Making me want to come back for more

A couple of people have emailed to ask whether I'm shutting "Scraps of Moscow" down now that I'm back in the US and engaged in the pursuit of a JD degree (an activity which doesn't leave a lot of time for whimsical contemplation of faraway places). I think I'm actually going to try to keep looking at coverage of Russia and sound off once in awhile, as well as posting pictures every now and then. I'll be back in Moscow for winter break anyway, and hopefully for at least a portion of next summer, so the city is never far from my thoughts.

Since I often use this space to provide critical observations about life in Russia, I feel like, in an effort to be "fair and balanced," I have to relate the story of my departure from Sheremetyevo-2 last Monday. Of course it was hectic, there were huge lines, etc., but I also experienced a couple of moments of human kindness which made me feel like I was being sent off with a smile. First, I went to declare some cash I was taking out of the country (this also had the handy result of allowing me to bypass the long line of people with nothing to declare waiting to clear customs through the "green corridor"). I received no hassle from the customs agent and went on to pass through the pre-check-in security (baggage X-ray and hand search, since our destination was the US). 10 minutes or more later, I see the customs agent come up to me and ask, "are you missing something?" I had left my videocamera on the customs desk, and this guy made the effort to come find me and make sure I got it and was not victimized by my own carelessness.

Then, as if that wasn't enough kindness (already more than I have ever experienced at Sh-2, and I've passed through there dozens of times), the Aeroflot check-in agent did not give me a hard time for having a bag that weighed 32.8 kilos, although the limit is 32 - AND she told me she might upgrade me to business class at the gate. Even though I lounged in the lounge for too long and was literally the last person to board the plane, she lived up to her semi-promise and put me in seat 1A. Just like Moscow, to make you feel like a downtrodden peon for 3+ years and then see you off like a king.

Anyway, I felt like that was a heartwarming tale to share, and also wanted to log on and make it known that "Scraps" is not going the way of the USSR - I'm keeping it together and will be posting here as often as time permits.

Oh, and to the couple of haters who have posted comments which require a response from me - I'll be posting those responses soon. Don't think you're getting the last word.

Suicide in the Russian military

Yesterday's Novye Izvestiia had an article about the high rate of suicide - not to mention accidental and other non-combat death - in today's Russian military. I have translated it below, and any errors resulting from the translation are mine alone.

With a machine gun and a noose around their necks.
By Nadezhda Krasilova

Every month, over 20 people commit suicide in the army.

Yesterday, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published figures which state that the crime rate in the army increased in July by 36% as compared with June. Since the beginning of the year, 158 servicemen have committed suicide. But human rights activists say that the army’s statistics are not consistent with reality, and that the MoD’s actual casualties in this time of peace are approximately three times the official figures.

Back at the end of July, Chief military prosecutor Alexander Savenkov was the first to announce the growth in the army crime rate. Prior to that, MoD reports suggested that crime in the army was steadily declining. For example, according to official figures, non-combat losses in 2004 were 954 versus 1286 in the year 2000. However, according to the Chief military prosecutor’s office, the amount of crimes committed in the army was steadily growing. The Chief military prosecutor released information that during the week from June 6 to 13 alone, 46 servicemen died and another 22 were injured in the “peacetime” army. In response, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov accused the Chief military prosecutor’s office of inefficiency and accused the Chief military prosecutor himself of failing to respect the verdict of a jury trial (the prosecutor had publicly criticized the verdict in the Ul’man case).

However, the military prosecutors’ criticism of the army leadership had to be indirectly taken into account, and Sergei Ivanov has decreed that henceforth the non-combat casualties of the army and navy will be published on the MoD’s official website. Yesterday, society had the chance to view the first such report where the MoD acknowledged a rise in peacetime losses. The official release states that the number of accidents and crimes in the Russian armed forces in July of this year was 1697, 36% more than in June. In all, since the beginning of this year, there have been over 9000 crimes and accidents. In July, 119 people in the services died, including two as a result of inappropriate treatment [hazing] (which killed 2 people in June also), 32 servicemen committed suicide (25 in June), 35 died in accidents (29 in June), and 15 as a result of careless handling of weapons (4 in June). Another 34 servicemen died in vehicular accidents, 7 died as a result of civilians’ criminal acts, and one due to negligence. In all, since the beginning of the year, according to the MoD’s figures, 158 servicemen have committed suicide (i.e., every month 20 leave this life willingly), 12 have died as a result of hazing, 153 in vehicular accidents, 147 in other accidents, and in 18 cases the cause of death was negligence.

In the opinion of human rights activists, however, even these figures provided by the military about crime in the army are understated. The Mother’s Right foundation told Novye Izvestiia that, according to their information, non-combat losses annually number around 3000 servicemen, and not 900-1100, as the MoD reports. This is because the military leadership does not count servicemen who die at home from illnesses received while in the army or those who go missing. Because of this, it’s not at all rare for a dead soldier to be retroactively demobilized and not make it into the MoD’s statistics. The Mother’s Right foundation was unable to explain the growth of suicides in July, since they only keep annual statistics and not monthly ones. They did, however, state that suicide is the main cause of death in the military, and that suicides make up 30 to 35% of all military deaths.

For purposes of comparison, US troops in Iraq (which I know number several times less than the total number of active-duty Russian servicemen, so the comparison is not perfect) suffered 406 "non-hostile" deaths during the period from March 2003 through July of 2005 (according to the iCasualties website).

Kommersant's Kolesnikov on Putin's flight of fancy

Kommersant's Kremlin correspondent, Andrei Kolesnikov, has an article in his usual tongue-in-cheek style about Putin's flight on Tuesday on a supersonic Tu-160 bomber (which I discussed at some length here, with a full rundown of coverage). This article is notable for several reasons. First, it's the only coverage where I recall seeing a serious inquiry into why the president might have wanted to do this - in doing so, Kolesnikov implicitly raised the question of whether it's normal for the leaders of large nations to engage in such risky behavior. He also mentioned the crash of a Tu-160 last year and recounted a conversation he had with the aircraft's designer, in which the latter admitted that he didn't know why the plane had crashed.

Also, the article has two interesting sidebars - "What has the Russian President piloted" and "What have world leaders piloted." Interestingly, two of the other "world leaders" who've engaged in similar flights are George W. Bush (the infamous "Mission Accomplished" stunt) and Mikheil Saakashvili. Finally, there's a series of answers from Duma deputies, political commentators, and the like, to the question "Against whom is Putin fighting a war?" It's all in Russian, and I hope Kommersant will translate this piece and put it on their English-language website, as they do with many of their better articles.

More follow-up

Earlier, I translated the results of a Levada Center poll dealing with issues that are of concern to the Russian population (here). Now, Mosnews has (in English) an interview with Yuri Levada himself in which he discusses the poll results.

Novye Izvestiia also had an article on Wednesday about this poll. An English translation was sent around in Johnson's Russia List but is not available on the JRL website. Here are a couple of excerpts:

Novye Izvestia
August 17, 2005
AS LONG AS PRICES DON'T RISE
By Andrei Gulyutin; Translated by Denis Shcherbakov

During the last few months, our fellow citizens have not been worried by politics, only about the economy. First of all, rising prices produces anxiety, as well as unemployment and setbacks in production. These are the results of the polls done by the Yuri Levada polling agency. Experts say that we are like the Chinese in this sense. [...]

The Chechen war is not even in the first ten of Russian fears. And the infringement of civil rights and liberties, for instance freedom of speech, does not disturb our citizens at all.

According to experts' opinions, such results speak about low level of social development of the society. "When respondents place monetary problems on the first place, that proves the fact that our country is an economically developing state," analyst of VIKA Alexander Generalov told us. "The same results were shown in China, as well as in several countries of the former socialist camp." At the same time, according to Generalov, the Czech Republic's citizens are not worried by economical problems, as their country in at the stage of economical rise. "Polls in that country in the 1990s indicated that the Czechs were worried about inflation and unemployment, but now foreign and social problems are in first place," Generalov notes. So, we are lagging behind the Czech Republic by ten years.

More on Khinshtein's witch-hunt

Earlier in this space we discussed (here and here) the campaign that's apparently being mounted by Moskovsky-Komsomolets-muckraker-turned-Duma-Deputy Alexander Khinshtein against members of the Yeltsin-era political-economic elite. As Khinshtein promised, after going after Mikhail Kasyanov, he set his sights on Vladimir Rushailo. Moscow News had an interesting article in the August 10-16 issue which included a rundown of theories on why this witch-hunt went down:

Open Season Declared on "Yeltsin's Family" Faction
By Nelli Monastyrskaya

[...] Theory 1: Putting the Squeeze on the "Family"

This is by far the most obvious theory. Both Mikhail Kasyanov and Vladimir Rushailo were high-profile figures in the entourage of the former president (Boris Yeltsin). It is known that rivalry between the "St. Petersburg clan" and the cabal of insiders dubbed the "Family" acquired a systemic character. Analysts attribute the ongoing campaign to discredit members of the "Family" faction to preparations for the 2007-08 elections. "Family" representatives might, in the run-up to the elections, try to stage a political comeback by rallying around a single presidential candidate - e.g., Mikhail Kasyanov. If this is indeed the case, it is quite likely that the campaign to discredit them is a political order designed to eliminate competition to the ruling establishment or its successors. Khinshtein himself actively flaunts this theory, saying that he is determined to show up all possible machinations with the real estate holdings of many other "Family" members. This simple explanation compels pundits to advance several more theories.

Theory 2: A PR Stratagem

If the charges against Mikhail Kasyanov are indeed politically motivated, then from the perspective of PR technology, the charges against Vladimir Rushailo and the "Family squeeze" explanation appear quite logical. Several "dacha" cases, following the same pattern and fitted into the theory of busting the "corrupt Family," are a cover-up for an operation to sweep clean the political field. The attack on Kasyanov alone, in the public's eye, is evidence of his viability as an opposition leader, automatically evoking sympathy among certain sections of the population.

Theory 3: Settling Accounts

The confrontation between Khinshtein and Rushailo began in 2000. When he was not as yet a State Duma deputy, Khinshtein, a journalist writing for the Moskovsky komsomolets daily, published a series of exposes on Gen. Orlov, a close associate of Interior Minister Rushailo. As a result, criminal proceedings were opened against Khinshtein over the use of a fake Moscow City Criminal Investigation Department (MUR) ID. The conflict was hushed up, but Khinshtein's relations with Rushailo are still less than friendly.

Theory 4: Rushailo's Performance as Interior Minister and Secretary of the RF Security Council

As RF interior minister, Rushailo was privy to highly sensitive, off-limits information which could have included compromising material, sleaze on some of the incumbent state and government officials or political figures. In this event, the "dacha case" could be a warning: It is dangerous to stir up a hornet's nest in the run-up to the presidential election.

Enough theorizing to make your head spin. The almighty Google is able to somewhat restore Khinshtein's reputation in my mind - I found a redeeming remark from him in a Mosnews article from last year about NTV's firing of Leonid Parfyonov:

Deputy and journalist Aleksandr Khinshtein was the only one of the United Russia faction who spoke of political motives in the NTV row. "The freedom of the press cannot be forced to conform to a military charter. One may like or dislike Parfyonov, but one cannot deny that his program was one of the most professional programs on television and its closure will deal a tangible blow to the Kremlin's reputation," he said.

Can't tell the players without a scorecard

I was poking around on the BBC's Russia Country Profile page today and found this useful primer on the affiliations of various Russian media outlets:

The press
* Komsomolskaya Pravda - mass circulation, outspoken daily, controlled by tycoon Vladimir Potanin
* Kommersant - liberal, business-orientated, controlled by tycoon Boris Berezovsky
* Moskovskiy Komsomolets - popular daily controlled by Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov
* Izvestia - popular daily controlled by tycoon Vladimir Potanin
* Rossiyskaya Gazeta - official government newspaper
* Nezavisimaya Gazeta - influential privately-owned daily
* Argumentiy i Faktiy - popular weekly
* Sovetskaya Rossiya - pro-Communist daily
* Krasnaya Zvezda - Defence Ministry newspaper
* The Moscow Times - English-language daily

Television
* Russia TV Channel - national network, run by state-owned Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (RTR)
* Channel One - national network, 51% owned by state, 49% by private shareholders
* NTV - national network, owned by gas monopoly Gazprom
* Centre TV - commercial, Moscow area
* Ren TV - Moscow-based commercial station with strong regional network

Radio
* Radio Russia - national network run by state-owned Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (RTR)
* Moscow Echo - influential private station
* Radio Mayak - state-run national network
* Russkoye Radio - major private network, music-based
* Voice of Russia - external service, broadcasts in English and other languages

News agencies
* Itar-Tass - state-owned, pages in English
* RIA-Novosti - state-owned, pages in English
* Interfax - private, pages in English

I'm hoping to have time before leaving Moscow to update my links to include more Russian media and information sources, and this is an OK start on that task, although there are definitely a few more I'd add. The main reason I want to improve the links on this site is a selfish one - I'm hoping to continue blogging about Russia from afar, and having a specific list of sites to visit regularly is one way to make that easier.

Russia's damaging inferiority complex

Alexander Golts, deputy editor of the excellent on-line publication Yezhednevny Zhurnal ("Daily Journal"), had some interesting comments in Monday's Moscow Times on the damaging impact of Russia's inferiority complex:

Russia's Economic Maneuvers
Moscow Times, Monday, August 15, 2005. Issue 3230. Page 8.
By Alexander Golts

Thirteen years ago, when Moscow and Beijing agreed that Russia would start shipping arms to China, the announcement made waves around the world. Military analysts began talking about the possibility of a new alliance between Moscow and Beijing that would take an anti-American tack.

Now these predictions appear to be coming true. On Thursday, Russia and China will commence their first joint military exercises, in which around 10,000 soldiers and officers will participate. [...]

In this complicated war game -- during which potential threats to the United States, China's biggest trading partner, are being meted out with great care -- maneuvers that can be interpreted in a variety of ways become all the more important. In any case, it is clear why Peace Mission 2005 is useful for China.

It is a lot less clear what these military exercises will do for Russia. It is not clear what exactly Moscow stands to gain from war games that present an apparent threat to the United States, a country with which Russia has a strategic partnership, as Russian authorities have announced on numerous occasions.

Yet, there is some clear-cut economic reasoning behind Russia's participation. China is the largest purchaser of Russian military hardware. Every year, it buys around $1 billion in weaponry from Russia. [...]

The military reasons why Russia is engaging in joint maneuvers with China are far more vague and nebulous. It seems that Russian military policy increasingly reflects the armed forces' inferiority complex. Without the resources to play a significant role in the Asian arena, Russia doing everything it can to make it seem as if it is an active participant in the region's affairs. In the process, Russia's leaders have resorted to anti-American saber rattling out of old habit.

For example, Russia's national security would only be enhanced if the coalition forces fighting in Afghanistan were finally to defeat the remnants of the Taliban. Yet at the recent summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, President Vladimir Putin suggested that the delegates discuss when coalition forces should be required to withdraw from military bases located in Central Asia. Not only do these bases supply the troops fighting in Afghanistan, but they also support stability in Central Asia itself, something which is also very much in Russia's interest.

In this instance, the desire to prove how important Russia is seems to have gotten the upper hand over common sense. Russia's participation in Peace Mission 2005 apparently has very similar motives.

Maybe a more personal version of this inferiority complex played some role in inspiring Putin's antics with the Tu-160 yesterday. There's certainly no common-sense reason for the leader of a so-called G-8 nation to risk his life playing fly-boy.

[Update:] The same Moscow Times op-ed page carried another insightful commentary piece about Russia's warming relationship with China, which it's clear that Russia is rushing into in order to restore its sense of being a world power. The reasoning must go something like, "well, we'll get together with the Chinese and show these Orange-Revolution-organizing Americans a thing or two."

At the Edge of the Middle Kingdom
By Andrei Piontkovsky

[...] Confrontation with the West and the development of a "strategic partnership" and effectively a military alliance with China will leave Russia not only marginalized but also subject to China's strategic interests. And it will lead in the end to the loss of control over the Far East and Siberia, first de facto and then de jure.

In an op-ed piece that appeared in Vedomosti in mid-July, Alexander Dugin, head of the International Eurasian Movement and one of Russia's leading apologists for "Asiope" (as opposed to Eurasia), called this a "great opportunity for Russia." In an earlier manifesto, Dugin wrote with pride: "In the 16th century, the Tatars passed the torch of Eurasian empire-building to Moscow."

Muscovy's Asiopeans have carried this torch for centuries now. But if they're honest with themselves, Asiopeans like Dugin have to understand that we're now in the process of handing it off. Five centuries is a good long stretch, after all, and in the 21st century, the time has come for Russia to make way for a much more promising builder of empires, the Middle Kingdom. Apparently, this is exactly what the leadership is preparing to do.

The Holy Asiopean Alliance of emperors Vladimir Putin and Hu Jintao is the alliance of a rabbit and a boa constrictor. Its outcome is inevitable, and it will be swift.

We've been so desperate to hold together the tatters of our own "near abroad" that we failed to notice that we have now become part of China's "near abroad."

That last sentence is all the more scathing because it's dead accurate.

Third term story gathers momentum

It's hard to say whether the country's leadership has figured out who it wants to be in the driver's seat after 2008, but last week's proposals from a couple of regional legislators to allow Putin to stay in office - covered extensively in this space - have certainly got the media talking. Tuesday's Moscow Times had a front-page story titled, "Signs of a 3rd Term Campaign."

A behind-the-scenes campaign appears to be revving up to make sure that Putin remains in office beyond 2008. As the clock slowly ticks down on Putin's final term, the chorus of support for a constitutional amendment could swell and help Putin's retinue to persuade the president that he should stay on, political analysts said. [...]

Putin has repeatedly spoken against amending the Constitution, but his most recent remarks could be interpreted as slightly more ambiguous, said Andrei Piontkovsky, an independent political analyst.

"It's another step in Putin's comments on the subject. This was the first time that the option was first mentioned in a positive context," he said.

"There has been strong pressure on Putin from his entourage to run for a third term, but he has strong hesitations," he said. "He understands the costs on an international level."

If Putin were to run under an amended Constitution, he would risk being likened to Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko and Uzbek President Islam Karimov, longtime leaders who have traded angry words with the West over democracy in their countries and the legitimacy of their regimes, Piontkovsky said.

Piontkovsky said the recent proposals appeared to have been orchestrated by the siloviki, a group of military and security officials who rode to power on Putin's coattails and want him to stay on.

But Dmitry Orlov, the director of the Agency for Political and Economic Communications, a think tank, said the regional legislators probably reacted to Putin's statements in Finland on their own. "They wished to reiterate their loyalty," he said.

Novye Izvestiia had an article which echoed that last thought (I haven't translated it yet, although I will if I have time tomorrow). The money quote in the article was from Vladimir Lysenko, President of the Institute of Modern Politics:

"These small-minded brown-nosers don't miss a single opportunity to demonstrate their loyalty to the leadership."

But the NI piece also allowed that there might be other forces working to "rev up" the third-term bandwagon.

Stick a fork in NTV

NTV is all done as a credible source of information. This has been clear to everyone else for awhile, probably, but I guess I don’t watch the Russian TV news as much as I used to. I guess this has been the case for a year or so now, but tonight I saw something that cemented the conclusion in my mind - NTV's news programs are no more credible than "Vremia" or "Vesti" on a good night. The brief midnight edition of their NTV's program “Segodnia” led off with a seven-minute report (out of the 15-minute total length of the broadcast) about Putin's flight today on a strategic bomber. There was ample footage of Putin in a flightsuit and helmet looking pleased with himself, as well as some shots of the always-obsequious-looking Fradkov sending off his boss. Clearly, this was the Kremlin-ordained top story of the evening, and without even watching the news on Channel One and Rossiia, I feel pretty sure it was the lead there as well.

And as for Putin’s mission itself, what can one say? I would love to see some poll data on Russians' reactions to this stunt, and I suspect that the overall response would be favorable - on the surface, it seems like sort of a cool thing for a president to do. The fact is, though, that it's a bit irresponsible for the head of state to risk his own head by participating in military training maneuvers, and people who are not actually in the military don't usually look good in various military helmets - just ask Michael Dukakis, whose ill-fated 1988 campaign for the US presidency was not helped by his appearing extraordinarily goofy riding around in a tank with a helmet on.

Obviously, today's "flight of the Putin" was a manufactured PR event, but the President was clearly enjoying himself - and the Russian media can clearly no longer tell the difference between a stunt and something that constitutes real news. Perhaps Putin can be excused - after all, he's just living out the fantasy of every KGB desk officer who fancies himself a warrior, and now that he's President, the big boys in the armed forces have to let him play with their toys. But it's hard to excuse the Russian "journalists" who gave this story such fulsome coverage. There is video of this event here from RBC, although my slow connection didn't permit me to actually view it; Lenta.ru has an item (under the category of "the day's top stories") with a photo from the Rossiia TV channel's coverage (headlined "The President's Supersonic Flight"); and, not to be outdone, Channel One (ORT) also has coverage on its website (titled, more dryly, "President Putin participated in military training exercises on board a Tu-160"), including video footage. As for English-language coverage, RIA Novosti has items here and here; ITAR-TASS has an article with a funny description of Putin's post-flight press conference; Mosnews has a story here; Reuters has a thorough article which discusses Putin's previous uses of military equipment as props for PR stunts; and China's state-run Xinhua news agency, perhaps in the new spirit of Russo-Chinese cooperation, also has a fairly thorough story.

According to an ITAR-TASS item an hour ago, the President and commander-in-chief has switched from air to sea and is now aboard the Peter the Great missile cruiser observing naval exercises in the Barents Sea. It's hard to imagine that there aren't any other problems in the country that require his attention, although I guess if I were in charge of an organization as dysfunctional as the Russian military, I might like to do some drop-by, in-person inspections myself once in awhile. But the very fact that he's willing to risk doing this shows that he's desperate to take people's minds off of the truly dilapidated state of much of the Russian military.

Update - Wednesday's Moscow Times has an article about Putin's sortie, titled "Putin Breaks Sound Barrier."

Luzhkov's future

The lead story in Monday's Moscow Times was about Mayor Luzhkov's plans to enter the fray in the upcoming City Duma elections:

Luzhkov Will Run for City Duma
Oksana Yablokova, Monday, August 15, 2005. Issue 3230. Page 1.

Adding fuel to what is shaping up to be a fiery election campaign for the Moscow City Duma, Mayor Yury Luzhkov said on Friday that he would run for a seat as the top candidate for the United Russia party.

I thought they "buried the lede" - American journalese for hiding a key element of the story toward the end of an article - when I saw this paragraph deep in the article, after the jump onto an inside page:

Luzhkov's candidacy does not necessarily mean that he will became a city legislator. Luzhkov and other prominent regional leaders ran for the State Duma in 1999 and 2003 elections with no intention of becoming deputies. They topped United Russia's party list in what was a clear attempt to garner more votes for the party.

But on Tuesday I heard more speculation that Luzhkov might actually want to become speaker of the Moscow City Duma (on the radio), or that this might be a result that's desirable to the Kremlin ("Moscow will ring in 2006 with a battle for power," Nezavisimaya Gazeta). Monday's MT article raised the first possibility but seemed to reject it:

Andrei Ryabov, a political analyst with the Carnegie Moscow Center, said Luzhkov might actually be interested in quitting two years before his term ended to become speaker of the City Duma. He said the Kremlin appeared to be chipping away at Luzhkov's hold on Moscow, noting that President Vladimir Putin made Valery Shantsev, Luzhkov's longtime deputy and a possible candidate to succeed him in 2007, the new governor of Nizhny Novgorod last week.

Ryabov, however, said it was more likely that Luzhkov would "use his authority to win the December elections and bring his men into the Moscow City Duma." "This will be the only way to retain his position at the helm of the city for some time longer," he said.

What does it all mean? I'd be lying if I said I thought I knew. But it will be interesting to watch the battle, if there is one, unfold, since Luzhkov has definitely been one of the great political survivors of the post-Soviet period.