Moldova and Information Wars

An interesting translation from today's JRL:

Nezavisimaya Gazeta
April 15, 2009
Editorial: "Campaigns and Wars: A Thing or Two About Information Policy"

Right now it's too soon to judge how much events in Moldova might exacerbate the information conflict between Russia and the West. There are substantial grounds for thinking there won't be any exacerbation. First, the attack upon and fire set at the parliament building is an obvious delict that does not offer a multitude of interpretations; second, both sides know full well that Voronin is not a pro-Russian figure; and finally, third, the prospect of Moldova joining Romania with the inevitable secession of the Dniester region is hardly inspiring to any sane person.

It would seem that in war as in war all means are good and you can quibble over anything. In fact, spontaneity and omnivory are signs more characteristic of a propaganda campaign, a more obviously local and short-term phenomenon.

That's not how it is in areal information war. Dilettantes sometimes think that its goal is to convince the opponent. However, that is the second goal both in time and importance; in fact, the top goal of an information war is to convince your own side. And only afterward to present this indestructible ideological unity to your opponent as an irrefutable argument in your debate.

The two phenomena we're talking about are utterly unalike in their very organization. A propaganda campaign is carried out by a limited circle of professionals and aimed outward from the beginning. There is no 'our side' here by definition. If you're convinced of what you're doing, fine; if you're not but you look convincing, that's not bad either. War is a deeply structured affair. Here each side has its headquarters and command points, a decent-sized army of mercenaries, abroad array of transmission belts to bring orders to subordinates and dependents. But the main thing is this: in no 'hot' war have so many volunteers participated as are now battling on the information fronts. Formally, these are the millions of participants in forums and blogs, but in essence it is everyone who has ever gotten into a conversation about the theme under discussion rather than about sports or the weather.

If we understand the goal of an information war as changing our opponent's mind, then it is hard to understand who is supposed to debate whom and in what language. Debates go on between countries, too, of course, but all these are faint streams on the backdrop of runaway domestic tsunamis going to and fro.

The information noise of politicians, the media, debating political experts, public figures, writers, artists, and even high school and university students is what creates the specific principles in accordance with which reality is understood and demonstrated. It is from this stock that the soft power of the state is extracted -- as an element of competitive advantage. Which ceases to be competitive if it is subordinated to the goals and means of the information war.

In very recent history we can distinguish three information wars between the West and Russia: the second Chechen war, the events surrounding the orange revolution, and 8 August 2008 in South Ossetia. All the rest -- Yukos, Litvinenko, and so forth -- are examples of classic propaganda campaigns.

It is wrong to think that there is one big war and the above mentioned are merely episodes in it. There is no total permanent war. Most of the time over the course of the last two decades, a pluralism of opinions in both camps has predominated over their uniformity, which is characteristic for war.

But what is most interesting is that all three instances developed according to completely analogous scenarios. A visible unity of the 'developed world' was achieved with respect to the subject of disagreement, and it was presented to Russia without visible effect, inasmuch as Russia had the opposite consensus. As we know, a whale and an elephant cannot fight each other. Due to a total mismatch of discourse.

Moreover, those who brought Russia human, material, and moral losses -- the Chechen fighters, the oranges, or Saakashvili -- subsequently made the West blush many times for the fact that it had ever supported them.

Could it be time to stop consolidating public opinion against one another? That is, might it be time for the elephant and whale to stop their attempts to butt heads?