Chisinau then and now

From the NY Public Library's online image collection
(which actually has a whole collection of Chisinau postcards from circa 1889)

Chisinau Arch and Cathedral - 2, originally uploaded to Flickr by chewbud.

Smacking the extended hand

[image source]

See below for further evidence that Putin lacks either the ability or (more likely) the inclination to play well with others. Although Lenta convincingly argues that Putin was misquoted on the "limited mental capacity" part (though not the preceding comments), the fact remains that VVP seems unable to get past the fact that admitting Russia's IT sector might be able to use Dell's help to develop does not mean that Russians - or their IT specialists, who are indeed some of the best in the world - are "invalids."

As I've pointed out in the past, the only people who suffer when Putin rejects offers of assistance from abroad are Russian citizens. I doubt the inflated sense of patriotism which some of them derive from Putin's displays of attitude will compensate in the long run for the opportunities many of them have missed out on thanks to a government that wants to be the only benefactor its people know.

After so many years of watching him, it's hard to be surprised at such a stupidly cocky comment, but it's still jarring:

Putin-Dell slapdown at Davos

The Russian prime minister tells the Dell CEO: 'We don't need help. We are not invalids.'

By Peter Gumbel, Europe editor
January 28, 2009: 2:34 PM ET

DAVOS, Switzerland (Fortune) -- Ever since Vladimir Putin rose to power in 2000, his political opponents and entire countries have learned to their cost that he has a tough, demeaning streak. Wednesday it was Michael Dell's turn.

At the official opening ceremony of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Putin, now Russian Prime Minister, delivered a 40-minute speech touching on everything from why the dollar should not be the sole reserve currency to how the world needed to enter into a smart energy partnership with Russia. Then it was time for questions. First up: Dell. He praised Russia's technical and scientific prowess, and then asked: "How can we help" you to expand IT in Russia.

Big mistake. Russia has been allergic to offers of aid from the West ever since hundreds of overpaid consultants arrived in Moscow after the collapse of Communism, in 1991, and proceeded to hand out an array of advice that proved, at times, useless or dangerous.

Putin's withering reply to Dell: "We don't need help. We are not invalids. We don't have limited mental capacity." The slapdown took many of the people in the audience by surprise. Putin then went on to outline some of the steps the Russian government has taken to wire up the country, including remote villages in Siberia. And, in a final dig at Dell, he talked about how Russian scientists were rightly respected not for their hardware, but for their software. The implication: Any old fool can build a PC outfit.

Using lists to think about the bilateral relationship under BHO

Obama's honeymoon period appears to be lending itself to lists in the minds of analysts - here's a list-driven piece by Steve Biegun, the McCain campaign's Russia guy and someone with a Russia background including studying the language in college, working there for the IRI in the early 1990s and serving on the Board of Directors of Ford, a company which has enjoyed a great deal of success in Russia.

And the article below by Nikolai Zlobin (the translation, which is not perfect, is from today's JRL - the original Russian is here), which is as insightful as his analyses of the bilateral relationship usually are, also runs down a list.

Vedomosti
January 28, 2009
US-RUSSIA: SIX BARRIERS
NIKOLAI ZLOBIN ON BARRIERS AND ILLUSIONS IN THE RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Discussions continue in Moscow on how Barack Obama's election
the US President will change everything in the Russian-American
relations now. Most of these discussions are based on the
following thesis: friction in the bilateral relations was fomented
by mistakes of George W. Bush's policy, vexation of Washington
with the growth of Moscow's clout with the world and its efforts
to check this growth, installation of a ring of hostile states
along the Russian perimeter, neglect of Russian interests, and so
on. More often than not the discussions end in the conclusion that
it is up to Washington now to mend its ways and remedy the
situation. I fear that this approach is erroneous. Moreover, it
constitutes a dangerous self-deception, one fraught with new
disappointments and conflicts.

Bush's policy was anything but anti-Russian. In fact, he was
probably the most pro-Russian president one could wish for. His
only fault in the relations with Russia was that he paid it
considerably less attention that Moscow would have preferred. Even
so, the US establishment kept criticizing Bush for what it thought
was pampering of Russia and for attaching what it thought was too
much importance to it.

As a matter of fact, all difficulties in the bilateral
relations stem from their own unbelievably asymmetric nature.
America is of considerably more importance to Russia than Russia
is to America - both politically and economically.

This asymmetry keeps growing. On the one hand, Russia
accounts for under 1% of the US foreign trade turnover and
therefore cannot count on being seen by the new US Administration
as a critical partner in the effort to survive the crisis. On the
other, Washington believes that all this alleged growth of
Russia's clout with the world is something of a myth really,
something cultivated in Russia itself and needed for exceptionally
domestic purposes. Neither in the shooting war with Georgia nor in
the gas conflict with Ukraine later on did Russia secure any
support abroad, within the international community or even within
the Commonwealth. No state lacking allies and partners may aspire
to any growth of its international influence and clout.

This growing asymmetry offers persuades me that Obama will
focus on Russia any more attention than his predecessor did.
Paying it lip service is more likely. That's fact number one.

Number two. The US establishment is more or less uniformly
anti-Russian. On the one hand, American elites understand that
Russia is not an adversary they should lose any sleep over or
waste time and effort to develop defense from. On the other, they
know that Russia being what it is cannot really hope to be an ally
or friend of America so that there is no overwhelming need to go
out of their way to improve relations with it. Moscow's opinion
will carry considerably less weight for Obama than opinions of
Berlin, Paris, or even Warsaw. Political values of Russia will
keep putting more and more distance between it and America with
Europe. These latter have no leverage with Moscow and perceive no
practical necessity to be seeking any. Mutual distrust will keep
growing. Claims that Washington was the puppet-master that
engineered the gas conflict with Ukraine recently only served to
convince the US establishment that the Russian authorities were
quite paranoidal in their attitude toward the United States. The
situation being what it is, trust Obama not to promote a policy
with regard to Russia that will clash with the general disposition
Washington feels toward Moscow.

Number three. The United States honestly does not think that
the responsibility for the deteriorating relations with Russia
rests with it. It will rather accept a diametric assumption. The
list of Washington's complaints against Russia is longer than
Moscow's against the United States. The widespread opinion in
Washington is that Bush's Russian policy - fraught with numerous
mistakes as it was - was nevertheless quite rational. Moreover, it
is not as if Washington had any bright ideas on how to change this
policy. The impression is that neither can Moscow boast of any
such ideas or political will to promote them.

Number four. Obama the politician is absolutely different
from Bush. On the one hand, Obama is a typical specimen of the
Chicago political machine, one known for coldly rational and
sometimes even purely administrative approach to politics. On the
other, Obama is more self-assured and self-sufficient that his
predecessor could even hope to be. Unlike Bush's, his foreign
policy will never be based on any psychological stuff like
sympathies or antipathies.

Number five. General public in the United States does not
care about improvement of relations with Russia. No forces
interested in better relations with Moscow are to be found among
US businesses, civil society, academic circles, journalist
community, or the military. And by the way, neither has Russia
lifted a finger to change this state of affairs. As a result,
Russia is absent from the US market of lobbying and it is this
market exactly that defines priorities of the new US
Administration to a considerable extent. And since improvement of
relations with Moscow is not even regarded by Washington as a
priority, how can Russia expect Obama to push other matters aside
in order to concentrate on Moscow and relations with it? General
public in Russia itself is not exactly hot on betterment of
relations with America. It is common knowledge meanwhile that this
situation is a result of a deliberately promoted policy. In a
word, it only serves to convince Washington not to waste its time
on Russia.

Number six. There is no point in expecting a serious revision
of America's relations with individual foreign states prior to a
revision by the new US Administration of the very basis of
American foreign policy. And, also importantly, without clear
signals and practical steps on the part of the mentioned
individual foreign states. Signals from Moscow never convinced
Washington that Russia was ready to meet it halfway.

That there are spheres and areas where Russia and the United
States cannot help cooperating goes without saying: from nuclear
arms and technologies control to international security and war on
terrorism, from ecology and space exploration to humanitarian
projects and Afghanistan. It stands to reason to expect
effectiveness of the American-Russian cooperation in these areas
to be higher now with Obama in the Oval Study. Actually, Obama
himself promised it in the inauguration speech. In any event,
belief that improvement of the bilateral relations is Washington's
singular task now and that Obama is itching to become friends with
Moscow is a dangerous delusion.

USDRUB

The ruble made a dramatic, if predicted, move lower today. Below is an article from Vedomosti on the subject as well as a link to their slideshow documenting the evolution of the dollar-ruble rate over the years. You can track the rate using Google Finance here.

35 руб. за доллар Сегодня на российском валютном рынке вновь драматические события — рубль дешевеет с самого начала торгов. Курсы доллара и евро в ходе торговой сессии (расчеты «сегодня») достигали 35 руб. и 45,88 руб. — оба значения исторические максимумы. Далее

Как менялся курс доллара Сентябрь 1999. Фото: Е. Стецко

And a post on businessneweurope's Moscow Blog asks, "Is it really that bad?"

Rating the media - and the governors

Medialogia, a useful ratings website I've followed in the past (which, however, seems not as frequently updated now that the election cycle is over) has a couple of interesting recaps of the Russian media market. The most comprehensive is the rating of newspapers and magazines most frequently cited in the Russian media in 2008. Interestingly, four of the top ten newspapers and five of the top ten magazines are either foreign or are Russian editions of foreign publications (albeit with local talent and content). Medialogia also has a rating of the most authoritative internet media for the fourth quarter of last year.

Also quite interesting is the ranking of governors by mentions in "central" news media for December 2008 (excerpt above). It's predictable that Luzhkov and Matviyenko would head up the list, but the drop-off in number of mentions once you get outside of the two big cities is precipitous.

Also, the previous month's bronze medalist, that connoisseur of track suits and Hummers, Ramzan Kadyrov, was knocked down a peg in December by erstwhile opposition leader and new governor of the Kirov region Nikita Belykh. Belykh's appointment occasioned much hand-wringing among the opposition about whether he was selling out or on the contrary taking an opportunity to demonstrate that politicians from the non-United-Russia camp can be successful as managers - or whether, on the third hand, he was being set up for failure by the powers-that-be by being given the governor's spot in a struggling region.

Moscow street art - the final upload

Last December I finally finished uploading all of my photos of graffiti and other "street art" from my years in Moscow. The final (for now) set contains nearly 900 photos, including stickers, stencils, scribbles, high art, political statements, etc., most of which date from late 2004 - mid-2005 and the summer of 2006. Only a few of them were ever uploaded to my now-dormant blog dedicated to such photos. These are some of my favorites, or at least the ones most readily identifiable as being именно from Moscow:

Traitor, deserter, adolescent bumbler - or just a regular guy?

[image source]

Strange things are afoot in Georgia. According to today's Moscow Times:

A Russian soldier said Tuesday that he deserted from his unit in separatist South Ossetia and sought asylum in Georgia because of unbearable living conditions, including poor treatment and scarce food.

"I wasn't captured by Georgian police," Alexander Glukhov said in an interview at a McDonald's restaurant in the Georgian capital, Tbilisi.

"I ran away because I couldn't stand the conditions I was living in," he said. "I want to stay here."

Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Alexander Drobyshevsky said earlier that Glukhov had been "seized by Georgian agents in the Akhalgori district of South Ossetia and taken to Tbilisi." Russia demands Glukhov's immediate release, Drobyshevsky said by telephone in Moscow.

Georgian Interior Ministry official Shota Utiashvili said Glukhov had handed himself over to Georgian police on Monday, complaining that the major of his unit had been beating him. "We did not detain him. He is free and can do whatever he wants," Utiashvili said. [...]

Glukhov, 21, said he was deployed in South Ossetia on Aug. 9, the second day of the war. "But I didn't take part in military operations myself. I was assigned to dig ditches and that sort of thing," he said.

He said that if he were to return to Russia, he would not want to resume his military service. "I'd just like to go home," he said, adding that he had not considered the consequences of his actions when he fled his unit more than a week ago.

When a reporter asked to see Glukhov's military identification card during the interview, Georgian Interior Ministry spokesman Shota Khizanishvili, who was present, said the card was at the ministry. He confirmed Glukhov's identity. Glukhov had earlier explained his reasons for deserting on Georgian television and displayed his ID.

Drobyshevsky suggested that Georgian agents had coerced Glukhov into making the televised comments.

"If a soldier is threatened or subjected to physical or emotional and psychological pressure, he could say absolutely anything," Drobyshevsky said.

Not surprisingly, this story is today's most blogged-about topic, according to Yandex. drugoi posted the above picture and opined, "He's no traitor, of course. He's just a fool, an adolescent, a little boy. He shouldn't be in the army, he should still be making mud pies in the sandbox."

Georgian blogger cyxymu posts video from Georgian TV and links to Glukhov's interview with Ekho Moskvy and this interesting post by Russian blogger shurigin, who appears to be a veteran and blames the whole incident on mismanagement of the military in general, and the higher command's neglect of the Russian troops in South Ossetia in particular: "The problem is that the troops in SO have been practically abandoned. It's a complete mess there [Бардак дикий]. Units are wintering in old, raggedy tents. The supply situation is horrible."

[UPDATE 1/29 - the Russian MoD is now executing a climb-down from its earlier allegations that Glukhov was kidnapped from his unit by the Georgian special services.]

Meanwhile, closer to home, a Georgian politician in exile in Northern Virginia has a column slamming Saakashvili in today's Moscow Times. Is it too cynical to entertain the possibility that Saak may have flipped from "our SOB" to Saddam-ville in less than a year, and that Georgian Chalabis are already being groomed Stateside? Actually, I think it is too cynical, but I couldn't resist raising the possibility. And just as, over the years, no one ever went broke underestimating the intelligence of the American people, in recent years few people have gone broke overestimating the cynicism of American foreign policy.

Black PR or market manipulation?

This fake ad (image source - advertka LJ community) was apparently stuck up all over the Moscow metro in recent days. It appears to be an exhortation by TV personality Vladimir Soloviov to invest in Sberbank. The text above the photo reads, "In 2008 I made $2,000,000 with Sberbank." And below the photo, "You can do it too! After all, I'm just as ordinary as you."

Soloviov, who appears to be even more self-absorbed than your average TV host, is convinced that this is part of a campaign to discredit him in the eyes of the public, alleging that it's government-funded. And perhaps it is, I don't know what controversies he's been embroiled in as of late, and the text of the "ad" is not exactly flattering to Soloviov (the final line could also be translated as "I'm just as simple as you."

My first thoughts (most likely incorrect but more interesting than a theory as mundane as black PR) upon reading about a fake ad using a public figure to pump the idea of investing in Sberbank were (1) maybe someone's trying a low-budget way to goose SBER's share price (but it's not as if the Moscow Metro is full of retail investors in the stock market); and (2) I doubt that anyone made $2m on Sberbank last year, unless it was by short-selling the stock, which since the start of 2008 has underperformed even the collapsing RTS index.


[UPDATE 1/29: having seen this additional (obviously fake) ad involving Soloviov, which shows him promoting a sketchy-looking weight-loss method, I am more inclined to agree that someone is just trying to make him look bad.]

Polemics and paranoia about a love-hate relationship

Sometimes the back-and-forth between scholars and self-appointed pundits at JRL can be entertaining. The excerpt below is from Andreas Umland's response to this critique of his article (full version here) about anti-American sentiment in Russia - I'm eliding the details.

Whoever knows Russian and had the opportunity to watch, for a week or so, the foreign affairs reporting of the two main Russian TV stations ORT and RTR might also start to "like the word 'paranoia'." Because that is exactly what Russia's politicians, journalists, pseudo-scholars, and other public figures are cultivating, on a daily basis, in Russian mass media today. Thus, Vladimir Putin's recent assessment that the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict has been instigated by the Bush administration has raised only few eyebrows, in Russia. Who else than the amerikantsy could be behind the costly confrontation between the two Slavic brother-nations?

Many Russian opinion makers seem to think that the more unpleasant an international (and, sometimes, even national) event is for Russia, the more likely it is that the US is somehow behind it. Scores of Russian intellectuals and politicians appear to actually "need" America for the definition of their homeland: Russia is what the US not is, and the US is what Russia is not. The longer these intellectuals and politicians will have access to Russian mass media the deeper such views will sink into Russian discourse already heavily contaminated with xenophobia and conspirology. My prediction is, therefore, that ­ should Putin continue to shape Moscow's information policies ­ Russian popular anti-Americanism will grow further, in the future. Whereas Western and Central European views of the US will, after the end of the Bush Jr. Administration, significantly and lastingly improve, the "Obama effect" may be only brief, in Russia.

I tend to agree that the anti-Americanism one encounters in the Russian mainstream is sometimes breathtaking. However, it's strange that amidst all of the dislike of the amorphous concept of "America," one still often encounters acceptance of or even affection for things American. drugoi had a post about this a while ago, in which he asked whether Russians' attitude toward the US might be similar to the way you feel about "a woman you really like who won't let you get close to her." I'm not sure it's as simple as that, but the seven pages of comments to his post provide at least some insight as to the range of opinions existing among the more vocal segments of the Russian blogosphere.

Nostalgia

tema has an interesting post about the visual design of Soviet agitprop materials (which he calls monotonous, "communist shit") that includes the above photo of Moscow's Dom Knigi, which is still there on Novyi Arbat. Dom Knigi is not even my favorite Moscow bookstore, and today it doesn't look anything like it did in 1967, when the photo was taken, but it still made me want to pay the place a visit.