The Economist (via JRL) has some good commentary on the tale of the rescued "Priz" minisub. Like their fellow Brits at the FT last week, they get right to the point on the weakness of the Russian navy. The last paragraph of the Economist piece also echoes - in a rather more withering fashion - the point made in last week's Moscow Times editorial about Putin's leadership deficiencies:

The Economist, August 13-19, 2005
The Russian navy [subscription required]
Potemkin fleet: The good news, and the less good news, from Russia's submarine drama

[...] The men survived because the Russians accepted foreign help at a moment when it could still make a difference. Five years ago they waited until there was no hope, and also tried to blame a non-existent foreign craft for hitting the Kursk. The psychological cost to Russia's top brass of last week's humility was considerable. But it is too soon to conclude that this reflects a new priority for human life over pride and secrecy. [...]

The biggest unchanged thing is the Russian navy itself. It plans to buy some of the remote-controlled gadgets used by the British rescuers. But, as Pavel Baev, a military analyst, says, the navy is in such poor shape that accidents of this sort are “doomed to happen again and again”. Between the Kursk and this week, another submarine sank in 2003, with nine lives lost. Last month, the flagship of a naval review in St Petersburg was damaged during a rehearsal.

The problem is that, even as the navy has shrunk from its Soviet size, the admirals still like to pretend that they can fight on the high seas, rather than using their limited means to prepare for more plausible tasks such as preventing poaching, or to care for and train their sailors. Mark Galeotti, of Britain's Keele University, says the result is a Potemkin navy, which can “just about pass muster so long as nobody shoots at it.”

Another similarity with the Kursk was the invisibility throughout the crisis of Vladimir Putin, Russia's president. For all his posturing and would-be authoritarianism, avoidance of responsibility is still an imperative for Mr Putin. Weakness and neurosis beneath a semblance of
power: the president and his navy have much in common.

More on the possibility of a third term in office for Putin

Last week, there was a lot of talk about an initiative by regional deputies in Primor'e to amend the constitution to remove the term limit on the Russian presidency (I covered the story here, here, here, and here). As it turns out, there was another, similar initiative originating outside of Russia's capital last week. Mosnews has the basic story:

St. Petersburg Lawmaker Suggests Constitution Amendment Allowing Third Term for Putin
Created: 12.08.2005 14:42 MSK

Lawmaker of the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly has brought in an initiative to change the Russian Constitution provisions on the third presidential term.

Igor Rimmer made a project of a bill on an amendment to the Constitution in order to increase the terms of the Russian president's authorities.

Rimmer's version of this amendment reads that "one and the same person cannot hold the post of the Russian president for more than three consecutive terms,"; Interfax news agency reported. Currently, it is impossible for a person to be president for more than two terms in a row. Vladimir Putin's second term expires in March 2008. [...]

Putin has recently said that he “maybe would like to” (run for president in 2008) but the Constitution did not permit to do so.

The only problem with this story is the last paragraph. If you look at the statement which Putin made recently (on August 2nd while on a visit to Finland - the full transcript of the press conference is available on the Kremlin's website here in English and here in Russian) and read it without too much cynicism - with less cynicism than I usually apply to Russian official statements, and less cynicism than I was applying to the Primor'e story last week - it seems like the response of someone who is not necessarily focused on serving a third term in office:

QUESTION: This is a question for President Putin. Your presidential term comes to an end in 2008. There has been plenty of speculation that you would like to stay in office beyond this date. Could you say something about your plans for the future?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: Perhaps I would like to stay in office, but our country’s constitution does not allow it. I think that what is most important for Russia today is stability, and we can achieve this stability only by respecting the laws that are in force and abiding by the constitution’s provisions. 2008 is still quite a long way off and I am sure that there is still much work to do [...]

So, possibly these regional deputies are loose cannons not encouraged by anyone in Moscow, and Putin is genuinely ambivalent about a third term. Pravda.ru has a somewhat lucid explication of this point of view:

Fabricating Vladimir Putin's third term in the office of the Russian President
Ivan Shmelev, 08/13/2005 14:46

The subject surfaced in Russian political discussions again, when a Finnish journalist asked Putin this question during his visit to Finland in the beginning of August. "Maybe I would like to, but the Constitution of Russia does not allow me to do it. I believe that stability is most important factor in present-day Russia, which can be achieved on the base of constitutional regulations," the head of state answered. Vladimir Putin stated back on 9 December 2003 that it was about time one should put an end to the rumors about the need to change the Constitution. [...]

Provocative initiatives continued stirring up the general public anyway. A member of the St.Petersburg Legislative Assembly, Igor Rimmer, developed a new project to amend the Russian Constitution, in which one and same person would not be allowed to take the post of the president for more than three terms in a row. The Central Electoral Committee rejected the initiative as well.

Despite the negative remarks from the committee and from the president himself, the Russian media decided to misinterpret the story and say that Putin would agree to change the Constitution. Furthermore, they believed that Putin would forget about the fact that only the next president would have a chance to use adequate amendments, if they were ever be introduced.

It is enough to look at the headlines, which certain media outlets used for their articles and reports: "Vladimir Putin wants to remain the president for the third time," - Echo of Moscow radio station; "Putin would like to keep presidency after 2008," - Gazeta.Ru. News headlines from Itar-Tass and RIA Novosti are a lot more peaceful against such a background: "Putin: The Constitution does not allow me to stay after 2008." Not even a word about the third term. [...]

Dwelling upon Vladimir Putin's third term on the position of the Russian president, Western journalists either forget, or are not willing to recollect the fact that such initiatives periodically occurred in the USA. Russia borrowed the USA's idea about the right for one and the same person to hold the four-year presidency twice in a row. When Ronald Reagan was elected president for the second time (1985-1988), many American scientists of politics set forth a suggestion to change the Constitution and let Mr. Reagan work for another four years.

President Putin has not made any statements about the third term. When someone uses the words of a deputy to prove the opposite, one should view such situation as a political provocation. If the words of all US congressmen were made a reality, the world would be waging World War VI nowadays.

I think the truth, as is so often the case, lies somewhere between the two versions of this story which are floating around. I doubt that the initiatives from Primor'e and St. Petersburg are part of a coordinated plan to get the ball rolling on a constitutional amendment; however, it's obvious that Putin and his inner circle are giving thought to who will run the country after 2008 and that one of the options is to leave the current president in office, which they could do in several different ways. Most likely, the country's leadership simply hasn't made up its mind (1) whether it's necessary or desirable for Putin to remain the country's leader after 2008, and (2) if it is, how best to make this happen. The one thing that is clear is that we'll hear lots more speculative coverage on this story (not necessarily the specific initiatives, but the larger question) before everything is said and done.

Lost in translation

I'm once again able to blog while watching TV in the comfort of my own home, although it's not quite as nice as the wi-fi setup at our old place on Tverskaya. Let me explain. We moved a month and a half ago to a temporary apartment in preparation for moving back to the US, and I've only just now realized that ROL online internet cards (which use dialup) aren't really that bad a deal, and 45.2kbps is a perfectly tolerable speed for many online tasks.

So, we're watching "Sex and the City" on NTV (where it's "Seks v Bol'shom Gorode," of course), and I couldn't help but noticing a moment where the usually excellent translators fell down on the job (like with many dubbed TV shows, on this one you can hear the original English-language dialogue, although it's quieter than the Russian-language voice-over) - Miranda is complaining to Carrie on the phone about some relationship problem, and in English she says, "I'm so f***ed up," which is translated as "Это так ужасно," which means roughly "This is horrible" in English. Not a very momentous observation, but I really just wanted to revel in the fact that I can now make such observations in real time. Thank you, ROL.

More on new money

Here is the Moscow Times’ take (from yesterday’s paper) on the introduction of the 5000-ruble banknote. It makes a couple of the points that I've seen before in one form or another, but it also gives a higher figure for the average Russian salary than was implied in an article from which I quoted in an earlier post.

5,000 Ruble Bill to Soak Up Cash
Moscow Times, August 11, 2005. Issue 3228. Page 1.
By Anna Smolchenko

The Central Bank said Wednesday it would introduce a new 5,000 ruble note in 2006, in a move to help soak up the increasing amount of cash circulating in the expanding Russian economy. […]

The need for the note stems from large cash turnover and the rise of average salaries in Russia, the Central Bank said in a statement.

With a value of around $170 at current exchange rates, the new bill has a higher value than the largest bill in the United States, reflecting the large amount of business done in cash transactions in Russia. Most Russians remain wary of banks and are renowned for using cash to pay for everything from apartments to cars.

For those bigger transactions, the new note will offer convenience, some experts say. For the average consumer or tourist, however, it could make the retail experience more difficult, as the 1,000 ruble bill can already be hard to break in many shops, others said.

"They are making it easier for themselves," said Vladimir Tikhomirov, an economist at UralSib bank. It will now be easier and cheaper for the Central Bank to deliver cash to Russia's oil-rich regions, where salaries are relatively high, he said. "Stashing money under mattresses" will also be easier, he said, referring to the average Russian's preferred method of saving.

The average monthly salary as of June was just under 9,000 rubles, according to the State Statistics Service, more than three times higher than five years ago. […]

The introduction of the new note is not expected to have any inflationary or other economic impact. "It's a wholly psychological thing for a country where everything is done in cash," said Richard Hainsworth, CEO of RusRating, a bank rating agency. […]

Novaya Gazeta on where the power lies in Uzbekistan

Novaya Gazeta - home to, among others, Anna Politkovskaya, perhaps the most accomplished chronicler of Russian war crimes in Chechnya - had an interesting article yesterday on the extent of the power wielded by the State Security Service, or SNB, in Uzbekistan. Reporter Rustam Murzaev seems to have done a good job of "following the money" - to use a phrase from American journalistic history - but of course some might conclude that this article, coming so soon after the announcement that the US is getting unceremoniously kicked out of its airbase in Uzbekistan (which I've discussed here and here), was planted by vindictive US agents. All I've done is translate the article into English from the original, which is available here on Novaya Gazeta's website. We translate, you decide.

Cotton Without a Single Gunshot
Rustam Murzaev, Novaya Gazeta, August 11, 2005.

A “quiet revolution” has taken place in Uzbekistan: power is now in the hands of the chairman of the National Security Service.

The chief security guard rarely becomes a grey cardinal. That is just too dangerous for the head of state. As a rule, the role of the special services in all CIS countries has been limited to the opportunity to provide mafia-style protection (kryshevat’) to various commercial enterprises. The one exception is the National Security Service (SNB) of Uzbekistan, the head of which has concentrated in his hands all real levers of state power.

Power shifts like this are known as “creeping coups.” At the time of his appointment ten years ago, few would have thought that SNB Chairman Rustam Inoyatov would be able to circumvent the system of checks and balances put into place by President Karimov and become the second most influential person in the country. Today he is the person who determines the government’s personnel policy, which means he bears personal responsibility for the actions of the people he’s put in place - including in Andijan.

Nationwide HR officer

In matters of politics Tashkent has always been slightly ahead of Moscow. It was here during the Soviet era that the first party corruption scandal took place, which in large part spurred on the perestroika movement. Uzbekistan was one of the first countries in the CIS where the authorities purged the political opposition by banning a couple of political parties. What’s happened in the country today is what democratic society has been warning us about for some time: the de facto authority has passed over to the siloviki. Moreover, this has happened in a way that’s quite consistent with recent trends in Russia: in the name of fighting corruption and terrorism.

The methods of running a country are little different from the laws of the free market. In order to control an enterprise or a country, it’s not necessary at all to officially occupy the top managerial position. It’s quite sufficient to gain control over the leading middle managers or government officials. Or you can get the personnel department under your thumb and install your people in the key management positions.

There’s no such thing as a former intelligence agent. Upon attaining power, modest KGB officer Inoyatov executed a standard “penetration” operation. Put more simply, he installed his own people in all government positions of any importance whatsoever. The top of the management pyramid is in Karimov's presidential staff [apparat]. That’s where State Advisor to the President on Personnel Affairs and SNB General Ravshan Shamshiev works, along with his deputy Umar Ismailov. The post of Secretary of the Council on National Security is occupied by another SNB General, Ruslan Mirzaev. The field offices are composed of the appropriate operational divisions of the SNB. Beyond this are the rank-and-file employees and reservists who work in the ministries and government departments. The network of this “secret service” covers practically all government organizations. And, wherever they may be, SNB employees are also occupied with their primary duties, i.e., the collection of information.

Agents correspond in coded notes only in the movies. SNB employees have a different reporting procedure – so-called obezlichki [from the Russian word obezlichka, which refers to a system of work where there is no individual responsibility for specific portions of work product - trans.]. In essence, these are run-of-the-mill denunciations [donosy] – unsigned and untitled. Everything goes into the file – from the ill-advised statements of this or that government official to his specific actions. And then, these obezlichki serve on the basis for personnel decisions. The fine sieve of constant scrutiny doesn’t let any dissident thinkers pass through. Any newly discovered opponents of Inoyatov are immediately recorded as such, with all of the consequences that follow from this. “The President trusts paperwork,” they say in Uzbekistan. And the paperwork is drawn up by the SNB. And not for free, either.

Bureaucratic price list

It’s possible that the system constructed by Inoyatov could actually strengthen the state, if it were not for corruption. The same corruption that the SNB is supposed to be fighting. The system of obezlichki, which is practically impervious to outside control, functions as a profitable commercial enterprise.

It’s a known fact that the appointment of a district [raion] administration head costs from 50,000 to 200,000 US dollars. The post of regional [oblast] head is more expensive – here the prices start at half a million “green.” Ministerial positions and management positions in government departments and other organizations are all for sale. For example, the presidential staff has the authority to designate the directors of district oil depots – these appointments are made personally by one of three SNB generals. In order to get someone appointed a rank-and-file refueler [at one of these depots], though, all that’s required is the approval of the “agency.” The volume of this market can be measured in the millions – a favorable obezlichka costs upwards of 5,000 US dollars, and Uzbekistan long ago surpassed its Central Asian neighbors in the amount of government officials it employs.

Of course, the SNB doesn't get by just on obezlichki. Providing mafia-style protection (kryshevanie) to the state as a whole does not preclude doing the same for certain sectors of the state’s economy. The method of making money is the same. To use the lingo of mystery novels, the SNB works through agents of influence. What’s more, some of these agents are high-placed government officials. For instance, the head of the country’s flour-milling industry Anvar Rakhimberdyev, former head of the Andijan regional Security Service Directorate and former chief SNB personnel officer, is a member of the SNB’s active reserve. The postal service is headed up by Rafkat Migmanov, former SNB chief of intelligence and counterintelligence. And the precious metals mining industry is controlled by former SNB Deputy Chairman Utkur Kamilov.

But the most important link in the management structure is SNB General Eler Ganiev, the current Minister of Foreign Affairs. The country’s entire foreign trade and foreign policy complex is in his hands, including large-scale investment programs. This means that he controls all of the country’s foreign currency inflows.

Dispute resolution, SNB-style

Converting one’s official position into personal income can only be done using commercial structures. In Uzbekistan, formerly the center of the USSR’s cotton production, serious money can be made only on the export of this product. Here the head of the SNB acted directly, without involving agents. Ganiev helped out – thanks to his protection, a company called Baltazia, which is controlled by Inoyatov’s relatives, quickly found its way onto the market of cotton sales to the Baltic states. According to some reports, in order to take care of this, the Minister even had to pay a visit to the capital of Estonia along with Inoyatov’s nephew. The competition took itself out of the game – a company belonging to Bakhadyr Ismailov, which had been active in this market, quickly shut down after a criminal case was opened against Ismailov.

The cotton business is a super-profitable one. It’s not so much the obvious demand for this product in northern countries. Aside from everything else, importers make money on simple category misallocation [peresortitsa], indicating low-quality cotton fiber in tax and customs documents instead of the actual higher-quality fibers involved.

This was not a particularly original scheme. For instance, in 2003-2005, US-registered companies called Suncape LLC and Texcom LLC signed contracts with the state foreign trade company Uzmarkazimpex, which is run by Kamalov, a close relative of SNB General Ismailov – contracts № 2003/06/39-Е and № 983/04/01/DBX for the delivery of fourth- and fifth-quality cotton fiber. The amount of each contract was 13.3 million US dollars. After that, it was simple sleight-of-hand – instead of the low-grade cotton indicated in the contracts, the buyer received first- and second-quality cotton fiber. The profit resulting from the category misallocation was around 10 million US dollars, completely tax-free.

Of course, those transactions were not entirely victimless. The SNB staff employee responsible for Uzkhlopkoprom, who tried to stop the deals from going forward, was fired inside of a day with no explanation. The head of the SNB’s directorate for fighting corruption, Colonel Vladimir Radjabov, was also driven out of the SNB, after trying to get to the bottom of the particulars of a contract between Belgian company Louis Dreyfus and the foreign trade company Uzprommashimpex, which is run by the brother of SNB personnel directorate head Guzairov. Here there was a larger sum of money at stake – according to specialists, around 15 million US dollars.

The siloviki do not live by cotton alone. According to some reports, the country’s security services are directly involved in supplying Uzbekistan with counterfeit cigarettes sold under the Pine brand, which are manufactured in underground factories in Afghanistan. According to the most minor estimates, the profit from trade in these counterfeit goods amounts to tens of millions of US dollars. There’s also a company called Benif, which is run by the brother of Inoyatov’s wife, Ergashev, whose deputy is his son Sharif. This company, with the support of the head of the SNB, has practically monopolized the supply of petroleum products, natural gas, and construction materials to Afghanistan. And the SNB does not shy away from simple mafia-style protection rackets. For example, a company called Fertex, which imports chemicals, suffered a classic shakedown – the head of the company was first frightened with audits and then easily convinced to pay a bribe.

The bottom line

There’s probably no point in focusing so much attention at Rustam Inoyatov’s business dealings. Representatives of many CIS countries’ security services are involved in “entrepreneurship.” What’s more important is that in creating an arrangement that works to his own benefit, the head of Uzbekistan’s SNB has built up the entire system of government around it. President Karimov is, practically speaking, cut off from any sources of objective information. Having lost the ability to react quickly to the changing situation in the regions, the president has become a captive of his “chief security guard.” At the same time, each additional outburst of popular anger only strengthens Inoyatov’s personal power.

Strong security services cannot work in a weak state. Sooner or later, they begin to dictate their conditions to the politicians. This is why it’s misguided to call the events in Andijan a “first Uzbek revolution.” A change in power in Uzbekistan has already taken place without demonstrations and gunfire – practically speaking, for several years all power here has already been in the hands of the special services.

[Update - Turns out there's another English-language version of this article online, here at Ferghana.ru. Thanks to Laurence for pointing this out.]

Hate crimes in Russia

The Kommersant article about the diplomatic row between Russia and Poland which I linked to yesterday has a very interesting sidebar. Its intent is to question why Putin made such a fuss over the attack on Russian diplomats' kids in Warsaw, but it also serves to highlight how many hate crimes take place in Russia. Not that this is news to anyone familiar with life in this country. Note that in nearly all of the incidents listed, the victims were people of color. This list includes only incidents involving diplomatic personnel which were covered in the media, which means it's just the tip of the iceberg in terms of racially motivated hate crimes. The somewhat stilted translation belongs to Kommersant.

Unfriendly Acts which Couldn't Be Qualified as Crime

The reaction of the Russian authorities seems rather strange, all the more so since outrages against diplomats and members of their families are not so rare in Russia, even if we confine ourselves to the cases informed by the mass media.

On the night of April 10, 1998, three persons unknown assaulted the third secretary of the embassy of Tajikistan in Moscow, stealing his documents and 80 roubles. The culprits disappeared without a trace.

On April 8, 1998, some patriotically-minded citizens in St.Petersburg attacked the consul of Latvia and took him to a secret place where he was flogged. The corporal punishment was videofilmed.

On August 24, 1998, in a Moscow dwelling house a drunken neighbour attacked the ambassador of Congo to Russia. The diplomat with bruises was brought to hospital, and the scoundrel was detained by the police.

On the night of April 17, 1999, three drunken men stopped the car of the assistant of the Chinese military attache in Moscow, beat him and ran away. The Chinese officer informed the police, and the hooligans were eventually apprehended.

On July 1999, a drunken man attacked the counsellor of the embassy of Benin in Moscow, struck him and when he fell to the ground kicked and beat him. The culprit was stopped and arrested by the police.

On December 10, 2000, three skinheads assaulted and beat the second secretary of the embassy of Japan in Moscow, breaking his nose. The scoundrels ran away. The embassy sent a note of protest to the Russian Foreign Ministry.

On February 2, 2002, a group of young men dressed in black jackets with swastika assaulted and beat the third secretary of the embassy of Kenya. They ran away.

On August 5, 2002, six teenagers assaulted the 16-year-old son of the first secretary of the embassy of Cameroun. They beat the boy who had to be taken to hospital. The embassy sent a note of protest to the Russian Foreign Ministry. The police apprehended the culprits.

On November 7, 2002, six persons unknown beat the ambassador of Ghana to Russia and his car driver. The Russian Foreign Ministry denounced the assault and expressed regret.

On June 16, 2003, eight teenagers assaulted the counselor of the Chinese embassy, beat him, took his Panasonic tape recorder and ran away.

On the night of June 1, 2004, several men beat the sons of the attache of the Libyan embassy in St.Petersburg. One of them died in hospital later. The embassy sent a note of protest to the Russian Foreign Ministry. The culprits have not been found.

On June 8, 2004, the son of the Mongolian consul general was killed in Irkutsk by persons unknown.

On December 27, 2004, an unknown man struck the wife of the first counsellor of the Mongolian embassy in Russia. The woman was brought to hospital with a serious brain injury. The results of the investigation have not been disclosed.

"Russian Transparency Remains Submerged" - FT

I found this interesting commentary piece via the Inopressa website, which translates western media coverage of Russia into Russian, which I found (in this instance) via Echo of Moscow's website.

Russian transparency remains submerged
By Neil Buckley Published: August 11 2005 03:00

When baby-faced captain Vyacheslav Milashevsky saluted and blinked in the daylight last Sunday after being rescued from his mini-submarine trapped on the ocean floor, Russia appeared to have learned from the Kursk submarine disaster in 2000. A few days later, however, those conclusions are starting to look premature.

The Kursk's sinking, five years ago tomorrow, led to the death of all 118 men on board, despite some having survived the initial explosion in one of the nuclear submarine's torpedo tubes. [...]

This time, the navy went public on the incident and its apparent cause, quickly sought international aid and, crucially, allowed British, American and Japanese rescuers to rapidly reach the site off Kamchatka. Captain Milashevsky and his six crew members aboard the AS-28 mini-submarine that had got tangled in a fishing net were saved.

In a front-page headline echoed in many Russian newspapers, Novaya Gazeta commented: "One lesson of the Kursk has been learned: people's lives are more important than military secrets."

If that moral message had been absorbed, Russian commentators noted, it was an important moment for a country where human life has long been cheap.

But since the rescue it has become clear that the Kursk's lessons have been at best partially assimilated. The incident has also highlighted that, while TV news may have been neutered during Mr Putin's presidency, Moscow newspapers retain the capacity for strident criticism, even if most do not reach far beyond the capital.

This observation about the media is right on the money - this is a point that's not made often enough, and one that's sometimes distorted. Unfortunately, the existence of a few outspoken newspapers with relatively small circulations in Moscow does not make for a free press.

The Russian navy, it has emerged, confirmed the incident only 24 hours after the submarine became trapped, after an anonymous caller tipped off a Kamchatka radio station.

"Again there was an attempt at hiding information, at censorship," said Nikita Belykh, leader of the opposition Union of Right Forces party, yesterday.

The navy's initial explanation, moreover, was only partial. The submarine's propeller had got wrapped in a fishing net. But it occurred while the vessel was inspecting or trying to repair a $1bn (€809m) subsea antenna designed to track foreign submarines, in whose anchor cables the submarine then became enmeshed.

And after the foreign rescue crews departed - with the apparently heartfelt thanks of Sergei Ivanov, Russia's defence minister - debate raged in some political and naval circles over whether they should have been invited, or were even needed.

Captain Valery Lepetyukhin of the navy's emergency rescue service suggested to a press conference that conditions on the stranded mini-submarine had not really been all that inhospitable. The British Scorpio submarine that cut it free had merely speeded up an operation the Russians could have completed themselves, he insisted.

I can only observe that this was an easy comment to make once the sailors were safely on terra firma. Prideful defensiveness, probably a manifestation of an inferiority complex, on the part of Russian officials is nothing new, though, and it's probably not going away any time soon.

Dmitry Rogozin, leader of the nationalist Motherland party, told Ekho Moskvy radio that bringing in foreign rescuers had revealed the subsea antenna's location and caused "damage to national security and the Russian state".

Rogozin can always be counted on for a paranoid and offensive comment at a time like this.

Many newspapers spotlighted the cash-strapped state of the Russian fleet. Komsomolskaya Pravda, noting the navy's lack of rescue equipment and that a Scorpio submarine cost only $1.5m, added: "Any 'new Russian' could lose that in a bad night at the casino." [...]

The problem, unfortunately, is not solely a financial one. Russia has plenty of money in the stabilization fund at the moment, and I understand they're now going to buy a Scorpio or two of their very own. The Scorpios can't deploy or manage themselves, though, and unfortunately the Russian military's problems are organizational and systemic, and serious enough to create a situation in the future where the Navy has the equipment but can't get it to the right place in time, or some critical maintenance on the equipment has been neglected, etc. For a leadership that is motivated primarily by avoiding responsibility and blame, there always seems to be enough of the latter to go around.

Will he or won't he?

Andy at Siberian Light has a thorough discussion of the possibility that Khodorkovsky might mount a jailhouse campaign for a State Duma seat, which is definitely worth checking out. Kommersant has fresh coverage of this story today in English ("From the Cell to the Chamber"), including the following forecast on how things might play out if Mikhail Borisovich does decide to take the plunge:

The only one obstacle that can prevent Mikhail Khodorkovksy from running for the Duma seat may be the Moscow City Court’s expedited hearing of the appeal against the verdict of the Meshchansky Court. Should the conviction be upheld, Khodorkovsky will lose his eligibility for office. If the consideration of the case in the second instance gets protracted, the former head of YUKOS may have time to get registered and even be elected, which is not that unlikely given that the Universitetsky district has steadily voted for right-wing candidates since 1993. However, even in this case the Duma’s majority, represented by the pro-Kremlin United Russia party, is sure to strip the new deputy of his immunity from the further prosecution and to give the Moscow City Court a chance to see the YUKOS case through.

Commentator Leonid Radzikhovsky has an opinion piece in the excellent Ezhednevny Zhurnal which deals all at once with and analyzes several developments surrounding Khodorkovsky and Yukos. I've translated a couple of paragraphs which deal with the possibility of the jailed oligarch running for the Duma:

"And God Disposes" 11 August 2005, 11:59am

[...] Another story related to MBKh [Khodorkovsky] is his possible candidacy to become a [State Duma] deputy. It's clear that MBKh won't be allowed for one reason or another to participate in elections - after all, the authorities didn't put him in jail so that they could see him in the Duma! But what's much more interesting is something else: what would his real chances be if he were able to stand in an election after all? I don't know what percentage of voters would vote for Khodorkovsky for President, but in any list of local district candidates he would be the best known, the most sensational, and the most scandalous, and this alone already halfway guarantees success.

And the [voters'] choice would not be a simple one. Voting "against" [Khodorkovsky], you would thereby be voting "in favor of" - in favor of his remaining in jail. Possibly, such a situation could cause even supporters of [Khodorkovsky's] sentence to waver, after all it's one thing to agree in general, and another thing entirely to personally sign such a sentence (and a vote "against" would in fact be a personal, albeit anonymous, signature under the sentence). On the other hand, the people [narod] are not sentimental when it comes to billionaires, and, Khodorkovsky's "left turns" [a reference to one of Khodorkovsky's recent article in Vedomosti] notwithstanding, just keep repeating, "they'll lock you up anyway, but don't you steal!" [Russian idiom that I'm not sure I've translated 100% correctly - trans.]

Well, and the most important thing: this would be not just a vote on the "Khodorkovsky question," but on the "Putin question," it would to some extent show the real feelings of people toward the authorities and to their most implacable foe. If Khodorkovsky (as many are certain) were to receive an insignificant percentage of votes, this would become for him both a personal drama (his illusions about the people would be destroyed) and a sobering moment. But if he were to come close to winning or actually make it into the Duma, then that would be a small political earthquake, and perhaps a portent of larger tremors.

What a pity that this unique poll, this unique socio-political and psychological experiment, won't take place. And, of course, it won't take place. [...]

Radzikhovsky, then, is certain that ways will be found to prevent Khodorkovsky from actually standing in a by-election or an election, and I tend to agree with him. I do hope that Mikhail Borisovich moves forward with this, though, because it will be interesting to see how exactly the authorities manage to shut his candidacy down.

If they use clumsy enough methods (and based on the Russian authorities' track record on dealing with situations like this, they probably will), all they'll do is cement Khodorkovsky's reputation as a modern-day dissident and a political prisoner. For this reason, the cynic in me thinks that he should go ahead and start campaigning - it will be good for his image in the long run. And the idealist in me also thinks he should do it, to exercise his rights as a citizen and to continue to bring attention to the inanity of his imprisonment. Along with many other Russia-watchers and Russians, I eagerly await further developments in this story.

Rainy Day Blogging

It's strikingly colder in Moscow today, and a steady rain has been falling for the past couple of hours. Looking out over Leningradsky Prospekt before I left the apartment, I noticed that once again the rain has caused some odd foamy substance to form on the roadway. I photographed this phenomenon back in July:



Must be something caused by the pollution in this town getting activated by rainfall after a dry spell.

I got a bit damp as I made my way to the OGI cafe on B. Dmitrovka St., luckily I was not disappointed - they do, in fact, have free wi-fi as claimed by Yandex's hot-spot directory, which, since these things change rapidly, is not always 100% accurate.

Looks like I'll be able to spend today following up on some of the stories that I covered yesterday. I was going to go check out the leftist youth protest planned for today near the Ministry of Internal Affairs building on Gazetny Pereulok, but I think the rain will keep me from doing that. Hopefully the protesters will be more resolute. Apparently NBP activists or supporters were planning to turn up, so I was expecting to see some police beat-downs and/or arrests. But it's too damp outside for my sandals and short-sleeved shirt, even with an umbrella.

Uzbekistan in the news

OK, one more item before the free-wi-fi-having cafe closes down for the night and kicks me out. My sister thoughtfully sent me a virtual clipping from the Washington Post the other day - Jim Hoagland's column on the closure of the US airbase in Uzbekistan, titled "Ousted from Uzbekistan." This column also ran in the Moscow Times, which often reprints columns that deal with Russian or former-Soviet issues from influential US newspapers.

I couldn't find any mention of this by the Central Asia experts over at at Registan, although I'm sure they'll get around to it, since it seems significant to have a heavyweight columnist devote an entire piece to this often overlooked part of the world. Maybe they didn't bother because Hoagland's column is too generalist for them, plus it seems to basically be just a way for "official Washington" - Hoagland's phrase - to air its version of what happened:

Ousted From Uzbekistan
Our Global Strategy Trips Over Cold War Reflexes
By Jim HoaglandSunday, August 7, 2005; Page B07

If you can supply energy to world markets, do you really need the United States and its conflicting priorities and bureaucracies, along with all that yammering about human rights and democracy? For Islam A. Karimov, the dictatorial ruler of Uzbekistan, the answer is a big NO.

Karimov's recent order to the United States to cease operations at the K2 air base and pull its troops out of his Central Asian republic within six months came only after he had reached new understandings on energy and other subjects with the leaders of China, Russia and his immediate neighbors. Tyrant and butcher Karimov may be; fool he is not.

Karimov received assent or encouragement -- official Washington is not sure which -- from Russian President Vladimir Putin and from China's collective leadership to stick his thumb in Uncle Sam's eye by closing the base, a move that complicates the resupply of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. [...]

The speed and the studied shrug with which Washington greeted the Uzbek president's expulsion seem to reflect not only a bowing to Uzbek sovereignty but also an assessment that Karimov's political viability is running on empty. The former Soviet bureaucrat is playing a losing and possibly short-lived hand at home, in this view.

He superficially resembles a 21st-century Mobutu Sese Seko, Ferdinand Marcos or Erich Honecker. Those Cold War-era satraps became more trouble than they were worth to their superpower patrons when they were openly repudiated by their own people. Communicating their expendability was often more a matter of calculation than of conscience.

Because the United States is reaching so deeply into the former Soviet sphere of influence to fight Islamic extremism, Washington does not have wholly owned clients there. Actions or words from Washington that undermine Karimov (or his autocratic neighbors) also affect Putin's hold on power in the Kremlin in a direct way.

This makes Washington's support for human rights abroad a more complex but even more important undertaking than it was in the Cold War. How other nations, and particularly Islamic nations, treat their citizens is today the substance, not just the form, of international relations.

A 21st-centure Erich Honecker. Ouch. A zinger worthy of the wittiest wags in Foggy Bottom. The full text of the column (linked above) is definitely worth reading. I'm not really equipped to comment on the conclusions, but there do seem to be some insightful observations in the piece.

A rather different take on the developments in Uzbek-American relations was offered in a Moscow Times column last Friday ("Shifting Forces Along the Silk Road"), which offers more insight into China's role in the region. Definitely worth a read.