Friday, October 31, 2008

VLKSM > Nashi

The 90th anniversary of the Komsomol is being celebrated more than one might expect, but it seems that the contemporary VLKSM-wannabes are not feeling as much love as they were a year ago. Read the full article for the punch line at the end...

Pro-Kremlin Youths Take Backseat to Crisis
Moscow Times, 28 October 2008
By Francesca Mereu / Staff Writer

Last year, pro-Kremlin youth groups were all over television, promising then-President Vladimir Putin love and loyalty, picketing foreign embassies and harassing a hodgepodge of opposition activists.

As recently as July, state-run television showed First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov lecturing Nashi activists in economics at their summer camp.

But with the election season over and the government grappling with the financial crisis, youth activists have drifted from the political spotlight, busying themselves instead with fashion shows and city cleanups.

There are no plans for a crisis-themed protest.

"We might organize something soon," Nashi spokeswoman Kristina Potupchik said of possible events concerning the crisis. "We have a meeting Friday. We will decide then."

Nashi is now working on "long-term projects," Potupchik said, adding that there are "fewer political reasons" for the mass demonstrations that the group organized during the December State Duma elections and the March presidential vote.

Nashi activist Antonina Shapovalova, who designed pro-Putin bikinis for the group, showed off her collection during the recent Moscow Fashion Week, Potupchik noted.

Nashi's top projects include promoting the patriotic children's movement Mishki, or Bear Cubs, tolerance programs and blood drives, she said.

"These are long-term and real projects, not one-day events," she said.

The plans are, however, unquestionably less confrontational than Nashi programs a year ago, when the group organized patrols -- accompanied by police and known as druzhinniki -- to head off any anti-Kremlin protests.

Now druzhinniki, members of a volunteer corps that dates back to Soviet times, are making different kinds of rounds. Recently, the volunteers removed political ads from the streets of Yaroslavl following local elections on Oct. 13, said Alexandra Valtinina, a spokeswoman for the volunteers.

"People were tired of seeing all those billboards, and we decided not to wait for communal workers to do the job," Valtinina said. "We cleaned everything up."

Nashi burst onto the political scene in 2005, staging a 50,000-member rally in Moscow to commemorate the 60th anniversary of Victory Day. The group was broadly seen as a response to the youth-led protests that helped bring pro-Western President Viktor Yushchenko to power in Ukraine.

Last year, the group noisily picketed the Estonian Embassy following a feud over the relocation of a Soviet-era war memorial in Tallinn. It has also been accused of harassing former British Ambassador Anthony Brenton after he attended an opposition conference.

Nashi founder Vasily Yakemenko left the group last year to head up the Youth Affairs Committee, which is in charge of the country's youth organizations.

A woman who answered the phone at the committee Monday said Yakemenko was unavailable for comment and referred all inquiries to Potupchik.

Nashi's fellow pro-Kremlin youth groups have been comparably tranquil since the end of the election cycle.

Vladimir Nasonov, spokesman for the United Russia youth group Young Russia, said "mass action" is not a wise tactic during times of crisis. He echoed President Dmitry Medvedev's accusation that the Unites States "set up" other countries in the current global financial crisis.

"Our duty is to defend the powers that be in case of large protests against the government," Nasonov said. "We need to back them, because the policy of those people living on the other side of the ocean should be blamed and not our government."

Andrei Groznetsky, a spokesman for Mestniye, another pro-Kremlin youth group, said youth movements were politically active only during the election season.

Both Young Russia and Mestniye appear to be focusing on more nationalistic issues.

Young Russia will hold a demonstration to "protect the Russian language" on Nov. 4, People's Unity Day, Nasonov said.

Mestniye, meanwhile, is devoting its energy to "fighting against illegal immigrants who work as unofficial cab drivers," Groznetsky said.

Both Nashi and Mestniye plan to hold demonstrations on People's Unity Day. The Nashi event, called "Blanket of Peace," will be held on Vasilyevsky Spusk, near the Kremlin.

After United Russia recaptured a constitutional majority in last year's Duma elections and Medvedev won a landslide victory in the March 2 presidential election, Nashi and other pro-Kremlin groups have denied suggestions that they might fade into political oblivion.

In March, several young people took to the streets to distribute rolls of toilet paper embossed with the logo of Kommersant after the newspaper quoted an unidentified Kremlin official as calling Nashi activists "jubilant street punks" and saying their services were no longer needed.

Also printed on the toilet paper was the cell phone number of the author of the article. Nashi denied any involvement in the stunt.

Yury Korgunyuk, a political analyst with Indem, a think tank, said the Kremlin needs all the resources it can get to deal with the current economic crisis, meaning that there will be few funds left over to finance youth groups.

"The markets are in chaos, and there are no bankers or businessmen the Kremlin can ask for money like before," Korgunyuk said. "What can the Kremlin ask of [the youth groups] now? To hold a sit-in in front of the American Embassy and scream, 'Down with the crisis?'"

In fact, Nashi is planning a Nov. 2 protest outside the U.S. Embassy in conjunction with Halloween, Potupchik said.

Nashi activists will bring pumpkins to protest "what the Americans did in South Ossetia, in Afghanistan and in other conflicts," Potupchik said.

The name of someone who died in one of these conflicts will be written on each pumpkin, she added.

Monday, October 27, 2008

Synchronicity, intellectual goofiness and Google hits

The past couple of months' uprootings and putting down of roots will (perhaps) be explored in a later post. For now, Scraps returns to the virtual airwaves with a rather frivolous post in lieu of something more serious. After all, "a blog is...a broadcast, not a publication. If it stops moving, it dies. If it stops paddling, it sinks."

Others who saw the video clip embedded below summed it up as follows:
In this awesome video for the song “Gorbachov” by Russian metal band ANJ, former Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Gorbachev is an axe-wielding barbarian, destroying zombies who attack the hard working big breasted women of Mother Russia. It really is a thing of beauty. Actually it’s more than that. It’s the best damn music video ever created.
Or, more succinctly:
Wow. Hot Russian women, Zombie Stalins, Gorbachov the barbarian, and erotic food innuendo. What else could you possibly need in a music video?
Indeed. Judge for yourselves (click here to see the HD version):

The video's director describes his opus as follows:
Suffice to say it's half Russian History allegory as told through an old zombie movie made in the Soviet Union, and half animated Soviet Propaganda posters.
This apparently made the rounds of RuNet a few months ago, and the link was emailed to me at that time by a fellow GVO Summit attendee. As I sifted through my neglected inbox today, I came upon this link and decided to check whether any of my fellow Russia bloggers have posted anything about this curious production. Apparently, no one did. Perhaps people found parts of it too tasteless, or the music accompanying the video too awful, to subject others to it; on the other hand, I would imagine that Sean could have a field day with some of the symbolism.

Imagine my surprise when, among the Technorati sightings of the video, I found an announcement that the band whose song inspired this crazy clip is performing tonight in my home town. Since we landed here in London exactly a month ago, this discovery tickled my homesickness bone and cemented my decision to post a video that would otherwise be out of character - not that there's anything NSFW, mind you, it's just rather... well, check it out yourself.


PS notwithstanding the potpourri of Google-friendly search terms appearing above, I should state quite clearly that this post was not authored with the intention of driving traffic...

Thursday, August 21, 2008

More Maps of Georgia

A couple more maps that I had the chance to scan in before leaving DC last week. Complaints about the white line through the larger images can be directed to the folks at A.U.'s library, although since they make an otherwise nice scanner fairly freely accessible I didn't have the heart to complain. The first is a map of tourist routes through Georgia which dates from 1966:



Georgia - Tourism Map 1966 - Cover, full-size image available here.



Georgia - Tourism Map 1966, full-size image available here.


The second is a city map of Tbilisi with a nifty folding layout, printed (according to the guy who sold it to me in Tbilisi) for the city's 1500th anniversary celebration in 1958; I am not sure about the "800" imprinted on the cover:


Tbilisi - 1958 Street Map Cover, full-size image available here.



Tbilisi - 1958 Street Map, full-size image available here.


This and all previous map-related posts can be seen on a single page here, or all of the map images I've uploaded can be viewed on Flickr here.

Monday, August 18, 2008

Unvacation

Since a few of my handful of regular readers may be wondering why I've let the blog go dark at such an eventful time, please allow me to explain. In recent weeks, we've been moving out of our apartment in DC, preparing to move to London. Last Thursday, we left DC for a month's vacation in Moldova, which of course also necessitated a bunch of packing. All of this came right on the heels of the bar exam, and since I had been focused on that all summer I guess I wasn't really prepared to be slapped in the face with all of the tasks presented by a relocation. It is whiny, to say the least, to complain about being stressed out at a time when there's just been a war on and people lost their homes and lives, but there you have it. I have come to think of the past month as my summer unvacation; hopefully the month to come will feel more like a vacation.

Anyway, judging from the sharp increase in visitors to this blog over the last couple of weeks (people have been checking out the maps of the region I've posted recently, especially this one), a lot of people have been using the internet to seek information about the war in Georgia. This may be a good thing or it may not - judging from what I've seen in the few mainstream media outlets I've had time to read/watch/listen to over the course of the conflict (I haven't been online much), only the laziest pundits and pontificators have refrained from weighing in on the crisis. Sometimes it is fruitful to hear a generalist's take on a region one follows closely; but often, it shows that the people who have to say things to fill air time and write things to fill column-inches are not always so careful when it comes to the facts. On just one day last week, reading two op-ed pages, I found a glaring error on each:

The most obvious one was in Richard Cohen's WaPo column from last Tuesday. Spot the mistake:

Peter the Great built his capital to face Europe, and Putin, don't forget, was mayor of St. Petersburg.
I don't think I have to elaborate for regular readers of this blog.

The other flubs were erroneous oversimplifications in a WSJ op-ed titled "How the West Can Stand Up to Russia," written by two guys from AEI, one of whom heads up something called the program on advanced strategic studies. Perhaps he operates on such an advanced level that he finds small details to be irrelevant when making sweeping generalizations; unfortunately, the history of the conflicts in Georgia is laden with seemingly trivial details and distinctions which turn out to be crucial to understanding what has actually happened there and what one can hope for in the future. Two passages from this piece caught my eye - here's the first:

Starting in 2004, Russia began issuing passports to the residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a fact that today serves as one of the main pretexts for the ferocity of Moscow's military campaign.

The authors are absolutely right to touch on this issue, which had often been glossed over in mainstream media accounts of the conflict but can no longer be ignored even by the press now that, for example, Medvedev named the goal of protecting "Russian Federation citizens" first when listing Russia's goals in going to war with Georgia in a public statement last week. I have done a lot of research on this interesting issue as it relates to Abkhazia (see a brief write-up of it here, a publication is forthcoming soon), and peak period when Russian passports were being handed out there was actually in 2002.

This may seem trivial, except that it undermines one of the authors' points, namely that Russia became substantially more hostile toward Georgia once Saakashvili replaced Shevardnadze. Hostility did increase, of course, based on Russia's aversion to colored revolutions and perhaps on the now well known personal beef between Putin and Saak, but Russia was quite willing to work on drawing Georgia's secessionist regions closer to its breast by handing out passports even under Shevardnadze.

If one can pinpoint a turning point in Russia's approach to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it was not so much the Rose Revolution as it was Russia's pacification of Chechnya, after which Russia - having ensured its own territorial integrity - began to seem more willing to undermine that of its neighbor. Unfortunately, these authors prefer to emphasize a false narrative of the Shevardnadze period as some pro-Russian continuation of "Soviet Georgia" (meanwhile, I recall attending a speech by Shevardnadze at Harvard back in 2000 or 2001 when he was so pro-U.S. it made me uncomfortable) and Saakashvili as Georgia's democratic savior. The truth is, of course, far more complex.

The second flawed passage from the op-ed was this one:

[T]he West should make use of Russia's claim that its role in South Ossetia and Abkhazia is driven by the need to protect the populations there. If so, Moscow should have no objections to U.N.-sanctioned peacekeepers and observers moving into those two regions to replace the jerry-rigged system of "peacekeepers" that, until the war broke out, consisted of Russian troops, local separatist militaries and Georgian forces.

I tend to agree that an international peacekeeping force in both regions would be an excellent next step, although Russia is unlikely to allow it and the West cannot exactly just parachute one in. Also, it's an open question whether any Western nations would be prepared to contribute troops to such a force. More importantly, the authors of the piece appear to assume similar peacekeeping situations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. De facto, it's true that in both regions the Russian "peacekeeping" forces have failed to keep up even the pretense of neutrality.

Formally, however, it's important to remember that the Russian forces in Abkhazia are there under a UN mandate (I've heard this was a quid pro quo for Russia agreeing to the deployment of US peacekeepers in Haiti) and are observed by a contingent of actual blue-helmets (the Russian press often refers to its semi-legitimate peacekeepers as "blue-helmets," but they are not in fact UN forces) under the command of UNOMIG. The peacekeeping structure in South Ossetia since the end of hostilities has been formally administered by the OSCE and by its very structure has been less favorable to Georgia.
Pointing out the difference may seem like a nitpick, but details are important in a scrap over a region where the population is only 70,000 (a fact which, by the way, makes all of the comparisons to Kosovo - where the population is roughly 30 times larger - seem a bit ridiculous). In any event, while it's an accurate description of the pre-war situation in South Ossetia, it's more than misleading - it's flat-out wrong - to suggest that the description of a peacekeeping system of "Russian troops, local separatist militaries and Georgian forces" ever applied to Abkhazia.

Since I'm not going to have time to do any sort of roundup or collection of my own thoughts on the crisis (which are, at the moment, as jumbled as the situation on the ground in Georgia), I will conclude with a few links to internet resources with worthwhile coverage.

[image source]

First of all, my friends at Global Voices Online have shown the strength of GVO's format by setting up a special page devoted to coverage of the conflict over South Ossetia and keeping it updated. Second, the New York Times has a dedicated topical page, which includes a link to their blog on the conflict, which links to various other bloggers covering the story, such as Paul Goble at Window on Eurasia. The NYT Moscow bureau's LiveJournal community collected comments on the crisis from Russian bloggers here and here. Also, the coverage by IWPR (including this Russian-language blog) - one of the most balanced internet resources on the region in times of peace and war alike - should not be missed, especially the wisdom of long-time Caucasus observer Tom de Waal.

If you're looking for the Russian point of view, check out RIA Novosti's topical page or this collection of official Russian government pronouncements.

Finally, here are some links compiled and circulated by the International Relations and Security Network in Zurich:

Media
Russo-Georgian conflict is not all Russia's fault, Christian Science Monitor
Georgia-Russia Conflict, by the BBC
In Depth: South Ossetia Crisis, by Financial Times

Blog posts
Putin's revenge, by FP Passport
Kosovo and South Ossetia, by Outside the Beltway
Danger Room: Georgia under online assault, by Wired
The Russian press, by the Duck of Minerva
Georgia, Russia and rethinking China, by the Oil and the Glory
Georgia, from the American side
, by Registan.net

Publications
Georgia's South Ossetia Conflict - Make Haste Slowly, by the International Crisis Group
Russia / North Ossetia: Trends in Conflict and Cooperation, by swisspeace
Tbilisi Withdraws from the Joint Control Commission; Proposes New Format for South Ossetia, by the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program (CACI-SRSP)
Europe’s Unrecognised Neighbours: The EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, by the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Reintegration or Reconquest? Georgia’s Policy Towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the Context of the Internal and International Situation, by the Centre for Eastern Studies (CES)

Primary resources
Minutes of UN Security Council meeting on the situation in Georgia, 8 August 2008 (PDF)
Minutes of UN Security Council meeting on the situation in Georgia, 8 August 2008 (Audio)
Agreement on a Cease-Fire and Separation of Forces, 14 May 1994 (PDF)
Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz Conflict, 4 April 1994 (PDF)
UN Security Council Resolution 876: Abkhazia, Georgia, 19 October 1993 (PDF)
UN Security Council Resolution 881: Abkhazia, Georgia, 4 November 1993 (PDF)
UN Security Council Resolution 892: Abkhazia, Georgia, 22 December 1993 (PDF)
UN Security Council Resolution 896: On Possible Establishment of Peacekeeping Force in Abkhazia, Georgia and on Political Settlement of the Abkhazia Conflict, 31 January 1994 (PDF)
UN Security Council Resolution 906: On Extension of the Mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia and on Political Settlement of the Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia
, 25 March 1994 (PDF)
UN Security Council Resolution 993: On Extension of the Mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia and Settlement of the Conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia, 12 May 1995 (PDF)

Maps
Republic of Georgia Maps, by Perry-Castañeda Library
Online Maps of Current Interest
, by Perry-Castañeda Library
Russia and Georgia at War: Day 2, by Daily Mail
Georgia, by the BBC
Ethnolinguistic Groups in the Caucasus Region, by Perry-Castañeda Library

____________________________________

And a postscript: I wrote most of this post last Thursday but then wasn't able to complete and post it before taking off for the airport. Last night, thanks to the miracle of the Russian media sphere (perhaps a more powerful influence than the CIS in the post-Soviet space) I was able to watch the Sunday evening Vesti and Vremia roundups, which from what I could tell dealt almost solely with the conflict over South Ossetia.

The coverage was amazing in several ways. First, both my wife and I had moments where we walked into the room having heard a voice on TV without seeing the speaker, certain it was Putin. In both cases, it turned out to be the new, improved Medvedev, who seems to have repackaged his speaking style to be a tough, trash-talking clone of the man who installed him in the presidency.

Second, I was quite impressed with Vremia's use of footage from CNN and Russia Today - the effect was to legitimize the Russian government's position and ORT's coverage by, for example, broadcasting remarks by Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov not as filmed or interviewed by ORT, but as they appeared on CNN. The Russian PR machine has become much slicker since I last regularly watched the main TV news programs a couple of years ago.

Finally, while I don't think any YouTube clips ridiculing Russia's leaders have made it onto the government-owned channels recently, one of them (I can't remember which) aired at great length a mash-up making out Saakashvili to be basically a paranoid madman. No word on whether the producer of the clip was one of the Kremlin's media-making sausage factories or an actual amateur netizen.

[Update Aug 21] I was remiss above in not also directing anyone interested in further dissection of the conflict in Georgia to the many recent posts on Sean's Russia Blog on the subject. As always at SRB, the commenting is fast and furious, and some of it is even edifying. Something I'd write a separate post on if I had time, though, is Sean's appeal to the idea of "self-determination," which (unless further elaborated) is a concept about as precise and useful as "Marxism" or "fascism."

Without getting into the situation in South Ossetia, which - even if one could draw borders that wouldn't require further resettlements of Georgians - is hardly viable as an independent state, and without getting into the distinctions between the ideas of internal and external self-determination (which are broken down in the context of Kosovo here), I would simply pose the following rhetorical question: if the titular ethnic group makes up less than 20% of a region's population of roughly 500,000, and expels from the region well over 200,000 people not belonging to that group, should the remaining population be allowed to vote on questions of self-determination?

Thursday, July 24, 2008

Cause and effect, a.k.a. "диктатура закона"

Cause:




"Mechel was selling steel in Russia at twice the price it put on exports," Putin said in televised comments. "And where has the margin for the state taxes gone?"

Mechel's owner, billionaire Igor Zyuzin, was reportedly ill and not present at the meeting to hear Putin's threat.

"The director has been invited, and he suddenly became ill,'' Putin said. "Of course, illness is illness, but I think he should get well as soon as possible. Otherwise, we will have to send him a doctor and clean up all the problems." [...]

"I'm asking the Federal Anti-Monopoly Service to pay special attention to the problem -- and maybe even the Investigative Committee of the Prosecutor General's Office."
Watch the video. As one of the commenters at drugoi's post on this topic noted, it's not just the words, it's the intonation - and, I would add, the gestures. And the swift official follow-up. No doubt "А маржа где?" will soon become a catchphrase in Moscow OCG and high finance circles alike.


Effect:


More narrative on the fallout here, here and here. No doubt someone made a bundle. Talk about bread and circuses.

Wednesday, July 23, 2008

More maps of the Caucasus

A friend of mine who's based in Tbilisi has emailed me these four maps: three interesting German maps of the changing political geography of the Caucasus (sorry, I don't know the source or copyright holder), and a fourth one (also quite interesting in its own way) which goes more toward the present-day situation in a small part of the region.


Histrorical Georgia 1774-1878, full-size version available here.




Histrorical Georgia 1917-1936, full-size version available here.




Histrorical Georgia 1936 - 1959, full-size version available here.




South Ossetia Areas of Control (geor-SO), full-size version available here.
Areas controlled by South Ossetian de facto authorities in red, areas controlled by Georgia in blue.
Here's one good backgrounder on the conflict, and here's another fairly interesting brief.

More maps of the Caucasus, as well as my general disclaimer about how, while I think the old maps are fascinating, I'm also convinced they are a fairly unhelpful lens through which to view the resolution of current territorial conflicts, can be seen here.

Sunday, July 20, 2008

Home

Now that everyone seems to be talking about an impending war over Abkhazia, in spite of Germany's best efforts (see the latest news here), I've decided to finally translate this post from a few months ago by LiveJournal blogger Cyxymu (perhaps my favorite blogger from the Caucasus), a Georgian who spent his childhood in Abkhazia but now lives in Tbilisi, having become an "internally displaced person" (IDP) during the hostilities in the early 1990s.

Why am I translating this now? For one thing, it's good to remember the human side of the conflict at times like this, but I had a more selfish reason for translating this post - the parts which describe pre-war bliss sort of called to my mind my childhood comfort level visiting my grandparents in Peoria and Madison combined with my in-laws' house in Floresti, Moldova (same corrugated roof, same clattering downspouts, same type of cellar...), where I hope to be spending some time next month.

And perhaps the most selfish reason for undertaking the task of translating this lyrical post rather than rooting around the internet for the most up-to-the minute speculations and accusations is that I just don't have time to do a proper roundup of all the analysis and pseudo-analysis that's circulating at the moment about what might actually happen in the region. Hopefully it will stay at the usual level of saber-rattling.

Anyway, here is cyxymu's post, titled "home":
Last night I dreamed about my grandfather's house. I hadn't dreamed about it in a long time, and it was amazing to find myself back in my childhood.

Most of the time I spent in Sukhumi I lived in that house, I knew all of its nooks and crannies, had secret hiding places and places to be alone and dream...

I dreamed that I was climbing the stairs to the attic, and it was so nice to listen to the rain fall up there. My brother and I went up there a lot and listened to thunderstorms, you could hear the branches banging against the corrugated roof, the rain pounding the tile and flowing down the gutter.

I also liked to hide in the garage, my brother and I had our headquarters there, the garage had a metal roof and the rain would pound on it really hard...

Sometimes when the Besletka [river] would rise during a rainstorm, it would start to flood. The water would pour into the cellar, and then we had to save our supplies) heroism was rewarded with the jam that grandmother made.

In the cellar we had hiding places where we hid all sorts of things, even just before we left, we hid an optical sight that I had found that very day. In back of the house was a chicken coop, and a rooster woke us up every morning as he summoned the sun to rise. Sometimes rats would get into the chicken coop, and I would hunt them with a small-caliber Geco. That's what I wanted the sight for.

In the garden grew everything necessary for human life: two types of pears, apples (champagne and winter), persimmons, green springtime plums [ткемали], plums, feijoa, medlar, figs and two kinds of cherries. I planted the peaches with my own hands. And tomatoes, cucumbers, raspberries, strawberries (though the strawberries often went bad, since we had very damp earth). The cucumbers liked to climb up on the raspberries, and we sometimes missed a cucumber, since we couldn't always see them in the greenery, and it would grow into a big, yellow cucumber. Then grandpa would say, "Well, it's OK, we'll use it for seeds next year."

Every spring he would start the seeds first in cans, then he would replant them into wooden crates, and only then into glass hot-houses. And when the tomatoes grew tall, grandpa and I strung nets over them, so that the pears wouldn't fall on the tomatoes when they ripened.

During [the war], when an Abkhazian shell hit next door, a bit of shrapnel took down a branch of the champagne apple tree as wide as your arm, some of the other trees lost limbs also, and I kept saying that it was the trees that protected us...

Shrapnel chopped up the whole house then, pieces flew in the window of the room where grandpa and grandma slept, miraculously not touching them, lots of bits penetrated the walls, tore the roof apart, knocked out all the windows in the house... But we didn't go move into an Abkhazian's house, instead we put in new glass and fixed the roof (patched the holes). Thinking ahead, we stuck crosses of white paper tape on the windows...

My heart aches for that house more than any other, in spite of the fact that we had nicer houses and apartments in Sukhumi. My heart stayed behind in that house.

And more than anything I can't forgive myself for leaving behind my grandpa and grandma - when I took my parents out of Sukhumi, I was hoping to return in a couple of days.

And no one from my family was able to make it to Sukhumi for my grandpa and grandma's funerals. We simply weren't allowed to return.

Obligation runs into devotion

As some of my readers may be aware, I've been spending the summer preparing to take the New York Bar Exam. The stress and difficulty of this process is not a proper subject for a post on this blog, however I would like to share one sample multiple choice question which I encountered today in the course of my practice test-taking. This is a question that is supposed to prepare test-takers for the Multistate Bar Examination, or MBE, which is the second day of the bar exam in many states:
Gorby wanted to kill Yeltsin in the most horrible manner possible. He knew that Yeltsin had difficulty sleeping and took medication which nearly rendered him (Yeltsin) unconscious during the night. Gorby decided to burn down Yeltsin's house as Yeltsin slept, and seized his opportunity one night after they had finished playing chess. Yeltsin had taken his medication and was sleeping deeply.

Gorby got a coffee cup, filled it with lighter fluid, lit a cigarette, and put the cup underneath Yeltsin's bed with the burning cigarette balanced on the cup's edge. Gorby knew that as the cigarette burned, it would tip and fall into the cup of lighter fluid, setting the bed on fire. Gorby then left the house. The igniter worked just as Gorby had planned, except that Yeltsin's housekeeper smelled the smoke and called for help before the bed could ignite.

Yeltsin was killed by the toxic fumes emitted by the burning lighter fluid, but there was no other damage to Yeltsin's home except the blackening of the ceiling of the bedroom from the dense smoke.

If Gorby is prosecuted for arson of Yeltsin's house, he should be found... [multiple choice options omitted]
(c) Kaplan / PMBR

Wednesday, July 16, 2008

Disrespecting "Real Sovereignty"



Below are some excerpts from a review of Andrei Kokoshin's book Real Sovereignty in the Modern World System, revised edition published in 2006 (you can buy it here). I'm posting them because they are the sort of trenchant yet erudite takedown that one doesn't often see on the pages of a thick journal, especially when directed at someone on the masthead of the journal; and also because Kokoshin was - and probably still is - the kind of person who Western foreign policy elites meet with when they visit Moscow (an academic who has published extensively in English and held a high-ranking position in the Yeltsin Administration, and someone with extensive contacts in the West) and it's interesting to see this of assessment of his more recent work.

Finally, I want to recommend that anyone with time on their hands and a good reading knowledge of Russian navigate here and read some of the back-issues of Svobodnaya Mysl'. I'm a little concerned that by expressing my delight at finding full-text back-issues online I will reveal my ignorance of what would seem to be an essential publication, but I guess it's a risk I'm willing to take. Incidentally, I think an English-language summary of Kokoshin's thesis about sovereignty may be provided by this article of his in Russia in Global Affairs.

What We Have Come To
The Transformation of a Soviet Scholar into a Russian Propaganda Specialist
By Vladislav Inozemtsev
Svobodnaia Mysl', No. 4, 2006, p. 209
Translated in Russian Politics and Thought, March/April 2007

[...]

It is strange and puzzling to find the style of argumentation used here from a scholar of such stature. Kokoshin constantly invokes the opinion of “Western scholars,” but the reader will search in vain for any mention of the works produced by Western theorists of sovereignty over the last fifteen years. The urgent judgments of Jean-Jacques Rousseau are a different matter (pp. 49–50). That is, Academician Kokoshin clearly has no interest in attempts to comprehend the reality of the post–cold war world. Moreover, the positions of Western sociologists and legal scholars are cited, as a rule, not from the original sources but from materials published in Russian journals: Expert, Kosmopolis, and Mezhdunarodnye protsessy.

Finally, Kokoshkin uses public opinion surveys to support this or that argument. For example, he cites survey findings from the Russian Center for Public Opinion Research (VTsIOM) to support his statement that “a significant portion of the U.S. political elite has demonstrated its intent to weaken Russia’s position in global politics on a range of parameters ever since the end of the cold war, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the collapse of the Soviet Union” (p. 29). His proof is that 30 percent of VTsIOM’s Russian respondents are convinced that the Americans intend to weaken Russia, and 51 percent think that U.S. “aid” to develop democracy in Russia has damaged our state (p. 118 n. 33). (By the way, of the book’s 173 pages, 78 are taken up with verbose notes—probably an odd sort of record for the genre.) No more proof is needed: no statements by U.S. officials, no materials from congressional hearings or reports by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), not even specific examples of actions against Russia funded by the United States! If this approach gains acceptance, the Academy of Sciences will soon be proving mathematical theorems with help from VTsIOM.

[...]

Anyone who finds the time to read Kokoshin’s new book will agree that its topic is not sovereignty. Rather, it offers a defense of the current Russian government. This defense includes the concept of “sovereign democracy,” which differs from “mere democracy” in being enriched by certain features that are “inherently characteristic” of the Russian state and, according to Kokoshin, “deeply rooted” in the Russian value system (for more detail, see pp. 74–77). It remains unclear whether these features include, for example, corruption and thievery, which are inherently typical of Russian officials, nor is it clear in general what exactly Kokoshin means by “features.” The book does, however, communicate unambiguously that it reflects ideally the
logic of the current ruling elite.

Kokoshin writes that the need to develop a theory of “sovereign democracy” has arisen because “in the current decade . . . a considerable segment of society began to view ‘democratic ideology’ as a negative phenomenon. Moreover, the public assesses the ‘democracy—nondemocracy’ juxtaposition not so much by the criterion of efficiency as by the dominance of emotion” (p. 75). But this raises the question: if Kokoshin is right, then is it not Russian professors’ job to teach their compatriots to avoid yielding to emotion and understand reality?! If an academician, professor, and teacher openly acknowledges that he has to adapt his teaching to the level of his failing students and stop teaching them basic knowledge (just to avoid having them kick him out of the classroom), then surely we must give up on the Russian scholarship that our deputy argues vehemently must be restored (see pp. 76–78, 86–88, 90–91).

[...]

Regrettably, the book by Kokoshin, an academician and State Duma deputy, has no scholarly value. But it is a peculiar literary record of a capable scholar’s transformation into a propaganda specialist for United Russia. It is a manual on how to search for and “elegantly” apply dubious sources of scholarly information. An amazed reader will find in it the names of the “well-known Russian political scientists” A. Kustarev, S. Zhiznin, N. Dolgopolova, and M. Khrustalev (the last of whom, let us note, has discovered that “the state has traditional ownership rights over certain territories and their resident population (citizens)” (quoted from p. 58; italics added—V.I.), as well as such giants of Russian scholarly thought as Valerii Fadeev, editor in chief of Expert, or Vladislav Surkov, deputy head of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation. Kokoshin offers abundant quotations from the latest speeches of such people, made during various meetings of the party’s economic leaders (in fact, these speeches, which timewise largely coincide with the date of Kokoshin’s publishing contract, constitute the “updates and additions” justifying a third edition).

This review has probably turned out to be excessively harsh. Today the shelves of Russian bookstores are breaking under the weight of printed materials next to which even Kokoshin’s deserves praise. But until the very last moment, this reviewer did not want to believe that the wave of obsequiousness could sweep up not only professional political technicians but also prominent members of the Soviet academic establishment. The realities of the struggle for real sovereignty, however, require even these sacrifices. Too bad.

Monday, July 14, 2008

Friendship of Peoples

RIA Novosti caption: The USA and the USSR youth
XIII meeting in Kishinev participants. Sept. 1, 1984.
[image source]

I found this picture in RIA Novosti's online archive. It reminded me that nine years ago this year I went to Chisinau for a summer that changed my life. When I went there in 1999, of course I knew I wasn't the first American student to spend time there (though it sometimes felt that way), but I didn't realize I'd had predecessors in the 1980s.

Interestingly, on the date this picture was taken, I was taking part in my own US-USSR "youth meeting" in Leningrad - it was the first day of what would be three years of school for me at School No. 232.