family" acquired a systemic character. Analysts attribute the ongoing campaign to discredit members of the "Family" faction to preparations for the 2007-08 elections. "Family" representatives might, in the run-up to the elections, try to stage a political comeback by rallying around a single presidential candidate - e.g., Mikhail Kasyanov. If this is indeed the case, it is quite likely that the campaign to discredit them is a political order designed to eliminate competition to the ruling establishment or its successors. Khinshtein himself actively flaunts this theory, saying that he is determined to show up all possible machinations with the real estate holdings of many other "Family" members. This simple explanation compels pundits to advance several more theories.

Theory 2: A PR Stratagem

If the charges against Mikhail Kasyanov are indeed politically motivated, then from the perspective of PR technology, the charges against Vladimir Rushailo and the "Family squeeze" explanation appear quite logical. Several "dacha" cases, following the same pattern and fitted into the theory of busting the "corrupt Family," are a cover-up for an operation to sweep clean the political field. The attack on Kasyanov alone, in the public's eye, is evidence of his viability as an opposition leader, automatically evoking sympathy among certain sections of the population.

Theory 3: Settling Accounts

The confrontation between Khinshtein and Rushailo began in 2000. When he was not as yet a State Duma deputy, Khinshtein, a journalist writing for the Moskovsky komsomolets daily, published a series of exposes on Gen. Orlov, a close associate of Interior Minister Rushailo. As a result, criminal proceedings were opened against Khinshtein over the use of a fake Moscow City Criminal Investigation Department (MUR) ID. The conflict was hushed up, but Khinshtein's relations with Rushailo are still less than friendly.

Theory 4: Rushailo's Performance as Interior Minister and Secretary of the RF Security Council

As RF interior minister, Rushailo was privy to highly sensitive, off-limits information which could have included compromising material, sleaze on some of the incumbent state and government officials or political figures. In this event, the "dacha case" could be a warning: It is dangerous to stir up a hornet's nest in the run-up to the presidential election.

Enough theorizing to make your head spin. The almighty Google is able to somewhat restore Khinshtein's reputation in my mind - I found a redeeming remark from him in a Mosnews article from last year about NTV's firing of Leonid Parfyonov:

Deputy and journalist Aleksandr Khinshtein was the only one of the United Russia faction who spoke of political motives in the NTV row. "The freedom of the press cannot be forced to conform to a military charter. One may like or dislike Parfyonov, but one cannot deny that his program was one of the most professional programs on television and its closure will deal a tangible blow to the Kremlin's reputation," he said.

Can't tell the players without a scorecard

I was poking around on the BBC's Russia Country Profile page today and found this useful primer on the affiliations of various Russian media outlets:

The press
* Komsomolskaya Pravda - mass circulation, outspoken daily, controlled by tycoon Vladimir Potanin
* Kommersant - liberal, business-orientated, controlled by tycoon Boris Berezovsky
* Moskovskiy Komsomolets - popular daily controlled by Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov
* Izvestia - popular daily controlled by tycoon Vladimir Potanin
* Rossiyskaya Gazeta - official government newspaper
* Nezavisimaya Gazeta - influential privately-owned daily
* Argumentiy i Faktiy - popular weekly
* Sovetskaya Rossiya - pro-Communist daily
* Krasnaya Zvezda - Defence Ministry newspaper
* The Moscow Times - English-language daily

Television
* Russia TV Channel - national network, run by state-owned Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (RTR)
* Channel One - national network, 51% owned by state, 49% by private shareholders
* NTV - national network, owned by gas monopoly Gazprom
* Centre TV - commercial, Moscow area
* Ren TV - Moscow-based commercial station with strong regional network

Radio
* Radio Russia - national network run by state-owned Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (RTR)
* Moscow Echo - influential private station
* Radio Mayak - state-run national network
* Russkoye Radio - major private network, music-based
* Voice of Russia - external service, broadcasts in English and other languages

News agencies
* Itar-Tass - state-owned, pages in English
* RIA-Novosti - state-owned, pages in English
* Interfax - private, pages in English

I'm hoping to have time before leaving Moscow to update my links to include more Russian media and information sources, and this is an OK start on that task, although there are definitely a few more I'd add. The main reason I want to improve the links on this site is a selfish one - I'm hoping to continue blogging about Russia from afar, and having a specific list of sites to visit regularly is one way to make that easier.

Russia's damaging inferiority complex

Alexander Golts, deputy editor of the excellent on-line publication Yezhednevny Zhurnal ("Daily Journal"), had some interesting comments in Monday's Moscow Times on the damaging impact of Russia's inferiority complex:

Russia's Economic Maneuvers
Moscow Times, Monday, August 15, 2005. Issue 3230. Page 8.
By Alexander Golts

Thirteen years ago, when Moscow and Beijing agreed that Russia would start shipping arms to China, the announcement made waves around the world. Military analysts began talking about the possibility of a new alliance between Moscow and Beijing that would take an anti-American tack.

Now these predictions appear to be coming true. On Thursday, Russia and China will commence their first joint military exercises, in which around 10,000 soldiers and officers will participate. [...]

In this complicated war game -- during which potential threats to the United States, China's biggest trading partner, are being meted out with great care -- maneuvers that can be interpreted in a variety of ways become all the more important. In any case, it is clear why Peace Mission 2005 is useful for China.

It is a lot less clear what these military exercises will do for Russia. It is not clear what exactly Moscow stands to gain from war games that present an apparent threat to the United States, a country with which Russia has a strategic partnership, as Russian authorities have announced on numerous occasions.

Yet, there is some clear-cut economic reasoning behind Russia's participation. China is the largest purchaser of Russian military hardware. Every year, it buys around $1 billion in weaponry from Russia. [...]

The military reasons why Russia is engaging in joint maneuvers with China are far more vague and nebulous. It seems that Russian military policy increasingly reflects the armed forces' inferiority complex. Without the resources to play a significant role in the Asian arena, Russia doing everything it can to make it seem as if it is an active participant in the region's affairs. In the process, Russia's leaders have resorted to anti-American saber rattling out of old habit.

For example, Russia's national security would only be enhanced if the coalition forces fighting in Afghanistan were finally to defeat the remnants of the Taliban. Yet at the recent summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, President Vladimir Putin suggested that the delegates discuss when coalition forces should be required to withdraw from military bases located in Central Asia. Not only do these bases supply the troops fighting in Afghanistan, but they also support stability in Central Asia itself, something which is also very much in Russia's interest.

In this instance, the desire to prove how important Russia is seems to have gotten the upper hand over common sense. Russia's participation in Peace Mission 2005 apparently has very similar motives.

Maybe a more personal version of this inferiority complex played some role in inspiring Putin's antics with the Tu-160 yesterday. There's certainly no common-sense reason for the leader of a so-called G-8 nation to risk his life playing fly-boy.

[Update:] The same Moscow Times op-ed page carried another insightful commentary piece about Russia's warming relationship with China, which it's clear that Russia is rushing into in order to restore its sense of being a world power. The reasoning must go something like, "well, we'll get together with the Chinese and show these Orange-Revolution-organizing Americans a thing or two."

At the Edge of the Middle Kingdom
By Andrei Piontkovsky

[...] Confrontation with the West and the development of a "strategic partnership" and effectively a military alliance with China will leave Russia not only marginalized but also subject to China's strategic interests. And it will lead in the end to the loss of control over the Far East and Siberia, first de facto and then de jure.

In an op-ed piece that appeared in Vedomosti in mid-July, Alexander Dugin, head of the International Eurasian Movement and one of Russia's leading apologists for "Asiope" (as opposed to Eurasia), called this a "great opportunity for Russia." In an earlier manifesto, Dugin wrote with pride: "In the 16th century, the Tatars passed the torch of Eurasian empire-building to Moscow."

Muscovy's Asiopeans have carried this torch for centuries now. But if they're honest with themselves, Asiopeans like Dugin have to understand that we're now in the process of handing it off. Five centuries is a good long stretch, after all, and in the 21st century, the time has come for Russia to make way for a much more promising builder of empires, the Middle Kingdom. Apparently, this is exactly what the leadership is preparing to do.

The Holy Asiopean Alliance of emperors Vladimir Putin and Hu Jintao is the alliance of a rabbit and a boa constrictor. Its outcome is inevitable, and it will be swift.

We've been so desperate to hold together the tatters of our own "near abroad" that we failed to notice that we have now become part of China's "near abroad."

That last sentence is all the more scathing because it's dead accurate.

Third term story gathers momentum

It's hard to say whether the country's leadership has figured out who it wants to be in the driver's seat after 2008, but last week's proposals from a couple of regional legislators to allow Putin to stay in office - covered extensively in this space - have certainly got the media talking. Tuesday's Moscow Times had a front-page story titled, "Signs of a 3rd Term Campaign."

A behind-the-scenes campaign appears to be revving up to make sure that Putin remains in office beyond 2008. As the clock slowly ticks down on Putin's final term, the chorus of support for a constitutional amendment could swell and help Putin's retinue to persuade the president that he should stay on, political analysts said. [...]

Putin has repeatedly spoken against amending the Constitution, but his most recent remarks could be interpreted as slightly more ambiguous, said Andrei Piontkovsky, an independent political analyst.

"It's another step in Putin's comments on the subject. This was the first time that the option was first mentioned in a positive context," he said.

"There has been strong pressure on Putin from his entourage to run for a third term, but he has strong hesitations," he said. "He understands the costs on an international level."

If Putin were to run under an amended Constitution, he would risk being likened to Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko and Uzbek President Islam Karimov, longtime leaders who have traded angry words with the West over democracy in their countries and the legitimacy of their regimes, Piontkovsky said.

Piontkovsky said the recent proposals appeared to have been orchestrated by the siloviki, a group of military and security officials who rode to power on Putin's coattails and want him to stay on.

But Dmitry Orlov, the director of the Agency for Political and Economic Communications, a think tank, said the regional legislators probably reacted to Putin's statements in Finland on their own. "They wished to reiterate their loyalty," he said.

Novye Izvestiia had an article which echoed that last thought (I haven't translated it yet, although I will if I have time tomorrow). The money quote in the article was from Vladimir Lysenko, President of the Institute of Modern Politics:

"These small-minded brown-nosers don't miss a single opportunity to demonstrate their loyalty to the leadership."

But the NI piece also allowed that there might be other forces working to "rev up" the third-term bandwagon.

Stick a fork in NTV

NTV is all done as a credible source of information. This has been clear to everyone else for awhile, probably, but I guess I don’t watch the Russian TV news as much as I used to. I guess this has been the case for a year or so now, but tonight I saw something that cemented the conclusion in my mind - NTV's news programs are no more credible than "Vremia" or "Vesti" on a good night. The brief midnight edition of their NTV's program “Segodnia” led off with a seven-minute report (out of the 15-minute total length of the broadcast) about Putin's flight today on a strategic bomber. There was ample footage of Putin in a flightsuit and helmet looking pleased with himself, as well as some shots of the always-obsequious-looking Fradkov sending off his boss. Clearly, this was the Kremlin-ordained top story of the evening, and without even watching the news on Channel One and Rossiia, I feel pretty sure it was the lead there as well.

And as for Putin’s mission itself, what can one say? I would love to see some poll data on Russians' reactions to this stunt, and I suspect that the overall response would be favorable - on the surface, it seems like sort of a cool thing for a president to do. The fact is, though, that it's a bit irresponsible for the head of state to risk his own head by participating in military training maneuvers, and people who are not actually in the military don't usually look good in various military helmets - just ask Michael Dukakis, whose ill-fated 1988 campaign for the US presidency was not helped by his appearing extraordinarily goofy riding around in a tank with a helmet on.

Obviously, today's "flight of the Putin" was a manufactured PR event, but the President was clearly enjoying himself - and the Russian media can clearly no longer tell the difference between a stunt and something that constitutes real news. Perhaps Putin can be excused - after all, he's just living out the fantasy of every KGB desk officer who fancies himself a warrior, and now that he's President, the big boys in the armed forces have to let him play with their toys. But it's hard to excuse the Russian "journalists" who gave this story such fulsome coverage. There is video of this event here from RBC, although my slow connection didn't permit me to actually view it; Lenta.ru has an item (under the category of "the day's top stories") with a photo from the Rossiia TV channel's coverage (headlined "The President's Supersonic Flight"); and, not to be outdone, Channel One (ORT) also has coverage on its website (titled, more dryly, "President Putin participated in military training exercises on board a Tu-160"), including video footage. As for English-language coverage, RIA Novosti has items here and here; ITAR-TASS has an article with a funny description of Putin's post-flight press conference; Mosnews has a story here; Reuters has a thorough article which discusses Putin's previous uses of military equipment as props for PR stunts; and China's state-run Xinhua news agency, perhaps in the new spirit of Russo-Chinese cooperation, also has a fairly thorough story.

According to an ITAR-TASS item an hour ago, the President and commander-in-chief has switched from air to sea and is now aboard the Peter the Great missile cruiser observing naval exercises in the Barents Sea. It's hard to imagine that there aren't any other problems in the country that require his attention, although I guess if I were in charge of an organization as dysfunctional as the Russian military, I might like to do some drop-by, in-person inspections myself once in awhile. But the very fact that he's willing to risk doing this shows that he's desperate to take people's minds off of the truly dilapidated state of much of the Russian military.

Update - Wednesday's Moscow Times has an article about Putin's sortie, titled "Putin Breaks Sound Barrier."

Luzhkov's future

The lead story in Monday's Moscow Times was about Mayor Luzhkov's plans to enter the fray in the upcoming City Duma elections:

Luzhkov Will Run for City Duma
Oksana Yablokova, Monday, August 15, 2005. Issue 3230. Page 1.

Adding fuel to what is shaping up to be a fiery election campaign for the Moscow City Duma, Mayor Yury Luzhkov said on Friday that he would run for a seat as the top candidate for the United Russia party.

I thought they "buried the lede" - American journalese for hiding a key element of the story toward the end of an article - when I saw this paragraph deep in the article, after the jump onto an inside page:

Luzhkov's candidacy does not necessarily mean that he will became a city legislator. Luzhkov and other prominent regional leaders ran for the State Duma in 1999 and 2003 elections with no intention of becoming deputies. They topped United Russia's party list in what was a clear attempt to garner more votes for the party.

But on Tuesday I heard more speculation that Luzhkov might actually want to become speaker of the Moscow City Duma (on the radio), or that this might be a result that's desirable to the Kremlin ("Moscow will ring in 2006 with a battle for power," Nezavisimaya Gazeta). Monday's MT article raised the first possibility but seemed to reject it:

Andrei Ryabov, a political analyst with the Carnegie Moscow Center, said Luzhkov might actually be interested in quitting two years before his term ended to become speaker of the City Duma. He said the Kremlin appeared to be chipping away at Luzhkov's hold on Moscow, noting that President Vladimir Putin made Valery Shantsev, Luzhkov's longtime deputy and a possible candidate to succeed him in 2007, the new governor of Nizhny Novgorod last week.

Ryabov, however, said it was more likely that Luzhkov would "use his authority to win the December elections and bring his men into the Moscow City Duma." "This will be the only way to retain his position at the helm of the city for some time longer," he said.

What does it all mean? I'd be lying if I said I thought I knew. But it will be interesting to watch the battle, if there is one, unfold, since Luzhkov has definitely been one of the great political survivors of the post-Soviet period.

What's worrying Russians?

Yuri Levada's polling outfit has published the results of a recent survey, which I think are pretty revealing. It will probably be translated elsewhere or commented on in English, but I took a few minutes to put it into English in order to share it here in its entirety:

Russians' Concerns.
August 15, 2005

In July 2005, the Yuri Levada Analytical Center (Levada Center) conducted a survey of 2107 Russians. One of the questions was "Which of the following social problems concern you the most, which do you consider the most acute?" Respondents could choose up to 5 or 6 [sic] answers.

1. Growth of prices [inflation] - 71%

2. Poverty, the impoverishment of the majority of the population - 53%

3. The growth of unemployment - 39%

4. Economic crisis, falling industrial and agricultural productivity - 33%

5. Increasing crime rate - 29%

6-7. Inaccessibility/unaffordibility of many forms of medical treatment - 29%

6-7. Growth of drug abuse - 29%

8. Growing cost/inaffordability of education - 27%

9. Sharp division [of society] into wealthy and poor, inequitable income distribution - 27%

10. Corruption and bribe-taking - 24%

11. Crisis in the areas of ethics, culture, and morality - 22%

12. Deterioration of the environment - 17%

13. The threat of explosions and other terrorist acts where you live - 15%

14. The weakness of the government - 11%

15. Abuses of power and the impunity of government officials - 9%

16. The arrival of immigrants and migrant workers - 7%

17. The military campaign in Chechnya - 7%

18. Growth in the rate of AIDS infection - 6%

19. Police brutality - 6%

20. Inability to obtain justice in a court of law - 5%

21. Growth of nationalism, deterioration of inter-ethnic relations - 4%

22. Delays in payment of salaries, pensions, stipends, etc. - 4%

23. Conflicts between different branches of government - 3%

24. Restrictions on civil rights and democratic freedoms (freedom of speech, freedom of the press) - 2%

Other - 1%

Unable to answer - 1%

The low percentage of respondents expressing concern about immigrants would seem to contradict additional recent polling data which got lots of media play earlier this week about the rise of racism and nationalism in Russia - e.g., "Racist Sentiments Grow in Russia - Survey" in Mosnews. And the relatively low number of people concerned about environmental issues also runs counter to another recent poll, which was written about (in English) by RIA Novosti under the headline "More than half of Russians think environmental situation is unfavorable - poll." I guess it all depends on how you ask the questions.

Coverage of this poll on Mosnews suggested that the story here is Russians' fear of inflation. I heard about this poll while listening to Echo of Moscow Radio, and their commentators' take on it was that the real story is the problems which do not seem to concern the people surveyed. I tend to agree, and this is what I think is revealing about the survey.

Perhaps not surprisingly, people seem to value other freedoms which came about after the collapse of the Soviet Union - the freedom to travel, to exchange currency, to engage in private enterprise - more than the freedom to express opposition to a government which seems to have been able to convince most citizens that it's doing an OK job.

Economic and real-life concerns are more important to people than freedoms which seem abstract - after all, as someone once told me, you can't eat newspapers; unfortunately, people don't realize that the absence of a free market of ideas in the political sphere does have an impact on the quality of the decisions made about economic policy and other things which have a more direct impact on one's pocketbook.

Memories of Uzbekistan

Hard to believe it's been almost a month since my trip down south. What's even more unbelievable is that I'll be leaving Moscow in less than a week. I'm trying to look ahead to the busy fall coming up, but it's easier and more pleasant to look back at the relatively carefree summer that's now coming to an end. In that spirit, I offer the photo at left, taken at 8:39pm on July 20 in Tashkent. It shows the full moon rising alongside the Hotel Uzbekistan. As with all photos on this blog, you can click on the image to view it in a larger format.

Latynina the novelist

I've expressed in the past my admiration for Yulia Latynina's political commentary. Misha is also a fan. Here are excerpts from a transcript of an NPR interview with Latynina ( via JRL) which deals more with the other kind of writing she does - fiction. And you can listen to the story on NPR's website here.

National Public Radio (NPR), "All Things Considered," August 9, 2005

[...] MARTHA WEXLER reporting: Yulia Latynina has become something of a brand name for Russians interested in politics. She publishes newspaper and online commentaries, and she has her own radio program called "Access Code." [...]

Listeners call in or e-mail their questions to the studio at Moscow Echo radio. Latynina seems to have the access code for the powers that be, and she boldly answers questions about the scandalous wheeling and dealing of the Russian elite. But the 37-year-old Latynina, a gutsy, energetic redhead, insists that she is first and foremost a novelist. Journalism, she says, is just a draft, a way to get information for the novels she churns out. Fiction, she says, can delve deeper into people's motives.

Ms. YULIA LATYNINA (Novelist): Since a lot of things that people do, it matters not so much what they do but also it matters very much why they do it. In this aspect journalism is totally incomplete because it cannot cover all facets of reality.

WEXLER: [...] People read her books not so much because they're great literature but to find out about the crooked world of Russian business. Critics wonder whether she's hiding behind thinly veiled fiction to avoid lawsuits or worse.

After early ventures into science fiction, Latynina began writing her economic thrillers, works like "Steel King" and "Industrial Zone." They reflected the post-Soviet battles over privatization. She's a student of Russian corruption and admits she's becoming gloomier.

Ms. LATYNINA: In Yeltsin's era you could be detained for committing some crime, pay money and be released. Now you can commit a crime, be detained, pay money, be released and within a week you will be arrested again because the guy whom you paid money wants more.

WEXLER: Latynina says it's wrong to underestimate the excesses of the oligarchs who emerged and profited under President Boris Yeltsin, but she finds something positive in their striving to acquire companies and increase the value of their shares.

Ms. LATYNINA: Now the people that surround Putin, they're not building private companies, neither for themselves, neither for their friends. Their ultimate goal is to rule and to control everything in the country, including private business, not that they want to nationalize the business. They just want to be paid by the business.

WEXLER: Latynina's latest novel is again set in a Russia where everything is for sale, including high-level government positions. But she's introduced a new element, Chechens plotting a terrorist attack of horrific proportions with the unwitting help of the security police. The Chechens battle other crime families for control of an oil plant. They want to turn it into a giant chemical bomb. The book is called "[Dzhakhannam], or See You in Hell."

Latynina says Russia never really assimilated Chechens and other peoples of the Caucasus, and after the Soviet Union collapsed these people filled the power vacuum with their ancient code of honor and clan loyalty. Latynina worries that the Chechen separatist campaign has turned into a religious war throughout the Caucasus and the commanders are Muslim clerics.

Whether it's her politics, her action-packed plot lines or her insider knowledge of Russia's business and power elite, something about Latynina's books has won her a respectable readership. The [Moskva] bookstore has placed "[Dzhakhannam]" on its best-seller table next to Dan Brown's "Da Vinci Code" in translation. The store carries 38,000 titles and in June "[Dzhakhannam]" was number 12 in sales. Martha Wexler, NPR News, Moscow.

Latynina's latest book is available for sale on-line here. The publisher's note on the page (I've translated it for your entertainment) reads as follows:

Yulia Latynina's new novel is not about economics and not about a terrorist act at an oil refinery. It's a novel about a society where there are no rules. Where official positions are bought and sold. Where the refinery owner gets rid of his partner with the help of some Chechens, and gets rid of the Chechens with the help of the FSB. Where the security services, instead of preventing a terrorist act, provoke one in order to win promotions. This novel is about a society which stands at the brink of a catastrophe more frightening than the most violent terrorist act.