Blogger cyxymu spent last week marking the 14th anniversary of the storm of Sukhumi, which dealt a final defeat to the Georgian forces in their war with Abkhazia. As He has a lengthy post with his own interesting theory about why the conflict unfolded as it did - he thinks that the main motivating force behind the fighting was Russia's desire to get Georgia to join the CIS.
He has also posted recollections from a number of his readers about their experiences during their last days in Sukhumi. I was going to translate a couple of them, but some of the best ones are quite long...
The recollections culminated on the 27th with cyxymu's own thoughts about the significance of that date (which I did translate - the same post has a couple of difficult-to-watch videos):
Today marks 14 years since the day when I stepped on the earth of my homeland for the last time. On September 27, 1993, I left my hometown and have not been back since. That was the last day when Sukhumi existed. On that day, as the Abkhaz say, "they shot the 'i' off Sukhumi," and along with it they killed the city's soul. And if on other questions I can find points of agreement with my Abkhaz friends, that day remains for us a chasm which we can never cross. For us [Georgians], that day is a day of mourning, a day when hundreds and thousands of civilians died by the hands of the Abkhaz units who entered the city; tens of thousands of Georgians, saving themselves and their children, fled into the mountains; a day when children lost their parents and parents lost their children. But for the Abkhaz side it is a day of victory, the day when they took Sukhumi. And we'll never be able to arrive at a common denominator regarding that day.Somewhat less emotionally, cyxymu posted last week about the Abkhazian special forces
I don't lose hope, and I believe that we will return to Sukhumi, that Abkhaz and Georgians will be able to live together, but in order for that to happen it's essential to punish the war criminals whose arms are covered up to their elbows in the blood of civilians.
troops captured after a skirmish with the Georgians, and how they were led by an
officer who had served in the Russian peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia before joining the Abkhazian
armed forces. The post is titled "вот такие у нас миротWARцы" - an impossible-to-translate pun meaning "these are the kind of peacekeepers we have," but substituting "WAR" for a phonetically similar syllable in the Russian word for "peacekeepers." He's also written recently about the firefight several days ago in South Ossetia.
[Update 10/1] I had the thought that I should temper the translated text above by noting that most neutral observers of the conflict believe that atrocities rising to the level of war crimes were committed on both sides (see, e.g., this Human Rights Watch report). For what it's worth, my opinion is that too much time has past and attitudes have become too entrenched for a tribunal or other attempt at post-conflict justice to be effective. On the other hand, I can't think of anything better, so maybe a low-impact "truth and reconciliation" process that doesn't necessarily hand down harsh sentences would be one way to go about starting to rebuild the bridges burnt back in 1993.
A very sad article from IWPR about relatives on both sides of the conflict still looking for the bodies of those officially declared missing.]
9 comments:
Just a small correction. They were not led by "an officer in the Russian peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia". Cyxymu writes, to be precise: "this man was Igor Muzovatkin, lieutenant-colonel, former commander of the Maykop battalion of the Russian peacekeeping forces, who decided to continue his career in Abkhazia, proving once again that Russian peacekeepers are not neutral but protect the interests of Abkhazia."
I do not intend to justify anyone, but you might agree that, first, you have misquoted the post of Cyxymu, and second, that a mercenary who once served in the peacekeeping forces is not a proof of anything.
Nothing personal :).
Dmitri, thanks for the correction, I agree with both of your points - and I'll change the post. Nothing personal, of course, thanks for reading and commenting!
Thanks Lyndon for bringing the post to attention.
Interesting theory on the circumstances surrounding the war in Abkhazia - my take on it, is that indeed the entry into CIS played a role in Russia's support of the Abkhaz forces.
This however is not the only dimension. The idea of Abkhazia's independence was as popular within the Abkhaz interest groups, as was Georgia's independence from the Soviet Union. Not to mention also Russia's own problems in the Caucasus - Cherkez and other traditionally close peoples to the Abkhaz would not appreciate Russia's non-involvement in Georgia-Abkhaz conflict. There was a degree of fear that separatist movements could develop elsewhere in the Caucasus, just as it happened in Chechnya.
Also, a theory advanced by Shevardnadze in his memoirs: many Soviet Generals had a personal aversion towards him, for "breaking up the Soviet Union" - when they got a chance, they wanted to do the same to Georgia.
Anyways, thanks again.
> The idea of Abkhazia's independence was as popular within the Abkhaz interest groups, as was Georgia's independence from the Soviet Union.
Moreover, the anti-Georgian nationalism has always been strong in Abkhazia. I visited Abkhazia a couple of times when I was a schoolboy, in the late 1970s, but I still remember clearly the stories I heard then about the Mingrelians (an ethnic sub-group of Georgians who lived in Abkhazia and who suffered most during the war). A very typical set of stories that one may hear from all kinds of nationalists: that they live in dirt, practice incest and kidnap children.
Unfortunately, I don't know what was the Mingrelians' opinion of the Abkhazians, but it may be interesting to note that Zviadi Gamsakhurdia, the first president of Georgia, was a Mingrelian (not from Abkhazia). This may explain his radical nationalism. And when two radical nationalism meet, we get what we've got in Abkhazia.
Dmitri, do you recollect any of the nationalists (Georgian or Mingrelian) making an issue of Beria's Mingrelian ethnicity?
Thanks to everyone for commenting and adding more to this discussion - the roots of the conflict are certainly complex and disputed, with ample historical myth-making on both sides both about events hundreds of years ago and about the events of the conflict itself. I think it's important to separate the question of what motivated the Abkhaz and the Georgians to take their dispute from the political into the military realm and the question of what Russia stood to gain from its involvement in the conflict - although of course it's hard to separate anything when everything is so intertwined.
Chris, my guess is that Gamsakhurdia's base and support in Mingrelia had more to do with things than Beria's (or Stalin's) ethnicity, though of course the shadows of the past hang heavily over the whole thing. Conciliation Resources has a good collection of articles dating from 1999 which talks about some of the roots and aspects of the conflict, as well as a bunch of more recent material here on Abkhazia and the other conflicts in the Caucasus.
> do you recollect any of the nationalists (Georgian or Mingrelian) making an issue of Beria's Mingrelian ethnicity?
No, Chris. After all, I was only a little boy then :)
> it's important to separate the question of what motivated the Abkhaz and the Georgians to take their dispute from the political into the military realm and the question of what Russia stood to gain from its involvement in the conflict
Stood or stands? And if stood, at what moment?
At the moment when Russia first interfered into this conflict, she did not have any choice. First, the bloodshed might cause an uncontrolled influx of refugees to the southern regions of Russia. 200,000 refugees would mean a humanitarian catastrophe. Second, the unanimous support of Abkhazia by the population of the republics of Northern Caucasus (Adygea, Kabardino-Balkaria, Chechnya, etc.) needed a way to "institutionalize" this support to prevent (or minimize) the growth of uncontrolled guerilla detachments.
Something had to be done, and what was done was not the worst possible thing. Russian peacekeepers saved thousands of people (including cyxymu, who, as he writes, left Abkhazia on a Russian landing craft). The murders were stopped.
Then, after the war was over, for some years Abkhazia lived in an economic blockade. The economic relations with Russia gave a chance to these people to get out of poverty.
I am a strong opponent of all kinds of separatism ("Imagine there's no countries!") and I would like to see Abkhazia a part of Georgia again, but, *(%$, if the current situation is the only chance to stop people from killing each other, so be it.
Thank you Dmitri!
I was asking because the Mingrelian issue is a theme in Sergo Beria's book about his father.
Stood or stands? And if stood, at what moment?
Well, I wrote "stood," because cyxymu's original post was about the motivations present in 1992-93. I think Russia's motivations have gone through at least a couple of changes during the past 15 years. First was the post-Soviet confusion when it was really difficult to tell what was coming from the center and what was being done on the ground. Then was the period of Russia's relative support for isolating the Abkhazians, which coincided with Russia's own secessionist problem. Then was the period of feeling that Chechnya was more or less resolved and wanting to stick it to Georgia and perhaps gain this lakomyi kusochek back as part of Russia. Obviously that's an oversimplification and ignores the agency of the Abkhazians; and it's very hard to look at "Russian motivations" as monolithic because different elite groups have over time wanted different things for Abkhazia.
I agree that there was some humanitarian rationale to intervene in the first instance, but of course the result was still (at least) 200,000 displaced people and a humanitarian catastrophe. And I think Russia's later behavior in the conflict (ultimately supporting the Abkhazians in a way that has entrenched the conflict) leads people to look back with more suspicion than they might otherwise have about Russia's initial motivations. But you are completely right there were motivations which appeared legitimate in 1992-93, and it's definitely right not to lose sight of this.
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