Post-soviet de facto "presidents" Bagapsh, Kokoity and Smirnov adorn a billboard in Tiraspol.Two of these men are now recognized by Moscow as Presidents (without the scare quotes).
[image source]
For those of you interested in the still-"frozen" conflict in Moldova (interest in which has increased after the unfreezing of the conflicts in Georgia this summer), I have collected a few relatively recent and worthwhile articles on the topic.
The must-read of the bunch is by William Hill, who provides both an excellent grounding in the history of the conflict for those less familiar with it and the level of insight one would expect from someone who has been involved in the resolution process for years.
Another interesting perspective is provided by Thomas de Waal, dean of the Caucasus conflict journalists, who reflects on his first visit to Transnistria and breaks down some of the key differences between Moldova's secessionist conflict and the ones in the Caucasus.
If you're interested in the view from Tiraspol, this write-up of Transnistria's de facto leadership's visit to Moscow earlier this fall (by the region's acting foreign minister) provides some insight. Unfortunately, the translation is not perfect and to get the full flavor you should read the original version in Russian. As an example of what gets lost in translation, the sentence translated as the neutral-sounding "The Russian Federation has already rendered assistance to Transnistria" could just as easily have been translated as "[Transnistria] is experienced in receiving aid from Russia," which puts the secessionist leaders' hat-in-hand trip to Moscow in a somewhat different light.
Finally, this article by a Moscow analyst discusses why a settlement did not take place after a flurry of activity this fall and why one may not be likely in the foreseeable future. The Russian version is available here.
For ongoing coverage of developments, you can sign up for this regular email bulletin put out by a Moldovan think-tank which includes a section on Transnistria, although the English version is sometimes incomprehensible.
2 comments:
There's one big difference between TN and the Georgian territories: long-term, the "correlation of forces" will slowly tip towards a settlement.
TN is of interest to Russia for several reasons -- Russian investments there, national prestige, nostalgia -- but probably the biggest is the presence of a large Russian minority. However, that minority is slowly-but-steadily disappearing: the Russians have been leaking away back to Russia over the last decade, one busload at a time. There will always be some, of course, but in another decade they'll just be 15%-20% (of a population of less than half a million). That probably won't be enough to maintain their current level of social, economic and political dominance.
Further: Transnistria's economy isn't going anywhere. Russia is the only major source of foreign investment, and that's about to dry up for the next few years. Lack of access to EU funds means that Tiraspol will fall behind Chisinau and (especially) Odessa as a regional hub. Once Moldova and Ukraine find their feet economically -- which, freely granted, may take a few more years -- TNR's leadership will lose a major claim to legitimacy. (Notice how much of their internal discourse is built around "things are worse Over There, or at least no better.")
Finally, of course, TNR's economy is heavily subsidized by Russia. That's worked okay so far, but Moscow's going to face a tight budget next year for the first time in almost a decade. Paying another couple hundred million for Tiraspol's cheap energy and pensions may not look so attractive.
So, while the impasse will probably continue into next year, the long-term prospects for settlement are actually pretty good.
Doug M.
Doug, I sort of agree with your comment and sort of disagree. I guess when I say "no settlement in the foreseeable future" I'm talking about the next six months, when the Moldovan elections will prevent any final settlement from happening. Actually, when I was in MD this past summer I heard from both right-bank and left-bank people that if you want to use elections as an excuse for kicking the ball down the road then you could end up never settling the thing because someone's always having elections (Russia, the PMR, the US, etc.).
Certainly you're right that in the long term this conflict should be amenable to settlement, but then again that has always been the case (at least as compared to the conflicts in the Caucasus). It's true that one of the PMR's "domestic" talking points is "things are worse Over There, or at least no better," but the idea of a distinctive ethnic mix (all united in Russophone bliss, of course) has also had a chance to take root, and the authorities like to emphasize that rule from the right bank would destroy that.
The bottom line is that Russia still seems to hold most of the cards, and if they want a settlement then they can force one - if they really want a settlement and are willing to back away from the Kozak Memorandum terms.
You're quite right to mention ethnic Russians leaving, but I wonder what the ethnic breakdown of emigrants actually is (i.e., how many of the Moldovans have also left for greener pastures) and to what extent those departing are leaving only temporarily. In many cases, the only thing that the Russian "citizens" in conflict regions get is a foreign-travel passport with no practical way to get a propiska in Russia.
On the whole, though, you're probably right about the "correlation of forces" (unless there's some kind of pro-Western coalition that wins the Moldovan elections next March and the guys in Moscow decide they need to keep TN out there as a carrot/stick). Russian investment (the kind that creates ownership on paper, not subsidies) in TN may create a situation where Moscow is indifferent to the territory's de jure status because Russian companies control all of the major assets there.
Apparently Greceanii recently signed some document which made reference to Russian ownership of the Cuciurgan power plant, but I'm not sure if this was carelessness or a policy choice - one of the things Chisinau gets to bargain with in the settlement process is whether it will recognize the results of the PMR's privatization program, which is probably Russia's most important goal.
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