Moscow Times, Monday, August 8, 2005. Issue 3225. Page 8.Putin and his team, as products of the Soviet system, made their careers by being studious avoiders of blame. Some argue that KGB was blessed with many of the most qualified employees in the USSR, but I see no reason to believe that the blame-avoiding, initiative-averse mentality that pervaded the Soviet Union would not have pervaded the organization which turned out to be perhaps the single most influential aspect of the USSR's legacy.
A Real Leader Does Not Remain Silent
President Vladimir Putin's silence during this weekend's rescue operation to save the seven men on the mini-submarine Priz revealed the hidden weakness of an administration obsessed with projecting strength. [...]
His decision to remain silent during the crisis appears to indicate a fear of being associated with potential tragedy.
This has been his style since the first test of his presidency, the sinking of the Kursk submarine in August 2000. Despite the criticism he received then, he demonstrated it again with his silence during the seizure of the school in Beslan last year.
He has been exceptionally quick to speak out in other situations, however, such as when the three teenage sons of Russian diplomats were beaten and robbed in Warsaw a week ago.
In keeping his distance during crises, Putin has set an example for his ministers. In Beslan, Federal Security Service director Nikolai Patrushev was sent down from Moscow to oversee the operation, but that was the last the public heard of him. After the disastrous conclusion it was as if he had never been there.
This weekend, it was Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov who was dispatched to Kamchatka to oversee the operation. He arrived, coincidentally or not, just before the U.S. and British rescue teams sailed into the militarily sensitive waters. But until success had been assured, he too refrained from any public role.
The Kremlin seems to understand what television viewers everywhere feel: that if a president, or a defense minister, is on the screen talking about a dangerous situation, he has taken responsibility for how it turns out.
What the Kremlin seems not to understand is that taking responsibility in times of crisis is the clearest sign of confident leadership.
Real leadership is not the studious avoidance of blame. Real leadership is the acceptance of responsibility at precisely the moments when a panicked population needs reassurance -- and when seven men trapped 190 meters under the ocean need unequivocal, unhesitating action from the highest level down.
Kremlin-connected spin doctor Gleb Pavlovsky has attributed Putin's enduring popularity to the fact that he has always been seen as being above the social crises and terrorist attacks of recent years. But escaping responsibility is not a recipe for popularity. It's a recipe for irrelevance.
Unfortunately, the last sentences of the MT editorial don't get it quite right. It's true that in a democracy, not being a responsible leader quickly leads to irrelevance and getting voted out of office. In a Soviet-type system (which Putin's Russia is drifting towards), however, getting voted out is not a threat, and everyone knows the figurehead leadership and the staged activities of the legislature, for example, are in fact irrelevant. The leadership is only accountable to itself (i.e., to other elites), and its activities are shrouded from the electorate behind the fancy curtain of the state-run media.
There are many Russians who were taught so well during their Soviet-era youth to avoid sticking their neck out that they haven't been able to change in the many years since they took the red flag down from the Kremlin. Unfortunately, managing a situation in order to avoid blame leads to both inefficiency and a lack of transparency. Obviously, in a situation where a decision needs to be made, it's inefficient (and, in cases where lives are at stake, criminal) to avoid doing so for fear of being blamed for a negative outcome later.
More troubling is the effect on transparency. Even when Putin and his lieutenants do make decisions, excluding ones which seem like sure bets, they seek to muddy the waters around the decisionmaking process, so as to avoid responsibility in the event that a tough decision turns out to have been the wrong one. I know I'm stating the obvious here, and I know that the Bush Administration has not exactly provided a sterling example in its handling of the Iraq War (proving that one doesn't have to have a Soviet upbringing to be inclined to dodge blame and obfuscate after the fact the reasons for which decisions were made) but that's no way to lead a country which claims to be a democracy.
Sorry for the rambling commentary on a commentary, I think I've been blogging for too long today. I'd love to hear comments from anyone who wants to take issue with any of these points and/or start a discussion about this.