This can also be seen as an example of Russia playing on one side of an issue abroad (in this case, signing the Dayton Agreement and supporting the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia) and on the opposite side at home. One could argue that harboring ethnic Serb war criminals is equal parts foreign and domestic policy, insofar as it plays to the Slavic nationalist base. Although this specific instance of pan-Slavic support is obviously not something that has been publicized before, I am sure that if the issue gets substantial coverage it will be turned by political groups like Rodina into another excuse for anti-Western rhetoric.So far there has been no comment from Russia regarding these allegations. I'm fairly certain that they'll turn out to be true, though. Russia has been suspected of harbouring war criminals for a while and I'm only surprised it has taken this long for evidence to come out. If the allegations really are true, the only word I think of to describe Russia's actions is 'stupid'. [...]
The whole idea of harbouring war criminals seems to be indicative of a general trend in Russian foreign policy of short-sighted short-termism. Time after time Russia is making stupid foreign policy decisions and blithely assuming that things will go well. This wouldn't be such a problem if there was someone in their Foreign Ministry had the ability to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear. Sadly though, there isn't anybody in Russia with that ability and, time after time, their plans go awry.
Tuesday, March 15, 2005
"...time after time, their plans go awry."
Why Russian TV is important
Moscow Times, March 15, 2005I suppose television is the "sole information source for many people these days" for many in America and Western Europe as well, but these are countries where television channels (if not individually, then taken as a group) present the news in a more or less balanced fashion. Not so in 21st-century Russia. The wide-open media window of the '90's has slammed shut.
"To Join the Elite, It's TV That Counts," By Nabi Abdullaev
It's not how powerful you are but how much coverage you get on television. That was the finding of a recent opinion poll that asked Russians across the country to name the most influential personalities in politics, business, culture and science.
Unsurprisingly, respondents readily picked President Vladimir Putin as the most powerful politician and pop diva Alla Pugachyova as the leading cultural figure. [...]
Many respondents were unable to name a single scientist, leading to a top- 10 list that bunched together Nobel Prize winners with dead scientists, television hosts and a hostage negotiator.
The sometimes startling answers are a direct result of television, which is the sole information source for many people these days, said Irina Palilova, a sociologist with the Levada Center, the independent polling agency that carried out the survey.
"This poll reflects that people just don't understand what the elite is and can only come up with names of figures who are popular in the media," said Olga Kryshtanovskaya, head of the Center for the Study of the Elite in the Russian Academy of Sciences. "Members of the elite are those who rule and decide, but the public knows little about those people," she said.
As such, Putin was followed on the list of the political elite by ultranationalist politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky, whose fist-waving antics are often shown on television. Third place went to Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov, whose complaints about government social reforms got significant television coverage in January, when the poll was conducted. Also on the list were State Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov (4), liberal politician Irina Khakamada (5), Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov (7), and one-time political heavyweights Yabloko leader Grigory Yavlinsky (9) and Mayor Yury Luzhkov (10).
After Pugachyova, the list of cultural figures included Oscar-winning film director Nikita Mikhalkov, crooner Iosif Kobzon, comedian Yevgeny Petrosyan and pop singer Nikolai Baskov. Not a single writer, artist or philosopher made it into the cultural top 10.
"The cultural elite is only identified as those who are stars," said Vera Zvereva, a culture researcher with the Institute of General History. [...]
Only 67 percent of respondents were able to name anyone in the scientific community. In the end, Nobel-winning physicist Zhores Alfyorov topped the list of scientific elite, while the late Nobel Peace Prize winner Alexander Sakharov placed third and Nobel-winning physicist Vitaly Ginzburg placed fifth.
The list also included physicist Sergei Kapitsa, who hosts a TV science show (2); the late eye doctor [and former presidential candidate] Svyatoslav Fyodorov (4); pediatrician Leonid Roshal, who assisted in negotiations during the Dubrovka and Beslan hostage crises (6); and animal television show host Nikolai Drozdov (8). The science list was rounded off by Moscow State University rector Viktor Sadovnichy (9) and, bizarrely, Nobel Prize-winning author Alexander Solzhenitsyn (10).
The survey asked 1,600 people in 46 regions to name five or six people who they believed were members of the nation's political, cultural, economic and scientific elite. The margin of error was less than 3 percentage points.
Monday, March 14, 2005
New project - Moscow Graffiti
This will leave more space in Scraps of Moscow for political and social commentary (if only I had more time!) and for underground/metro photos, at least until I create a separate site for those as well...
In any event, the Russian Communist Party appears to be doing its part to raise the profile of graffiti in the political discussion in Russia - check out this AP story:
Communism in Russia gets trendy rebranding
The Associated Press
Monday, March 14, 2005[...]At a party plenary meeting outside Moscow that focused on propaganda - a word that in Russia evokes images of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution - the party's first deputy chairman, Ivan Melnikov, said the Communists should turn to methods such as graffiti and cellphone messaging. [...]
The Communist Party leader, Gennady Zyuganov, called on his comrades to smarten up their propaganda efforts, using artistic images, satire and advertising. Using a phrase from capitalism, he said they should seek to "sell the brand" of the party, according to the Itar-Tass news agency. [...]
Friday, March 11, 2005
Around Barrikadnaya
Shoe-repair stand on Kudrinskaya Sq., looking towards the Garden Ring.
Pigeon-festooned artwork by the entrance to
the Barrikadnaya metro station.
Both photos taken on Saturday, March 5, around 2pm.
United Russia Scam?
Friday, March 11, 2005. Issue 3122. Page 1.What this made me think of was the scheme, common in the business world here during the 1990's and earlier in this decade, of the one-day company (firma-odnodnevka). Shady business operators open a company and operate briefly without paying taxes; then they close the company down and open up a new one so that they are not liable for the violations of the old company. It can be seen, I suppose, some sort of shell game. The names of the companies change, sometimes more than one of them at a time is used for operations, but the people running the enterprise are always the same. So it goes with United Russia. Its masters have run afoul of the electorate and now they want to close up shop, move down the street and hang out a new shingle with a different name on it. But the people running the show will be the same.
Kremlin Mulls Ditching United Russia
By Francesca Mereu Staff Writer
Worried about United Russia's falling popularity after its approval of controversial social reforms, senior Kremlin officials are planning to create a new party of power and ditch the Kremlin-controlled party ahead of the 2007 parliamentary elections, two sources familiar with the situation said.
The Kremlin, however, faces numerous hurdles to forming a new party -- hurdles that it unwittingly raised by deciding to overhaul the electoral system, political analysts said.
Widespread public anger over the monetization of social benefits -- which stripped millions of pensioners, disabled people, war veterans and others of state benefits in exchange for meager cash payments -- has largely been directed at the United Russia-dominated State Duma, rather than at President Vladimir Putin or the federal government.
Unprepared for the outcry and determined to maintain its grip on parliament, the Kremlin is looking to form a new party of power, the two sources said.
Both refused to go on the record with their comments, citing the sensitive nature of the issue. One is a well-placed official in the White House, the seat of the federal government, and the other is a well-connected official in the Kremlin. [...]
Rapidly cycling "parties of power" are nothing new in Russia - there were several in rapid succession, I seem to recall, in the late 1990's. But the way that the MT lede distilled this situation really struck me as making United Russia's intentions sound just too similar to the way tax cheats operate.
Russian media criticized by Russian commentators
A friend emailed me a link to a much better piece, this one on the Russian state-run media, available for the time being only in Russian, by commentator Viktor Shenderovich. The article deals with media coverage of the story surrounding the Italian journalist Juliana Sgrena, and covers other territory as well. I am going to try translating it if I have time.
More on Maskhadov
Anyway, here are some excerpts from de Waal's piece on Maskhadov:
[...] Maskhadov was neither a great Chechen nationalist leader nor a “terrorist” as the Russians claimed, but a modest man who, if history had been different, might have ended up as a Russian army general.
He was a man of contradictions. Educated in the Soviet army, he was in many ways as Russian as he was Chechen. Although a professional warrior, he tried to be a politician. Marginalised by the second war in Chechnya that began in 1999, he tried to appeal both to western and Islamic audiences to support what he saw as his resistance struggle. [...]
When Russian federal troops invaded Chechnya in December 1994 to crush the regime of rebel president Jokhar Dudayev, Maskhadov took it upon himself to turn a diverse group of partisan fighters into something like a regular army. His success in doing that helped the Chechen fighters inflict a humiliating defeat on the Russian army in 1996.
Yet Maskhadov also had a traditional distaste for war, typical of many military men. In an interview in the village of Goity in February 1994, as fighting raged around him, he could barely disguise his irritation with Dudayev and his fiery polemics, and talked instead of the need for a truce.
By contrast, Maskhadov found it easy to find a common language with the more reasonable among his Russian counterparts. It was his ability to talk to them that thrust him more and more into the limelight, as he was able to negotiate ceasefires and start peace talks in 1995. With one general, Anatoly Romanov, he developed such a close relationship that the two were almost friends. Romanov was then blown up in unexplained circumstances and gravely injured. [...]
The years 1996-97 were the high point for Maskhadov. In January 1997, he was elected president in a vote that was monitored by international observers and recognised by both Russia and the international community. In an emphatic pledge of support, more than 300,000 Chechens voted for him.
Then in May of that year, he met Yeltsin again in the Kremlin and signed a landmark treaty with Moscow, which was deliberately ambiguous about the status of Chechnya but promised cooperation and an end to violence.
But everything had already begun to unravel. The radical commanders who had defeated the Russians were now dividing up the spoils of Chechnya. Criminality and kidnapping were rampant. Radical Islamists began to win new recruits. Ayman al-Zawahiri, a leading Islamic militant who later became second-in-command of al-Qaeda, tried to travel to Chechnya.
One of Maskhadov’s main strengths – his flexibility and pragmatism – proved to be one of his weaknesses.
He tried to accommodate all interests in Chechnya, including those of the radical Islamists, while failing to reach out to the popular constituency that had brought him to power. Chechnya descended into anarchy. Having initially committed himself to a secular Chechnya, he half-heartedly declared the rule of shariah, Islamic law.
On a series of foreign trips, including to London and Washington, Maskhadov met with sympathy but could not articulate a clear message or give good arguments as to how Chechnya could be given support.
As Vladimir Putin rose to power and Russian troops re-invaded Chechnya in 1999, Maskhadov pleaded in vain for negotiations. It was a plea he repeated only last month after Moscow ignored a ceasefire he had announced.
Maskhadov and his envoys abroad condemned the theatre siege in Moscow in 2002 and last year’s seizure of the school in Beslan, but these acts tainted him in the eyes of many, proving at the very least that he was unable to rein in the more radical actions of his long-term rival Shamil Basayev. His failure completely to disassociate himself from Basayev made it easy for the Russian government to accuse him of complicity in such extremism.
Mairbek Vachagayev, who worked as Maskhadov’s spokesman for several years and is now in exile in Paris, said by telephone that he feared Maskhadov’s death would radicalise the Chechen rebel movement.
“Although he was a mild, cultured man he was able to restrain people, Maskhadov persuaded them not to go out and commit acts of terror,” said Vachagayev. “Now instead of one Shamil [Basayev] we will have ten - and instead of one Beslan we will have ten. [...]
No one disputes that Maskhadov was a unique figure and there is no one who can replace him as political leader of the Chechen resistance movement.
Both Chechens and Russians have lost a figure of substance who was a known quantity. His passing pushes the Chechen conflict deeper into the shadows.
Wednesday, March 09, 2005
State official shares love with state-run "journalists" - film at 8:00 (and 9:00!)
After seeing both of these reports run on the air this evening, I was delighted to find them on the channels' respective websites so that I could share this hilarity, which turns to outrage upon further consideration. Can you imagine US reporters standing still for such "praise" from Donald Rumsfeld? Can you imagine him ever wanting to offer it up?? I hope not. And I hope we in the US never have our government in bed with the mass media to the extent that - as this episode demonstrates - is the case in today's Russia.From the website of Rossiia, a.k.a. RTR, Russia's state-run Channel 2:
Sergei Ivanov gives awards to Margarita Simon'ian and Olga Kirii
"Vesti" correspondent Margarita Simon'ian and Channel One reporter Olga Kirii were awarded medals "For strengthening fellowship in battle." The Ministry of Defense noted the courage displayed by the journalists while broadcasting the events in Beslan in September of last year. While presenting the awards, Sergei Ivanov thanked them [sic] for their superior professionalism.
From the website of ORT, Russia's state-run Channel 1:
Two journalists receive medals "For strengthening fellowship in battle."
Olga Kirii, head of Channel One's Southern bureau, and "Rossiia" correspondent Margarita Simon'ian received this award for their work during the events of last September in Beslan. Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov presented them with the medals.
Sergei Ivanov, Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation: "This presentation is taking place within the walls of the Ministry of Defense not only because they are sweet and charming women, but also because they demonstrated courage and fortitude, and demonstrated those qualities which are characteristic first and foremost of servicemen and of law enforcement officials. I am referring to their personal role in broadcasting the events in Beslan."
This is an excellent example of so many things that are wrong here today that it's hard to know where to begin. Focusing on the most obvious (to me, anyway) - this demonstrates how poorly the Kremlin's media masters understand how their reports will play with a broader audience. Someone (perhaps Minister Ivanov himself?) thought that it would be a good idea to have this awards ceremony, make sure cameras were there, and make damn sure those obedient news programs, Vesti and Vremia, aired a segment on it.
Or maybe I have it all wrong because I'm looking at this through American eyes. If you blur the lines between entertainment and news, and remember that yesterday was International Women's Day, when the airwaves were full of ridiculous variety shows and concerts where women were being presented with flowers and presents left and right, perhaps this episode is not out of place.
By the way, I don't want to suggest that these two women are not courageous correspondents - at least one of them literally dodged bullets in Beslan - but I just can not get over my disgust at having freaky-looking, proto-Soviet Sergei Ivanov - a career KGB officer who looks as out of place in a military uniform as Michael Dukakis did in a tank - talking about courage and fortitude and giving flowers to members of the media as though they were on his personal staff.
Am I overreacting here? I guess it wouldn't be the first time.
Moldovan Election Observation - in Moscow
Russia had reason to be sore with the Moldovans conducting the election - after all, Russian observers were not allowed into the country for the March 6 vote - but this kind of biased reporting is the main reason why I find Vremia to be such a painful show to watch.
Anyway, we showed up at the Moldovan embassy in downtown Moscow and wound up waiting about 90 minutes as Lorina stood in line to vote and eventually cast her ballot. Here's a brief photo essay - I wish I'd been able to get it posted here sooner, but hopefully it will still be of interest to some.
The wait begins - 5:15pm, at the end of the line.
The line stretching around the corner of Kuznetsky Most
and Rozhdestvenka St.
The line from the Kuznetsky Most side.
5:30pm - Lorina looking cheerful in line -
before she got sick of everyone around her
arguing, cursing and shoving.
Entrance to the polling station on Rozhdestvenka St.
Russian policemen controlling the queue on the Rozhdestvenka St. side.
6:30pm.
The senior officer on the scene was calling a higher authority to ask whether his team would have to stay past 9pm. That was the time when the polling station was scheduled to close down, but it appeared that would not give all of the assembled prospective voters a chance to vote. The cop on the phone appeared more concerned with letting the two busloads of militia who were there for crowd control go off shift on time - remember, this was the Sunday before two days off in Russia - while his shorter, stouter colleague kept the Moldovan masses orderly. I don't know whether they kept the polls open late after all in Moscow - it was too cold to stick around and watch.
6:31pm - the wait continues.
6:42pm - our work is done here.
When Lorina came out of the polling station, she was a bit tired from all of the shoving and cursing in line, and a bit ashamed of the disorderly way in which some of her compatriots had behaved, but she had in her passport the equivalent of the "I voted" sticker given out at American elections, a small stamp saying "Votat," meaning (naturally), "Voted":
I guess the stamp differs pretty significantly from the sticker they hand out in the US, though - one is a good way of keeping people from voting twice (although one report quoted a Russian observer who found the practice suspicious), and the other just lets a proud citizen demonstrate that (s)he has fulfilled a social obligation.
Thus concludes our brief foray into the world of election observation. For those interested in more on the Moldovan elections - they appear to belong to history now - SiberianLight has several good posts (organized by index topic - nice touch), or you can check out a recent cover story on opposition candidate Iurie Rosca in the always lewd, often interesting eXile, or, for those of you not afraid of Russian, RIA Novosti's coverage of the story.
The New York Times, to its credit, had one of their Moscow correspondents in Moldova for a week covering the story - read his stories here, here, here, and here, before they become pay-per-view.
Finally, the RFE/RL website has an interesting article called "Moldova: Voters Back Communists -- But Which Communists?"
Tuesday, March 08, 2005
Happy Women's Day!
ORT (Channel 1) interrupted the special holiday presentation of the movie "Titanic" for a 9pm news brief to announce that Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov was "destroyed" today by Russian forces in Tolstoy-yurt. I am sure that appetites at more than one 8th of March feast were spoiled by the extensive footage of Maskhadov's body (turns out that "destroyed" is a polite way of saying "killed" - his body was very much intact, although pretty beaten up), in a pool of blood, from every conceivable angle.
The news brief continued with a classic bit of Channel 1 news - footage of a "private" meeting between President Putin and FSB head Nikolai Patrushev, at which Patrushev gave the big boss the good news that the hit on Maskhadov was successful. Putin was careful to say that participants in the operation today should receive medals if it was confirmed that they had really killed Maskhadov - to be honest, as much footage as they showed of the corpse, it wasn't clear to me that it was definitely him.
Then viewers were treated to more footage of the body, a brief live interview with military spokesman Ilya Shabalkin, and a retrospective of Chechen bad guys who have been successfully "destroyed" by Russian forces in the past decade, showing, in the ORT reporter's words, that "payback is unavoidable" ("возмездие неминуемо") for such terrorists.
It is amazing to me that such an outpouring of pride and chest-thumping can accompany the capture of a guy who has been wanted and has been successfully evading Russian forces within a small piece of Russia's own territory (Chechnya) for years. It is also unfortunate news for anyone who hopes for a negotiated settlement in Chechnya - in spite of his possible ties to international terrorists, inconsistent statements, and questionable control over the Chechen forces, Maskhadov was really the only person with whom sitting down for negotiations might have been conceivable. You can bet they won't be negotiating with Basayev...
Lenta.ru has an interesting related story - apparently Ramzan Kadyrov has come out with a statement that the intent was to capture Maskhadov and, after questioning, give him a lower-ranking position in the Kremlin-supported Chechen security service.
Here's Siberian Light's coverage of the breaking story on Maskhadov's death (or "destruction," or perhaps "liquidation," if you'd rather hew to the doublespeak preferred by warriors on terrorism worldwide).
On an unrelated note, apologies for the long break between entries - I have a lot of good material stored up, some of which is getting stale (e.g., photos from the polling station at the Moldovan consulate in Moscow last Sunday), and I hope to be more active this week, so stay tuned - last week was occupied with visits from my sister-in-law, mother-in-law, and mother, plus a quick trip up to St. Petersburg, so there was not much time for anything else.
OK, now I really must go catch the surprising and unexpected conclusion to "Titanic."