TOL is on top of it again

Earlier this year, I was delighted to find that TOL had started a blog about the unresolved post-Soviet conflicts (sometimes called "frozen conflicts"), called Steady State. It's a topic of great interest to me and one that I've considered starting a blog or web-portal about; but they sort of saved me the trouble.

Now TOL has filled another niche which I'd have loved to fill, given infinite time (I even set this up some time ago), with a new blog about Moldova - more precisely, according to them, "about political, economic, and social issues facing Moldova." There's a lot of original content there, including a post about Russia's "wine war" with Moldova (my phrase, not theirs) and it all looks pretty interesting. They still need to add something to their "about" page, but the topics covered so far - a series about the difficulties facing the disabled in Moldova, migration issues (naturally), etc. - look promising. My unsolicited recommendation to blogmaster Ecaterina Sanalatii is to come up with a title for the blog, something more compelling than "TOL Moldova," and my further (still unsolicited) recommendation would be to call it "Moldova Matters" - I guess I like the not-so-subtle double meaning.

Still catching up with the summer's news

One of the events of the summer which has been seamlessly woven into the "new Cold War" narrative was Russia's suspension of its obligations under the CFE treaty. Although a law student should perhaps have something more to say about this, I don't, really, except to mention the obvious - that it's an example of the common phenomenon of "international law" - even treaty law - taking a back seat to political considerations.

The Accidental Russophile covered this story in a much more thorough and timely fashion, but I wanted to chime in with a couple of links and share a few articles which do explore the legal aspects of this brouhaha: a thoroughly footnoted article from the newsletter of the American Society of International Law; and several posts on the excellent international law blog Opinio Juris.

Requiem for the '90s; or, Let us now praise floppy disks

Ten years ago, I was a newly minted college grad, just embarking on a year in which I would hold five different jobs (including, happily, one that had me in Moscow for over a month) before returning to the academy.

During some of that year's quieter moments, while I was in Durham, NC, I thought I would try to translate a book I picked up in Moscow (ah, the optimism of youth!). I didn't get farther than the first few pages, but earlier this year when Yeltsin's passing reminded everyone about the Russia of the '90s I was compelled to find that snippet - or scrap, if you will - of translation and post it in memory of Boris Nikolayevich. Unfortunately, I couldn't find the file for the life of me - that is, until yesterday, when I was transferring the contents of some old floppy disks to my hard drive.

Thanks to an enterprising internet librarian, you can now read the book in Russian online here. My source for the cover image was here. And here's the bit I translated:

Nikolai Modestov
Criminal Moscow:
A Documentary Chronicle of the Lawlessness of the '80's and '90's

In Lieu of an Introduction

The city empties rapidly with the onset of twilight. The odd passers-by, stepping around the heaps of trash left over from the day's "market activity," hurry home quickly. Metro passengers avert their eyes from the muscular young men with close-cropped hair who curse and smoke in right in the traincar. There are more cars on the street than people. This is understandable, nowadays it is safer to travel in an automobile.

Activity is concentrated around the nightclubs, casinos, and brightly-lit supermarkets which are open "day and night." These are the places that the gleaming Lincolns, Mercedes, Jeeps, and the speedy "eights" gather. The guarded parking lots will resemble an auto show until morning. And the deeper the city falls into slumber, the more desperate the partying is in the bars and other establishments. It is the hour of the tough guys of various crews, the reckless women of the shadows, the "merchants of success" and the straight-up criminals, who are ready to spend the whole night being deafened by overplayed hits, staring at the crowd, and inhaling cigarette smoke and the smell of restaurant food—if only to forget the stench of prison filth and gulag cells. Criminal Moscow is on the town...

The current lifestyle of these kings will become a distinctinve symbol for future generations. Just as Chicago of the '30's has become synonymous with the gangster era, Moscow of the '90's will be the standard for lawlessness, a period of impotent authorities and characterized by the dictates of mafia rule.

There is no need to examine figures or turn to the militia's crime reports to understand the uncontrolled increase in crime. No one feels safe in the capital today. Bankers, surrounded by former "alfas" and members of the Spetsnaz, are still not insulated from the bullets of hired assassins or from remotely controlled bombs. The rank-and-file office workers who live from paycheck to paycheck stand to become victims of amateur muggers or catch a fatal blow from the brass knuckles of a small-time hood flexing his muscle. It is not even necessary to mention those who find themselves on the "front lines" of the criminal battles: the "godfathers," racketeers, and other mafiosi. The brotherhood feels the pain of clashes between criminal clans far more than the actions of law enforcement agencies like the militia, prosecutors, and other security forces. What's more, innocent bystanders are, alas, not infrequently the victims of these battles.

The murder count in the Moscow region exceeds three thousand per year. However, even this figure does not fully reflect the real situation. To make things look better, police station employees resort to tricks of the trade. Everyone knows that the higher-ups judge their subordinates on the reports they receive from their secretaries, and no one wants to stand before a general and get a dressing-down.

The Moscow of this era was quite successfully recreated in the TV series "Brigada." To quote Lou Reed, those were different times. Just how different was explored, albeit briefly, in the NYT's article-sized romp around the city, "36 Hours in Moscow," which was published a couple of months ago:

OLD-TIMERS always marvel about how much Moscow has changed since the stultifying days of the Soviet Union. That's ancient history. What's really worth marveling about is how much the city has changed in the last year or two. Few places in the world have undergone such a rapid, dizzying and cacophonic transformation as Moscow, and it shows no sign of abating. The gangster Moscow of the 1990s has given way to something tamer, more metropolitan, perhaps, but it is still brash and flashy. The city, like Russia itself, seems to be in search of its identity — embracing the past, though often ironically, while plunging full-speed ahead. What the future holds is uncertain, but meantime, Muscovites are indulging in what an energy-fueled boom has bestowed on them.

Abkhazia goes for the gold?

A couple of weeks ago, I translated an article from Nezavisimaia Gazeta which is rather speculative but looked to be about some elements in the Russian government trying to use the award of the 2014 Winter Games to Sochi as an excuse to launder money in Abkhazia, raise the value of their investments there, or perhaps simply help out the separatists' cause. It ran in JRL, but I'm posting it here in lieu of more original content. The transition back to DC and impending parenthood are keeping me from spending my usual excessive amount of time online, which may be a good thing.

When word emerged that Sochi would be hosting the Games, I thought immediately about the repercussions for the conflict in Abkhazia, which is within spitting distance of Sochi. TOL's Steady State speculated that Sochi's hosting the 2014 Games might postpone resolution of the conflict until 2018, because there would be incentives to paper over differences and avoid potential flare-ups until the Games were over, and while I'd hope the opposite would be true and we could perhaps expect an accelerated, more focused approach to conflict resolution, their pessimistic guess is probably better than mine.

Anyway, here's the translation:

Svetlana Gamova
Abkhazia's Olympic Triumph
Nezavisimaia Gazeta, July 26, 2007

Russia to invest hundreds of millions of dollars in the unrecognized republic

Sochi's victory in the contest to host the 2014 Winter Olympics has opened previously unheard of prospects for neighboring Abkhazia. Russia is planning to place in the unrecognized republic key elements of the construction complex that will guarantee the erection of the Olympic infrastructure. The amounts of investment currently under discussion are in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Abkhazia's undeniable triumph could turn out to be quite costly for Russia itself – it complicates the already difficult relationship with Georgia and could lead to new problems with [Russia's] WTO accession.

As Abkhazia's Foreign Minister Sergei Shamba told NG yesterday, in order to supply the needs of the Olympic construction complex, new facilities will be built in Abkhazia to produce cement and bricks and to mine gravel. However, he had a hard time naming the total cost of Abkhazia's "Olympic" program, saying that this issue is currently being discussed within the governments of Moscow and the Russian Federation. At the same time, according to information on the Abkhazian government's website, the construction of a cement factory in Tkvarcheli, which is proposed under the program, will alone cost investors $170 million. And that's just one factory. According to Sergei Shamba, there are also plans to establish a gravel production facility in the Gudauta region and a brick factory in the Gul'ripshskii region of the republic.

The Abkhazian Minister [Shamba] summed up Sukhumi's plans as follows: "In short, Abhkazia has been included in the Olympic zone, and the Russian investments are linked to our hopes for the development of our economy."

According to Shamba, the investment proposals were prepared in Sukhumi and given to the Russian government some time ago, but "Moscow paid attention to them only once it became clear that Sochi would host the Olympics." He also stated that possible investments in Abkhazia's resort zone, adjacent to Sochi, are under discussion within the Russian government. "It's clear that the Olympics will attract a large number of visitors who can also be housed on our territory [u nas]." Overall, though, added Shamba, Abkhazia's participation in Russia's preparation for the Olympics is founded on simple calculations which show that it is cheaper to transport building materials to Sochi from various regions of Abkhazia than from, say, Novorossiisk.

The administration of the Federal Development Program for Sochi [Federal'naia tselevaia programma po razvitiiu Sochi] did not confirm to NG that Abkhazia had been officially included in the Russian Olympic zone. FDP press-secretary Dmitrii Nezdorovin noted that "the Federal Development Program does not provide for sites located on the territory of another country." However, the FDP is only one of the sources of funding for construction related to the Olympics. The placement of construction industry facilities in neighboring Abkhazia is being discussed at the highest levels in Russia. For example, last Thursday, Vice-Premier Aleksandr Zhukov openly stated that Abkhazia would become one of the suppliers for construction materials for Sochi. According to him, cement factories might be built in Abkhazia that would supply material for the construction of the Olympic Village.

Tbilisi has not yet responded officially to this happy news for Sukhumi. Nino Kadzhaia, Director of the Georgian Foreign Ministry's Department of Information and Press, told NG that "Georgia's foreign ministry has no comment for the time being on the Russian Vice-Premier's statement about investment in construction in Abkhazia." At the same time Georgian politicians are not concealing their disapproval. Konstantin Gabashvili, the Chairman of the Georgian Parliament's Committee on External Contacts, had the following to say to NG yesterday about the situation: "I would ask my Russian colleagues not to use the preparations for the Olympics in Sochi as an excuse to complicate Russo-Georgian relations. Investment is possible, but it shouldn't be done over Tbilisi's head. It is essential that everything be agreed with the government of Georgia, whose territorial integrity Russia officially acknowledges. Investment in Abkhazia which is not approved by the Georgian leadership is a direct basis for the deepening of the conflict and damages Russo-Georgian relations."

According to the leader of the political movement "By Ourselves" ["My sami"] Paata Davitaia, "The Russian government's decision to invest $170 million to build a cement factory in Tkvarcheli on the territory of Abkhazia is a blatant violation of several international agreements." The Georgian politician referred to, among others, the agreement of the heads of the CIS states of January 19, 1996, which refers to economic sanctions against Abkhazia. "Another question arises: what tax service will monitor the expenditure of these not insignificant sums? The Abkhazian tax service, which is for all intents and purposes illegal? The Russian tax service? But this is not in their jurisdiction. Perhaps the Georgian tax service, which doesn't monitor the situation on separatist Abkhazian territory? All of this looks like money laundering," concluded Davitaia.

Moscow Carnegie Center expert Aleksei Malashenko told NG that Aleksandr Zhukov's statement could have a negative impact on relations between Russia and Georgia. "We are giving yet another excuse for Georgia to raise a question about Russia's WTO accession," said the Malashenko. According to him, in the story about Abkhazia's participation in the construction of Olympic sites "there is an element of senselessness: if cement is needed, it can be bought from a legitimate company in a legitimate country."

Georgia's official protest was swift enough, published on the IHT website (in an AP story) on the same date as the article I translated:

"Any joint projects between Moscow and Abkhazia failing to take into account Georgian interests wouldn't only draw Georgia's negative reaction, but will call into doubt the rightfulness of the selection of the Olympics' site," Burdzhanadze said Thursday.

The story covering Georgia's outrage also suggested that Shamba was running out in front of the train with his statements about huge Russian investment in the region:

No Russian officials have put forward any plans to involve Abkhazia in preparations for the Sochi Olympics, but Sergei Shamba, the foreign minister in the separatist government of Abkhazia, told Georgian television Thursday that the region was eager to offer construction materials and labor.

Russia has since denied (through Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov) that involving Abkhazia in the preparations for the 2014 Games is "on the agenda." Furthermore, according to a post on this topic by cyxymu (heavily commented on, if you're interested in reading more about this and you read Russian), Gref (or at least his ministry) also denied that Russia has plans to invest in Abkhazia in connection with the Sochi Games. Cyxymu thinks this is a simple calculation - $170 million of investment in Abkhazia would lead to Russia losing a billion or more dollars a year by having its WTO membership blocked by Georgia.

Notwithstanding these denials and the above AP report, the statements coming from Russian officials have seemed as conflicted as Russia's long-term approach to settling the Abkhazian conflict:

There have been mixed signals coming from different levels of the Russian authorities on Abkhazia’s possible role in preparation for the Olympic Games in Sochi, which is less than 40 kilometers away from the breakaway region.

Moscow Mayor, Yuri Luzhkov, said on July 9 that it was difficult to imagine holding the Olympics in Sochi without the participation of “such a kind neighbor as Abkhazia.”

On July 19 Russian Vice-Premier Alexander Zhukov said that cement-producing factories could be built in Abkhazia to supply the construction of infrastructure in Sochi. [...]

On July 27, Russian ambassador to Georgia, Vyacheslav Kovalenko said although Moscow was interested in Abkhazia’s involvement “no one has ever said that Russia is going to do this without Georgia."

On the other hand, the same article that quoted those statements also quoted Abkhazian "president" Sergei Bagapsh as saying the potential investment from Russia was around $15 million, an order of magnitude less than the figure cited by Shamba in the Nezavisimaya Gazeta article.

It seems obvious that all of the conflicting statements flying around are a result of the divergent interests of elites, even within the same country or de facto country. Some Russian officials have huge investments in Abkhazia and feel strongly that it should be returned more firmly and officially into Russia's orbit. It's a different matter whether their views on this preceded their property holdings, but now anyone who holds property in Abkhazia which was acquired after the shooting war ended has a strong incentive to make sure that Georgian refugees (with their pesky claims to their homes) and rule from Tbilisi (which might contest some of the "privatization" or "leasing" of public property) do not return to Abkhazia.

The approach of the group of Russian elites who seek official economic engagement with Abkhazia, which includes Mayor Luzhkov and some Duma Deputies (some of whom also like to play on the populist potential of Abkhazia) seems to run counter to the views of others who might have other priorities and be willing to use Abkhazia as a bargaining chip to pursue them. There are cleavages in Abkhazia as well, between more Russia-oriented elites (indeed, some officials in the de facto Abkhazian government are current or former officers in the Russian security services) and those who value the small measure of independence Abkhazia has attained, remember Russia's willingness to blockade Abkhazia in the 1990s, and/or realize that some in Russia may be willing to sell Abkhazia down the river if the right incentives come along.

Courtesy of two recent posts by cyxymu (which is easily my favorite blog about Abkhazia) on "How Abkhazia is Being Sold Off" - here and here - here are a couple of articles on the hot topic (especially during resort season) of Abkhazian real estate from Izvestiia and Kommersant-Vlast' (the latter is titled "Подмосковный абхазский округ," or - roughly - "Moscow Suburban District of Abkhazia"). OK, that parentheses-laden sentence tells me I've lost the thread, and it's time to go back to reconnecting with DC - by which I mean baking in the near-record heat on my way to taking refuge from said heat in a movie theater.

[Update Aug 10] I've found a few links I'd saved back when I first translated this piece. They may not be so relevant, but here goes: Russian official (interestingly, the presidential property manager) denying that Abkhazia would pose a "threat" to the Sochi Games; a piece by Molly Corso citing "experts" suggesting that Sochi's getting the Games could "create yet another obstacle to the resolution" of the "frozen conflicts" in Georgia; and a Guardian Unlimited commentator opining about the significance of the decision to give the 2014 Games to Sochi in general.

[Update Aug 11] Vilhelm Konnander also had an interesting post about his first thoughts on learning of Sochi's getting the 2014 Winter Games.

Восток - дело тонкое*

This just goes to show that (to paraphrase Skynyrd) you can take the boy out of Russia, but you'll never take the Russia out' the boy. Rather than buying a porcelain Mao on Hong Kong's Hollywood Road, I found this overpriced (HK$300, bargained down from a truly outrageous HK$850) and rather anatomically incorrect porcelain Stalin (or, as some here who've seen him have dubbed him, "red-headed Mao with a moustache") in a somewhat more out-of-the-way tchotchke shop. I know that Soviet-sculpture-obsessed Rubashov will appreciate this.

Chinese Stalin - acquired in Hong Kong, July 2007.

*The origin of this phrase is this canonical movie, which has provided the title for at least one excellent blog.

Stalin in the Underground

Are London subway riders more intellectual than the Metro hordes in DC? That is one conclusion one might draw from some of the things advertised in the Tube here. In DC, I recall ads for defense contractors, HIV medication, living in Baltimore (!), health & auto insurance, fake-me-out college degree programs, and (to be fair) a number of other things, including books, albeit usually trashy romances or pulp thrillers. In London, I see ads for musicals and museums, along with, of course, ads for travel agents, movies, booze, insurance, plastic surgery & botox injections, etc. But what made me pose the question was seeing this series of ads a couple of times:

Stalin in the Underground, originally uploaded by lyndonk2.

The product being advertised is Simon Sebag Montefiore's book Young Stalin (to be released in October in the US). The ads are attention-getting; my only beef with them is that they - like the posters for the Borat movie - use a Cyrillic "Д" in place of the Latin letter "A". I've griped about the same type of offense being committed in a similar context in the past, and I still don't understand why publishers / advertisers do this. Can someone who doesn't read Russian enlighten me? Does the appearance of an out-of-place Cyrillic letter that sort of resembles the Latin letter it's replacing instill an air of compelling exoticism in the product being advertised?

"Cyber Attacks Explained"

I thought this was a nice, apolitical article about an incident (or would it better be called a phenomenon?) which I don't think I've yet seen discussed in politically neutral terms. Clinically discussing the technical aspects of what happened is a good antidote for the hysteria which has tended to envelop all online discussions of this topic that I've seen. Of course it's because the author's agenda has nothing to do with Russia or Estonia - rather, his goal seems to be the laudable one of raising consciousness about potential American vulnerabilities.

Cyber Attacks Explained
By James A. Lewis, Director, CSIS Technology and Public Policy Program
June 15, 2007

The small Baltic country of Estonia was the target of a series of cyber attacks in May 2007. These were "denial of service" attacks, where an attacker floods the target network with bogus messages, causing its servers (computers that serve as a hub in a network) to slow or shut down.

The attacks caused grave concern among NATO officials, in large part because, at first, Russia was blamed. This attribution was wrong, in the sense that the attacks were not launched from Russian government computers. Like many things in cyberspace, it was difficult to tell who was at the other end of the Internet. Attribution in the Estonia case was made even harder by the use of "botnets." Botnets—short for robot networks—are the big new thing in cyber crime. A cyber criminal takes remote control of a computer by surreptitiously loading software on it. Most consumers don’t know that their computers have been compromised. Some botnets are huge, using tens of thousands of computers around the world. Having these gigantic criminal networks simultaneously send thousands of messages every minute overburdened Estonian servers and caused them to crash.

Attacks, crashes, robots—sounds like a war—and many commentators saw this as the first "cyber war." This was, of course, completely erroneous. Botnets are used all the time—they are the source of most spam—and are nothing special for cyber crime. This was not the first time that a government had seen foreign protestors attack servers and Web sites with botnets, hacks, and graffiti. China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and the United States have seen similar attacks, albeit on a smaller scale.

Nor was the Russian government inept enough to leave a trail of e-mails leading back to the Kremlin. Though one Russian government computer was used in the attacks, that was because it had been captured and controlled in a botnet. This does not prove that the Russian government is innocent. Russian government agents could have used chat rooms and e-mail to incite patriotic Russian hackers and cyber criminals to batter Estonian networks as punishment for daring to move a statue of a Soviet soldier. Estonian police arrested one such hacker, an ethnic Russian and Estonian citizen. Again, this is standard stuff—intelligence agents inciting a protest or riot. The attacks on Estonia are better seen as cyber protests than as war, like demonstrators lying down in a capital’s streets to block traffic (only without the risk of being run over).

On the Estonian end, there was turmoil, but not collapse or terror. Since independence, Estonia has been a leader in "e-government," or service using the Internet. This made them more vulnerable, but it also made them prepared to work in cyberspace. The Estonians responded calmly and were able to restore key services to minimal levels within a few days. Parliament, the president’s office, the police, and the foreign ministry were the primary targets, along with Estonia’s largest bank. Some took the simple response of blocking messages coming from other countries—this reduced the attacks, although it kept Estonians on travel from accessing their bank accounts.

Denial of service is not the most dangerous form of attack. A serious attack would not have been as noisy but would have penetrated Estonian computers and databases and scrambled or erased the data. Making health records and bank accounts disappear would have been far more disruptive. The United States faces this kind of attack, and it is vulnerable—U.S. government networks are routinely penetrated. We have many more networks than Estonia. Many are secure. Others are not. Unfortunately, we do not know which is which. All will be made clear when it is our turn to be attacked, but it might be better to find and fix our vulnerable systems before this occurs.

The article in pdf format.

Yeltsinomics - or, old jokes are the best jokes

Following on from Boris Yeltsin's funeral,
our favourite story from a British journalist
who interviewed him:

Journalist: "So, President Yeltsin, how would
you describe the state of the Russian
economy in one word?"

Yeltsin: "Good".

Journalist: "Okay then Mr President, perhaps
you would describe it in more than one word?"

Yeltsin: "Ah, in that case - not good."


Thanks, MK!

A tale of two cities - three, actually

St. Pete & Moscow meet in London

The photo is from May 13, the day I arrived here.

More on Moldovans in Italy

A couple of months ago, I translated a comment on Alex Culiuc's blog which I found to be touching and revealing about the lives of Moldovan labor migrants. Since then, I've been meaning to translate a follow-up comment by the same person (here's the original), and I've finally gotten around to it:

...when I write about Moldova I get very emotional, because I don't understand why life is so difficult. On every corner in Italy there are Moldovans looking for work which they hope will make them some money and allow them to pay off their debts and send some money home to their children. Just today I was standing by a bank, and a strange woman walked up and greeted me. She asked me just one thing: "Do you know of any job at all, no matter what it pays, I'm sick of walking around outside and searching from morning until night," and she got teary-eyed, then she got embarrassed and left.

It's difficult when there's nothing I can do to help, it's difficult when I hear hurtful words about us, but those at home should know that there are lots of us here who work very hard and aren't ashamed to say we're from Moldova, and to tell people about our holy places; we cook our national dishes, and we pray all the time for our motherland.

I know lots of people who say that they are sick of being someone's slave and have gone home to their villages, because it is psychologically very difficult to always be a foreigner.

My friend is an Italian, and he always wants to learn something about my country, I'm happy that at least Europe is interested in us because of our girls. Because before, 10 years ago, no one even knew what side of the world we were from, but now, like they say, "whether they talk good or bad about you, at least they talk about you." [...she describes differences between Moldovans and Italians...]

I'm still quite young, and I have time to choose my way in life, but now I want to tell the people who want to come here that the land where you were born will always be in your soul. Best to you all, Ciao vi voglio sempre bene.

Another comment from Snejana, in which she summarizes an Italian's opinion and posts it in full (in Italian, which I can't translate and have omitted here):

Here are a few words from Italians who have visited Moldova. I don't know if you'll understand Italian, but I'll translate the most important part, which is that those who have been there a few times say that the situation is getting better; I want to believe this, too.

So do I, although I'm not sure it's true.

Old and New on Str. Cosmonautilor - Chisinau, Moldova, August 2006